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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/10214-0.txt b/10214-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8aec130 --- /dev/null +++ b/10214-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,3664 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 10214 *** + +INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY AND WRITINGS OF PLATO + +By + +THOMAS TAYLOR + + + + +"Philosophy," says Hierocles, "is the purification and perfection of human +life. It is the purification, indeed, from material irrationality, and the +mortal body; but the perfection, in consequence of being the resumption of +our proper felicity, and a reascent to the divine likeness. To effect these +two is the province of Virtue and Truth; the former exterminating the +immoderation of the passions; and the latter introducing the divine form to +those who are naturally adapted to its reception." + +Of philosophy thus defined, which may be compared to a luminous pyramid, +terminating in Deity, and having for its basis the rational soul of man +and its spontaneous unperverted conceptions,--of this philosophy, August, +magnificent, and divine, Plato may be justly called the primary leader +and hierophant, through whom, like the mystic light in the inmost +recesses of some sacred temple, it first shone forth with occult and +venerable splendour.[1] It may indeed be truly said of the whole of this +philosophy, that it is the greatest good which man can participate: for +if it purifies us from the defilements of the passions and assimilates us +to Divinity, it confers on us the proper felicity of our nature. Hence it +is easy to collect its pre-eminence to all other philosophies; to show +that where they oppose it, they are erroneous; that so far as they +contain any thing scientific they are allied to it; and that at best they +are but rivulets derived from this vast ocean of truth. + +------------------ +[1] In the mysteries a light of this kind shone forth from the adytum of +the temple in which they were exhibited. +------------------ + +To evince that the philosophy of Plato possesses this preeminence; that +its dignity and sublimity are unrivaled; that it is the parent of all +that ennobles man; and, that it is founded on principles, which neither +time can obliterate, nor sophistry subvert, is the principal design of +this Introduction. + +To effect this design, I shall in the first place present the reader with +the outlines of the principal dogmas of Plato's philosophy. The undertaking +is indeed no less novel than arduous, since the author of it has to tread +in paths which have been untrodden for upwards of a thousand years, and +to bring to light truths which for that extended period have been +concealed in Greek. Let not the reader, therefore, be surprised at the +solitariness of the paths through which I shall attempt to conduct him, +or at the novelty of the objects which will present themselves in the +journey: for perhaps he may fortunately recollect that he has traveled +the same road before, that the scenes were once familiar to him, and that +the country through which he is passing is his native land. At, least, if +his sight should be dim, and his memory oblivious, (for the objects which +he will meet with can only be seen by the most piercing eyes,) and his +absence from them has been lamentably long, let him implore the power +of wisdom, + + From mortal mists to purify his eyes, + That God and man he may distinctly see. + +Let us also, imploring the assistance of the same illuminating power, begin +the solitary journey. + +Of all the dogmas of Plato, that concerning the first principle of things +as far transcends in sublimity the doctrine of other philosophers of a +different sect, on this subject, as this supreme cause of all transcends +other causes. For, according to Plato, the highest God, whom in the +Republic he calls the good, and in the Parmenides the one, is not only +above soul and intellect, but is even superior to being itself. Hence, +since every thing which can in any respect be known, or of which any +thing can be asserted, must be connected with the universality of things, +but the first cause is above all things, it is very properly said by +Plato to be perfectly ineffable. The first hypothesis therefore of his, +Parmenides, in which all things are denied of this immense principle, +concludes as follows: "The one therefore is in no respect. So it seems. +Hence it is not in such a manner as to be one, for thus it would be +being, and participate of essence; but as it appears, the one neither is +one, nor is, if it be proper to believe in reasoning of this kind. It +appears so. But can any thing either belong to, or be affirmed of that, +which is not? How can it? Neither therefore does any name belong to it, +nor discourse, nor any science, nor sense, nor opinion. It does not +appear that there can. Hence it can neither be named, nor spoken of, nor +conceived by opinion, nor be known, nor perceived by any being. So it +seems." And here it must be observed that this conclusion respecting the +highest principle of things, that he is perfectly ineffable and +inconceivable, is the result of a most scientific series of negations, in +which not only all sensible and intellectual beings are denied of him, +but even natures the most transcendently allied to him, his first and +most divine progeny. For that which so eminently distinguishes the +philosophy of Plato from others is this, that every part of it is stamped +with the character of science. The vulgar indeed proclaim the Deity to be +ineffable; but as they have no scientific knowledge that he is so, this +is nothing more than a confused and indistinct perception of the most +sublime of all truths, like that of a thing seen between sleeping and +waking, like Phaeacia to Ulysses when sailing to his native land, + + That lay before him indistinct and vast, + Like a broad shield amid the watr'y waste. + +In short, an unscientific perception of the ineffable nature of the +Divinity resembles that of a man, who on surveying the heavens, should +assert of the altitude of its highest part, that it surpasses that of +the loftiest tree, and is therefore immeasurable. But to see this +scientifically, is like a survey of this highest part of the heavens by +the astronomer; for he by knowing the height of the media between us and +it, knows also scientifically that it transcends in altitude not only the +loftiest tree; but the summits of air and aether, the moon, and even the +sun itself. + +Let us therefore investigate what is the ascent to the ineffably, and +after what manner it is accomplished, according to Plato, from the last +of things, following the profound and most inquisitive Damascius as our +leader in this arduous investigation. Let our discourse also be common +to other principles, and to things proceeding from them to that which is +last, and let us, beginning from that which is perfectly effable and +known to sense, ascend too the ineffable, and establish in silence, as in +a port, the parturitions of truth concerning it. Let us then assume the +following axiom, in which as in a secure vehicle we may safely pass from +hence thither. I say, therefore, that the unindigent is naturally prior +to the indigent. For that which is in want of another is naturally +adapted from necessity to be subservient to that of which it is indigent. +But if they are mutually in want of each other, each being indigent of +the other in a different respect, neither of them will be the principle. +For the unindigent is most adapted to that which is truly the principle. +And if it is in want of any thing, according to this it will not be the +principle. It is however necessary that the principles should be this +very thing, the principle alone. The unindigent therefore pertains to +this, nor must it by any means be acknowledged that there is any thing +prior to it. This however, would be acknowledged if it had any connection +with the indigent. + +Let us then consider body, (that is, a triply extended substance,) endued +with quality; for this is the first thing effable by us, and is, sensible. +Is this then the principle of things? But it is two things, body, and +quality which is in body as a subject. Which of these therefore is by +nature prior? For both are indigent of their proper parts; and that also +which is in a subject is indigent of the subject. Shall we say then that +body itself is the principle of the first essence? But this is impossible. +For, in the first place, the principle will not receive any thing from that +which is posterior to itself. But body, we say is the recipient of quality. +Hence quality, and a subsistence in conjunction with it, are not derived +from body, since quality is present with body as something different. And, +in the second place, body is every way, divisible; its several parts are +indigent of each other, and the whole is indigent of all the parts. As it +is indigent, therefore, and receives its completion from things which are +indigent, it will not be entirely unindigent. + +Further still, if it is not one but united, it will require, as Plato +says, the connecting one. It is likewise something common and formless, +being as it were a certain matter. It requires, therefore, ornament and +the possession of form, that it may not be merely body, but a body with a +certain particular quality; as for instance, a fiery, or earthly, body, +and, in short, body adorned and invested with a particular quality. Hence +the things which accede to it, finish and adorn it. Is then that which +accedes the principle? But this is impossible. For it does not abide in +itself, nor does it subsist alone, but is in a subject of which also it +is indigent. If, however, some one should assert that body is not a +subject, but one of the elements in each, as for instance, animal in +horses and man, thus also each will be indigent of the other, viz. this +subject, and that which is in the subject; or rather the common element, +animal, and the peculiarities, as the rational and irrational, will be +indigent. For elements are always, indigent of each other, and that which +is composed from elements is indigent of the elements. In short, this +sensible nature, and which is so manifest to us, is neither body, for +this does not of itself move the senses, nor quality; for this does not +possess an interval commensurate with sense. Hence, that which is the +object of sight, is neither body nor color; but colored body, or color +corporalized, is that which is motive of the sight. And universally, that +which its sensible, which is body with a particular quality, is motive of +sense. From hence it is evident that the thing which excites the sense is +something incorporeal. For if it was body, it would not yet be the object +of sense. Body therefore requires that which is incorporeal, and that +which is incorporeal, body. For an incorporeal nature, is not of itself +sensible. It is, however, different from body, because these two possess +prerogatives different from each other, and neither of these subsists +prior to the other; but being elements of one sensible thing, they are +present with each other; the one imparting interval to that which is void +of interval, but the other introducing to that which is formless, +sensible variety invested with form. In the third place, neither are both +these together the principles; since they are not unindigent. For they +stand in need of their proper elements, and of that which conducts them +to the generation of one form. For body cannot effect this, since it is +of itself impotent; nor quality, since it is not able to subsist separate +from the body in which it is, or together with which it has its being. +The composite therefore either produces itself, which is impossible, for +it does not converge to itself, but the whole of it is multifariously +dispersed, or it is not produced by itself, and there is some other +principle prior to it. + +Let it then be supposed to be that which is called nature, being a +principle of motion and rest, in that which is moved and at rest, +essentially and not according to accident. For this is something more +simple, and is fabricative of composite forms. If, however, it is in the +things fabricated, and does not subsist separate from nor prior to them, +but stands in need of them for its being, it will not be unindigent; +though its possesses something transcendent with respect to them, viz. +the power of fashioning and fabricating them. For it has its being +together with them, and has in them an inseparable subsistence; so +that, when they are it is, and is not when they are not, and this in +consequence of perfectly verging to them, and not being able to sustain +that which is appropriate. For the power of increasing, nourishing, and +generating similars, and the one prior to these three, viz. nature, is +not wholly incorporeal, but is nearly a certain quality of body, from +which it alone differs, in that it imparts to the composite to be +inwardly moved and at rest. For the quality of that which is sensible +imparts that which is apparent in matter, and that which falls on sense. +But body imparts interval every way extended; and nature, an inwardly +proceeding natural energy, whether according to place only, or according +to nourishing, increasing, and generating things similar. Nature, +however, is inseparable from a subject, and is indigent, so that it will +not be in short the principle, since it is indigent of that which is +subordinate. For it will not be wonderful, if being a certain principle, +it is indigent of the principle above it; but it would be wonderful if it +were indigent of things posterior to itself, and of which it is supposed +to be the principle. + +By the like arguments we may show that the principle cannot be irrational +soul, whether sensitive, or orectic. For if it appears that it has +something separate, together with impulsive and Gnostic enemies, yet at +the same time it is bound in body, and has something inseparable from it; +since it is notable to convert itself to itself, but its enemy is mingled +with its subject. For it is evident that its essence is something of this +kind; since if it were liberated and in itself free, it would also evince +a certain independent enemy, and would not always be converted to body; +but sometimes it would be converted to itself; or though it were always +converted to body, yet it would judge and explore itself. The energies, +therefore, of the multitude of mankind, (though they are conversant with +externals,) yet, at the same time they exhibit that which is separate +about them. For they consult how they should engage in them, and observe +that deliberation is necessary, in order to effect or be passive to +apparent good, or to decline something of the contrary. But the impulses +of other animals are uniform and spontaneous, are moved together with the +sensible organs, and require the senses alone that they may obtain from +sensibles the pleasurable, and avoid the painful. If, therefore, the body +communicates in pleasure and pain, and is affected in a certain respect +by them, it is evident that the psychical energies, (i.e. energies +belonging to the soul) are exerted, mingled with bodies, and are not +purely psychical, but are also corporeal; for perception is of the +animated body, or of the soul corporalized, though in such perception the +psychical idiom predominates over the corporeal; just as in bodies, the +corporeal idiom has dominion according to interval and subsistence. As +the irrational soul, therefore, has its being in something different from +itself, so far it is indigent of the subordinate: but a thing of this +kind will not be the principle. + +Prior them to this essence, we see a certain form separate from a +subject, and converted to itself, such as is the rational nature. Our +soul, therefore, presides over its proper energies and corrects itself. +This, however, would not be the case, unless it was converted to itself; +and it would not be converted, to itself unless it had a separate +essence. It is not therefore indigent of the subordinate. Shall we then +say that it is the most perfect principle? But, it does not at once exert +all its energies, but is always indigent of the greater part. The +principle, however, wishes to have nothing indigent: but the rational +nature is an essence in want of its own energies. Some one, however, may +say that it is an eternal essence, and has never-failing essential +energies, always concurring with its essence, according to the self-moved +and ever vital, and that it is therefore unindigent; but the principle is +perfectly unindigent. Soul therefore, and which exerts mutable energies, +will not be the most proper principle. Hence it is necessary that there +should be something prior to this, which is in every respect immutable, +according to nature, life, and knowledge, and according to all powers and +enemies, such as we assert an eternal and immutable essence to be, and +such as is much honoured intellect, to which Aristotle having ascended, +thought he had discovered the first principle. For what can be wanting to +that which perfectly comprehends in itself its own plenitudes (oleromata), +and of which neither addition nor ablation changes any thing belonging to +it? Or is not this also, one and many, whole and parts, containing in +itself, things first, middle, and last? The subordinate plenitudes also +stand in need of the more excellent, and the more excellent of the +subordinate, and the whole of the parts. For the things related are +indigent of each other, and what are first of what are last, through the +same cause; for it is not of itself that which is first. Besides, the one +here is indigent of the many, because it has its subsistence in the many. +Or it may be said, that this one is collective of the many, and this not +by itself, but in conjunction with them. Hence there is much of the +indigent in this principle. For since intellect generates in itself its +proper plenitudes from which the whole at once receives its completion, +it will be itself indigent of itself, not only that which is generated of +that which generates, but also that which generates, of that which is +generated, in order to the whole completion of that which wholly generates +itself. Further still, intellect understands and is understood, is +intellective of and intelligible to itself, and both these. Hence the +intellectual is indigent of the intelligible, as of its proper object of +desire; and the intelligible is in want of the intellectual, because it +wishes to be the intelligible of it. Both also are indigent of either, +since the possession is always accompanied with indigence, in the same +manner as the world is always present with matter. Hence a certain +indigence is naturally coessentiallized with intellect, so that it cannot +be the most proper principle. Shall we, therefore, in the next place, +direct our attention to the most simple of beings, which Plato calls the +one being, [Greek: en on]? For as there is no separation there throughout +the Whole, nor any multitude, or order, or duplicity, or conversion to +itself, what indigence will there appear to me, in the perfectly united? +And especially what indigence will there be of that which is subordinate? +Hence the great Parmenides ascended to this most safe principle, as that +which is most unindigent. Is it not, however, here necessary to attend to +the conception of Plato, that the united is not the one itself, but that +which is passive[2] to it? And this being the case, it is evident that it +ranks after the one; for it is supposed to be the united and not the one +itself. If also being is composed from the elements bound and infinity, +as appears from the Philebus of Plato, where he calls it that which is +mixt, it will be indigent of its elements. Besides, if the conception of +being is different from that of being united, and that which is a whole +is both united and being, these will be indigent of each other, and the +whole which is called one being is indigent of the two. And though the +one in this is better than being, yet this is indigent of being, in order +to the subsistence of one being. But if being here supervenes the one, as +it were, form in that which is mixt and united, just as the idiom of man +in that which is collectively rational-mortal-animal, thus also the one +will be indigent of being. If, however, to speak more properly, the one +is two-fold; this being the cause of the mixture, and subsisting prior to +being, but that conferring rectitude, on being,--if this be the case, +neither will the indigent perfectly desert this nature. After all these, +it may be said that the one will be perfectly unindigent. For neither is +it indigent of that which is posterior to itself for its subsistence, +since the truly one is by itself separated from all things; nor is it +indigent of that which is inferior or more excellent in itself; for there +is nothing in it besides itself; nor is it in want of itself. But it is +one, because neither has it any duplicity with respect to itself. For not +even the relation of itself to itself must be asserted of the truly one; +since it is perfectly simple. This, therefore, is the most unindigent of +all things. Hence this is the principle and the cause of all; and this is +at once the first of all things. If these qualities, however, are present +with it, it will not be the one. Or may we not say that all things +subsist in the one according to the one? And that both these subsist in +it, and such other things as we predicate of it, as, for instance, the +most simple, the most excellent, the most powerful, the preserver of all +things, and the good itself? If these things, however, are thus true of +the one, it will thus also be indigent of things posterior to itself, +according to those very things which we add to it. For the principle is, +and is said to be the principle of things proceeding from it, and the +cause is the cause of things caused, and the first is the first of things +arranged, posterior to it.[3] + +------------------ +[2] See the Sophista of Plato, where this is asserted. + +[3] For a thing cannot be said to be a principle or cause without the +subsistence of the things of which it is the principle or cause. Hence, +so far as it is a principle or cause, it will be indigent of the +subsistence of these. +------------------ + +Further still, the simple subsists according to a transcendency of other +things, the most powerful according to power with relation to the subjects +of it; and the good, the desirable, and the preserving, are so called with +reference to things benefitted, preserved, and desiring. And if it should +be said to be all things according to the preassumption of all things in +itself, it will indeed be said to be so according to the one alone, and +will at the same time be the one cause of all things prior to all, and will +be thus, and no other according to the one. So far, therefore, as it is the +one alone, it will be unindigent; but so far as unindigent, it will be the +first principle, and stable root of all principles. So far, however, as it +is the principle and the first cause of all things, and is pre-established +as the object of desire to all things, so far it appears to be in a certain +respect indigent of the things to which it is related. It has therefore, if +it be lawful so to speak, an ultimate vestige of indigence, just as on the +contrary matter has an ultimate echo of the unindigent, or a most obscure +and debile impression of the one. And language indeed appears to be here +subverted. For so far as it is the one, it is also unindigent, since the +principle has appeared to subsist according to the most unindigent and the +one. At the same time, however, so far as it is the one, it is also the +principle; and so far as it is the one it is unindigent, but so far as the +principle, indigent. Hence so far as it is unindigent, it is also indigent, +though not according to the same; but with respect to being that which it +is, it is undigent; but as producing and comprehending other things in +itself, it is indigent. This, however, is the peculiarity of the one; so +that it is both unindigent and indigent according to the one. Not indeed +than it is each of these, in such a manner as we divide it in speaking of +it, but it is one alone; and according to this is both other things, and +that which is indigent. For how is it possible, it should not be indigent +also so far as it is the one? Just as it is all other things which proceed +from it. For the indigent also is, something belonging to all things. +Something else, therefore, must be investigated which in no respect has any +kind of indigence. But of a thing of this kind it cannot with truth be +asserted that it is the principle, nor can it even be said of it that it is +most unindigent, though this appears to be the most venerable of all +assertions.[4] + +--------------- +[4] See the extracts from Damascius in the additional notes to the third +volume, which contain an inestimable treasury of the most profound +conceptions concerning the ineffable. +------------------ + +For this signifies transcendency, and an exemption from the indigent. We do +not, however, think it proper to call this even the perfectly exempt; but +that which is in every respect incapable of being apprehended, and about +which we must be perfectly silent, will be the most, just axiom of our +conception in the present investigation; nor yet this as uttering any +thing, but as rejoicing in not uttering, and by this venerating that +immense unknown. This then is the mode of ascent to that which is called +the first, or rather to that which is beyond every thing which can be +conceived, or become the subject of hypothesis. + +There is also another mode, which does not place the unindigent before +the indigent, but considers that which is indigent of a more excellent +nature, as subsisting secondary to that which is more excellent. Every +where then, that which is in capacity is secondary to that which is in +energy. For that it may proceed into energy, and that it may not remain +in capacity in vain, it requires that which is in energy. For the more +excellent never blossoms from the subordinate nature. Let this then be +defined by us according to common unperverted conceptions. Matter +therefore has prior to itself material form; because all matter is form +in capacity, whether it be the first matter which is perfectly formless, +or the second which subsists according to body void of quality, or in +other words mere triple extension, to which it is likely those directed +their attention who first investigated sensibles, and which at first +appeared to be the only thing that had a subsistence. For the existence +of that which is common in the different elements, persuaded them that +there is a certain body void of quality. But since, among bodies of this +kind, some possess the governing principle inwardly, and others +externally, such as things artificial, it is necessary besides quality to +direct our attention to nature, as being something better than qualities, +and which is prearranged in the order of cause, as art is, of things +artificial. Of things, however, which are inwardly governed, some appear +to possess being alone, but others to be nourished and increased, and to +generate things similar to themselves. There is therefore another certain +cause prior to the above-mentioned nature, viz. a vegetable power itself. +But it is evident that all such things as are ingenerated in body as in a +subject, are of themselves incorporeal, though they become corporeal by +the participation of that in which they subsist, so that they are said +to be and are material in consequence of what they suffer from matter. +Qualities therefore, and still more natures, and in a still greater +degree the vegetable life, preserve the incorporeal in themselves. Since +however, sense exhibits another more conspicuous life, pertaining to +beings which are moved according to impulse and place, this must be +established prior to that, as being a more proper principle, and as the +supplier of a certain better form, that of a self-moved animal, and which +naturally precedes plants rooted in the earth. The animal however, is not +accurately self-moved. For the whole is not such throughout they whole; +but a part moves and a part is moved. This therefore is the apparent +self-moved. Hence, prior to this it is necessary there should be that +which is truly self-moved, and which according to the whole of itself +moves ands is moved, that the apparently self-moved may be the image of +this. And indeed the soul which moves the body must be considered as a +more proper self-moved essence. This, however, is twofold, the one +rational, the other irrational. For that there is a rational soul is +evident: or has not every one a cosensation of himself, more clear or +more obscure, when converted to himself in the attentions to and +investigations of himself, and in the vital and Gnostic animadversions of +himself? For the essence which is capable of this, and which can collect +universals by reasoning, will very justly be rational. The irrational +soul also, though it does not appear to investigate these things, and to +reason with itself, yet at the same time it moves bodies from place to +place, being itself previously moved from itself; for at different times +it exerts a different impulse. Does it therefore move itself from one +impulse to another? or it is moved by something else, as, for instance, +by the whole rational soul in the universe? But it would be absurd to say +that the energies of every irrational soul are not the energies of that +soul, but of one more divine; since they are infinite, and mingled with +much of the base and imperfect. For this would be just the same as to say +that the irrational enemies are the energies of the rational soul. I omit +to mention the absurdity of supposing that the whole essence is not +generative of its proper energies. For if the irrational soul is a +certain essence, it will have peculiar energies of its own, not imparted +from something else, but proceeding from itself. This irrational soul, +therefore, will also move itself at different times to different impulses. +But if it moves itself, it will be converted to itself. If, however, this +be the case, it will have a separate subsistence, and will not be in a +subject. It is therefore rational, if it looks to itself: for in being +converted to, it surveys itself. For when extended to things external, it +looks to externals, or rather it looks to colored body, but does not see +itself, because sight itself is neither body nor that which is colored. +Hence it does not revert to itself. Neither therefore is this the case +with any other irrational nature. For neither does the phantasy project a +type of itself, but of that which is sensible, as for instance of colored +body. Nor does irrational appetite desire itself, but aspires after a +certain object of desire, such as honor, or pleasure, or riches. It does +not therefore move itself. + +But if some one, on seeing that brutes exert rational energies, should +apprehend that these also participate of the first self-moved, and on +this account possess a soul converted to itself, it may perhaps be +granted to him that these also are rational natures, except that they +are not so essentially, but according to participation, and this most +obscure, just as the rational soul may be said to be intellectual +according to participation, as always projecting common conceptions +without distortion. It must however be observed, that the extreme are +that which is capable of being perfectly separated, such as the rational +form, and that which is perfectly inseparable, such as corporeal quality, +and that in the middle of these nature subsists, which verges to the +inseparable, having a small representation of the separable and the +irrational soul, which verges to the separable; or it appears in a +certain respect to subsist by itself, separate from a subject; so that +it becomes doubtful whether it is self-motive, or alter-motive. For it +contains an abundant vestige of self-motion, but not that which is true +and converted to itself, and on this account perfectly separated from +a subject. And the vegetable soul has in a certain respect a middle +subsistence. On this account to some of the ancients it appeared to be +a certain soul, but to others, nature. + +Again, therefore, that we may return to the proposed object of +investigation, how can a self-motive nature of this kind, which is +mingled with the alter-motive, be the first principle of things? For +it neither subsists from itself, nor does it in reality perfect itself; +but it requires a certain other nature, both for its subsistence and +perfection: and prior to it is that which is truly self-moved. Is +therefore that which is properly self-moved the principle, and is it +indigent of no form more excellent than itself? Or is not that which +moves always naturally prior to that which is moved; and in short does +not every form which is pure from its contrary subsist by itself prior +to that which is mingled with it? And is not the pure the cause of the +commingled? For that which is coessentialized with another has also an +energy mingled with that other. So that a self-moved nature will indeed, +make itself; but thus subsisting it will be at the same time moving and +moved, but will not be made a moving nature only. For neither is it this +alone. Every form however is always alone according to its first +subsistence; so that there will be that which moves only without being +moved. And indeed it would be absurd that there should be that which is +moved only such as body, but that prior both to that which is self-moved +and that which is moved only, there should not be that which moves only. +For it is evident that there must be, since this will be a more excellent +nature, and that which is self-moved, so far as it moves itself, is more +excellent than so far as it is moved. It is necessary therefore that the +essence which moves unmoved, should be first, as that which is moved, not +being motive, is the third, in the middle of which is the self-moved, +which we say requires that which moves in order to its becoming motive. +In short, if it is moved, it will not abide, so far as it is moved; and +if it moves, it is necessary it should remain moving so far as it moves. +Whence then does it derive the power of abiding? For from itself it +derives the power either of being moved only, or of at the same time +abiding and being moved wholly according to the same. Whence then does +it simply obtain the power of abiding? Certainly from that which simply +abides. But, this is an immovable cause. We must therefore admit that +the immovable is prior to the self moved. Let us consider then if the +immovable is the most proper principle? But how is this possible? For the +immovable contains as numerous a multitude immovably; as the self-moved +self-moveably. Besides an immovable separation must necessarily subsist +prior to a self-moveable separation. The unmoved therefore is at the same +time one and many, and is at the same time united and separated, and a +nature of this kind is denominated intellect. But it is evident that +the united in this is naturally prior to and more honorable than the +separated. For separation is always indigent of union; but not, on the +contrary, union of separation. Intellect, however, has not the united +pure from its opposite. For intellectual form is coessentialized with the +separated, through the whole of itself. Hence that which is in a certain +respect united requires that which is simply united; and that which +subsists with another is indigent of that which subsists by itself; and +that which subsists according to participation, of that which subsists +according to essence. For intellect being self-subsistent produces itself +as united, and at the same time separated. Hence it subsists according to +both these. It is produced therefore from that which is simply united and +alone united. Prior therefore to that which is formal is the +uncircumscribed, and undistributed into forms. And this is that which we +call the united, and which the wise men of antiquity denominated being, +possessing in one contraction multitude, subsisting prior to the many. + +Having therefore arrived thus far, let us here rest for a while, and +consider with ourselves, whether being is the investigated principle of +all things. For what will there be which does not participate of being? +May we not say, that this, if it is the united, will be secondary to the +one, and that by participating of the one it becomes the united? But in +short; if we conceive the one to be something different from being, if +being is prior to the one, it will not participate of the one. It will +therefore be many only, and these will be infinitely infinite. But if the +one is with being, and being with the one, and they are either coordinate +or divided from each other, there will be two principles, and the +above-mentioned absurdity will happen. Or they will mutually participate +of each other, and there will be two elements. Or they are parts of +something else, consisting from both. And, if this be the case, what will +that be which leads them to union with each other? For if the one unites +being to itself (for this may be said), the one also will energize prior +to being, that it may call forth and convert being to itself. The one, +therefore, will subsist from itself self-perfect prior to being. Further +still, the more simple is always prior to the more composite. If +therefore they are similarly simple, there will either be two principles, +or one from the two, and this will be a composite. Hence the simple and +perfectly incomposite is prior to this, which must be either one, or not +one; and if not one, it must either be many, or nothing. But with respect +to nothing, if it signifies that which is perfectly void, it will signify +something vain. But if it signifies the arcane, this will not even be +that which is simple. In short, we cannot conceive any principle more +simple than the one. The one therefore is in every respect prior to +being. Hence this is the principle of all things, and Plato recurring to +this, did not require any other principle in his reasonings. For the +arcane in which this our ascent terminates is not the principle of +reasoning, nor of knowledge, nor of animals, nor of beings, nor of +unities, but simply of all things, being arranged above every conception +and suspicion that we can frame. Hence Plato indicates nothing concerning +it, but makes his negations of all other things except the one, from the +one. For that the one is he denies in the last place, but he does not +make a negation of the one. He also, besides this, even denies this +negation, but not the one. He denies, too, name and conception, and all +knowledge, and what can be said more, whole itself and every being. But +let there be the united and the unical, and, if you will, the two +principles bound and the infinite. Plato, however, never in any respect +makes a negation of the one which is beyond all these. Hence in the +Sophista he considers it as the one prior to being, and in the Republic +as the good beyond every essence; but at the same time the one alone is +left. Whether however is it known and effable, or unknown and ineffable? +Or is it in a certain respect these, and in a certain respect not? For by +a negation of this it may be said the ineffable is affirmed. And again, +by the simplicity of knowledge it will be known or suspected, but by +composition perfectly unknown. Hence neither will it be apprehended by +negation. And in short, so far as it is admitted to be one, so far it +will be coarranged with other things, which are the subject of position. +For it is the summit of things, which subsist according to position. At +the same time there is much in it of the ineffable and unknown, the +uncoordinated, and that which is deprived of position, but these are +accompanied with a representation of the Contraries: and the former are +more excellent, than the latter. But every where things pure subsist +prior to their contraries, and such as are unmingled to the commingled. +For either things more excellent subsist in the one essentially, and in a +certain respect the contraries of these also will be there at the same +time; or they subsist according to participation, and are derived from +that which is first a thing of this kind. Prior to the one, therefore, is +that which is simply and perfectly ineffable, without position, +uncoordinated, and incapable of being apprehended, to which also the +ascent of the present discourse hastens through the clearest indications, +omitting none of those natures between the first and the last of things. + +Such then is the ascent to the highest God, according to the theology of +Plato, venerably preserving his ineffable exemption from all things, and +his transcendency, which cannot be circumscribed by any gnostic energy, +and at the same time, unfolding the paths which lead upwards to him, and +enkindling that luminous summit of the soul, by which she is conjoined +with the incomprehensible one. + +From this truly ineffable principle, exempt from all essence, power, and +energy, a multitude of divine natures, according to Plato, immediately +proceeds. That this must necessarily be the case, will be admitted by the +reader who understands what has been already discussed, and is fully +demonstrated by Plato in the Parmenides, as will be evident to the +intelligent from the notes on that Dialogue. In addition therefore to +what I have staid on this subject, I shall further observe at present +that this doctrine, which is founded in the sublimest and most scientific +conceptions of the human mind, may be clearly shown to be a legitimate +dogma of Plato from what is asserted by him in the sixth book of his +Republic. For he there affirms, in the most clear and unequivocal terms, +that the good, or the ineffable principle of things is superessential, +and shows by the analogy of the sun to the good, that what light and +sight are in the visible, that truth and intelligence are in the +intelligible world. As light therefore, immediately proceeds from the +sun, and wholly subsists according to a solar idiom or property, so truth +or the immediate progeny of the good, must subsist according to a +superessential idiom. And as the good, according to Plato, is the same +with the one, as is evident from the Parmenides, the immediate progeny of +the one will be the same as that of the good. But, the immediate +offspring of the one cannot be any thing else than unities. And, hence we +necessarily infer that according to Plato, the immediate offspring of the +ineffable principle of things are superessential unities. They differ +however from their immense principle in this, that he is superessential +and ineffable, without any addition; but this divine multitude is +participated by the several orders of being, which are suspended from and +produced by it. Hence, in consequence of being connected with multitude +through this participation, they are necessarily subordinate to the one. + +No less admirably, therefore, than Platonically does Simplicius, in his +Commentary of Epictetus, observe on this subject as follows: "The +fountain and principle of all things is the good: for that which all +things desire, and to which all things are extended, is the principle and +the end of all things. The good also produces from itself all things, +first, middle, and last. But it produces such as are first and proximate +to itself, similar to itself; one goodness, many goodnesses, one +simplicity and unity which transcends all others, many, unities, and one +principle many principles. For the one, the principle, the good, and +deity, are the same: for deity is the first and the cause of all things. +But it is necessary that the first should also be most simple; since +whatever is a composite and has multitude is posterior to the one. And +multitude and things, which are not good desire the good as being above +them: and in short, that which is not itself the principle is from the +principle. + +But it is also necessary that the principle of all things should possess +the highest, and all, power. For the amplitude of power consists in +producing all things from itself, and in giving subsistence to similars, +prior to things which are dissimilar. Hence the one principle produces +many principles, many simplicities, and many goodnesses, proximately from +itself. For since all things differ from each other, and are multiplied +with their proper differences, each of these multitudes is suspended from +its one proper principle. Thus, for instance, all beautiful things, +whatever and wherever they may be, whether in souls or in bodies, are +suspended from one fountain of beauty. Thus too, whatever possesses +symmetry, and whatever is true, and all principles, are in a certain +respect, connate with the first principle, so far as they are principles +and fountains and goodnesses, with an appropriate subjection and analogy. +For what the one principle is to all beings, that each of the other +principles is to the multitude comprehended under the idiom of its +principle. For it is impossible, since each multitude is characterized +by a certain difference, that it should not be extended to its proper +principle, which illuminates one and the same form to all the individuals +of that multitude. For the one is the leader of every multitude; and +every peculiarity or idiom in the many is derived to the many from the +one. All partial principles therefore are established in that principle +which ranks as a whole, and are comprehended in it, not with interval and +multitude, but as parts in the whole, as multitude in the one, and number +in the monad. For this first principle is all things prior to all: and +many principles are multiplied about the one principle, and in the one +goodness, many goodnesses are established. This too, is not a certain +principle like each of the rest: for of these, one is the principle of +beauty, another of symmetry, another of truth, and another of something +else, but it is simply principle. Nor is it simply the principles of +beings, but it is the principle of principles. For it is necessary that +the idiom of principle, after the same manner as other things, should not +begin from multitude, but should be collected into one monad as a summit, +and which is the principle of principles. + +Such things therefore as are first produced by the first good, in +consequence of being connascent with it, do not recede from essential +goodness, since they are immovable and unchanged, and are eternally +established in the same blessedness. They are likewise not indigent of +the good, because they are goodnesses themselves. All other natures +however, being produced by the one good, and many goodnesses, since they +fall off from essential goodness, and are not immovably established in +the hyparxis of divine goodness, on this account they possess the good +according to participation." + +From this sublime theory the meaning of that ancient Egyptian dogma, that +God is all things, is at once apparent. For the first principle,[6] as +Simplicius in the above passage justly observes, is all things prior +to all; i.e. he comprehends all things causally, this being the most +transcendent mode of comprehension. As all things therefore, considered +as subsisting causally in deity, are transcendently more excellent than +they are when considered as effects preceding from him, hence that mighty +and all-comprehending whole, the first principle, is said to be all +things prior to all; priority here denoting exempt transcendency. As the +monad and the centre of a circle are images from their simplicity of this +greatest of principles, so likewise do they perspicuously shadow forth +to us its causal comprehension of all things. For all number may be +considered as subsisting occultly in the monad, and the circle in the +centre; this occult being the same in each with causal subsistence. + +----------------- +[6] By the first principle here, the one is to be understood for that +arcane nature which is beyond the one, since all language is subverted +about it, can only, as we have already observed, be conceived and +venerated in the most profound silence. +----------------- + +That this conception of causal subsistence is not an hypothesis devised +by the latter Platonists, but a genuine dogma of Plato, is evident from +what he says in the Philebus: for in that Dialogue he expressly asserts +that in Jupiter a royal intellect, and a royal soul subsist according to +cause. Pherecydes Syrus, too, in his Hymn to Jupiter, as cited by Kercher +(in Oedip. Egyptiac.), has the following lines: +[Greek: + O theos esti kuklos, tetragonos ede trigonos, + Keinos de gramme, kentron, kai panta pro panton.] + +i.e. Jove is a circle, triangle and square, centre and line, and all things +before all. From which testimonies the antiquity of this sublime doctrine +is sufficiently apparent. + +And here it is necessary to observe that nearly all philosophers: prior +to Jamblichus (as we are informed by Damascius) asserted indeed, that +there is one superessential God, but that the other gods had an essential +subsistence, and were deified by illuminations from the one. They +likewise said that there is a multitude of super-essential unities, who +are not self-perfect subsistences, but illuminated unions with deity, +imparted to essences by the highest Gods. That this hypothesis, however, +is not conformable to the doctrine of Plato is evident from his +Parmenides, in which he shows that the one does not subsist in itself. +(See vol. iii, p. 133). For as we have observed from Proclus, in the +notes on that Dialogue, every thing which is the cause of itself and is +self-subsistent, is said to be in itself. Hence as producing power +always comprehends, according to cause that which it produces, it is +necessary that whatever produces itself should comprehend itself so far +as it is a cause, and should be comprehended by itself so far as it is +caused; and that it should be at once both cause and the thing caused, +that which comprehends, and that which is comprehended. If therefore a +subsistence in another signifies, according to Plato, the being produced +by another more excellent cause (as we have shown in the note to p. 133, +vol. iii), a subsistence in itself must signify that which is self- +begotten, and produced by itself. If the one therefore is not self-sub- +sistent as even transcending this mode of subsistence, and if it be +necessary that there should be something self-subsistent, it follows +that this must be the characteristic property of that which immediately +proceeds from the ineffable. But that there must be something self- +subsistent is evident, since unless this is admitted there will not +be a true sufficiency in any thing. + +Besides, as Damascius well observes, if that which is subordinate by +nature is self-perfect, such as the human soul, much more will this be the +case with a divine soul. But if with soul, this also will be true of +intellect. And if it be true of intellect, it will also be true of life: if +of life, of being likewise; and if of being, of the unities above being. +For the self-perfect, the self-sufficient, and that which is established in +itself, will much more subsist in superior than in subordinate natures. If +therefore, these are in the latter, they will also be in the former. I mean +the subsistence of a thing by itself, and essentialized in itself; and such +are essence and life, intellect, soul, and body. For body, though it does +not subsist from, yet subsists by itself; and through this belongs to the +genus of substance, and is contra-distinguished from accident, which cannot +exist independent of a subject. + +Self-subsistent superessential natures therefore are the immediate +progeny of the one, if it be lawful thus to denominate things, which +ought rather to be called ineffable unfoldings into light from the +ineffable; for progeny implies a producing cause, and the one must be +conceived as something even more excellent than this. From this divine +self-perfect and self-producing multitude, a series of self-perfect +natures, viz. of beings, lives, intellects, and souls proceeds, according +to Plato, in the last link of which luminous series he also classes the +human soul; proximately suspended from the daemoniacal order: for this +order, as he clearly asserts in the Banquet, "stands in the middle rank +between the divine and human, fills up the vacant space, and links +together all intelligent nature." And here to the reader, who has not +penetrated the depths of Plato's philosophy, it will doubtless appear +paradoxical in the extreme, that any being should be said to produce +itself, and yet at the same time proceed from a superior cause. The +solution of this difficulty is as follows:--Essential production, or that +energy through which any nature produces something else by its very +being, is the most perfect mode of production, because vestiges of it are +seen in the last of things; thus fire imparts heat, by its very essence, +and snow coldness. And in short, this is a producing of that kind, in +which the effect is that secondarily which the cause is primarily. As +this mode of production therefore, from its being the most perfect of all +others, originates from the highest natures, it will consequently first +belong to those self-subsistent powers, who immediately proceed from the +ineffable, and will from them be derived to all the following orders of +beings. But this energy, as being characterized by the essential, will +necessarily be different in different producing causes. Hence, from that +which subsists, at the summit of self subsistent natures, a series of +self subsisting beings will indeed proceed, but then this series will be +secondarily that which its cause is primarily, and the energy by which it +produces itself will be secondary to that by which it is produced by its +cause. Thus, for instance, the rational soul both produces itself (in +consequence of being a self-motive nature), and is produced by intellect; +but it is produced by intellect immutably, and by itself transitively; +for all its energies subsist in time, and are accompanied with motion. So +far therefore as soul contains intellect by participation, so far it is +produced by intellect, but so far as it is self-motive it is produced by +itself. In short, with respect to every thing self-subsistent, the summit +of its nature is produced by a superior cause, but the evolution of that +summit is its own spontaneous energy; and, through this it becomes +self-subsistent, and self-perfect. + +That the rational soul, indeed, so far as it is rational, produces +itself, may be clearly demonstrated as follows:--That which is able to +impart any thing superior and more excellent in any genus of things, can +easily impart that which is subordinate and less excellent in the same +genus; but well being confessedly ranks higher and is more excellent than +mere being. The rational soul imparts well being to itself, when it +cultivates and perfects itself, and recalls and withdraws itself from the +contagion of the body. It will therefore also impart being to itself. And +this with great propriety; for all divine natures, and such things as +possess the ability of imparting any thing primarily to others, +necessarily begin this energy from themselves. Of this mighty truth the +sun himself is an illustrious example; for he illuminates all things with +his light, and is himself light, and the fountain and origin of all +splendour. Hence, since the souls imparts life and motion to other +things, on which account Aristotle calls an animal antokincton, self- +moved, it will much more, and by a much greater priority, impart life and +motion to itself. + +From this magnificent, sublime, and most scientific doctrine of Plato, +respecting the arcane principle of things and his immediate progeny, it +follows that this ineffable cause is not the immediate maker of the +universe, and this, as I have observed in the Introduction to the Timaeus, +not through any defect, but on the contrary through transcendency of power. +All things indeed are ineffably unfolded from him at once, into light; but +divine media are necessary to the fabrication of the world. For if the +universe was immediately produced from the ineffable, it would, agreeably +to what we have above observed, be ineffable also in a secondary degree. +But as this is by no means the case, it principally derives its immediate +subsistence from a deity of a fabricative characteristic, whom Plato calls +Jupiter, conformably to the theology of Orpheus. The intelligent reader +will readily admit that this dogmas is so far from being derogatory to the +dignity of the Supreme, that on the contrary it exalts that dignity, and, +preserves in a becoming manner the exempt transcendency of the ineffable. +If therefore we presume to celebrate him, for as we have already observed, +it is more becoming to establish in silence those parturitions of the soul +which dare anxiously to explore him, we should celebrate him as the +principle of principles, and the fountain of deity, or in the reverential +language of the Egyptians, as a darkness thrice unknown.[7] Highly laudable +indeed, and worthy the imitation of all posterity, is the veneration which +the great ancients paid to this immense principle. This I have already +noticed in the Introduction to the Parmenides, and I shall only observe at +present in addition, that in consequence of this profound and most pious +reverence of the first God, they did not even venture to give a name to +the summit of that highest order of divinities which is denominated +intelligible. Hence, says Proclus, in his Mss. Scholia on the Cratylus, +"Not every genus of the gods has an appellation; for with respect to the +first Deity, who is beyond all things, Parmenides teaches us that he is +ineffable; and the first genera of the intelligible gods, who are united to +the one, and are called occult, have much of the unknown and ineffable. For +that which is perfectly effable cannot be conjoined with the perfectly +ineffable; but it is necessary that the progression of intelligibles should +terminate in this order, in which the first effable subsists, and that +which is called by proper names. For there the first intelligible forms, +and the intellectual nature of intelligibles, are unfolded into light. +But, the natures prior to this being silent and occult, are only known +by intelligence. Hence the whole of the telestic science energizing +theurgically ascends as far as to this order. Orpheus also says that this +is first called by a name by the other gods; for the light proceeding from +it is known to and denominated by the intellectual gods." + +----------------- +[7] Psalm xviii:11; xcvii:2. +----------------- + +With no less magnificence therefore than piety, does Proclus thus speak +concerning the ineffable principle of things. "Let us now if ever remove +from ourselves multiform knowledge, exterminate all the variety of life, +and in perfect quiet approach near to the cause of all things. For this +purpose, let not only opinion and phantasy be at rest, nor the passions +alone which impede our anagogic impulse to the first be at peace; but let +the air, and the universe itself, be still. And let all things extend us +with a tranquil power to communion with the ineffable. Let us also +standing there, having transcended the intelligible (if we contain any +thing of this kind), and with nearly closed eyes adoring as it were the +rising sun, since it is not lawful for any being whatever intently to +behold him,--let us survey the sun whence the light of the intelligible +gods proceeds, emerging, as the poets say, from the bosom of the ocean; +and again from this divine tranquillity descending into intellect, and +from intellect employing the reasonings of the soul, let us relate to +ourselves what the natures are from which in this progression we shall +consider the first God as exempt. And let us as it were celebrate him, +not as establishing the earth and the heavens, nor as giving subsistence +to souls, and the generations of all animals; for he produced these +indeed, but among the last of things. But prior to these, let us +celebrate him as unfolding into light the whole intelligible and +intellectual genus of gods, together with all the supermundane and +mundane divinities as, the God of all gods, the Unity of all unities, +and beyond the first adyta--as more ineffable than all silence, and more +unknown than all essence,--as holy among the holies, and concealed in +the intelligible gods." Such is the piety, such the sublimity, and +magnificence of conception, with which the Platonic philosophers speak of +that which is in reality in every respect ineffable, when they presume to +speak about it, extending the ineffable parturitions of the soul to the +ineffable cosensation of the incomprehensible one. + +From this sublime veneration of this most awful nature, which, as is +noticed in the extracts from Damascius, induced the most ancient +theologists, philosophers, and poets, to be entirely silent concerning +it, arose the great reverence which the ancients paid to the divinities +even of a mundane characteristic, or from whom bodies are suspended, +considering them also as partaking of the nature of the ineffable, and as +so many links of the truly golden chain of deity. Hence we find in the +Odyssey, when Ulysses and Telemachus are removing the arms from the walls +of the palace of Ithaca, and Minerva going before them with her golden +lamp fills all the place with a divine light, +[Greek: + . . . . . paroithe de pallas Athene +Chryseon lychnon echrusa phars perikalles epoiei.] + +Before thee Pallas Athene bore a golden cresset and cast a most lovely +light. Telemachus having observed that certainly some one of the celestial +gods was present, +[Greek: + Emala tis deos endon, of ouranon euryn echousi.] + +Verily some God is within, of those that hold the wide heaven. Ulysses +says in reply, "Be silent, restrain your intellect (i.e. even cease to +energize intellectually), and speak not." +[Greek: + Siga, kai kata son noon ischana, med' ereeine.] + +Hold thy peace and keep all this in thine heart and ask not hereof. +--Book 19, Odyssey. + +Lastly, from all that has been said, it must, I think, be immediately +obvious to every one whose mental eye is not entirely blinded, that there +can be no such thing as a trinity in the theology of Plato, in any respect +analogous to the Christian Trinity. For the highest God, according to +Plato, as we have largely shown from irresistible evidence, is so far from +being a part of a consubsistent triad, that he is not to be connumerated +with any thing; but is so perfectly exempt from all multitude, that he is +even beyond being; and he so ineffably transcends all relation and +habitude, that language is in reality subverted about him, and knowledge +refunded into ignorance. What that trinity however is in the theology of +Plato, which doubtless gave birth to the Christian, will be evident to the +intelligent from the notes on the Parmenides, and the extracts, from +Damascius. And thus much for the doctrine of Plato concerning the principle +of things, and his immediate offspring, the great importance of which will, +I doubt not, be a sufficient apology for the length of this discussion. + +In the next place, following Proclus and Olympiodorus as our guides, let us +consider the mode according to which Plato teaches us mystic conceptions of +divine natures: for he appears not to have pursued every where the same +mode of doctrine about these; but sometimes according to a divinely +inspired energy, and at other times dialectically, he evolves the truth +concerning them. And sometimes he symbolically announces their ineffable +idioms, but at other times he recurs to them from images, and discovers in +them the primary causes of wholes. For in the Phaedrus being evidently +inspired, and having exchanged human intelligence for a better possession, +divine mania, he unfolds many arcane dogmas concerning the intellectual, +liberated, and mundane gods. But in the Sophista dialectically contending +about being, and the subsistence of the one above beings, and doubting +against philosophers more ancient than himself, he shows how all beings are +suspended from their cause and the first being, but that being itself +participates of that unity which is exempt from all things, that it is a +passive,[8] one, but not the one itself, being subject to and united to the +one, but not being that which is primarily one. In a similar manner too, in +the Parmenides, he unfolds dialectically the progressions of being from the +one, through the first hypothesis of that dialogue, and this, as he there +asserts, according to the most perfect division of this method. And again +in the Gorgias, he relates the fable concerning the three fabricators, and +their demiurgic allotment. But in the Banquet he speaks concerning the +union of love; and in the Protagoras, about the distribution of mortal +animals from the gods; in a symbolical manner concealing the truth +concerning divine natures, and as far as to mere indication unfolding his +mind to the most genuine of his readers. + +----------------- +[8] It is necessary to observe, that, according to Plato, whatever +participates of any thing is said to be passive to that which it +participates, and the participations themselves are called by him passions. +----------------- + +Again, if it be necessary to mention the doctrine delivered through the +mathematical disciplines, and the discussion of divine concerns from +ethical or physical discourses, of which many may be contemplated in the +Timaeus, many in the dialogue called Politicus, and many may be seen +scattered in other dialogues; here likewise, to those who are desirous of +knowing divine concerns through images, the method will be apparent. Thus, +for instance, the Politicus shadows forth the fabrication in the heavens. +But the figures of the five elements, delivered in geometrical proportions +in the Timaeus, represent in images the idioms of the gods who preside over +the parts of the universe. And the divisions of the essence of the soul in +that dialogue shadow forth the total orders of the gods. To this we may +also add that Plato composes politics, assimilating them to divine natures, +and adorning them from the whole world and the powers which it contains. +All these, therefore, through the similitude of mortal to divine concerns, +exhibit to us in images the progressions, orders, and fabrications of the +latter. And such are the modes of theologic doctrine employed by Plato. + +"But those," says Proclus, "who treat of divine concerns in an indicative +manner, either speak symbolically and fabulously, or through images. And of +those who openly announce their conceptions, some frame their discourses +according to science, but others according to inspiration from the gods. +And he who desires to signify divine concerns through symbols is Orphic, +and, in short, accords with those who write fables respecting the gods. +But he who does this through images is Pythagoric. For the mathematical +disciplines were invented by the Pythagorean in order to a reminiscence of +divine concerns, to which through these as images, they endeavour to +ascend. For they refer both numbers and figures to the gods, according to +the testimony of their historians. But the enthusiastic character, or he +who is divinely inspired, unfolding the truth itself concerning the gods +essentially, perspicuously ranks among the highest initiators. For these do +not think proper to unfold the divine orders, or their idioms, to their +familiars through veils, but announce their powers and their numbers in +consequence of being moved by the gods themselves. But the tradition of +divine concerns according to science is the illustrious, prerogative of the +Platonic philosophy. For Plato alone, as it appears to me of all those who +are known to us, has attempted methodically to divide and reduce into order +the regular progression of the divine genera, their mutual difference, the +common idioms of the total orders, and the distributed idioms in each." + +Again, since Plato employs fables, let us in the first place consider +whence the ancients were induced to devise fables, and in the second place, +what the difference is between the fables of philosophers and those of +poets. In answer to the first question then, it is necessary to know that +the ancients employed fables looking to two things, viz. nature, and our +soul. They employed them by looking to nature, and the fabrication of +things, as follows. Things unapparent are believed from things apparent, +and incorporeal natures from bodies. For seeing the orderly arrangement of +bodies, we understand that a certain incorporeal power presides over them; +as with respect to the celestial bodies, they have a certain presiding +motive power. As we therefore see that our body is moved, but is no longer +so after death, we conceive that it was a certain incorporeal power which +moved it. Hence, perceiving that we believe things incorporeal and +unapparent from things apparent and corporeal, fables came to be adopted, +that we might come from things apparent to certain unapparent natures; as, +for instance, that on hearing the adulteries, bonds, and lacerations of the +gods, castrations of heaven, and the like, we may not rest satisfied with +the apparent meaning of such like particulars, but may proceed to the +unapparent, and investigate the true signification. After this manner, +therefore, looking to the nature of things, were fables employed. + +But from looking to our souls, they originated as follows: While we are +children we live according to the phantasy, but the phantastic part is +conversant with figures, and types, and things of this kind. That the +phantastic part in us therefore may be preserved, we employ fables in +consequence of this part rejoicing in fables. It may also be said that +a fable is nothing else than a false discourse shadowing forth the truth: +for a fable is the image of truth. But the soul is the image of the +natures prior to herself; and hence the soul very properly rejoices in +fables, as an image in an image. As we are therefore from our childhood +nourished in fables, it is necessary that they should be introduced. And +thus much for the first problem, concerning the origin of fables. + +In the next place let us consider what the difference is between the +fables of philosophers and poets. Each therefore has something in which +it abounds more than, and something in which it is deficient from the +other. Thus, for instance, the poetic fable abounds in this, that we must +not rest satisfied with the apparent meaning, but pass on to the occult +truth. For who, endued with intellect, would believe that Jupiter was +desirous of having connection with Juno, and on the ground, without +waiting to go into the bed-chamber. So that the poetic fable abounds, in +consequence of asserting such things as do not suffer us to stop at the +apparent, but lead us to explore the occult truth. But it is defective in +this, that it deceives those of a juvenile age. Plato therefore neglects +fable of this kind, and banishes Homer from his Republic; because youth +on hearing such fables, will not be able to distinguish what is +allegorical from what is not. + +Philosophical fables, on the contrary, do not injure those that go no +further than the apparent meaning. Thus, for instance, they assert that +there are punishments and rivers under the earth: and if we adhere to the +literal meaning of these we shall not be injured. But they are deficient +in this, that as their apparent signification does not injure, we often +content ourselves with this, and do not explore the latent truth. We may +also say that philosophic fables look to the enemies of the soul. For if +we were entirely intellect alone, and had no connection with phantasy, we +should not require fables, in consequence of always associating with +intellectual natures. If again, we were entirely irrational, and lived +according to the phantasy, and had no other energy than this, it would be +requisite that the whole of our life should be fabulous. Since, however, +we possess intellect, opinion, and phantasy, demonstrations are given +with a view to intellect; and hence Plato says that if you are willing to +energize according to intellect, you will have demonstrations bound with +adamantine chains; if according to opinion, you will have the testimony +of renowned persons; and if according to the phantasy, you have fables by +which it is excited; so that from all these you will derive advantage. + +Plato therefore rejects the more tragical mode of mythologizing of the +ancient poets, who thought proper to establish an arcane theology +respecting the gods, and on this account devised wanderings, castrations, +battles and lacerations of the gods, and many other such symbols of the +truth about divine natures which this theology conceals;--this mode he +rejects, and asserts that it is in every respect most foreign from +erudition. But he considers those mythological discourses about the gods +as more persuasive and more adapted to truth, which assert that a divine +nature is the cause of all good, but of no evil, and that it is void of +all mutation, comprehending in itself the fountain of truth, but never +becoming the cause of any deception to others. For such types of theology +Socrates delivers in the Republic. + +All the fables therefore of Plato guarding the truth in concealment, +have not even their externally apparent apparatus discordant with our +undisciplined and unperverted anticipations of divinity. But they bring +with them an image of the mundane composition in which both the apparent +beauty is worthy of divinity, and a beauty more divine than this is +established in the unapparent lives and powers of its causes. + +In the next place, that the reader may see whence and from what dialogues +principally the theological dogmas of Plato may be collected, I shall +present him with the following translation of what Proclus has admirably +written on this subject. + +"The truth (says he) concerning the gods pervades, as I may say, through +all the Platonic dialogues, and in all of them conceptions of the first +philosophy, venerable, clear, and supernatural, are disseminated, in some +more obscurely, but in others more conspicuously;--conceptions which +excite those that are in any respect able to partake of them, to the +immaterial and separate essence of the gods. And as in each part of the +universe and in nature itself, the demiurgus of all which the world +contains established resemblances of the unknown essence of the gods, +that all things might be converted to divinity through their alliance +with it, in like manner I am of opinion, that the divine intellect of +Plato weaves conceptions about the gods with all its progeny, and leaves +nothing deprived of the mention of divinity, that from the whole of its +offspring a reminiscence of total natures may be obtained, and imparted +to the genuine lovers of divine concerns. + +"But if it be requisite to lay before the reader those dialogues out of +many which principally unfold to us the mystic discipline about the gods, +I shall not err in ranking among this number the Phaedo and Phaedrus, the +Banquet and the Philebus, and together with these the Sophista and +Politicus, the Cratylus and the Timaeus. For all these are full through +the whole of themselves, as I may say, of the divine science of Plato. +But I should place in the second rank after these, the fable in the +Gorgias, and that in the Protagoras, likewise the assertions about the +providence of the gods in the Laws, and such things as are delivered +about the Fates, or the mother of the Fates, or the circulations of the +universe, in the tenth book of the Republic. Again you may, if you +please, place in the third rank those Epistles through which we may be +able to arrive at the science about divine natures. For in these, mention +is made of the three kings; and many other divine dogmas worthy the +Platonic theory are delivered. It is necessary therefore, regarding +these, to explore in them each order of the gods. + +Thus from the Philebus, we may receive the science respecting the one +good, and the two first principles of things (bound and infinity) together +with the triad subsisting from these. For you will find all these +distinctly delivered to us by Plato in that dialogue. But from the Timaeus +you may obtain the theory about intelligibles, a divine narration about the +demiurgic monad, and the most full truth about the mundane gods. From the +Phaedrus you may learn all the intelligible and intellectual genera, and +the liberated orders of the gods, which are proximately established above +the celestial circulations. From the Politicus you may obtain the theory of +the fabrication in the heavens, of the periods of the universe, and of the +intellectual causes of those periods. But from the Sophista you may learn +the whole sublunary generation, and the idiom of the gods who are allotted +the sublunary region, and preside over its generations and corruptions. And +with respect to each of the gods, we may obtain many sacred conceptions +from the Banquet, many from the Cratylus, and many from the Phaedo. For in +each of these dialogues more or less mention is made of divine names, from +which it is easy for those who are exorcised in divine concerns to discover +by a reasoning process the idioms of each. + +"It is necessary, however, to evince that each of the dogmas accords with +Platonic principles and the mystic traditions of theologists. For all the +Grecian theology is the progeny of the mystic doctrine of Orpheus; +Pythagoras first of all learning from Aglaophemus the origins of the +gods, but Plato in the second place receiving an all-perfect science of +the divinities from the Pythagoric and Orphic writings. For in the +Philebus, referring the theory about the two forms of principles (bound +and infinity) to the Pythagoreans, he calls them men dwelling with the +gods, and truly blessed. Philolaus, therefore, the Pythagorean, has left +for us in writing admirable conceptions about these principles, +celebrating their common progression into beings, and their separate +fabrication. Again, in the Timaeus, endeavouring to teach us about the +sublunary gods and their order, Plato flies to theologists, calls them +the sons of the gods, and makes them the fathers of the truth about these +divinities. And lastly, he delivers the orders of the sublunary gods +proceeding from wholes, according to the progression delivered by +theologists of the intellectual kings. Further still, in the Cratylus he +follows the traditions of theologists respecting the order of the divine +processions. But in the Gorgias he adopts the Homeric dogma, respecting +the triadic hypostases of the demiurgi. And, in short, he every where +discourses concerning the gods agreeably to the principles of theologists; +rejecting indeed the tragical part of mythological fiction, but establishing +first hypotheses in common with the authors of fables. + +"Perhaps, however, some one may here object to us, that we do not in a +proper manner exhibit the every where dispersed theology of Plato, and that +we endeavour to heap together different particulars from different +dialogues, as if we were studious of collecting many things into one +mixture, instead of deriving them all from one and the same fountain. For +if this were our intention, we might indeed refer different dogmas to +different treatises of Plato, but we shall by no means have a precedaneous +doctrine concerning the gods, nor will there be any dialogue which presents +us with an all-perfect and entire procession of the divine genera, and +their coordination with each other. But we shall be similar to those who +endeavor to obtain a whole from parts, through the want of a whole prior[9] +to parts, and to weave together the perfect, from things imperfect, when, +on the contrary, the imperfect ought to have the first cause of its +generation in the perfect. For the Timaeus, for instance, will teach us the +theory of the intelligible genera, and the Phaedrus appears to present us +with a regular account of the first intellectual orders. But where will be +the coordination of intellectuals to intelligibles? And what will be the +generation of second from first natures? In short, after what manner the +progression of the divine orders takes place from the one principle of all +things, and how in the generations of the gods, the orders between the one, +and all-perfect number, are filled up, we shall be unable to evince. + +----------------- +[9] A whole prior to parts is that which causally contains parts in +itself. Such parts too, when they proceed from their occult causal +subsistence, and have a distinct being of their own, are nevertheless +comprehended, though in a different manner, in their producing whole. +----------------- + +"Further still, it may be said, where will be the venerableness of your +boasted science about divine natures? For it is absurd to call these +dogmas, which are collected from many places, Platonic, and which, as you +acknowledge, are reduced from foreign names to the philosophy of Plato; +nor are you able to evince the whole entire truth about divine natures. +Perhaps, indeed, they will say that certain persons, junior to Plato, +have delivered in their writings, and left to their disciples, one +perfect form of philosophy. You, therefore, are able to produce one +entire theory about nature from the Timaeus; but from the Republic, or +Laws, the most beautiful dogmas about morals, and which tend to one form +of philosophy. Alone, therefore, neglecting the treatise of Plato, which +contains all the good of the first philosophy, and which may be called +the summit of the whole theory, you will be deprived of the most perfect +knowledge of beings, unless you are so much infatuated as to boast on +account of fabulous fictions, though an analysis of things of this kind +abounds with much of the probable, but not of the demonstrative. Besides, +things of this kind are only delivered adventitiously in the Platonic +dialogues; as the fable in the Protagoras, which is inserted for the sake +of the political science, and the demonstrations respecting it. In like +manner the fable in the Republic is inserted for the sake of justice; and +in the Gorgias for the sake of temperance. For Plato combines fabulous +narrations with investigations of ethical dogmas, not for the sake of the +fables, but for the sake of the leading design, that we may not only +exercise the intellectual part of the soul, through contending reasons, +but that the divine part of the soul may more perfectly receive the +knowledge of beings, through its sympathy with more mystic concerns. +For from other discourses we resemble those who are compelled to the +reception of truth; but from fables we are affected in an ineffable +manner, and call forth our unperverted conceptions, venerating the mystic +information which they contain. + +"Hence, as it appears to me, Timaeus with great propriety thinks it fit +that we should produce the divine genera, following the inventors of +fables as sons of the gods, and subscribe to their always generating +secondary natures from such as are first, though they should speak +without demonstration. For this kind of discourse is not demonstrative, +but entheastic, or the progeny of divine inspiration; and was invented by +the ancients, not through necessity, but for the sake of persuasion, not +regarding naked discipline, but sympathy with things themselves. But if +you are willing to speculate not only the causes of fables, but of other +theological dogmas, you will find that some of them are scattered in the +Platonic dialogues for the sake of ethical, and others for the sake of +physical considerations. For in the Philebus, Plato discourses concerning +bound and infinity, for the sake of pleasure, and a life according to +intellect. For I think the latter are species of the former. In the +Timaeus the discourse about the intelligible gods is assumed for the sake +of the proposed physiology. On which account, it is every where necessary +that images should be known from paradigms, but that the paradigms of +material things should be immaterial, of sensibles, intelligible, and of +physical forms, separate from nature. But in the Phaedrus, Plato +celebrates the supercelestial place, the subcelestial profundity, and +every genus under this for the sake of amatory mania; the manner in which +the reminiscence of souls takes place; and the passage to these from +hence. Every where, however, the leading end, as I may say, is either +physical or political, while the conceptions about divine natures are +introduced either for the sake of invention or perfection. How, therefore, +can such a theory as yours be any longer venerable and supernatural, and +worthy to be studied beyond every thing, when it is neither able to +evince the whole in itself, nor the perfect, nor that which is +precedaneous in the writings of Plato, but is destitute of all these, is +violent and not spontaneous, and does not possess a genuine, but an +adventitious order, as in a drama? And such are the particulars which may +be urged against our design. + +"To this objection I shall make a just and perspicuous reply. I say then +that Plato every where discourses about the gods agreeably to ancient +opinions and the nature of things. And sometimes indeed, for the sake of +the cause of the things proposed, he reduces them to the principles of +the dogmas, and thence, as from an exalted place of survey, contemplates +the nature of the thing proposed. But some times he establishes the +theological science as the leading end. For in the Phaedrus, his subject +respects intelligible beauty, and the participation of beauty pervading +thence through all things; and in the Banquet it respects the amatory +order. + +"But if it be necessary to consider, in one Platonic dialogue, the +all-perfect, whole and connected, extending as far as to the complete +number of theology, I shall perhaps assert a paradox, and which will +alone be apparent to our familiars. We ought however to dare, since we +have begun the assertion, and affirm against our opponents, that the +Parmenides, and the mystic conceptions of this dialogue, will accomplish +all you desire. For in this dialogue, all the divine genera proceed in +order from the first cause, and evince their mutual suspension from each +other. And those indeed which are highest, connate with the one, and of +a primary nature, are allotted a form of subsistence, characterized by +unity, occult and simple; but such as are last are multiplied, are +distributed into many parts, and excel in number, but are inferior in +power to such as are of a higher order; and such as are middle, according +to a convenient proportion, are more composite than their causes, but +more simple than their proper progeny. And, in short, all the axioms of +the theological science appear in perfection in this dialogue; and all +the divine orders are exhibited subsisting in connection. So that this +is nothing else than the celebrated generation of the gods, and the +procession of every kind of being from the ineffable and unknown cause of +wholes.[10] The Parmenides therefore, enkindles in the lovers of Plato +the whole and perfect light of the theological science. But after this, +the aforementioned dialogues distribute parts of the mystic discipline +about the gods, and all of them, as I may say, participate of divine +wisdom, and excite our spontaneous conceptions respecting a divine nature. + +------------------ +[10] The principle of all things is celebrated by Platonic philosophy as +the cause of wholes, because through transcendency of power he first +produces those powers in the universe which rank as wholes, and afterward +those which rank as parts through these. Agreeably to this Jupiter, the +artificer of the universe, is almost always called [Greek: demiourgos ton +olon], the demiurgus of wholes. See the Timaeus, and the Introduction to it. +------------------ + +And it is necessary to refer all the parts of this mystic discipline to +these dialogues, and these again to the one and all perfect theory of the +Parmenides. For thus, as it appears to me, we shall suspend the more +imperfect from the perfect, and parts from wholes, and shall exhibit +reasons assimilated to things of which, according to the Platonic Timaeus, +they are interpreters. Such then is our answer to the objection which may +be urged against us; and thus we refer the Platonic theory to the +Parmenides; just as the Timaeus is acknowledged by all who have the least +degree of intelligence to contain the whole science about nature." + +All that is here asserted by Proclus will be immediately admitted by the +reader who understands the outlines which we have here given of the +theology of Plato, and who is besides this a complete master of the +mystic meaning of the Parmenides; which I trust he will find sufficiently +unfolded, through the assistance of Proclus, in the introduction and +notes to that dialogue. + +The next important Platonic dogma in order, is that doctrine concerning +ideas, about which the reader will find so much said in the notes on the +Parmenides, that but little remains to be added here. That little however +is as follows: The divine Pythagoras, and all those who have legitimately +received his doctrines, among whom Plato holds the most distinguished +rank, asserted that there are many orders of beings, viz. intelligible, +intellectual, dianoetic, physical, or in short, vital and corporeal +essences. For the progression of things, the subjection which naturally +subsists together with such progression, and the power of diversity in +coordinate genera give subsistence to all the multitude of corporeal and +incorporeal natures. They said, therefore, that there are three orders in +the whole extent of beings; viz. the intelligible, the dianoetic, and the +sensible; and that in each of these ideas subsist, characterized by the +respective essential properties of the natures by which they are +contained. And with respect to intelligible ideas, these they placed +among divine natures, together with the producing, paradigmatic, and +final causes of things in a consequent order. For if these three causes +sometimes concur, and are united among themselves, (which Aristotle says +is the case), without doubt this will not happen in the lowest works of +nature, but in the first and most excellent causes of all things, which +on account of their exuberant fecundity have a power generative of all +things, and from their converting and rendering similar to themselves the +natures which they have generated, are the paradigms, or exemplars of all +things. But as these divine causes act for their own sake, and on account +of their own goodness, do they not exhibit the final cause? Since +therefore intelligible forms are of this kind, and are the leaders of so +much good to wholes, they give completion to the divine orders, though +they largely subsist about the intelligible order contained in the +artificer of the universe. But dianoetic forms or ideas imitate the +intellectual, which have a prior subsistence, render the order of soul +similar to the intellectual order, and comprehend all things in a +secondary degree. + +These forms beheld in divine natures possess a fabricative power, but +with us they are only gnostic, and no longer demiurgic, through the +defluxion of our wings, or degradation of our intellectual powers. For, +as Plato says in the Phaedrus, when the winged powers of the soul are +perfect and plumed for flight, she dwells on high, and in conjunction +with divine natures governs the world. In the Timaeus, he manifestly +asserts that the demiurgus implanted these dianoetic forms in souls, in +geometric, arithmetic, and harmonic proportions: but in his Republic (in +the section of a line in the 6th book) he calls them images of +intelligibles; and on this account does not for the most part disdain to +denominate them intellectual, as being the exemplars of sensible natures. +In the Phaedo he says that these are the causes to us of reminiscence; +because disciplines are nothing else than reminiscences of middle +dianoetic forms, from which the productive powers of nature being derived +and inspired, give birth to all the mundane phenomena. + +Plato however did not consider things definable, or in modern language +abstract ideas, as the only universals, but prior to these he established +those principles productive of science which essentially reside in the +soul, as is evident from his Phaedrus and Phaedo. In the 10th book of the +Republic too, he venerates those separate forms which subsist in a divine +intellect. In the Phaedrus, he asserts that souls elevated to the +supercelestial place, behold Justice herself, temperance herself, and +science herself; and lastly in the Phaedo he evinces the immortality of +the soul from the hypothesis of separate forms. + +Syrianus[11], in his commentary on the 13th book of Aristotle's +Metaphysics, shows in defense of Socrates, Plato, the Parmenideans, +and Pythagoreans, that ideas were not introduced by these divine men +according to the usual meaning of names, as was the opinion of Chrysippus, +Archedemus, and many of the junior Stoics; for ideas are distinguished by +many differences from things which are denominated from custom. Nor do +they subsist, says he, together with intellect, in the same manner as +those slender conceptions which are denominated universals abstracted +from sensibles, according to the hypothesis of Longinus:[12] for if that +which subsists is unsubstantial, it cannot be consubsistent with intellect. + +----------------- +[11] See my translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics, p. 347. If the reader +conjoins what is said concerning ideas in the notes on that work, with +the introduction and notes to the Parmenides in this, he will be in +possession of nearly all that is to be found in the writings of the +ancients on this subject. + +[12] It appears from this passage of Syrianus that Longinus was the +original inventor of the theory of abstract ideas; and that Mr. Locke was +merely the restorer of it. +----------------- + +Nor are ideas according to these men notions, as Cleanthes afterwards +asserted them to be. Nor is idea definite reason, nor material form; for +these subsist in composition and division, and verge to matter. But ideas +are perfect, simple, immaterial, and impartible natures. And what wonder +is there, says Syrianus, if we should separate things which are so much +distant from each other? Since neither do we imitate in this particular +Plutarch, Atticus, and Democritus, who, because universal reasons +perpetually subsist in the essence of the soul, were of opinion that these +reasons are ideas: for though they separate them from the universal in +sensible natures, yet it is not proper to conjoin in one and the same the +reason of soul, and an intellect such as ours, with paradigmatic and +immaterial forms, and demiurgic intellections. But as the divine Plato +says, it is the province of our soul to collect things into one by a +reasoning process, and to possess a reminiscence of those transcendent +spectacles, which we once beheld when governing the universe in conjunction +with divinity. Boethus,[13] the peripatetic too, with whom it is proper to +join Cornutus; thought that ideas are the same with universals in sensible +natures. However, whether these universals are prior to particulars, they +are not prior in such a manner as to be denudated from the habitude which +they possess with respect to them, nor do they subsist as the causes of +particulars; both which are the prerogatives of ideas; or whether they are +posterior to particulars, as many are accustomed to call them, how can +things of posterior origin, which have no essential subsistence, but are +nothing more than slender conceptions, sustain the dignity of fabricative +ideas? + +------------------- +[13] This was a Greek philosopher, who is often cited by Simplicius in +his Commentary on the Predicaments, and must not therefore be confounded +with Boetius, the roman senator and philosopher. +------------------- + +In what manner then, says Syrianus, do ideas subsist according to the +contemplative lovers of truth? We reply, intelligibly and tetradically +([Greek: noeros kai tetradikos]), in animal itself ([Greek: en to +antozoo]), or the extremity of the intelligible order; but intellectually +and decadically ([Greek: noeros kai dekadikos]), in the intellect of the +artificer of the universe; for, according to the Pythagoric Hymn, "Divine +number proceeds from the retreats of the undecaying monad, till it arrives +at the divine tetrad which produced the mother of all things, the universal +recipient, venerable, circularly investing all things with bound, immovable +and unwearied, and which is denominated the sacred decad, both by the +immortal gods and earth-born men." + +[Greek: +Proeisi gar o Theios arithmos, os phesin o Pythagoreios eis auton +umnos, + Monados ek keuthmonos akeralou esti'an iketai + Tetrada epi zatheen, he de teke metera panton, + Pandechea, presbeiran, oron peri pasi titheiran, + Atropon, akamatou, dekada kleiousi min agnen, + Athanatoi to theoi kai gegeneeis anthropoi.] + +And such is the mode of their subsistence according to Orpheus, +Pythagoras and Plato. Or if it be requisite to speak in more familiar +language, an intellect sufficient to itself, and which is a most perfect +cause, presides over the wholes of the universe, and through these +governs all its parts; but at the same time that it fabricates all +mundane natures, and benefits them by its providential energies, it +preserves its own most divine and immaculate purity; and while it +illuminates all things, is not mingled with the natures which it +illuminates. This intellect, therefore, comprehending in the depths of +its essence an ideal world, replete with all various forms, excludes +privation of cause and casual subsistence, from its energy. But as it +imparts every good and all possible beauty to its fabrications, it +converts the universe to itself, and renders it similar to its own +omniform nature. Its energy, too, is such as its intellection; but it +understands all things, since it is most perfect. Hence there is not any +thing which ranks among true beings, that is not comprehended in the +essence of intellect; but it always establishes in itself ideas, which +are not different from itself and its essence, but give completion to it, +and introduce to the whole of things, a cause which is at the same time +productive, paradigmatic, and final. For it energizes as intellect, and +the ideas which it contains are paradigmatic, as being forms; and they +energize from themselves, and according to their own exuberant goodness. +And such are the Platonic dogmas concerning ideas, which sophistry and +ignorance may indeed oppose, but will never be able to confute. + +From this intelligible world, replete with omniform ideas, this sensible +world, according to Plato, perpetually flows, depending on its artificer +intellect, in the same manner as shadow on its forming substance. For as +a deity of an intellectual characteristic is its fabricator, and both the +essence and energy of intellect are established in eternity the sensible +universe, which is the effect or production of such an energy, must be +consubsistent with its cause, or in other words, must be a perpetual +emanation from it. This will be evident from considering that every thing +which is generated, is either generated by art or by nature, or according +to power. It is necessary, therefore, that every thing operating +according to nature or art should be prior to the things produced; but +that things operating according to power should have their productions +coexistent with themselves; just as the sun produces light coexistent +with itself; fire, heat; and snow, coldness. If therefore the artificer +of the universe produced it by art, he would not cause it simply to be, +but to be in some particular manner; for all art produces form. Whence +therefore does the world derive its being? If he produced it from nature, +since that which makes by nature imparts something of itself to its +productions, and the maker of the world is incorporeal, it would be +necessary that the world, the offspring of such an energy, should be +incorporeal. It remains therefore, that the demiurgus produced the +universe by power alone; but every thing generated by power subsists +together with the cause containing this power: and hence production of +this kind cannot be destroyed unless the producing cause is deprived of +power. The divine intellect therefore that produced the sensible universe +caused it to be coexistent with himself. + +This world thus depending on its divine artificer, who is himself an +intelligible world replete with the archetypal ideas of all things, +considered according to its corporeal nature, is perpetually flowing, and +perpetually advancing to being (en to gignesthai), and compared with its +paradigm, has no stability or reality of being. However, considered as +animated by a divine soul, and as receiving the illuminations of all the +supermundane gods, and being itself the receptacle of divinities from +whom bodies are suspended, it is said by Plato in the Timaeus to be a +blessed god. The great body of this world too, which subsists in a +perpetual dispersion of temporal extension, may be properly called a +whole with a total subsistence, on account of the perpetuity of its +duration, though this is nothing more than a flowing eternity. And hence +Plato calls it a whole of wholes; by the other wholes which are +comprehended in its meaning, the celestial spheres, the sphere of fire, +the whole of air considered as one great orb; the whole earth, and the +whole sea. These spheres, which are called by Platonic writers parts with +a total subsistence, are considered by Plato as aggoregately perpetual. +For if the body of this world is perpetual, this also must be the case +with its larger parts, on account of their exquisite alliance to it, and +in order that wholes with a partial subsistence, such as all individuals, +may rank in the last gradation of things. + +As the world too, considered as one great comprehending whole, is called +by Plato a divine animal, so likewise every whole which it contains is a +world, possessing in the first place, a self-perfect unity; proceeding +from the ineffable, by which it becomes a god; in the second place, a +divine intellect; in the third place, a divine soul; and in the last +place, a deified body. Hence each of these wholes is the producing cause +of all the multitude which it contains, and on this account is said to be +a whole prior to parts; because, considered as possessing an eternal form +which holds all its parts together, and gives to the whole perpetuity of +subsistence, it is not indigent of such parts to the perfection of its +being. That these wholes which rank thus high in the universe are +animated, must follow by a geometrical necessity. For, as Theophrastus +well observes, wholes would possess less authority than parts, and things +eternal than such as are corruptible, if deprived of the possession +of soul. + +And now having with venturous, yet unpresuming wing, ascended to the +ineffable principle of things, and standing with every eye closed in the +vestibules of the adytum, found that we could announce nothing concerning +him, but only indicate our doubts and disappointment, and having thence +descended to his occult and most venerable progeny, and passing through +the luminous world of ideas, holding fast by the golden chain of deity, +terminated our downward flight in the material universe, and its +undecaying wholes, let us stop awhile and contemplate the sublimity and +magnificence of the scene which this journey presents to our view. Here +then we see the vast empire of deity, an empire terminated upwards by a +principle so ineffable that all language is subverted about it, and +downwards, by the vast body of the world. Immediately subsisting after +this immense unknown we in the next place behold a mighty all- +comprehending one, which as being next to that which is in every +respect incomprehensible, possesses much of the ineffable and unknown. +From this principle of principles, in which all things casually subsist +absorbed in superessential light and involved in unfathomable depths, we +view a beauteous progeny of principles, all largely partaking of the +ineffable, all stamped with the occult characters of deity, all +possessing an over-flowing fullness of good. From these dazzling summits, +these ineffable blossoms, these divine propagations, we next see being, +life, intellect, soul, nature and body depending; monads suspended from +unities, deified natures proceeding from deities. Each of these monads +too, is the leader of a series which extends from itself to the last of +things, and which while it proceeds from, at the same time abides in, and +returns to its leader. And all these principles and all their progeny are +finally centred, and rooted by their summits in the first great all- +comprehending one. Thus all beings proceed from, and are comprehended +in the first being; all intellects emanate from one first intellect; all +souls from one first soul; all natures blossom from one first nature; and +all bodies proceed from the vital and luminous body of the world. And +lastly, all these great monads are comprehended in the first one, from +which both they and all their depending series are unfolded into light. +Hence this first one is truly the unity of unities, the monad of monads, +the principle of principles, the God of gods, one and all things, and yet +one prior to all. + +Such, according to Plato, are the flights of the true philosopher, such +the August and magnificent scene which presents itself to his view. By +ascending these luminous heights, the spontaneous tendencies of the soul +to deity alone find the adequate object of their desire; investigation +here alone finally reposes, doubt expires in certainty, and knowledge +loses itself in the ineffable. + +And here perhaps some grave objector, whose little soul is indeed acute, +but sees nothing with a vision healthy and sound, will say that all this +is very magnificent, but that it is soaring too high for man; that it is +merely the effect of spiritual pride; that no truths, either in morality +or theology, are of any importance which are not adapted to the level of +the meanest capacity; and that all that it is necessary for man to know +concerning either God or himself is so plain, that he that runs may read. +In answer to such like cant, for it is nothing more,--a cant produced by +the most profound ignorance, and frequently attended with the most +deplorable envy, I ask, is then the Delphic precept, KNOW THYSELF, a +trivial mandate? Can this be accomplished by every man? Or can any one +properly know himself without knowing the rank he holds in the scale of +being? And can this be effected without knowing what are the natures +which he surpasses, and what those are by which he is surpassed? And can +he know this without knowing as much of those natures as it is possible +for him to know? And will the objector be hardy enough to say that every +man is equal to this arduous task? That he who rushes from the forge, or +the mines, with a soul distorted, crushed and bruised by base mechanical +arts, and madly presumes to teach theology to a deluded audience, is +master of this sublime, this most important science? For my own part I +know of no truths which are thus obvious, thus accessible to every man, +but axioms, those self-evident principles of science which are +conspicuous by their own light, which are the spontaneous unperverted +conceptions of the soul, and to which he who does not assent deserves, as +Aristotle justly remarks, either pity or correction. In short, if this is +to be the criterion of all moral and theological knowledge, that it must +be immediately obvious to every man, that it is to be apprehended by the +most careless inspection, what occasion is there for seminaries of +learning? Education is ridiculous, the toil of investigation is idle. Let +us at once confine Wisdom in the dungeons of Folly, recall Ignorance from +her barbarous wilds, and close the gates of Science with +everlasting bars. + +Having thus taken a general survey of the great world, and descended from +the intelligible to the sensible universe, let us still, adhering to that +golden chain which is bound round the summit of Olympus, and from which +all things are suspended, descend to the microcosm man. For man +comprehends in himself partially everything which the world contains +divinely and totally. Hence, according to Pluto, he is endued with an +intellect subsisting in energy, and a rational soul proceeding from the +same father and vivific goddess as were the causes of the intellect and +soul of the universe. He has likewise an ethereal vehicle analogous to +the heavens, and a terrestrial body, composed from the four elements, and +with which also it is coordinate. + +With respect to his rational part, for in this the essence of man +consists, we have already shown that it is of a self-motive nature, and +that it subsists between intellect, which is immovable both in essence +and energy, and nature, which both moves and is moved. In consequence of +this middle subsistence, the mundane soul, from which all partial souls +are derived, is said by Plato in the Timaeus, to be a medium between that +which is indivisible and that which is divisible about bodies, i.e. the +mundane soul is a medium between the mundane intellect, and the whole of +that corporeal life which the world participates. In like manner, the +human soul is a medium between a daemoniacal intellect proximately, +established above our essence, which it also elevates and perfects, and +that corporeal life which is distributed about our body, and which is +the cause of its generation, nutrition and increase. This daemoniacal +intellect is called by Plato, in the Phaedrus, theoretic and, the +governor of the soul. The highest part therefore of the human soul is the +summit of the dianoetic power ([Greek: to akrotaton tes dianoias]), or +that power which reasons scientifically; and this summit is our intellect. +As, however, our very essence is characterized by reason, this our summit +is rational, and though it subsists in energy, yet it has a remitted union +with things themselves. Though too it energizes from itself, and contains +intelligibles in its essence, yet from its alliance to the discursive +nature of soul, and its inclination to that which is divisible, it falls +short of the perfection of an intellectual essence and energy profoundly +indivisible and united, and the intelligibles which it contains degenerate +from the transcendently fulged and self-luminous nature of first +intelligibles. Hence, in obtaining a perfectly indivisible knowledge, it +requires to be perfected by an intellect whose energy is ever vigilant +and unremitted; and it's intelligibles, that they may become perfect, +are indigent of the light which proceeds from separate intelligibles. +Aristotle, therefore, very properly compares the intelligibles of our +intellect to colors, because these require the splendour of the sun, and +denominates an intellect of this kind, intellect in capacity, both on +account of its subordination to an essential intellect, and because it is +from a separate intellect that it receives the full perfection of its +nature. The middle part of the rational soul is called by Plato, dianoia, +and is that power which, as we have already said, reasons scientifically, +deriving the principles of its reasoning, which are axioms from intellect. +And the extremity of the rational soul is opinion, which in his Sophista +he defines to be that power which knows the conclusion of dianoia. This +power also knows the universal in sensible particulars, as that every man +is a biped, but it knows only the oti, or that a thing is, but is ignorant +of the dioti, or why it is: knowledge of the latter kind being the province +of the dianoetic power. + +And such is Plato's division of the rational part of our nature, which he +very justly considers as the true man; the essence of every thing +consisting in its most excellent part. + +After this follows the irrational nature, the summit of which is the +phantasy, or that power which perceives every thing accompanied with +figure and interval; and on this account it may be called a figured +intelligence ([Greek: morphotike noesis]). This power, as Jamblichus +beautifully observes, groups upon, as it were, and fashions all the +powers of the soul; exciting in opinion the illuminations from the +senses, and fixing in that life which is extended with body, the +impressions which descend from intellect. Hence, slays Proclus, it folds +itself about the indivisibility of true intellect, conforms itself to all +formless species, and becomes perfectly every thing, from which the +dianoetic power and our indivisible reason consists. Hence too, it is all +things passively which intellect is impassively, and on this account +Aristotle calls it passive intellect. Under this subsist anger and +desire, the former resembling a raging lion, and the latter a many-headed +beast; and the whole is bounded by sense, which is nothing more than a +passive perception of things, and on this account is justly said by +Plato, to be rather passion than knowledge; since the former of these is +characterized by alertness, and the latter by energy. + +Further still, in order that the union of the soul with this gross +terrestrial body may be effected in a becoming manner, two vehicles, +according to Plato, are necessary as media, one of which is ethereal, and +the other aerial, and of these, the ethereal vehicle is simple and +immaterial, but the aerial, simple and material; and this dense earthly +body is composite and material. + +The soul thus subsisting as a medium between natures impartible +and such as are divided about bodies, it produces and constitutes the +latter of these; but establishes in itself the prior causes from which it +proceeds. Hence it previously receives, after the manner of an exemplar, +the natures to which it is prior as their cause; but it possesses through +participation, and as the blossoms of first natures, the causes of its +subsistence. Hence it contains in its essence immaterial forms of things +material, incorporeal of such as are corporeal, and extended of such as +are distinguished by interval. But it contains intelligibles after the +manner of an image, and receives partibly their impartible forms, such +as are uniform variously, and such as are immovable, according to a +self-motive condition. Soul therefore is all things, and is elegantly +said by Olympiodorus to be an omniform statue ([Greek: pammorphon +agalma]): for it contains such things as are first through participation, +but such as are posterior to its nature, after the manner of an exemplar. + +As, too, it is always moved; and this always is not eternal, but +temporal, for that which is properly eternal, and such is intellect, is +perfectly stable, and has no transitive energies, hence it is necessary +that its motions should be periodic. For motion is a certain mutation +from some things into others. And beings are terminated by multitudes and +magnitudes. These therefore being terminated, there can neither be an +infinite mutation, according to a right line, nor can that which is +always moved proceed according to a finished progression. Hence that +which is always moved will proceed from the same to the same; and will +thus form a periodic motion. Hence, too, the human, and this also is true +of every mundane soul, uses periods and restitutions of its proper life. +For, in consequence of being measured by time, it energizes transitively, +and possesses a proper motion. But every thing which is moved perpetually +and participates of time, revolves periodically and proceeds from the +same to the same. And hence the soul, from possessing motion, and +energizing according to time, will both possess periods of motion and +restitutions to its pristine state. + +Again, as the human soul, according to Plato, ranks among the number of +those souls that sometimes follow the mundane divinities, in consequence +of subsisting immediately after daemons and heroes, the perpetual +attendants of the gods, hence it possesses a power of descending +infinitely into generation, or the sublunary region, and of ascending +from generation to real being. For since it does not reside with divinity +through an infinite time, neither will it be conversant with bodies +through the whole succeeding time. For that which has no temporal +beginning, both according to Plato and Aristotle, cannot have an end; and +that which has no end, is necessarily without a beginning. It remains, +therefore, that every soul must perform periods, both of ascensions from +generation, and of descensions into generation; and that this will never +fail, through an infinite time. + +From all this it follows that the soul, while an inhabitant of earth, is +in a fallen condition, an apostate from deity, an exile from the orb of +light. Hence Plato, in the 7th book of his Republic, considering our life +with reference to erudition and the want of it, assimilates us to men in +a subterranean cavern, who have been there confined from their childhood, +and so fettered by chains as to be only able to look before them to the +entrance of the cave which expands to the light, but incapable through +the chain of turning themselves round. He supposes too, that they have +the light of a fire burning far above and behind them; and that between +the fire and the fettered men, there is a road above, along which a low +wall is built. On this wall are seen men bearing utensils of every kind, +and statues in wood and stone of men and other animals. And of these men +some are speaking and others silent. With respect to the fettered men in +this cave, they see nothing of themselves or another, or of what is +carrying along, but the shadows formed by the fire falling on the +opposite part of tho cave. He supposes too, that the opposite part of +this prison has an echo; and that in consequence of this the fettered +men, when they hear any one speak, will imagine that it is nothing else +than the passing shadow. + +Here, in the first place, as we have observed in the notes on that book, +the road above between the fire and the fettered men, indicates that +there is a certain ascent in the cave itself from a more abject to a more +elevated life. By this ascent, therefore Plato signifies the contemplation +of dianoetic objects in the mathematical disciplines. For as the shadows +in the cave correspond to the shadows of visible objects, and visible +objects are the immediate images of dianoetic forms, or those ideas which +the soul essentially participates, it is evident that the objects from +which these shadows are formed must correspond to such as are dianoetic. +It is requisite, therefore, that the dianoetic power exercising itself in +these, should draw forth the principles of these from their latent +retreats, and should contemplate them not in images, but as subsisting in +herself in impartible involution. + +In the next place he says, "that the man who is to be led from the cave +will more easily see what the heavens contain, and the heavens +themselves, by looking in the night to the light of the stars, and the +moon, than by day looking on the sun, and the light of the sun." By this +he signifies the contemplation of intelligibles: for the stars and their +light are imitations of intelligibles, so far as all of them partake of +the form of the sun, in the same manner as intelligibles are +characterized by the nature of the good. + +After the contemplation of these, and after the eye is accustomed through +these to the light, as it is requisite in the visible region to see the +sun himself in the last place, in like manner, according to Plato, the +idea of the good must be seen the last in the intelligible region. He, +likewise divinely adds, that it is scarcely to be seen; for we can only +be conjoined with it through the intelligible, in the vestibule of which +it is beheld by the ascending soul. + +In short, the cold, according to Plato, can only be restored while on +earth to the divine likeness, which she abandoned by her descent, and be +able after death to reascend to the intelligible world, by the exercise +of the cathartic and theoretic virtues; the former purifying her from the +defilements of a mortal nature, and the latter elevating her to the +vision of true being: for thus, as Plato says in the Timaeus, "the soul +becoming sane and entire, will arrive at the form of her pristine habit." +The cathartic, however, must necessarily precede the theoretic virtues; +since it is impossible to survey truth while subject to the perturbation +and tumult of the passions. For the rational soul subsisting as a medium +between intellect and the irrational nature, can then only without +revulsion associate with the intellect prior to herself, when she becomes +pure from copassivity with inferior natures. By the cathartic virtues, +therefore, we become sane, in consequence of being liberated from the +passions as diseases; but we become entire by the reassumption of +intellect and science as of our proper parts; and this is effected by +contemplative truth. Plato also clearly teaches us that our apostacy from +better natures is only to be healed by a flight from hence, when he +defines in his Theaetetus philosophy to be a flight from terrestrial +evils: for he evinces by this that passions are connascent with mortals +alone. He likewise says in the same dialogue, "that neither can evil +be abolished, nor yet do they subsist with the gods, but that they +necessarily revolve about this terrene abode, and a mortal nature." For +those who are obnoxious to generation and corruption can also be affected +in a manner contrary to nature, which is the beginning of evils. But in +the same dialogue he subjoins the mode by which our flight from evil +is to be accomplished. "It is necessary," says he "to fly from hence +thither: but the flight is a similitude to divinity, as far as is +possible to man; and this similitude consists in becoming just and holy +in conjunction with intellectual prudence." For it is necessary that he +who wishes to run from evils, should in the first place turn away from a +mortal nature; since it is not possible for those who are mingled with it +to avoid being filled with its attendant evils. As therefore, through our +flight from divinity, and the defluction of those wings which elevate us +on high, we fell into this mortal abode, and thus became connected with +evils, so by abandoning passivity with a mortal nature, and by the +germination of the virtues, as of certain wings, we return to the abode +of pure and true good, and to the possession of divine felicity. For the +essence of many subsisting as a medium between daemoniacal natures, who +always have an intellectual knowledge of divinity, and those beings who +are never adapted by nature to understand him, it ascends to the former +and descends to the latter, through the possession and desertion of +intellect. For it becomes familiar both with the divine and brutal +likeness, through the amphibious condition of its nature. + +When the soul therefore has recovered her pristine perfection in as great +a degree as is possible, while she is an inhabitant of earth by the +exercise of the cathartic and theoretic virtues, she returns after death, +as he says in the Timaeus, to her kindred star, from which she fell, and +enjoys a blessed life. Then, too, as he says in the Phaedrus, being +winged, she governs the world in conjunction with the gods. And this +indeed is the most beautiful end of her labors. This is what he calls in +the Phaedo, a great contest and a mighty hope. This is the most perfect +fruit of philosophy to familiarize and lead her back to things truly +beautiful, to liberate her from this terrene abode as from a certain +subterranean cavern of material life, elevate her to ethereal splendors, +and place her in the islands of the blessed. + +From this account of the human soul, that most important Platonic dogma +necessarily follows, that our soul essentially contains all knowledge, +and that whatever knowledge she acquires in the present life, is in +reality nothing more than a recovery of what a he once possessed. This +recovery is very properly called by Plato reminiscence, not as being +attended with actual recollection in the present life, but as being an +actual repossession of what the soul had lost through her oblivious union +with the body. Alluding to this essential knowledge of the soul, which +discipline evocates from its dormant retreats, Plato says in the +Sophista, "that we know all things as in a dream, and are again ignorant +of them, according to vigilant perception." Hence too, as Proclus well +observes, it is evident that the soul does not collect her knowledge from +sensibles, nor from things partial and divisible discover the whole and +the one. For it is not proper to think that things which have in no +respect a real subsistence, should be the leading causes of knowledge to +the soul; and that things which oppose each other and are ambiguous, +should precede science which has a sameness of subsistence; nor that +things which are variously mutable, should be generative of reasons which +are established in unity; nor that things indefinite should be the causes +of definite intelligence. It is not fit, therefore, that the truth of +things eternal should be received from the many, nor the discrimination +of universals from sensibles, nor a judgment respecting what is good from +irrational natures; but it is requisite that the soul entering within +herself, should investigate herself the true and the good, and the +eternal reasons of things. + +We have said that discipline awakens the dormant knowledge of +the soul; and Plato considered this as particularly effected by the +mathematical discipline. Hence, he asserts of theoretic arithmetic that +it imparts no small aid to our ascent to real being, and that it +liberates us from the wandering and ignorance about a sensible nature. +Geometry too is considered by him as most instrumental to the knowledge +of the good, when it is not pursued for the sake of practical purposes, +but as the means of ascent to an intelligible essence. Astronomy also is +useful for the purpose of investigating the fabricator of all things, +and contemplating as in most splendid images the ideal world, and its +ineffable cause. And lastly music, when properly studied, is subservient +to our ascent, viz. when from sensible we betake ourselves to the +contemplation of ideal and divine harmony. Unless, however, we thus +employ the mathematical discipline, the study of them is justly +considered by Plato as imperfect and useless, and of no worth. For as +the true end of man according to his philosophy is an assimilation to +divinity, in the greatest perfection of which human nature is capable, +whatever contributes to this is to be ardently pursued; but whatever has +a different tendency, however necessary it may be to the wants and +conveniences of the mere animal life, is comparatively little and vile. +Hence it necessary to pass rapidly from things visible and audible, to +those which are alone seen by the eye of intellect. For the mathematical +sciences, when properly studied, move the inherent knowledge of the soul; +awaken its intelligence; purify its dianoetic power; call forth its +essential forms from their dormant retreats; remove that oblivion and +ignorance which are congenial with our birth; and dissolve the bonds +arising from our union with an irrational nature. It is therefore +beautifully said by Plato in the 7th book of his Republic, "that the soul +through these disciplines has an organ purified and enlightened, which is +blinded and buried by studies of a different kind, an organ better worth +saving than ten thousand eyes, since truth becomes visible through this +alone." + +Dialectic, however, or the vertex of the mathematical sciences, +as it is called by Plato in his Republic, is that master discipline which +particularly leads us up to an intelligible essence. Of this first of +sciences, which is essentially different from vulgar logic, and is the +same with what Aristotle calls the first philosophy and wisdom, I have +largely spoken in the introduction and notes to the Parmenides. Suffice +it therefore to observe in this place, that dialectic differs from +mathematical science in this, that the latter flows from, and the former +is void of hypothesis. That dialectic has a power of knowing universals; +that it ascends to good and the supreme cause of all; and, that it +considers good as the end of its elevation; but that the mathematical +science, which previously fabricates for itself definite principles, from +which it evinces things consequent to such principles, does not tend to +the principle, but to the conclusion. Hence Plato does not expel +mathematical knowledge from the number of the sciences, but asserts it to +be the next in rank to that one science which is the summit of all; nor +does he accuse it as ignorant of its own principles, but considers it as +receiving these from the master science dialectic, and that possessing +them without any demonstration, it demonstrates from these its consequent +propositions. + +Hence Socrates, in the Republic, speaking of the power of dialectic, +says that it surrounds all disciplines like a defensive enclosure, and +elevates those that use it to the good itself, and the first unities; +that it purifies the eye of the soul; establishes itself in true beings, +and, the one principle of all things, and ends at last in that which is +no longer hypothetical. The power of dialectic, therefore, being thus +great, and the ends of this path so mighty, it must by no means be +confounded with arguments which are alone conversant with opinion: for +the former is the guardian of sciences, and the passage to it is through +these, but the latter is perfectly destitute of disciplinative science. +To which we may add, that the method of reasoning which is founded in +opinion, regards only that which is apparent; but the dialectic method +endeavors to arrive at the one itself, always employing for this purpose +steps of ascent, and at last beautifully ends in the nature of the good. +Very different therefore is it from the merely logical method, which +presides over the demonstrative phantasy, is of a secondary nature, and +is alone pleased with contentious discussions. For the dialectic of Plato +for the most part employs divisions and analyses as primary sciences, and +as imitating the progression of beings from the one, and their conversion +to it again. It likewise sometimes uses definitions and demonstrations, +and prior to these the definitive method, and the divisive prior to this. +On the contrary, the merely logical method, which is solely conversant +with opinion, is deprived of the incontrovertible reasonings of +demonstration. + +The following is a specimen of the analytical method of Plato's dialectic. +Of analysis there are three species. For one is an ascent from sensibles +to the first intelligibles; a second is an ascent through things +demonstrated and subdemonstrated, to undemonstrated and immediate +propositions; and a third proceeds from hypothesis to unhypothetical +principles. Of the first of these species, Plato has given a most +admirable specimen in the speech of Diotima in the Banquet. For there he +ascends from the beauty about bodies to the beauty in souls; from this to +the beauty in right disciplines; from this again to the beauty in laws; +from the beauty in laws to the ample sea of beauty (Greek: to polu pelagos +tou kalou); and thus proceeding he at length arrives at the beautiful +itself. + +The second species of analysis is as follows: It is necessary to make the +thing investigated the subject of hypothesis; to survey such things as +are prior to it; and to demonstrate these from things posterior, +ascending to such as are prior, till we arrive at the first thing and to +which we give our assent. But beginning from this, we descend +synthetically to the thing investigated. Of this species, the following +is an example from the Phaedrus of Plato. It is inquired if the soul is +immortal; and this being hypothetically admitted, it is inquired in the +next place if it is always moved. This being demonstrated, the next +inquiry is if that which is always moved, is self-moved; and this again +being demonstrated, it is considered whether that which is self-moved is +the principle of motion, and afterwards if the principle is unbegotten. +This then being admitted as a thing acknowledged, and likewise that what +is begotten is incorruptible, the demonstration of the thing proposed is +thus collected. If there is a principle, it is unbegotten and +incorruptible. That which is self-moved is the principle of motion. Soul +is self-moved. Soul therefore (i.e. the rational soul) is incorruptible, +unbegotten, and immortal. + +Of the third species of analysis, which proceeds from the hypothetical to +that which is unhypothetical, Plato has given a most beautiful specimen +in the first hypothesis of his Parmenides. For here, taking for his +hypothesis that the one is, he proceeds through an orderly series of +negations, which are not privative of their subjects, but generative of +things which are as it were, their opposites, till he at length takes +away the hypothesis that the one is. For he denies of it all discourse +and every appellation. And thus evidently denies of it not only that it +is, but even negation. For all things are posterior to the one; viz. +things known, knowledge, and the instruments of knowledge. And thus, +beginning from the hypothetical, he ends in that which is unhypothetical, +and truly ineffable. + +Having taken a general survey, both of the great world and the microcosm +man, I shall close this account of the principal dogmas of Plato, with +the outlines of his doctrine concerning Providence and Fate, as it is a +subject of the greatest importance, and the difficulties in which it is +involved are happily removed by that prince of philosophers. + +In the first place, therefore, Providence, according to common +conceptions, is the cause of good to the subjects of its care; and Fate +is the cause of a certain connection to generated natures. This being +admitted, let us consider what the things are which are connected. Of +beings, therefore, some have their essence in eternity, and others in +time. But by beings whose essence is in eternity, I mean those whose +energy as well as their essence is eternal; and by beings essentially +temporal, those whose essence is always in generation, or becoming to be, +though this should take place in an infinite time. The media between +these two extremes are natures which, in a certain respect, have an +essence permanent and better than generation, or a flowing subsistence, +but whose energy is measured by time. For it is necessary that every +procession from things first to last should be effected through media. +The medium, therefore, between these two extremes, must either be that +which has an eternal essence, but any energy indigent of time, or, on the +contrary, that which has a temporal essence, but an eternal energy. It is +impossible, however, for the latter of these to have any subsistence; for +if this were admitted, energy would be prior to essence. The medium, +therefore, must be that whose essence is eternal, but energy temporal. +And the three orders which compose this first middle and last are, the +intellectual, psychical (or that pertaining to soul), and corporeal. For +from what has been already said by us concerning the gradation of beings, +it is evident that the intellectual order is established in eternity, +both in essence and energy; that the corporeal order is always in +generation, or advancing to being, and this either in an infinite time, +or in a part of time; and that the psychical is indeed eternal in +essence, but temporal in energy. Where then shall we rank things which +being distributed either in places or times, have a certain coordination +and sympathy with each other through connection? It is evident that they +must be ranked among altermotive and corporeal natures. For of things +which subsist beyond the order of bodies, some are better both than place +and time; and others, though they energize according to time, appear to +be entirely pure from any connection with place. + +Hence things which are governed and connected by Fate are entirely +altermotive and corporeal. If this then is demonstrated, it is manifest +that admitting Fate to be a cause of connection, we must assert that it +presides over altermotive and corporeal natures. If, therefore, we look +to that which is the proximate cause of bodies, and thorough which also +altermotive beings are moved, breathe, and are held together, we shall +find that this is nature, the energies of which are to generate, nourish, +and increase. If, therefore, this power not only subsists in us, and all +other animals and plants, but prior to partial bodies there is, by a much +greater necessity, one nature of the world which comprehends and is +motive of all bodies; it follows that nature must be the cause of things +connected, and that in this we must investigate Fate. Hence, Fate is +nature, or that incorporeal power which is the one life of the world, +presiding over bodies, moving all things according to time, and +connecting the motions of things that, by places and times, are distant +from each other. It is likewise the cause of the mutual sympathy of +mortal natures, and of their conjunction with such as are eternal. For +the nature which is in us, binds and connects all the parts of our body, +of which also it is a certain Fate. And as in our body some parts have a +principal subsistence, and others are less principal, and the latter are +consequent to the former, so in the universe, the generations of the less +principal parts are consequent to the motions of the more principal, viz. +the sublunary generations to the periods of the celestial bodies; and the +circle of the former is the image of the latter. + +Hence it is not difficult to see that Providence is deity itself, the +fountain of all good. For whence can good be imparted, to all things, but +from divinity? So that no other cause of good but deity is, as Plato +says, to be assigned. And, in the next place, as this cause is superior +to all intelligible and sensible natures, it is consequently superior to +Fate. Whatever too is subject to Fate, is also under the dominion of +Providence; having its connection indeed from Fate, but deriving the good +which it possesses from Providence. But again, not all things that are +under the dominion of Providence are indigent of Fate; for intelligibles +are exempt from its sway. Fate therefore is profoundly conversant with +corporeal natures; since connection introduces time and corporeal motion. +Hence Plato, looking to this, says in the Timaeus, that the world is +mingled from intellect and necessity, the former ruling over the latter. +For by necessity here he means the motive cause of bodies, which in other +places he calls Fate. And this with great propriety; since every body is +compelled to do whatever it does, and to suffer whatever it suffers; to +heat or to be heated, to impart or to receive cold. But the elective +power is unknown to a corporeal nature; so that the necessary and the +nonelective may be said to be the peculiarities of bodies. + +As there are two genera of things, therefore, the intelligible and the +sensible, so likewise there are two kingdoms of these; that of +Providence, upwards, which reigns over intelligibles and sensibles, and +that of Fate downwards, which reigns over sensibles only. Providence +likewise differs from Fate in the same manner as deity from that which is +divine indeed, but participation, and not primarily. For in other things +we see that which has a primary subsistence, and that which subsists +according to participation. Thus the light which subsists in the orb of +the sun is primary light, and that which is in the air, according to +participation; the latter being derived from the former. And life is +primarily in the soul, but secondarily in the body. Thus also, according +to Plato, Providence is deity, but Fate is something divine, and not a +god: for it depends upon Providence, of which it is as it were the image. +As Providence too is to intelligibles, so is Fate to sensibles. And, +alternately, as Providence is to Fate, so are intelligibles to sensibles. +But intelligibles are the first of beings, and from these others derive +their subsistence. And hence the order of Fate depends on the dominion of +Providence. + +In the second place, let us look to the rational nature itself, when +correcting the inaccuracy of sensible information, as when it accuses the +sight of deception, in seeing the orb of the sun as not larger than a +foot in diameter; when it represses the ebullitions of anger, and +exclaims with Ulysses, + + "Endure my heart;" + +or when it restrains the wanton tendencies of desire to corporeal delight. +For in all such operations it manifestly subdues the irrational motions, +both gnostic and appetitive, and absolves itself from them, as from +things foreign to its nature. But it is necessary to investigate the +essence of every thing, not from its perversion, but from its energies +according to nature. If therefore reason, when it energizes in us as +reason, restrains the shadowy impressions of the delights of licentious +desire, punishes the precipitate motion of fury, and reproves the senses +as full of deception, asserting that + + "We nothing accurate, or see, or hear:" + +and if it says this, looking to its internal reasons, none of which it +knows through the body, or through corporeal cognitions, it is evident +that, according to this energy, it removes itself far from the senses, +contrary to the decision of which it becomes separated from those sorrows +and delights. + +After this, let us direct our attention to another and a better motion of +our rational soul, when, during the tranquillity of the inferior parts, +by a self-convertive energy, it sees its own essence, the powers which it +contains, the harmonic reasons from which it consists, and the many lives +of which it is the middle boundary, and thus finds itself to be a +rational world, the image of the prior natures, from which it proceeds, +but the paradigm of such as are posterior to itself. To this energy of +the soul, theoretic arithmetic and geometry greatly contribute, for these +remove it from the senses, purify the intellect from the irrational forms +of life with which it is surrounded, and lead it to the incorporeal +perception of ideas. For if these sciences receive the soul replete with +images, and knowing nothing subtile and unattended with material +garrulity; and if they elucidate reasons possessing an irrefragable +necessity of demonstration, and forms full of all certainty and +immateriality, and which by no means call to their aid the inaccuracy of +sensibles, do they not evidently purify our intellectual life from things +which fill us with a privation of intellect, and which impede our +perception of true being? + +After both these operations of the rational soul, let us now survey her +highest intelligence, through which she sees her sister souls in the +universe, who are allotted a residence in the heavens, and in the whole +of a visible nature, according to the will of the fabricator of the +world. But above all souls, she sees intellectual essences and orders. +For a deiform intellect resides above every soul, and which also imparts +to the soul an intellectual habit. Prior to these, however, she sees +those divine monads, from which all intellectual multitudes receive their +unions. For above all things united, there must necessarily be unific +causes; above things vivified, vivifying causes; above intellectual +natures, those that impart intellect; and above all participants, +imparticipable natures. From all these elevating modes of intelligence, +it must be obvious to such as are not perfectly blind, how the soul, +leaving sense and body behind, surveys through the projecting energies of +intellect those beings that are entirely exempt from all connection with +a corporeal nature. + +The rational and intellectual soul therefore, in whatever manner it may +be moved according to nature, is beyond body and sense. And hence it must +necessarily have an essence separate from both. But from this again, it +becomes manifest, that when it energizes according to its nature, it is +superior to Fate, and beyond the reach of its attractive power; but that, +when falling into sense and things irrational and corporalized, it +follows downward natures and lives, with them as with inebriated +neighbors, then together with them it becomes subject to the dominion of +Fate. For again, it is necessary that there should be an order of beings +of such a kind, as to subsist according to essence above Fate, but to be +sometimes ranked under it according to habitude. For if there are beings, +and such are all intellectual natures which are eternally established +above the laws of Fate, and also which, according to the whole of their +life, are distributed under the periods of Fate, it is necessary that the +medium between these should be that nature which is sometimes above, and +sometimes under the dominion of Fate. For the procession of incorporeal +natures is much more without a vacuum than that of bodies. + +The free will therefore of man, according to Plato, is a rational +elective, power, desiderative of true and apparent good, and leading the +soul to both, through which it ascends and descends, errs and acts with +rectitude. And hence the elective will be the same with that which +characterizes our essence. According to this power, we differ from divine +and mortal natures: for each of these is void of that two-fold inclination; +the one on account of its excellence being alone established in true +good; but the other in apparent good, on account of its defect. Intellect +too characterizes the one, but sense the other; and the former, as +Plotinus says, is our king, but the latter our messenger. We therefore +are established in the elective power as a medium; and having the ability +of tending both to true and apparent good, when we tend to the former we +follow the guidance of intellect, when to the latter, that of sense. The +power therefore which is in us is not capable of all things. For the +power which is omnipotent is characterized by unity; and on this account +is all-powerful, because it is one, and possesses the form of good. But +the elective power is two-fold, and on this account is not able to effect +all things; because, by it's inclinations to true and apparent good, it +falls short of that nature which is prior to all things. It would however +be all-powerful, if it had not an elective impulse, and was will alone. +For a life subsisting according to will alone subsists according to good, +because the will naturally tends to good, and such a life makes that +which is characteristic in us most powerful and deiform. And hence +through this the soul, according to Plato, becomes divine, and in another +life, in conjunction with deity, governs the world. And thus much of the +outlines of the leading dogmas of the philosophy of Plato. + +In the beginning of this Introduction, I observed that, in drawing these +outlines I should conduct the reader through novel and solitary paths, +solitary indeed they must be, since they have been unfrequented from the +reign of the emperor Justinian to the present time; and novel they will +doubtless appear to readers of every description, and particularly to +those who have been nursed as it were in the bosom of matter, the pupils +of experiment, the darlings of sense, and the legitimate descendants of +the earth-born race that warred on the Olympian gods. To such as these, +who have gazed on the dark and deformed face of their nurse, till they +are incapable of beholding the light of truth, and who are become so +drowsy from drinking immoderately of the cup of oblivion, that their +whole life is nothing more than a transmigration from sleep to sleep, and +from dream to dream, like men passing from one bed to another,--to such +as these, the road through which we have been traveling will appear to be +a delusive passage, and the objects which we have surveyed to be nothing +more than fantastic visions, seen only by the eye of imagination, and +when seen, idle and vain as the dreams of a shadow. + +The following arguments, however, may perhaps awaken some few of these +who are less lethargic than the rest, from the sleep of sense, and enable +them to elevate their mental eye from the dark mire in which they are +plunged, and gain a glimpse of this most weighty truth, that there is +another world, of which this is nothing more than a most obscure +resemblance, and another life, of which this is but the flying mockery. +My present discourse therefore is addressed to those who consider +experiment as the only solid criterion of truth. In the first place then, +these men appear to be ignorant of the invariable laws of demonstration +properly so called, and that the necessary requisites of all +demonstrative propositions are these: that they exist as causes, are +primary, more excellent, peculiar, true, and known than the conclusions. +For every demonstration not only consists of principles prior to others, +but of such as are eminently first; since if the assumed propositions may +be demonstrated by other assumptions, such propositions may indeed +appear prior to the conclusions, but are by no means entitled to the +appellation of first. Others, on the contrary, which require no +demonstration, but are of themselves manifest, are deservedly esteemed +the first, the truest, and the best. Such indemonstrable truths were +called by the ancients axioms from their majesty and authority, as the +assumptions which constitute demonstrative syllogisms derive all their +force and efficacy from these. + +In the next place, they seem not to be sufficiently aware, that universal +is better than partial demonstration. For that demonstration is the more +excellent which is derived from the better cause; but a universal is more +extended and excellent than a partial cause; since the arduous +investigation of the why in any subject is only stopped by the arrival at +universals. Thus if we desire to know why the outward angles of a +triangle are equal to four right angles, and it is answered, Because the +triangle is isosceles; we again ask, but why Because isosceles? And if it +be replied, Because it is a triangle; we may again inquire, But why +because a triangle? To which we finally answer, because a triangle is a +right-lined figure. And here our inquiry rests at that universal idea, +which embraces every preceding particular one, and is contained in no +other more general and comprehensive than itself. Add too, that the +demonstration of particulars is almost the demonstration of infinites; of +universals the demonstration of finites; and of infinites there can be no +science. That demonstration likewise is the best which furnishes the mind +with the most ample knowledge; and this is, alone, the province of +universals. We may also add, that he who knows universals knows +particulars likewise in capacity; but we can not infer that he who has +the best knowledge of particulars, knows any thing of universals. And +lastly, that which is universal is the object of intellect and reason; +but particulars are coordinated to the perceptions of sense. + +But here perhaps the experimentalist will say, admitting all this to be +true, yet we no otherwise obtain a perception of these universals than by +an induction of particulars, and abstraction from sensibles. To this, I +answer that the universal which is the proper object of science, is not +by any means the offspring of abstraction; and induction is no otherwise +subservient to its existence than an exciting cause. For if scientific +conclusions are indubitable, if the truth of demonstration is necessary +and eternal, this universal is truly all, and not like that gained by +abstraction, limited to a certain number of particulars. Thus, the +proposition that the angles of every triangle are equal to two right, if +it is indubitably true, that is, if the term every in it really includes +all triangles, cannot be the result of any abstraction; for this, however +extended it may be, is limited, and falls far short of universal +comprehension. Whence is it then that the dianoetic power concludes thus +confidently that the Proposition is true of all triangles? For if it be +said that the mind, after having abstracted triangle from a certain +number of particulars, adds from itself what is wanting to complete the +all; in the first place, no man, I believe, will say that any such +operation as this took place in his mind when he first learnt this +proposition; and in the next place, if this should be granted, it would +follow that such proposition is a mere fiction, since it is uncertain +whether that which is added to complete the all is truly added; and thus +the conclusion will no longer be indubitably necessary. + +In short, if the words all and every, with which every page of theoretic +mathematics is full, mean what they are conceived by all men to mean, and +if the universals which they signify are the proper objects of science, +such universals must subsist in the soul prior to the energies of sense. +Hence it will follow that induction is no otherwise subservient to +science, than as it produces credibility in axioms and petitions; and +this by exciting the universal conception of these latent in the soul. +The particulars, therefore, of which an induction is made in order to +produce science, must be so simple, that they may be immediately +apprehended, and that the universal may be predicated of them without +hesitation. The particulars of the experimentalists are not of this kind, +and therefore never can be sources of science truly so called. + +Of this, however, the man of experiment appears to be totally ignorant, +and in consequence of this, he is likewise ignorant that parts can only +be truly known through wholes, and that this is particularly the case +with parts when they belong to a whole, which, as we have already +observed, from comprehending in itself the parts which it produces, is +called a whole prior to parts. As he, therefore, would by no means merit +the appellation of a physician who should attempt to cure any part of the +human body, without a previous knowledge of the whole; so neither can he +know any thing truly of the vegetable life of plants, who has not a +previous knowledge of that vegetable life which subsists in the earth as +a whole prior to, because the principle and cause of all partial +vegetable life, and who still prior to this has not a knowledge of that +greater whole of this kind which subsists in nature herself; nor, as +Hippocrates justly observes, can he know any thing truly of the nature of +the human body who is ignorant what nature is considered as a great +comprehending whole. And if this be true, and it is so most indubitably, +with all physiological inquiries, how much more must it be the case with +respect to a knowledge of those incorporeal forms to which we ascended in +the first part of this Introduction, and which in consequence of +proceeding from wholes entirely exempt from body are participated by it, +with much greater obscurity and imperfection? Here then is the great +difference, and a mighty one it is, between the knowledge gained by the +most elaborate experiments, and that acquired by scientific reasoning, +founded on the spontaneous, unperverted, and self-luminous conceptions of +the soul. The former does not even lead its votary up to that one nature +of the earth from which the natures of all the animals and plants on its +surface, and of all the minerals and metals in its interior parts, +blossom as from a perennial root. The latter conducts its votary through +all the several mundane wholes up to that great whole the world itself, +and thence leads him through the luminous order of incorporeal wholes to +that vast whole of wholes, in which all other wholes are centred and +rooted, and which is no other than the principle of all principles, and +the fountain of deity itself. No less remarkable likewise, is the +difference between the tendencies of the two pursuits, for the one +elevates the soul to the most luminous heights, and to that great +ineffable which is beyond all altitude; but the other is the cause of a +mighty calamity to the soul, since, according to the elegant expression +of Plutarch, it extinguishes her principal and brightest eye, the +knowledge of divinity. In short, the one leads to all that is grand, +sublime and splendid in the universe; the other to all that is little, +groveling[14] and dark. The one is the parent of the most pure and ardent +piety; the genuine progeny of the other are impiety and atheism. And, in +fine, the one confers on its votary the most sincere, permanent, and +exalted delight; the other continual disappointment, and unceasing +molestation. + +----------------- +[14] That this must be the tendency of experiment, when prosecuted as the +criterion of truth, is evident from what Bacon, the prince of modern +philosophy, says in the 104th Aphorism of his Novum Organum, that +"baseless fabric of a vision." For he there sagely observes that wings +are not to be added to the human intellect, but rather lead and weights; +that all its leaps and flights may be restrained. That this is not yet +done, but that when it is we may entertain better hopes respecting the +sciences. "Itaque hominum intellectui non plumae addendae, sed plumbum +potius, et pondera; ut cohibeant omnem saltum et volatum. Atque hoc adhuc +factum non est; quum vero factum fuerit, melius de scientiis sperare +licebit." A considerable portion of lead must certainly have been added +to the intellect of Bacon when he wrote this Aphorism. +----------------- + +If such then are the consequences, such the tendencies of experimental +inquiries, when prosecuted as the criterion of truth, and daily +experience[15] unhappily shows that they are, there can be no other remedy +for this enormous evil than the intellectual philosophy of Plato. So +obviously excellent indeed is the tendency of this philosophy, that its +author, for a period of more than two thousand years, has been universally +celebrated by the epithet of divine. Such too is its preeminence, that it +may be shown, without much difficulty, that the greatest men of antiquity, +from the time in which its salutary light first blessed the human race, +have been more or less imbued with its sacred principles, have been more or +less the votaries of its divine truths. Thus, to mention a few from among a +countless multitude. In the catalogue of those endued with sovereign power, +it had for its votaries Dion of Siracusian, Julian the Roman, and Chosroes +the Persian, emperor; among the leaders of armies, it had Chabrias and +Phocion, those brave generals of the Athenians; among mathematicians, those +leading stars of science, Eudoxus, Archimedes[16] and Euclid; among +biographers, the inimitable Plutarch; among physicians, the admirable +Galen; among rhetoricians, those unrivaled orators Demosthenes and Cicero; +among critics, that prince of philologists, Longinus; and among poets, the +most learned and majestic Virgil. Instances, though not equally illustrious, +yet approximating to these in splendour, may doubtless be adduced after +the fall of the Roman empire; but then they have been formed on these +great ancients as models, and are, consequently, only rivulets from +Platonic streams. And instances of excellence in philosophic attainments, +similar to those among the Greeks, might have been enumerated among the +moderns, if the hand of barbaric despotism had not compelled philosophy +to retire into the deepest solitude, by demolishing her schools, and +involving the human intellect in Cimmerian darkness. In our own country, +however, though no one appears to have wholly devoted himself to the +study of this philosophy, and he who does not will never penetrate its +depths, yet we have a few bright examples of no common proficiency in its +more accessible parts. + +----------------- +[15] I never yet knew a man who made experiment the test of truth, and I +have known many such, that was not atheistically inclined. + +[16] I have ranked Archimedes among the Platonists, because he cultivated +the mathematical sciences Platonically, as is evident from the testimony of +Plutarch in his Life of Marcellus, p. 307. For he there informs us that +Archimedes considered the being busied about mechanics, and in short, every +art which is connected with the common purposes of life, as ignoble and +illiberal; and that those things alone were objects of his ambition with +which the beautiful and the excellent were present, unmingled with the +necessary. The great accuracy and elegance in the demonstrations of Euclid +and Archimedes, which have not been equaled by any of our greatest modern +mathematicians, were derived from a deep conviction of this important +truth. On the other hand modern mathematicians, through a profound +ignorance of this divine truth, and looking to nothing but the wants and +conveniences of the animal life of man, as if the gratification of his +senses was his only end, have corrupted pure geometry, by mingling with it +algebraical calculations, and through eagerness to reduce it as much as +possible to practical purposes, have more anxiously sought after +conciseness than accuracy, facility than elegance of geometrical +demonstration. +----------------- + +The instances I allude to are Shaftesbury, Akenside, Harris, Petwin, and +Sydenham. So splendid is the specimen of philosophic abilities displayed by +these writers, like the fair dawning of same unclouded morning, that we +have only deeply to regret that the sun of their genius sat before we were +gladdened with its effulgence. Had it shone with its full strength, the +writer of this Introduction would not have attempted either to translate +the works, or elucidate the doctrines of Plato; but though it rose with +vigor, it dispersed not the clouds in which its light was gradually +involved, and the eye in vain anxiously waited for it's meridian beam. +In short, the principles of the philosophy of Plato are of all others the +most friendly to true piety, pure morality, solid learning, and sound +government. For as it is scientific in all its parts, and in these parts +comprehends all that can be known by man in theology and ethics, and all +that is necessary for him to know in physics, it must consequently contain +in itself the source of all that is great and good both to individuals and +communities, must necessarily exalt while it benefits, and deify while it +exalts. + +We have said that this philosophy at first shone forth through Plato with +an occult and venerable splendor; and it is owing to the hidden manner in +which it is delivered by him, that its depth was not fathomed till many +ages after it's promulgation, and when fathomed, was treated by +superficial readers with ridicule and contempt. Plato indeed, is not +singular in delivering his philosophy occultly: for this was the custom +of all the great ancients; a custom not originating from a wish to become +tyrants in knowledge, and keep the multitude in ignorance, but from a +profound conviction that the sublimest truths are profaned when clearly +unfolded to the vulgar. This indeed must necessarily follow; since, as +Socrates in Plato justly observes, "it is not lawful for the pure to be +touched by the impure;" and the multitude are neither purified from the +defilements of vice, nor the darkness of twofold ignorance. Hence, while +they are thus doubly impure, it is as impossible for them to perceive the +splendors of truth, as for an eye buried in mire to survey the light +of day. + +The depth of this philosophy then does not appear to have been perfectly +penetrated except by the immediate disciples of Plato, for more than five +hundred years after its first propagation. For though Crantor, Atticus, +Albinus, Galen and Plutarch, were men of great genius, and made no common +proficiency in Philosophic attainments, yet they appear not to have +developed the profundity of Plato's conceptions; they withdrew not the +veil which covers his secret meaning, like the curtains which guarded the +adytum of temples from the profane eye; and they saw not that all behind +the veil is luminous, and that there divine spectacles[17] every where +present themselves to the view. This task was reserved for men who were +born indeed in a baser age, but, who being allotted a nature similar to +their leader, were the true interpreters of his mystic speculations. The +most conspicuous of these are the great Plotinus, the most learned +Porphyry, the divine Jamblichus, the most acute Syrianus, Proclus the +consummation of philosophic excellence, the magnificent Hierocles, the +concisely elegant Sallust, and the most inquisitive Damascius. By these +men, who were truly links of the golden chain of deity, all that is +sublime, all that is mystic in the doctrines of Plato (and they are +replete with both these in a transcendent degree), was freed from its +obscurity and unfolded into the most pleasing and admirable light. Their +labors, however, have been ungratefully received. The beautiful light +which they benevolently disclosed has hitherto unnoticed illumined +philosophy in her desolate retreats, like a lamp shining on some +venerable statue amidst dark and solitary ruins. The prediction of the +master has been unhappily fulfilled in these his most excellent +disciples. "For an attempt of this kind," says he,[18] "will only be +beneficial to a few, who from small vestiges, previously demonstrated, +are themselves able to discover these abstruse particulars. But with +respect to the rest of mankind, some it will fill with a contempt by no +means elegant, and others with a lofty and arrogant hope, that they shall +now learn certain excellent things." Thus with respect to these admirable +men, the last and the most legitimate of the followers of Plato, some +from being entirely ignorant of the abstruse dogmas of Plato, and finding +these interpreters full of conceptions which are by no means obvious to +every one in the writings of that philosopher, have immediately concluded +that such conceptions are mere jargon and revery, that they are not truly +Platonic, and that they are nothing more than streams, which, though, +originally derived from a pure fountain, have become polluted by distance +from their source. Others, who pay attention to nothing but the most +exquisite purity of language, look down with contempt upon every writer +who lived after the fall of the Macedonian empire; as if dignity and +weight of sentiment were inseparable from splendid and accurate diction; +or as if it were impossible for elegant writers to exist in a degenerate +age. So far is this from being the case, that though the style of +Plotinus[19] and Jamblichus[20] is by no means to be compared with that +of Plato, yet this inferiority is lost in the depth and sublimity of +their conceptions, and is as little regarded by the intelligent reader, +as motes in a sunbeam by the eye that gladly turns itself to the +solar light. + +-------------- +[17] See my Dissertation on the Mysteries. + +[18]See the 7th Epistle of Plato. + +[19] It would seem that those intemperate critics who have thought proper +to revile Plotinus, the leader of the latter Platonists, have paid no +attention to the testimony of Longinus concerning this most wonderful +man, as preserved by Porphyry in his life of him. For Longinus there +says, "that though he does not entirely accede to many of his hypotheses, +yet he exceedingly admires and loves the form of his writing, the density +of his conceptions, and the philosophic manner in which his questions are +disposed." And in another place he says, "Plotinus, as it seems, has +explained the Pythagoric and Platonic principles more clearly than those +that were prior to him; for neither are the writings of Numenius, +Cronius, Moderatus, and Thrasyllus, to be compared with those of Plotinus +on this subject." After such a testimony as this from such a consummate +critic as Longinus, the writings of Plotinus have nothing to fear from +the imbecile censure of modern critics. I shall only further observe, +that Longinus, in the above testimony, does not give the least hint of +his having found any polluted streams, or corruption of the doctrines of +Plato, in the works of Plotinus. There is not indeed the least vestige of +his entertaining any such opinion in any part of what he has said about +this most extraordinary man. This discovery was reserved for the more +acute critic of modern times, who, by a happiness of conjecture unknown +to the ancients, and the assistance of a good index, can in a few days +penetrate the meaning of the profoundest writer of antiquity, and bid +defiance even to the decision of Longinus. + +[20] Of this most divine man, who is justly said by the emperor Julian to +have been posterior indeed in time, but not in genius even to Plato himself, +see the life which I have given in the History of the Restoration of the +Platonic Theology, in the second vol. of my Proclus on Euclid. +---------------------- + +As to the style of Porphyry, when we consider that he was the disciple of +Longinus, whom Eunapius elegantly calls "a certain living library, and +walking museum," it is but reasonable to suppose that he imbibed some +portion of his master's excellence in writing. That he did so is +abundantly evident from the testimony of Eunapius, who particularly +commends his style for its clearness, purity, and grace. "Hence," he +says, "Porphyry being let down to men like a mercurial chain, through his +various erudition, unfolded every thing into perspicuity, and purity." +And in another place he speaks of him as abounding with all the graces of +diction, and as the only one that exhibited and proclaimed the praise of +his master. With respect to the style of Proclus, it is pure, clear and +elegant, like that of Dionysius Halicarnassus; but is much more copious +and magnificent; that of Hierocles is venerable and majestic, and nearly +equals the style of the greatest ancients; that of Sallust possesses an +accuracy and a pregnant brevity, which cannot easily be distinguished +from the composition of the Stagirite; and lastly, that of Damascius is +clear and accurate, and highly worthy a most investigating mind. + +Others again have filled themselves with a vain confidence, from reading +of commentaries of these admirable interpreters, and have in a short time +considered themselves superior to their masters. This was the case with +Ficinus, Picus, Dr. Henry Moore, and other pseudo Platonists, their +contemporaries, who, in order to combine Christianity with the doctrines +of Plato, rejected some of his most important tenets, and perverted +others, and thus corrupted one of these systems, and afforded no real +benefit to the other. + +But who are the men by whom these latter interpreters of Plato are +reviled? When and whence did this defamation originate? Was it when the +fierce champions for the trinity fled from Galilee to the groves of +Academus, and invoked, but in vain, the assistance of Philosophy? When + + The trembling grove confessed its fright, + The wood-nymphs started at the sight; + Ilissus backward urg'd his course, + And rush'd indignant to his source. + +Was it because that mitred sophist, Warburton, thought fit to talk of the +polluted streams of the Alexandrian school, without knowing any thing of +the source whence those streams are derived? Or was it because some heavy +German critic, who knew nothing beyond a verb in mi, presumed to grunt at +these venerable heroes? Whatever was its source, and whenever it +originated, for I have not been able to discover either, this however is +certain, that it owes its being to the most profound Ignorance, or the +most artful Sophistry, and that its origin is no less contemptible than +obscure. For let us but for a moment consider the advantages which these +latter Platonists possessed beyond any of their modern revilers. In the +first place, they had the felicity of having the Greek for their native +language, and must therefore, as they were confessedly, learned men, have +understood that language incomparably better than any man since the time +in which the ancient Greek was a living tongue. In the next place, they +had books to consult, written by the immediate disciples of Plato, which +have been lost for upwards of a thousand years, besides many Pythagoric +writings from which Plato himself derived most of his more sublime +dogmas. Hence we find the works of Parmenides, Empedocles, the Electic +Zeno, Speusippus, Xenocrates, and many other illustrious philosophers of +the highest antiquity, who were either genuine Platonists or the sources +of Platonism, are continually cited by these most excellent interpreters, +and in the third place they united the greatest purity of life to the +most piercing vigor of intellect. Now when it is considered that the +philosophy to the study of which these great men devoted their lives, was +professedly delivered by its author in obscurity; that Aristotle himself +studied it for twenty years; and that it was no uncommon thing, as Plato +informs us in one of his Epistles, to find students unable to comprehend +its sublimest tenets even in a longer period than this,--when all these +circumstances are considered, what must we think of the arrogance, not to +say impudence, of men in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth +centuries, who have dared to calumniate these great masters of wisdom? Of +men, with whom the Greek is no native language; who have no such books to +consult as those had whom they revile; who have never thought, even in a +dream, of making the acquisition of wisdom the great object of their +life; and who in short have committed that most baneful error of +mistaking philology for philosophy, and words for things? When such as +these dare to defame men who may be justly ranked among the greatest and +wisest of the ancients, what else can be said than that they are the +legitimate descendants of the suitors of Penelope, whom, in the animated +language of Ulysses, + + Laws or divine or human fail'd to move, + Or shame of men, or dread of gods above: + Heedless alike of infamy or praise, + Or Fame's eternal voice in future days,[21] + +----------------- +[21] Pope's Odyssey, book xxii, v. 47, &c. +----------------- + +But it is now time to present the reader with a general view of the works +of Plato, and, also to speak of the preambles, digressions, and style of +their author, and of the following translation. In accomplishing the +first of these, I shall avail myself of the synopsis of Mr. Sydenham, +taking the liberty at the same time of correcting it where it appears to +be erroneous, and of making additions to it where it appears to be +deficient. + +The dialogues of Plato are of various kinds; not only with regard to +those different matters, which are the subjects of them; but in respect +of the manner also in which they are composed or framed, and of the form +under which they make their appearance to the reader. It will therefore, +as I imagine, be not improper, in pursuance of the admonition given us by +Plato himself in his dialogue named Phaedrus[22] and in imitation of the +example set us by the ancient Platonists to distinguish the several +kinds; by dividing them, first, into the most general; and then, +subdividing into the subordinate; till we come to those lower species, +that particularly and precisely denote the nature of the several +dialogues, and from which they ought to take their respective +denominations. + +---------------- +[22] Whoever is unable to divide and distinguish things into their +several sorts or species; and, on the other hand, referring every +particular to its proper species, to comprehend them all in one general +idea; will never understand any writings of which those things are the +subject, like a true critic, upon those high principles of art to which +the human understanding reaches. We have thought proper, here, to +paraphrase this passage, for the sake of giving to every part of so +important a sentence its full force, agreeably to the tenor of Plato's +doctrine; and in order to initiate our readers into a way of thinking, +that probably many of them are as yet unacquainted with. +---------------- + +The most general division of the writings of Plato, is into those of the +Sceptical kind, and those of they Dogmatical. In the former sort, nothing +is expressly either proved or asserted, some philosophical question only is +considered and examined; and the reader is left to himself to draw such +conclusions, and discover such truths as the philosopher means to +insinuate. This is done, either in the way of inquiry, or in the way of +controversy and dispute. In the way of controversy are carried on all such +dialogues, as tend to eradicate false opinions; and that, either indirectly, +by involving them in difficulties, and embarrassing the maintainers of them; +or directly, by confuting them. In the way of inquiry proceed those whose +tendency is to raise in the mind right opinions; and that either by exciting +to the pursuit of some part of wisdom, and showing in what manner to +investigate it; or by leading the way, and helping the mind forward in the +search. And this is effected by a process through opposing arguments.[23] + +------------------ +[23] It is necessary to observe that Plato in the Parmenides calls all +that part of his Dialectic, which proceeds through opposite arguments, an +exercise and wandering. +------------------ + +The dialogues of the other kind, the Dogmatical or Didactic, teach +explicitly some point of doctrine; and this they do either by laying it +down in the authoritative way, or by proving it in the ways of reason and +argument. In the authoritative way the doctrine is delivered, sometimes by +the speaker himself magisterially, at other times as derived to him by +tradition from wise men. The argumentative or demonstrative method of +teaching, used by Plato, proceeds in all the dialectic ways, dividing, +defining, demonstrating, and analysing; and the object of it consists in +exploring truth alone. According to this division is framed the following +scheme, or table: + +DIALOGUES[24] + +Sceptical Disputative Embarrassing Confuting Inquisitive Exciting Assisting +Dogmatical Demonstrative Analytical Inductional Authoritative Magisterial +Traditional + +----------------- +[24]We have, given us by Diogenes Laertius, another division of the +characters, as he calls them, of Plato's writings, different from that +exhibited in the scheme above. This we have thought proper to subjoin, on +account of its antiquity and general reception. + +Dialogues + +Diadectic Speculative Physical Logical Practical Ethical Political +Inquisitive Gymnastic Maieutic Peirastic Agonistic Endeietic Anatreptic + +The learned reader will observe the latter half of the dialogues, according +to this scheme, to be described by metaphors taken from the gymnastic art: +the dialogues, here termed gymnastic, being imagined to bear a similitude +to that exercise; the agonistic, to the combat. In the lowest subdivision, +indeed, the word maieutic is a metaphor of another kind, fully explained in +Plato's Theaetetus: the maieutic dialogues, however, were supposed to +resemble giving the rudiments of the art; as the peirastic were, to +represent a skirmish, or trial of proficiency; the endeietic were, it +seems, likened to the exhibiting a specimen of skill; and the anatreptic, +to presenting the spectacle of a thorough defeat, or sound drubbing. The +principal reason why we contented not ourselves with this account of the +difference between the dialogues of Plato, was the capital error there +committed in the first subdivision, of course extending itself through the +latter. This error consists in dividing the Didactic dialogues with regard +to their subject-matter; while those of the Inquisitive sort are divided +with respect to the manner of their composition. So that the subdivisions +fall not, with any propriety, under one and the same general head. Besides, +a novice in the works of Plato might hence be led naturally to suppose, +that the dogmatical or didactic dialogues are, all of them, written in the +same manner; and that the others, those of the inquisitive kind, by us +termed sceptical, have no particular subjects at all; or, if they have, +that their subjects are different from those of the didactic dialogues, +and are consequently unphilosophical. Now every one of the suppositions +here mentioned is far from being true. +---------------- + +The philosopher, in thus varying his manner, and diversifying his +writings into these several kinds, means not merely to entertain with +their variety; not to teach, on different occasions, with more or less +plainness and perspicuity; not yet to insinuate different degrees of +certainty in the doctrines themselves: but he takes this method, as a +consummate master of the art of composition in the dialogue-way of +writing, from the different characters of the speakers, as from different +elements in the frame of these dramatic dialogues, or different +ingredients in their mixture, producing some peculiar genius and turn of +temper, as it were, in each. + +Socrates indeed is in almost all of them the principal speaker: but when +he falls into the company of some arrogant sophist; when the modest +wisdom, and clear science of the one, are contrasted with the confident +ignorance and blind opinionativeness of the other; dispute and +controversy must of course arise: where the false pretender cannot fail +of being either puzzled or confuted. To puzzle him only is sufficient, +if there be no other persons present; because such a man can never be +confuted in his own opinion: but when there is an audience round them, +in danger of being misled by sophistry into error, then is the true +philosopher to exert his utmost, and the vain sophist to be convicted +and exposed. + +In some dialogues Plato represents his great master mixing in +conversation with young men of the best families in the commonwealth. +When these happen to have docile dispositions and fair minds, then is +occasion given to the philosopher to call forth[25] the latent seeds of +wisdom, and to cultivate the noble plants with true doctrine, in the +affable and familiar way of joint inquiry. To this is owing the +inquisitive genius of such dialogues: where, by a seeming equality in the +conversation, the curiosity or zeal of the mere stranger is excited; that +of the disciple is encouraged; and, by proper questions, the mind is +aided and forwarded in the search of truth. + +----------------- +[25] We require exhortation, that we may be led to true good; dissuasion, +that we may be turned from things truly evil; obstetrication, that we may +draw forth our unperverted conceptions; and confutation, that we may be +purified from two-fold ignorance. +----------------- + +At other times, the philosophic hero of these dialogues is introduced +in a higher character, engaged in discourse with men of more improved +understandings and enlightened minds. At such seasons he has an +opportunity of teaching in a more explicit manner, and of discovering +the reasons of things: for to such an audience truth is due, and all +demonstrations[26] possible in the teaching it. Hence, in the dialogues +composed of these persons, naturally arises the justly argumentative or +demonstrative genius; and this, as we have before observed, according to +all the dialectic methods. + +----------------- +[26] The Platonists rightly observe, that Socrates, in these cases, makes +use of demonstrative and just reasoning, ([Greek: apodeiktikou]); whereas +to the novice he is contented with arguments only probable, ([Greek: +pithanois]); and against the litigious sophist often employs such as are +[Greek: eristikoi]; puzzling and contentious. +----------------- + +But when the doctrine to be taught admits not of demonstration; of which +kind is the doctrine of antiquities, being only traditional, and a matter +of belief; and the doctrine of laws, being injunctional, and the matter of +obedience; the air of authority is then assumed: in the former cases, the +doctrine is traditionally handed down to others from the authority of +ancient sages; in the latter, is magisterially pronounced with the +authority of a legislator.[27] + +----------------- +[27] It is necessary to observe, that in those dialogues in which Socrates +is indeed introduced, but sustains an inferior part, he is presented to +our view as a learner, and not as a teacher; and this is the case in the +Parmenides and Timaeus. For by the former of these philosophers he is +instructed in the most abtruse theological dogmas, and by the latter in +the whole of physiology. +----------------- + +Thus much for the manner in which the dialogues of Plato are severally +composed, and the cast of genius given them in their composition. The +form under which they appear, or the external character that marks them, +is of three sorts: either purely dramatic, like the dialogue of tragedy +or comedy; or purely narrative, where a former conversation is supposed +to be committed to writing, and communicated to some absent friend; or of +the mixed kind, like a narration in dramatic poems, where is recited, to +some person present, the story of things past. + +Having thus divided the dialogues of Plato, in respect of that inward +form or composition, which creates their genius; and again, with +reference to that outward form, which marks them, like flowers and other +vegetables, with a certain character; we are further to make a division +of them, with regard to their subject and their design; beginning with +their design, or end, because for the sake of this are all the subjects +chosen. The end of all the writings of Plato is that, which is the end of +all true philosophy or wisdom, the perfection and the happiness of man. +Man therefore is the general subject; and the first business of philosophy +must be to inquire what is that being called man, who is to be made happy; +and what is his nature, in the perfection of which is placed his happiness. +As however, in the preceding part of this Introduction, we have endeavored +to give the outlines of Plato's doctrine concerning man, it is unnecessary +in this place to say any thing further on that subject. + +The dialogues of Plato, therefore, with respect to their subjects, may be +divided into the speculative, the practical, and such as are of a mixed +nature. The subjects of these last are either general, comprehending both +the others; or differential, distinguishing them. The general subject are +either fundamental, or final: those of the fundamental kind are philosophy, +human nature, the soul of man; of the final kind are love, beauty, good. +The differential regard knowledge, as it stands related to practice; in +which are considered two questions: one of which is, whether virtue is to +he taught; the other is, whether error in the will depends on error in +the judgment. The subjects of the speculative dialogues relate either to +words, or to things. Of the former sort are etymology, sophistry, rhetoric, +poetry; of the latter sort are science, true being, the principles of +mind, outward nature. The practical subjects relate either to private +conduct, and the government of the mind over the whole man; or to his +duty towards others in his several relations; or to the government of a +civil state, and the public conduct of a whole people. Under these three +heads rank in order the particular subjects practical; virtue in general, +sanctity, temperance, fortitude, justice, friendship, patriotism, piety; +the ruling mind in a civil government, the frame and order of a state, +law in general, and lastly, those rules of government and of public +conduct, the civil laws. + +Thus, for the sake of giving the reader a scientific, that is a +comprehensive, and at the same time a distinct view of Plato's writings, +we have attempted to exhibit to him, their just and natural distinctions; +whether he chooses to consider them with regard to their inward form or +essence, their outward form or appearance, their matter; or their end: +that is, in those more familiar terms, we have used in this Synopsis, +their genius, their character, their subject, and their design. + +And here it is requisite to observe, that as it is the characteristic of +the highest good to be universally beneficial, though some things are +benefitted by it more and others less, in consequence of their greater or +less aptitude to receive it; in like manner the dialogues of Plato are +so largely stamped with the characters of sovereign good, that they are +calculated to benefit in a certain degree even those who are incapable +of penetrating their profundity. They can tame a savage sophist, like +Thrasymachus in the Republic; humble the arrogance even of those who +are ignorant of their ignorance; make those to become proficients in +political, who will never arrive at theoretic virtue; and, in short, like +the illuminations of deity, wherever there is any portion of aptitude in +their recipients, they purify, irradiate, and exalt. + +After this general view of the dialogues of Plato, let us in the next +place consider their preambles, the digressions with which they abound, +and the character of the style in which they are written. With respect to +the first of these, the preambles, however superfluous they may at first +sight appear, they will be found on a closer inspection necessary to the +design of the dialogues which they accompany. Thus the prefatory part of +the Timaeus unfolds, in images agreeably to the Pythagoric custom, the +theory of the world; and the first part of the Parmenides, or the +discussion of ideas, is in fact merely a preamble to the second part, +or the speculation of the one; to which however it is essentially +preparatory. Hence, as Plutarch says, when he speaks of Plato's dialogue +on the Atlantic island: These preambles are superb gates and magnificent +courts with which he purposely embellishes his great edifices, that +nothing may be wanting to their beauty, and that all may be equally +splendid. He acts, as Dacier well observes, like a great prince, who, +when he builds a sumptuous palace, adorns (in the language of Pindar) the +vestibule with golden pillars. For it is fit that what is first seen +should be splendid and magnificent, and should as it were perspicuously +announce all that grandeur which afterwards presents itself to the view. + +With respect to the frequent digressions in his dialogues, these also, +when accurately examined, will be found to be no less subservient to the +leading design of the dialogues in which they are introduced; at the same +time that they afford a pleasing relaxation to the mind from the labor of +severe investigation. Hence Plato, by the most happy and enchanting art, +contrives to lead the reader to the temple of Truth through the delightful +groves and valleys of the Graces. In short, this circuitous course, when +attentively considered, will be found to be the shortest road by which he +could conduct the reader to the desired end: for in accomplishing this it +is necessary to regard not that road, which is most straight in the +nature of things, or abstractedly considered, but that which is most +direct in the progressions of human understanding. + +With respect to the style of Plato, though it forms in reality the +most inconsiderable part of the merit of his writings, style in all +philosophical works being the last thing that should be attended to, yet +even in this Plato may contend for the palm of excellence with the most +renowned masters of diction. Hence we find that his style was the +admiration of the finest writers of antiquity. According to Ammianus, +Jupiter himself would not speak otherwise, if he were to converse in the +Attic tongue. Aristotle considered his style as a medium between poetry +and prose. Cicero no less praises him for the excellence of his diction +than the profundity of his conceptions; and Longinus calls him with +respect to his language, the rival of Homer. Hence he is considered by +this prince of critics, as deriving into himself abundant streams from +the Homeric fountain, and is compared by him, in his rivalship of Homer, +to a new antagonist who enters the lists against one that is already the +object of universal admiration. + +Notwithstanding this praise, however, Plato has been accused, as Longinus +informs us, of being frequently hurried away as by a certain Bacchic fury +of words to immoderate and unpleasant metaphors, and an allegoric +magnificence of diction. Longinus excuses this by saying that whatever +naturally excels in magnitude possesses very little of purity. For that, +says he, which is in every respect accurate is in danger of littleness. +He adds, "and may not this also be necessary, that those of an abject and +moderate genius, because they never encounter danger, nor aspire after +the summit of excellence, are for the most part without error and remain +in security; but that great things become insecure through their magnitude?" +Indeed it appears to me, that whenever this exuberance, this Bacchic +fury, occurs in the diction of Plato, it is owing to the magnitude of the +inspiring influence of deity with which he is then replete. For that he +sometimes wrote from divine inspiration is evident from his own confession +in the Phaedrus, a great part of which is not so much like an orderly +discourse as a dithyrambic poem. Such a style therefore, as it is the +progeny of divine mania, which, as Plato justly observes, is better than +all human prudence, spontaneously adapts itself to its producing cause, +imitates a supernatural power as far as this can be effected by words, +and thus necessarily becomes magnificent, vehement, and exuberant; for +such are the characteristics of its source. All judges of composition +however, both ancient and modern, are agreed that his style is in general +graceful and pure; and that it is sublime without being impetuous and +rapid. It is indeed no less harmonious than elevated, no less accurate[27] +than magnificent. It combines the force of the greatest orators with the +graces of the first of poets; and in short; is a river to which those +justly celebrated lines of Denham may be most pertinently applied: + + Tho' deep, yet clear; tho' gentle, yet not dull; + Strong without rage, without o'erfowing full. + +----------------- +[27] The reader will see, from the notes on Plato's dialogues, and +particularly from the notes on the Parmenides and Timaeus, that the style +of that philosopher possesses an accuracy which is not to be found in any +modern writer; an accuracy of such a wonderful nature, that the words are +exactly commensurate with the sense. Hence the reader who has happily +penetrated his profundity finds, with astonishment, that another word +could not have been added without being superfluous, nor one word taken +away without injuring the sense. The same observation may also be applied +to the style of Aristotle. +----------------- + +Having thus considered the philosophy of Plato, given a general view of +his writings, and made some observations on his style, it only now +remains to speak of the following arrangement of his dialogues and +translation of his works, and then, with a few appropriate observations, +to close this Introduction. + +As no accurate and scientific arrangement then of these dialogues has +been transmitted to us from the ancients, I was under the necessity of +adopting an arrangement of my own, which I trust is not unscientific, +however inferior it may be to that which was doubtless made, though +unfortunately lost, by the latter interpreters of Plato. In my +arrangement, therefore, I have imitated the order of the universe in +which, as I have already observed, wholes precede parts, and universals +particulars. Hence I have placed those dialogues first which rank as +wholes, or have the relation of a system, and afterwards those in which +these systems are branch out into particulars. Thus, after the First +Alcibiades, which may be called, and appears to have been generally +considered by the ancients an introduction to the whole of Plato's +philosophy, I have placed the Republic and the Laws, which may be said to +comprehend systematically the morals and politics of Plato. After these I +have ranked the Timaeus, which contains the whole of his physiology, and +together with it the Critias, because of its connection with the Timaeus. +The next in order is the Parmenides, which contains a system of his +theology. Thus far this arrangement is conformable to the natural progress +of the human mind in the acquisition of the sublimest knowledge; the +subsequent arrangement principally regards the order of things. After the +Parmenides then, the Sophista, Phaedrus, Greater Hippias, and Banquet, +follow, which may be considered as so many lesser wholes subordinate to +and comprehended in the Parmenides, which, like the universe itself, is a +whole of wholes. For in the Sophista being itself is investigated, in the +Banquet love itself, and in the Phaedrus beauty itself; all which are +intelligible forms, and are consequently contained in the Parmenides, in +which the whole extent of the intelligible is unfolded. The Greater +Hippias is classed with the Phaedrus, because in the latter the whole +series of the beautiful is discussed, and in the former that which +subsists in soul. After these follows the Theaetetus, in which science +considered as subsisting in soul is investigated; science itself, +according to its first subsistence, having been previously celebrated by +Socrates in one part of the Phaedrus. The Politicus and Minos, which +follow next, may be considered as ramifications from the Laws; and, in +short, all the following dialogues either consider more particularly the +dogmas which are systematically comprehended in those already enumerated, +or naturally flow from them as their original source. As it did not +however appear possible to arrange these dialogues which rank as parts in +the same accurate order as those which we considered as whole, it was +thought better to class them either according to their agreement in one +particular circumstance, as the Phaedo, Apology, and Crito, all which +relate to the death of Socrates, and as the Meno and Protagoras, which +relate to the question whether virtue can be taught; or according to +their agreement in character, as the Lesser Hippias and Euthydemus, which +are anatreptic, and the Theages, Laches, and Lysis, which are maieutic +dialogues. The Cratylus is ranked in the last place, not so much because +the subject of it is etymology, as because a great part of it is deeply +theological; for by this arrangement, after having ascended to all the +divine orders and their ineffable principle in the Parmenides, and thence +descended in a regular series to the human soul in the subsequent +dialogues, the reader is again led back to deity in this dialogue, and +thus imitates the order which all beings observe, that of incessantly +returning to the principles whence they flew. + +After the dialogues[28] follow the Epistles of Plato, which are in every +respect worthy that prince of all true philosophers. They are not only +written with great elegance, and occasionally with magnificence of +diction, but with all the becoming dignity of a mind conscious of its +superior endowments, and all the authority of a master in philosophy. +They are likewise replete with many admirable political observations, +and contain some of his most abstruse dogmas, which though delivered +enigmatically, yet the manner in which they are delivered, elucidates at +the same time that it is elucidated by what is said of these dogmas in +his more theological dialogues. + +----------------- +[28] As I profess to give the reader a translation of the genuine works +of Plato only, I have not translated the Axiochus, Demodoeus, Sisyphus, +&c. as these are evidently spurious dialogues. +----------------- + +With respect, to the following translation, it is necessary to observe, in +the first place, than the numbers of legitimate dialogues of Plato is +fifty-five; for though the Republic forms but one treatise, and the Laws +another, yet the former consists of ten, and the latter of twelve books, +and each of these books is a dialogue. Hence, as there are thirty-three +dialogues, besides the Laws and the Republic, fifty-five will, as we have +said, be the amount of the whole. Of these fifty-five, the nine following +have been translated by Mr. Sydenham; viz. the First and Second Alcibiades, +the Greater and Lesser Hippias, the Banquet (except the speech of +Alcibiades), the Philebus, the Meno, the Io, and the Rivals.[29] I have +already observed, and with deep regret, that this excellent though +unfortunate scholar died before he had made that proficiency in the +philosophy of Plato which might have been reasonably expected from so fair +a beginning. I personally knew him only in the decline of life, when his +mental powers were not only considerably impaired by age, but greatly +injured by calamity. His life had been very stormy; his circumstances, for +many years preceding his death, were indigent; his patrons were by no means +liberal; and his real friends were neither numerous nor affluent. He began +the study of Plato, as he himself informed me, when he had considerably +passed the meridian of life, and with most unfortunate prejudices against +his best disciples, which I attempted to remove during my acquaintance with +him, and partly succeeded in the attempt; but infirmity and death prevented +its completion. Under such circumstances it was not to be expected that he +would fathom the profundity of Plato's conceptions, and arrive at the +summit of philosophic attainments. I saw, however, that his talents and his +natural disposition were such as might have ranked him among the best of +Plato's interpreters, if he had not yielded to the pressure of calamity, if +he had not nourished such baneful prejudices, and if he had not neglected +philosophy in the early part of life. Had this happened, my labors would +have been considerably lessened, or perhaps rendered entirely unnecessary, +and his name would have been transmitted to posterity with undecaying +renown. As this unfortunately did not happen, I have been under the +necessity of diligently examining and comparing with the original all +those parts of the dialogues which he translated, that are more deeply +philosophical, or that contain any thing of the theology of Plato. In +these, as might be expected, I found him greatly deficient; I found him +sometimes mistaking the meaning through ignorance of Plato's more sublime +tenets, and at other times perverting it, in order to favor some opinions +of his own. His translation however of other parts which are not so +abstruse is excellent. In these he not only presents the reader faithfully +with the matter, but likewise with the genuine manner of Plato. The notes +too which accompany the translation of these parts generally exhibit just +criticism and extensive learning, an elegant taste, and a genius naturally +philosophic. Of these notes I have preserved as much as was consistent with +the limits and design of the following work. + +----------------- +[29] In the notes on the above-mentioned nine dialogues, those written +by Mr. Sydenham are signed S., and those by myself T. +----------------- + +Of the translation of the Republic by Dr. Spens, it is necessary to observe +that a considerable part of it is very faithfully executed; but that in the +more abstruse parts it is inaccurate; and that it every where abounds with +Scotticisms which offend an English ear, and vulgarisms which are no less +disgraceful to the translator than disgusting to the reader. Suffice it +therefore to say of this version, that I have adopted it wherever I found +it could with propriety be adopted, and given my own translation where it +was otherwise. + +Of the ten dialogues translated by Dacier, I can say nothing with +accuracy, because I have no knowledge whatever of the French language; +but if any judgment may be formed of this work, from a translation of it +into English, I will be bold to say that it is by no means literal, and +that he very frequently mistakes the sense of the original. From this +translation therefore I could derive but little assistance; some however +I have derived, and that little I willingly acknowledge. In translating +the rest of Plato's works, and this, as the reader may easily see, form +by far the greatest part of them, I have had no assistance from any +translation except that of Ficinus, the general excellency of which is +well known to every student of Plato, arising not only from his +possessing a knowledge of Platonism superior to that of any translators +that have followed him, but likewise from his having made this +translation from a very valuable manuscript in the Medicean library, +which is now no longer to be found. I have, however, availed myself of +the learned labors of the editors of various dialogues of Plato; such as +the edition of the Rivals, Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, and Phaedo, by +Forster; of the First and Second Alcibiades and Hipparchus, by Etwall; of +the Meno, First Alcibiades, Phaedo and Phaedrus, printed at Vienna, 1784; +of the Cratylus and Theaetetus, by Fischer; of the Republic, by Massey; +and of the Euthydemus and Gorgias, by Dr. Routh, president of Magdalen +College, Oxford. This last editor has enriched his edition of these two +dialogues with very valuable and copious philological and critical notes, +in which he has displayed no less learning than judgment, no less +acuteness than taste. He appears indeed to me to be one of the best and +most modest of philologists; and it is to be hoped that he will be +imitated in what he has done by succeeding editors of Plato's text. + +If my translation had been made with an eye to the judgment of the many, +it would have been necessary to apologize for its literal exactness. +Had I been anxious to gratify false taste with respect to composition, I +should doubtless have attended less to the precise meaning of the original, +have omitted almost all connective Particles, have divided long periods +into a number of short ones, and branched out the strong and deep river of +Plato's language into smooth-gliding, shallow, and feeble streams; but as +the present work was composed with the hope indeed of benefitting all, but +with an eye to the criticism solely of men of elevated souls, I have +endeavored not to lose a word of the original; and yet at the same time +have attempted to give the translation as much elegance as such verbal +accuracy can be supposed capable of admitting. I have also endeavored to +preserve the manner as well as the matter of my author, being fully +persuaded that no translation deserves applause, in which both these are +not as much as possible preserved. + +My principal object in this arduous undertaking has been to unfold all +the abstruse and sublime dogmas of Plato, as they are found dispersed in +his works. Minutely to unravel the art which he employs in the +composition of all his dialogues, and to do full justice to his meaning +in every particular, must be the task of some one who has more leisure, +and who is able to give the works of Plato to the public on a more +extensive plan. In accomplishing this great object, I have presented the +reader in my notes with nearly the substance in English of all the +following manuscript Greek Commentaries and Scholia on Plato; viz. of the +Commentaries of Proclus on the Parmenides and First Alcibiades; and of +his Scholia on the Cratylus; of the Scholia of Olympiodorus on the +Phaedo, Gorgias, and Philebus; and of Hermeas on the Phoedrus. To these +are added very copious extracts from the manuscript of Damascius,[30] +Peri Archon, and from the published works of Proclus on the Timeus, +Republic, and Theology of Plato. Of the four first of these manuscripts, +three of which are folio volumes, I have complete copies taken with my +own hand; and of the copious extracts from the others, those from +Olympiodorus on the Gorgias were taken by me from the copy preserved in +the British Museum; those from the same philosopher on the Philebus, and +those from Hermeas on the Phaedrus, and Damascius Peri Archon, from the +copies in the Bodleian library. + +----------------- +[30] Patricius was one of the very few in modern times who have been +sensible of the great merit of these writings, as is evident from the +extract from the preface to his translation of Proclus's Theological +Elements. (Ferrar. 4to. 1583.) Patricius, prior to this, enumerates the +writings of Proclus, and they are included in his wish that all the +manuscript Greek commentaries on Plato were made public. +----------------- + +And here gratitude demands that I should publicly acknowledge the very +handsome and liberal manner in which I was received by the University of +Oxford, and by the principal librarian and sub-librarians of the Bodleian +library, during the time that I made the above mentioned extracts. In the +first place I have to acknowledge the very polite attention which was paid +to me by Dr. Jackson,[31] dean of Christ-church. In the second place, the +liberty of attendance at the Bodleian library, and the accommodation which +was there afforded me, by the librarians of that excellent collection, +demand from me no small tribute of praise. And, above all, the very liberal +manner in which I was received by the fellows of New College, with whom I +resided for three weeks, and from whom I experienced even Grecian +hospitality, will, I trust, be as difficult a task for time to obliterate +from my memory, as it would be for me to express it as it deserves. + +----------------- +[31] I was much pleased to find that this very respectable prelate is a +great admirer of Aristotle, and that extracts from the Commentaries of +Simplicius and Ammonius on the Categories of that philosopher, are read +by his orders in the college of which he is the head. +----------------- + +With respect to the faults which I may have committed in this translation +(for I am not vain enough to suppose it is without fault), I might plead +as an excuse, that the whole of it has been executed amidst severe +endurance from bodily infirmity and indigent circumstances; and that a +very considerable part of it was accomplished amidst other ills of no +common magnitude, and other labors inimical to such an undertaking. But +whatever may be my errors, I will not fly to calamity for an apology. Let +it be my excuse that the mistakes I may have committed in lesser +particulars, have arisen from my eagerness to seize and promulgate those +great truths in the philosophy and theology of Plato, which though they +have been concealed for ages in oblivion, have a subsistence coeval with +the universe, and will again be restored, and flourish for very extended +periods, through all the infinite revolutions of time. + +In the next place, it is necessary to speak concerning the qualifications +requisite in a legitimate student of the philosophy of Plato, previous to +which I shall just notice the absurdity of supposing that a mere knowledge +of the Greek tongue, however great that knowledge may be, is alone +sufficient to the understanding the sublime doctrines of Plato; for a man +might as well think that he can understand Archimedes without a knowledge +of the elements of geometry, merely because he can read him in the +original. Those who entertain such an idle opinion, would do well to +meditate on the profound observation of Heraclitus, "that polymathy does +not teach intellect," ([Greek: Polymathic noon ou didaskei]). + +By a legitimate student, then, of the Platonic philosophy, I mean one +who, both from nature and education, is properly qualified for such +an arduous undertaking; that is one who possesses a naturally good +disposition; is sagacious and acute, and is inflamed with an ardent +desire for the acquisition of wisdom and truth; who from his childhood +has been well instructed in the mathematical disciplines; who, besides +this, has spent whole days, and frequently the greater part of the night, +in profound meditation; and, like one triumphantly sailing over a raging +sea, or skillfully piercing through an army of foes, has successfully +encountered an hostile multitude of doubts;--in short, who has never +considered wisdom as a thing of trifling estimation and easy access, but +as that which cannot be obtained without the most generous and severe +endurance, and the intrinsic worth of which surpasses all corporeal good, +far more than the ocean the fleeting bubble which floats on its surface. +To such as are destitute of these requisites, who make the study of words +their sole employment, and the pursuit of wisdom but at best a secondary +thing, who expect to be wise by desultory application for an hour or two +in a day, after the fatigues of business, after mixing with the base +multitude of mankind, laughing with the gay affecting airs of gravity +with the serious, tacitly assenting to every man's opinion, however +absurd, and winking at folly however shameful and base--to such as +these--and, alas! the world is full of such--the sublimest truths must +appear to be nothing more than jargon and reverie, the dreams of a +distempered imagination, or the ebullitions of fanatical faith. + +But all this is by no means wonderful, if we consider that two-fold +ignorance is the disease of the many. For they are not only ignorant with +respect to the sublimest knowledge, but they are even ignorant of their +ignorance. Hence they never suspect their want of understanding, but +immediately reject a doctrine which appears at first sight absurd, +because it is too splendid for their bat-like eyes to behold. Or if they +even yield their assent to its truth, their very assent is the result of +the same most dreadful disease of the soul. For they will fancy, says +Plato, that they understand the highest truths, when the very contrary is +really the case. I earnestly therefore entreat men of this description, +not to meddle with any of the profound speculations of the Platonic +philosophy, for it is more dangerous to urge them to such an employment, +than to advise them to follow their sordid avocations with unwearied +assiduity, and toil for wealth with increasing alacrity and vigor; as +they will by this means give free scope to the base habits of their soul, +and sooner suffer that punishment which in such as these must always +precede mental illumination, and be the inevitable consequence of guilt. +It is well said indeed by Lysis, the Pythagorean, that to inculcate +liberal speculations and discourses to those whose morals are turbid and +confused, is just as absurd as to pour pure and transparent water into a +deep well full of mire and clay; for he who does this will only disturb +the mud, and cause the pure water to become defiled. The woods of such, +as the same author beautifully observes, (that is the irrational or +corporeal life), in which these dire passions are nourished, must first +be purified with fire and sword, and every kind of instrument (that is, +through preparatory disciplines, and the political virtues), and reason +must be freed from its slavery to the affections, before any thing useful +can be planted in these savage haunts. + +Let not such then presume to explore the regions of Platonic philosophy. +The land is too pure to admit the sordid and the base. The road which +conducts to it is too intricate to be discovered by the unskillful and +stupid, and the journey is too long and laborious to be accomplished by +the effeminate and the timid, by the slave of passion and the dupe of +opinion, by the lover of sense and the despiser of truth. The dangers and +difficulties in the undertaking are such as can be sustained by none but +the most hardy and accomplished adventurers; and he who begins the journey +without the strength of Hercules, or the wisdom and patience of Ulysses, +must be destroyed by the wild beasts of the forest, or perish in the storms +of the ocean; must suffer transmutation into a beast through the magic +power of Circe, or be exiled for life by the detaining charm of Calypso; +and in short must descend into Hades, and wander in its darkness, without +emerging from thence to the bright regions of the morning, or be ruined +by the deadly melody of the Syren's song. To the most skillful traveler, +who pursues the right road with an ardor which no toils can abate, with +a vigilance which no weariness can surprise into negligence, and with +virtue which no temptations can seduce, it exhibits for many years the +appearance of the Ithaca of Ulysses, or the flying Italy of AEneas; for +we no sooner gain a glimpse of the pleasing land which is to be the end +of our journey, than it is suddenly ravished from our view, and we still +find ourselves at a distance from the beloved coast, exposed to the fury +of a stormy sea of doubts. + +Abandon then, ye groveling souls, the fruitless design! Pursue with +avidity the beaten road which leads to popular honors and sordid gain, +but relinquish all thoughts of a voyage for which you are totally +unprepared. Do you not perceive what a length of sea separates you from +the royal coast? A sea, + + Huge, horrid, vast, where scarce in safety sails + The best built ship, though Jove inspire the gales. + +And may we not very justly ask you, similar to the interrogation of +Calypso, + + What ships have you, what sailors to convey, + What oars to cut the long laborious way? + +I shall only observe further, that the life of Plato, by Olympiodorus, was +prefixed to this translation, in preference to that by Diogenes Laertius, +because the former is the production of a most eminent Platonist, and the +latter of a mere historian, who indiscriminately gave to the public whatever +anecdotes he found in other authors. If the reader combines this short +sketch of the life of Plato with what that philosopher says of himself in +his 7th Epistle, he will be in possession of the most important particulars +about him that can be obtained at present. + + + +EXPLANATIONS OF CERTAIN PLATONIC TERMS + +As some apology may be thought necessary for having introduced certain +unusual words of Greek origin, I shall only observe, that, as all arts and +sciences have certain appropriate terms peculiar to themselves, philosophy, +which is the art of arts, and science of sciences, as being the mistress of +both, has certainly a prior and a far superior claim to this privilege. I +have not, however, introduced, I believe, any of these terms without at the +same time sufficiently explaining them; but, lest the contrary should have +taken place, the following explanation of all such terms as I have been +able to recollect, and also of common words used by Platonists in a +peculiar sense, is subjoined for the information of the reader. + +Anagogic, [Greek: anagogikos]. Leading on high. + +Demiurgus, [Greek: demiourgos]. Jupiter, the artificer of the universe. + +Dianoetia. This word is derived from [Greek: dianoia], or that power of +the soul which reasons scientifically, deriving the principles of its +reasoning from intellect. Plato is so uncommonly accurate in his diction, +that this word is very seldom used by him in any other than its primary +sense. + +The Divine, [Greek: to Theion], is being subsisting in conjunction with +the one. For all things, except the one, viz. essence, life, and +intellect, are considered by Plato as suspended from and secondary to the +gods. For the gods do not subsist in, but prior to, these, which they +also produce and connect, but are not characterized by these. In many +places, however, Plato calls the participants of the gods by the names of +the gods. For not only the Athenian Guest in the Laws, but also Socrates +in the Phaedrus, calls a divine soul a god. "For," says he, "all the +horses and charioteers of the gods are good," &c. And afterwards, still +more clearly, he adds, "And this is the life of the gods." And not only +this, but he also denominates those nature gods that are always united to +the gods, and which, in conjunction with them, give completion to one +series. He also frequently calls daemons gods, though, according to +essence, they are secondary to and subsist about the gods. For in the +Phaedrus, Timaeus, and other dialogues, he extends the appellation of +gods as far as the daemons. And what is still more paradoxical than all +this, he does not refuse to call some men gods; as, for instance, the +Elean Guest in the Sophista. From all this, therefore, we must infer that +with respect to the word god, one thing which is thus denominated is +simply deity; another is so according to union; a third, according to +participation; a fourth, according to contact; and a fifth, according to +similitude. Thus every superessential nature is primarily a god; but +every intellectual nature is so according to union. And again, every +divine soul is a god according to participation; but divine daemons are +gods according to contact with the gods; and the souls of men obtain this +appellation through similitude. Each of these, however, except the first, +is as we have said, rather divine than a god; for the Athenian Guest in +the Laws, calls intellect itself divine. But that which is divine is +secondary to the first deity, in the same manner as the united is to the +one; that which is intellectual to intellect; and that which is animated +to soul. Indeed, things more uniform and simple always precede, and the +series of beings ends in the one itself. + +Doxastic. This word is derived from doxa, opinion, and signifies that +which is apprehended by opinion, or that power which is the extremity of +the rational soul. This power knows the universal in particulars, as that +every man is a rational animal; but it knows not the dioti, or why a +thing is, but only the oti, or that it is. + +The Eternal, [Greek: To aionion], that which has a never-ending subsistence, +without any connection with time; or, as Plotinus profoundly defines it, +infinite life at once total and full. + +That which is generated, [Greek: to geneton]. That which has not the +whole of its essence or energy subsisting at once without temporal +dispersion. + +Generation, [Greek: genesis]. An essence composite and multiform, and +conjoined with time. This is the proper signification of the word; but it +is used symbolically by Plato, and also by theologists more ancient than +Plato, for the sake of indication. For as Proclus beautifully observes +(in MS. Comment in Parmenidem), "Fables call the ineffable unfolding into +light through causes, generation." "Hence," he adds in the Orphic +writings, the first cause is denominated time; for where there is +generation, according to its proper signification, there also there +is time." + +A Guest, [Greek: Xenos]. This word, in its more ample signification in +the Greek, denotes a stranger, but properly implies one who receives +another, or is himself received at an entertainment. In the following +dialogues, therefore, wherever one of the speakers is introduced as a +Xenos, I have translated this word guest, as being more conformable to +the genius of Plato's dialogues, which may be justly called rich mental +banquets, and consequently the speakers in them may be considered as so +many guests. Hence in the Timaeus, the persons of that dialogue are +expressly spoken of as guests. + +Hyparxis, [Greek: uparxis]. The first principle or foundation, as it +were, of the essence of a thing. Hence also, it is the summit of essence. + +Idiom, [Greek: Idioma]. The characteristic peculiarity of a thing. + +The Immortal, [Greek: To athanaton]. According to Plato, there are many +orders of immortality, pervading from on high to the last of things; and +the ultimate echo, as it were, of immorality is seen in the perpetuity of +the mundane wholes, which according to the doctrine of the Elean Guest in +the Politicus, they participate from the Father of the universe. For both +the being and the life of every body depend on another cause; since body +is not itself naturally adapted to connect, or adorn, or preserve itself. +But the immortality of partial souls, such as ours, is more manifest and +more perfect than this of the perpetual bodies in the universe; as is +evident from the many demonstrations which are given of it in the Phaedo, +and in the 10th book of the Republic. For the immortality of partial +souls has a more principal subsistence, as possessing in itself the cause +of eternal permanency. But prior to both these is the immortality of +daemons; for these neither verge to mortality, nor are they filled with +the nature of things which are generated and corrupted. More venerable, +however, than these, and essentially transcending them, is the +immortality of divine souls, which are primarily self-motive, and contain +the fountains and principles of the life which is attributed about +bodies, and through which bodies participate of renewed immortality. And +prior to all these is the immortality of the gods: for Diotima in the +Banquet does not ascribe an immortality of this kind to demons. Hence +such an immortality as this is separate and exempt from wholes. For, +together with the immortality of the gods, eternity subsists, which is +the fountain of all immortality and life, as well that life which is +perpetual, as that which is dissipated into nonentity. In short, +therefore, the divine immortal is that which is generative and connective +of perpetual life. For it is not immortal, as participating of life, but +as supplying divine life, and deifying life itself. + +Imparticipable, [Greek: To amethekton]. That which is not consubsistent +with an inferior nature. Thus imparticipable intellect is an intellect +which is not consubsistent with soul. + +Intellectual Projection, [Greek: noera epibole]. As the perception of +intellect is immediate, being a darting forth, as it were, directly to +its proper objects, this direct intuition is expressed by the term +projection. + +The Intelligible, [Greek: To noeton]. This word in Plato and Platonic +writers has a various signification: for, in the first place, whatever is +exempt from sensibles, and has its essence separate from them, is said to +be intelligible, and in this sense soul is intelligible. In the second +place, intellect, which is prior to soul, is intelligible. In the third +place, that which is more ancient than intellect, which replenishes +intelligence and is essentially perfective of it, is called intelligible; +and this is the intelligible which Timaeus in Plato places in the order +of a paradigm, prior to the demiurgic intellect and intellectual energy. +But beyond these is the divine intelligible, which is defined according +to divine union and hyparxis. For this is intelligible as the object of +desire to intellect, as giving perfection to and containing it, and as +the completion of being. The highest intelligible, therefore, is that +which is the hyparxis of the gods; the second, that which is true being, +and the first essence; the third, intellect, and all intellectual life; +and the fourth, the order belonging to soul. + +Logismos, reasoning. When applied to divinity as by Plato in the Timaeus, +signifies a distributive cause of things. + +On account of which; with reference to which; through which; according to +which, from which; or in which; viz. [Greek: di o, uph' ou, di ou, kath' +o, ex ou]. By the first of these terms, Plato is accustomed to denominate +the final cause; by the second the paradigmatic; by the third, the +demiurgic; by the fourth, the instrumental; by the fifth, form; and by +the sixth, matter. + +Orectic. This word is derived from [Greek: orexis], appetite. + +Paradigm, [Greek: paradeigma]. A pattern, or that with reference to which +a thing is made. + +The perpetual, [Greek: to aidion]. That which subsists forever, but through +a connection with time. + +A Politician, [Greek: politikos]. This word, as Mr. Sydenham justly +observes in his notes in the Rivals, is of a very large and extensive +import as used by Plato, and the other ancient writers on politics: for +it includes all those statesmen or politicians in aristocracies and +democracies, who were, either for life, or for a certain time, invested +with the whole or a part of kingly authority, and the power thereto +belonging. See the Politicus. + +Prudence, [Greek: Phronesis]. This word frequently means in Plato and +Platonic writers, the habit of discerning what is good in all moral +actions, and frequently signifies intelligence, or intellectual +Perception. The following admirable explanation of this word is given by +Jamblichus Prudence having a precedaneous subsistence, receives its +generation from a pure and perfect intellect. Hence it looks to intellect +itself, is perfected by it, and has this as the measure and most +beautiful paradigm of all its energies. If also we have any communion +with the gods, it is especially effected by this virtue; and through this +we are in the highest degree assimilated to them. The knowledge too of +such things as are good, profitable, and beautiful, and of the contraries +to these, is obtained by this virtue; and the judgment and correction of +works proper to be done are by this directed. And in short it is a +certain governing leader of men, and of the whole arrangement of their +nature; and referring cities and houses, and the particular life, of +every one to a divine paradigm, it forms them according to the best +similitude; obliterating some things and purifying others. So that +prudence renders its possessors similar to divinity. Jamblic. apud. +Stob. p. 141. + +Psychical, [Greek: psychikos]. Pertaining to soul. + +Science. This word is sometimes defined by Plato to be that which assigns +the causes of things; sometimes to be that the subjects of which have a +perfectly stable essence; and together with this, he conjoins the +assignation of cause from reasoning. Sometimes again he defines it to be +that the principles of which are not hypotheses; and, according to this +definition, he asserts that there is one science which ascends as far as +to the principle of things. For this science considers that which is +truly the principle as unhypothetic, has for its subject true being, and +produces its reasonings from cause. According to the second definition, +he calls dianoetic knowledge science; but according to the first alone, +he assigns to physiology the appellation of science. + +The telestic art. The art pertaining to mystic ceremonies. + +Theurgic. This word is derived from [Greek: Theourgia], or that religious +operation which deifies him by whom it is performed as much as is possible +to man. + +Truth, [Greek: aletheia]. Plato, following ancient theologists, considers +truth multifariously. Hence, according to his doctrine, the highest truth +is characterized by unity, and is the light proceeding from the good, +which imparts purity, as he says in the Philebus, and union, as he says +in the Republic, to intelligibles. The truth which is next to this in +dignity is that which proceeds from intelligibles, and illuminates the +intellectual orders, and which an essence unfigured, uncolored, and +without contact, first receives, where also the plain of truth is +situated, as it is written in the Phaedrus. The third kind of truth is, +that which is connascent with souls, and which through intelligence comes +into contact with true being. For the psychical light is the third, from +the intelligible; intellectual deriving its plenitude from intelligible +light, and the psychical from the intellectual. And the last kind of +truth is that which is full of error and inaccuracy through sense, and +the instability of its object. For a material nature is perpetually +flowing, and is not naturally adapted to abide even for a moment. + +The following beautiful description of the third kind of truth, or that +which subsists in souls, is given by Jamblichus: "Truth, as the name +implies, makest a conversion about the gods and their incorporeal energy; +but, doxastic imitation, which, as Plato says, is fabricative of images, +wanders about that which is deprived of divinity and is dark. And the +former indeed receives its perfection in intelligible and divine forms, +and real beings which have a perpetual sameness of subsistence; but the +latter looks to that which is formless, and non-being, and which has a +various subsistence; and, about this it's visive power is blunted. The +former contemplates that which is, but the latter assumes such a form as +appears to the many. Hence the former associates with intellect, and +increases the intellectual nature which we contain; but the latter, from +looking to that which always seems to be, hunts after folly and +deceives." Jamblic. apud Stob. p. 136. + +The unical, [Greek: to niaion]. That which is characterized by unity. + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Introduction to the Philosophy and +Writings of Plato, by Thomas Taylor + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 10214 *** diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..718bef5 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #10214 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/10214) diff --git a/old/10214-8.txt b/old/10214-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..372911b --- /dev/null +++ b/old/10214-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,4083 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Introduction to the Philosophy and Writings +of Plato, by Thomas Taylor + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Introduction to the Philosophy and Writings of Plato + +Author: Thomas Taylor + +Release Date: November 22, 2003 [EBook #10214] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO Latin-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK INTRODUCTION TO THE *** + + + + +Produced by Jake Jaqua + + + + +INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY AND WRITINGS OF PLATO + +By + +THOMAS TAYLOR + + + + +"Philosophy," says Hierocles, "is the purification and perfection of human +life. It is the purification, indeed, from material irrationality, and the +mortal body; but the perfection, in consequence of being the resumption of +our proper felicity, and a reascent to the divine likeness. To effect these +two is the province of Virtue and Truth; the former exterminating the +immoderation of the passions; and the latter introducing the divine form to +those who are naturally adapted to its reception." + +Of philosophy thus defined, which may be compared to a luminous pyramid, +terminating in Deity, and having for its basis the rational soul of man +and its spontaneous unperverted conceptions,--of this philosophy, August, +magnificent, and divine, Plato may be justly called the primary leader +and hierophant, through whom, like the mystic light in the inmost +recesses of some sacred temple, it first shone forth with occult and +venerable splendour.[1] It may indeed be truly said of the whole of this +philosophy, that it is the greatest good which man can participate: for +if it purifies us from the defilements of the passions and assimilates us +to Divinity, it confers on us the proper felicity of our nature. Hence it +is easy to collect its pre-eminence to all other philosophies; to show +that where they oppose it, they are erroneous; that so far as they +contain any thing scientific they are allied to it; and that at best they +are but rivulets derived from this vast ocean of truth. + +------------------ +[1] In the mysteries a light of this kind shone forth from the adytum of +the temple in which they were exhibited. +------------------ + +To evince that the philosophy of Plato possesses this preeminence; that +its dignity and sublimity are unrivaled; that it is the parent of all +that ennobles man; and, that it is founded on principles, which neither +time can obliterate, nor sophistry subvert, is the principal design of +this Introduction. + +To effect this design, I shall in the first place present the reader with +the outlines of the principal dogmas of Plato's philosophy. The undertaking +is indeed no less novel than arduous, since the author of it has to tread +in paths which have been untrodden for upwards of a thousand years, and +to bring to light truths which for that extended period have been +concealed in Greek. Let not the reader, therefore, be surprised at the +solitariness of the paths through which I shall attempt to conduct him, +or at the novelty of the objects which will present themselves in the +journey: for perhaps he may fortunately recollect that he has traveled +the same road before, that the scenes were once familiar to him, and that +the country through which he is passing is his native land. At, least, if +his sight should be dim, and his memory oblivious, (for the objects which +he will meet with can only be seen by the most piercing eyes,) and his +absence from them has been lamentably long, let him implore the power +of wisdom, + + From mortal mists to purify his eyes, + That God and man he may distinctly see. + +Let us also, imploring the assistance of the same illuminating power, begin +the solitary journey. + +Of all the dogmas of Plato, that concerning the first principle of things +as far transcends in sublimity the doctrine of other philosophers of a +different sect, on this subject, as this supreme cause of all transcends +other causes. For, according to Plato, the highest God, whom in the +Republic he calls the good, and in the Parmenides the one, is not only +above soul and intellect, but is even superior to being itself. Hence, +since every thing which can in any respect be known, or of which any +thing can be asserted, must be connected with the universality of things, +but the first cause is above all things, it is very properly said by +Plato to be perfectly ineffable. The first hypothesis therefore of his, +Parmenides, in which all things are denied of this immense principle, +concludes as follows: "The one therefore is in no respect. So it seems. +Hence it is not in such a manner as to be one, for thus it would be +being, and participate of essence; but as it appears, the one neither is +one, nor is, if it be proper to believe in reasoning of this kind. It +appears so. But can any thing either belong to, or be affirmed of that, +which is not? How can it? Neither therefore does any name belong to it, +nor discourse, nor any science, nor sense, nor opinion. It does not +appear that there can. Hence it can neither be named, nor spoken of, nor +conceived by opinion, nor be known, nor perceived by any being. So it +seems." And here it must be observed that this conclusion respecting the +highest principle of things, that he is perfectly ineffable and +inconceivable, is the result of a most scientific series of negations, in +which not only all sensible and intellectual beings are denied of him, +but even natures the most transcendently allied to him, his first and +most divine progeny. For that which so eminently distinguishes the +philosophy of Plato from others is this, that every part of it is stamped +with the character of science. The vulgar indeed proclaim the Deity to be +ineffable; but as they have no scientific knowledge that he is so, this +is nothing more than a confused and indistinct perception of the most +sublime of all truths, like that of a thing seen between sleeping and +waking, like Phaeacia to Ulysses when sailing to his native land, + + That lay before him indistinct and vast, + Like a broad shield amid the watr'y waste. + +In short, an unscientific perception of the ineffable nature of the +Divinity resembles that of a man, who on surveying the heavens, should +assert of the altitude of its highest part, that it surpasses that of +the loftiest tree, and is therefore immeasurable. But to see this +scientifically, is like a survey of this highest part of the heavens by +the astronomer; for he by knowing the height of the media between us and +it, knows also scientifically that it transcends in altitude not only the +loftiest tree; but the summits of air and aether, the moon, and even the +sun itself. + +Let us therefore investigate what is the ascent to the ineffably, and +after what manner it is accomplished, according to Plato, from the last +of things, following the profound and most inquisitive Damascius as our +leader in this arduous investigation. Let our discourse also be common +to other principles, and to things proceeding from them to that which is +last, and let us, beginning from that which is perfectly effable and +known to sense, ascend too the ineffable, and establish in silence, as in +a port, the parturitions of truth concerning it. Let us then assume the +following axiom, in which as in a secure vehicle we may safely pass from +hence thither. I say, therefore, that the unindigent is naturally prior +to the indigent. For that which is in want of another is naturally +adapted from necessity to be subservient to that of which it is indigent. +But if they are mutually in want of each other, each being indigent of +the other in a different respect, neither of them will be the principle. +For the unindigent is most adapted to that which is truly the principle. +And if it is in want of any thing, according to this it will not be the +principle. It is however necessary that the principles should be this +very thing, the principle alone. The unindigent therefore pertains to +this, nor must it by any means be acknowledged that there is any thing +prior to it. This however, would be acknowledged if it had any connection +with the indigent. + +Let us then consider body, (that is, a triply extended substance,) endued +with quality; for this is the first thing effable by us, and is, sensible. +Is this then the principle of things? But it is two things, body, and +quality which is in body as a subject. Which of these therefore is by +nature prior? For both are indigent of their proper parts; and that also +which is in a subject is indigent of the subject. Shall we say then that +body itself is the principle of the first essence? But this is impossible. +For, in the first place, the principle will not receive any thing from that +which is posterior to itself. But body, we say is the recipient of quality. +Hence quality, and a subsistence in conjunction with it, are not derived +from body, since quality is present with body as something different. And, +in the second place, body is every way, divisible; its several parts are +indigent of each other, and the whole is indigent of all the parts. As it +is indigent, therefore, and receives its completion from things which are +indigent, it will not be entirely unindigent. + +Further still, if it is not one but united, it will require, as Plato +says, the connecting one. It is likewise something common and formless, +being as it were a certain matter. It requires, therefore, ornament and +the possession of form, that it may not be merely body, but a body with a +certain particular quality; as for instance, a fiery, or earthly, body, +and, in short, body adorned and invested with a particular quality. Hence +the things which accede to it, finish and adorn it. Is then that which +accedes the principle? But this is impossible. For it does not abide in +itself, nor does it subsist alone, but is in a subject of which also it +is indigent. If, however, some one should assert that body is not a +subject, but one of the elements in each, as for instance, animal in +horses and man, thus also each will be indigent of the other, viz. this +subject, and that which is in the subject; or rather the common element, +animal, and the peculiarities, as the rational and irrational, will be +indigent. For elements are always, indigent of each other, and that which +is composed from elements is indigent of the elements. In short, this +sensible nature, and which is so manifest to us, is neither body, for +this does not of itself move the senses, nor quality; for this does not +possess an interval commensurate with sense. Hence, that which is the +object of sight, is neither body nor color; but colored body, or color +corporalized, is that which is motive of the sight. And universally, that +which its sensible, which is body with a particular quality, is motive of +sense. From hence it is evident that the thing which excites the sense is +something incorporeal. For if it was body, it would not yet be the object +of sense. Body therefore requires that which is incorporeal, and that +which is incorporeal, body. For an incorporeal nature, is not of itself +sensible. It is, however, different from body, because these two possess +prerogatives different from each other, and neither of these subsists +prior to the other; but being elements of one sensible thing, they are +present with each other; the one imparting interval to that which is void +of interval, but the other introducing to that which is formless, +sensible variety invested with form. In the third place, neither are both +these together the principles; since they are not unindigent. For they +stand in need of their proper elements, and of that which conducts them +to the generation of one form. For body cannot effect this, since it is +of itself impotent; nor quality, since it is not able to subsist separate +from the body in which it is, or together with which it has its being. +The composite therefore either produces itself, which is impossible, for +it does not converge to itself, but the whole of it is multifariously +dispersed, or it is not produced by itself, and there is some other +principle prior to it. + +Let it then be supposed to be that which is called nature, being a +principle of motion and rest, in that which is moved and at rest, +essentially and not according to accident. For this is something more +simple, and is fabricative of composite forms. If, however, it is in the +things fabricated, and does not subsist separate from nor prior to them, +but stands in need of them for its being, it will not be unindigent; +though its possesses something transcendent with respect to them, viz. +the power of fashioning and fabricating them. For it has its being +together with them, and has in them an inseparable subsistence; so +that, when they are it is, and is not when they are not, and this in +consequence of perfectly verging to them, and not being able to sustain +that which is appropriate. For the power of increasing, nourishing, and +generating similars, and the one prior to these three, viz. nature, is +not wholly incorporeal, but is nearly a certain quality of body, from +which it alone differs, in that it imparts to the composite to be +inwardly moved and at rest. For the quality of that which is sensible +imparts that which is apparent in matter, and that which falls on sense. +But body imparts interval every way extended; and nature, an inwardly +proceeding natural energy, whether according to place only, or according +to nourishing, increasing, and generating things similar. Nature, +however, is inseparable from a subject, and is indigent, so that it will +not be in short the principle, since it is indigent of that which is +subordinate. For it will not be wonderful, if being a certain principle, +it is indigent of the principle above it; but it would be wonderful if it +were indigent of things posterior to itself, and of which it is supposed +to be the principle. + +By the like arguments we may show that the principle cannot be irrational +soul, whether sensitive, or orectic. For if it appears that it has +something separate, together with impulsive and Gnostic enemies, yet at +the same time it is bound in body, and has something inseparable from it; +since it is notable to convert itself to itself, but its enemy is mingled +with its subject. For it is evident that its essence is something of this +kind; since if it were liberated and in itself free, it would also evince +a certain independent enemy, and would not always be converted to body; +but sometimes it would be converted to itself; or though it were always +converted to body, yet it would judge and explore itself. The energies, +therefore, of the multitude of mankind, (though they are conversant with +externals,) yet, at the same time they exhibit that which is separate +about them. For they consult how they should engage in them, and observe +that deliberation is necessary, in order to effect or be passive to +apparent good, or to decline something of the contrary. But the impulses +of other animals are uniform and spontaneous, are moved together with the +sensible organs, and require the senses alone that they may obtain from +sensibles the pleasurable, and avoid the painful. If, therefore, the body +communicates in pleasure and pain, and is affected in a certain respect +by them, it is evident that the psychical energies, (i.e. energies +belonging to the soul) are exerted, mingled with bodies, and are not +purely psychical, but are also corporeal; for perception is of the +animated body, or of the soul corporalized, though in such perception the +psychical idiom predominates over the corporeal; just as in bodies, the +corporeal idiom has dominion according to interval and subsistence. As +the irrational soul, therefore, has its being in something different from +itself, so far it is indigent of the subordinate: but a thing of this +kind will not be the principle. + +Prior them to this essence, we see a certain form separate from a +subject, and converted to itself, such as is the rational nature. Our +soul, therefore, presides over its proper energies and corrects itself. +This, however, would not be the case, unless it was converted to itself; +and it would not be converted, to itself unless it had a separate +essence. It is not therefore indigent of the subordinate. Shall we then +say that it is the most perfect principle? But, it does not at once exert +all its energies, but is always indigent of the greater part. The +principle, however, wishes to have nothing indigent: but the rational +nature is an essence in want of its own energies. Some one, however, may +say that it is an eternal essence, and has never-failing essential +energies, always concurring with its essence, according to the self-moved +and ever vital, and that it is therefore unindigent; but the principle is +perfectly unindigent. Soul therefore, and which exerts mutable energies, +will not be the most proper principle. Hence it is necessary that there +should be something prior to this, which is in every respect immutable, +according to nature, life, and knowledge, and according to all powers and +enemies, such as we assert an eternal and immutable essence to be, and +such as is much honoured intellect, to which Aristotle having ascended, +thought he had discovered the first principle. For what can be wanting to +that which perfectly comprehends in itself its own plenitudes (oleromata), +and of which neither addition nor ablation changes any thing belonging to +it? Or is not this also, one and many, whole and parts, containing in +itself, things first, middle, and last? The subordinate plenitudes also +stand in need of the more excellent, and the more excellent of the +subordinate, and the whole of the parts. For the things related are +indigent of each other, and what are first of what are last, through the +same cause; for it is not of itself that which is first. Besides, the one +here is indigent of the many, because it has its subsistence in the many. +Or it may be said, that this one is collective of the many, and this not +by itself, but in conjunction with them. Hence there is much of the +indigent in this principle. For since intellect generates in itself its +proper plenitudes from which the whole at once receives its completion, +it will be itself indigent of itself, not only that which is generated of +that which generates, but also that which generates, of that which is +generated, in order to the whole completion of that which wholly generates +itself. Further still, intellect understands and is understood, is +intellective of and intelligible to itself, and both these. Hence the +intellectual is indigent of the intelligible, as of its proper object of +desire; and the intelligible is in want of the intellectual, because it +wishes to be the intelligible of it. Both also are indigent of either, +since the possession is always accompanied with indigence, in the same +manner as the world is always present with matter. Hence a certain +indigence is naturally coessentiallized with intellect, so that it cannot +be the most proper principle. Shall we, therefore, in the next place, +direct our attention to the most simple of beings, which Plato calls the +one being, [Greek: en on]? For as there is no separation there throughout +the Whole, nor any multitude, or order, or duplicity, or conversion to +itself, what indigence will there appear to me, in the perfectly united? +And especially what indigence will there be of that which is subordinate? +Hence the great Parmenides ascended to this most safe principle, as that +which is most unindigent. Is it not, however, here necessary to attend to +the conception of Plato, that the united is not the one itself, but that +which is passive[2] to it? And this being the case, it is evident that it +ranks after the one; for it is supposed to be the united and not the one +itself. If also being is composed from the elements bound and infinity, +as appears from the Philebus of Plato, where he calls it that which is +mixt, it will be indigent of its elements. Besides, if the conception of +being is different from that of being united, and that which is a whole +is both united and being, these will be indigent of each other, and the +whole which is called one being is indigent of the two. And though the +one in this is better than being, yet this is indigent of being, in order +to the subsistence of one being. But if being here supervenes the one, as +it were, form in that which is mixt and united, just as the idiom of man +in that which is collectively rational-mortal-animal, thus also the one +will be indigent of being. If, however, to speak more properly, the one +is two-fold; this being the cause of the mixture, and subsisting prior to +being, but that conferring rectitude, on being,--if this be the case, +neither will the indigent perfectly desert this nature. After all these, +it may be said that the one will be perfectly unindigent. For neither is +it indigent of that which is posterior to itself for its subsistence, +since the truly one is by itself separated from all things; nor is it +indigent of that which is inferior or more excellent in itself; for there +is nothing in it besides itself; nor is it in want of itself. But it is +one, because neither has it any duplicity with respect to itself. For not +even the relation of itself to itself must be asserted of the truly one; +since it is perfectly simple. This, therefore, is the most unindigent of +all things. Hence this is the principle and the cause of all; and this is +at once the first of all things. If these qualities, however, are present +with it, it will not be the one. Or may we not say that all things +subsist in the one according to the one? And that both these subsist in +it, and such other things as we predicate of it, as, for instance, the +most simple, the most excellent, the most powerful, the preserver of all +things, and the good itself? If these things, however, are thus true of +the one, it will thus also be indigent of things posterior to itself, +according to those very things which we add to it. For the principle is, +and is said to be the principle of things proceeding from it, and the +cause is the cause of things caused, and the first is the first of things +arranged, posterior to it.[3] + +------------------ +[2] See the Sophista of Plato, where this is asserted. + +[3] For a thing cannot be said to be a principle or cause without the +subsistence of the things of which it is the principle or cause. Hence, +so far as it is a principle or cause, it will be indigent of the +subsistence of these. +------------------ + +Further still, the simple subsists according to a transcendency of other +things, the most powerful according to power with relation to the subjects +of it; and the good, the desirable, and the preserving, are so called with +reference to things benefitted, preserved, and desiring. And if it should +be said to be all things according to the preassumption of all things in +itself, it will indeed be said to be so according to the one alone, and +will at the same time be the one cause of all things prior to all, and will +be thus, and no other according to the one. So far, therefore, as it is the +one alone, it will be unindigent; but so far as unindigent, it will be the +first principle, and stable root of all principles. So far, however, as it +is the principle and the first cause of all things, and is pre-established +as the object of desire to all things, so far it appears to be in a certain +respect indigent of the things to which it is related. It has therefore, if +it be lawful so to speak, an ultimate vestige of indigence, just as on the +contrary matter has an ultimate echo of the unindigent, or a most obscure +and debile impression of the one. And language indeed appears to be here +subverted. For so far as it is the one, it is also unindigent, since the +principle has appeared to subsist according to the most unindigent and the +one. At the same time, however, so far as it is the one, it is also the +principle; and so far as it is the one it is unindigent, but so far as the +principle, indigent. Hence so far as it is unindigent, it is also indigent, +though not according to the same; but with respect to being that which it +is, it is undigent; but as producing and comprehending other things in +itself, it is indigent. This, however, is the peculiarity of the one; so +that it is both unindigent and indigent according to the one. Not indeed +than it is each of these, in such a manner as we divide it in speaking of +it, but it is one alone; and according to this is both other things, and +that which is indigent. For how is it possible, it should not be indigent +also so far as it is the one? Just as it is all other things which proceed +from it. For the indigent also is, something belonging to all things. +Something else, therefore, must be investigated which in no respect has any +kind of indigence. But of a thing of this kind it cannot with truth be +asserted that it is the principle, nor can it even be said of it that it is +most unindigent, though this appears to be the most venerable of all +assertions.[4] + +--------------- +[4] See the extracts from Damascius in the additional notes to the third +volume, which contain an inestimable treasury of the most profound +conceptions concerning the ineffable. +------------------ + +For this signifies transcendency, and an exemption from the indigent. We do +not, however, think it proper to call this even the perfectly exempt; but +that which is in every respect incapable of being apprehended, and about +which we must be perfectly silent, will be the most, just axiom of our +conception in the present investigation; nor yet this as uttering any +thing, but as rejoicing in not uttering, and by this venerating that +immense unknown. This then is the mode of ascent to that which is called +the first, or rather to that which is beyond every thing which can be +conceived, or become the subject of hypothesis. + +There is also another mode, which does not place the unindigent before +the indigent, but considers that which is indigent of a more excellent +nature, as subsisting secondary to that which is more excellent. Every +where then, that which is in capacity is secondary to that which is in +energy. For that it may proceed into energy, and that it may not remain +in capacity in vain, it requires that which is in energy. For the more +excellent never blossoms from the subordinate nature. Let this then be +defined by us according to common unperverted conceptions. Matter +therefore has prior to itself material form; because all matter is form +in capacity, whether it be the first matter which is perfectly formless, +or the second which subsists according to body void of quality, or in +other words mere triple extension, to which it is likely those directed +their attention who first investigated sensibles, and which at first +appeared to be the only thing that had a subsistence. For the existence +of that which is common in the different elements, persuaded them that +there is a certain body void of quality. But since, among bodies of this +kind, some possess the governing principle inwardly, and others +externally, such as things artificial, it is necessary besides quality to +direct our attention to nature, as being something better than qualities, +and which is prearranged in the order of cause, as art is, of things +artificial. Of things, however, which are inwardly governed, some appear +to possess being alone, but others to be nourished and increased, and to +generate things similar to themselves. There is therefore another certain +cause prior to the above-mentioned nature, viz. a vegetable power itself. +But it is evident that all such things as are ingenerated in body as in a +subject, are of themselves incorporeal, though they become corporeal by +the participation of that in which they subsist, so that they are said +to be and are material in consequence of what they suffer from matter. +Qualities therefore, and still more natures, and in a still greater +degree the vegetable life, preserve the incorporeal in themselves. Since +however, sense exhibits another more conspicuous life, pertaining to +beings which are moved according to impulse and place, this must be +established prior to that, as being a more proper principle, and as the +supplier of a certain better form, that of a self-moved animal, and which +naturally precedes plants rooted in the earth. The animal however, is not +accurately self-moved. For the whole is not such throughout they whole; +but a part moves and a part is moved. This therefore is the apparent +self-moved. Hence, prior to this it is necessary there should be that +which is truly self-moved, and which according to the whole of itself +moves ands is moved, that the apparently self-moved may be the image of +this. And indeed the soul which moves the body must be considered as a +more proper self-moved essence. This, however, is twofold, the one +rational, the other irrational. For that there is a rational soul is +evident: or has not every one a cosensation of himself, more clear or +more obscure, when converted to himself in the attentions to and +investigations of himself, and in the vital and Gnostic animadversions of +himself? For the essence which is capable of this, and which can collect +universals by reasoning, will very justly be rational. The irrational +soul also, though it does not appear to investigate these things, and to +reason with itself, yet at the same time it moves bodies from place to +place, being itself previously moved from itself; for at different times +it exerts a different impulse. Does it therefore move itself from one +impulse to another? or it is moved by something else, as, for instance, +by the whole rational soul in the universe? But it would be absurd to say +that the energies of every irrational soul are not the energies of that +soul, but of one more divine; since they are infinite, and mingled with +much of the base and imperfect. For this would be just the same as to say +that the irrational enemies are the energies of the rational soul. I omit +to mention the absurdity of supposing that the whole essence is not +generative of its proper energies. For if the irrational soul is a +certain essence, it will have peculiar energies of its own, not imparted +from something else, but proceeding from itself. This irrational soul, +therefore, will also move itself at different times to different impulses. +But if it moves itself, it will be converted to itself. If, however, this +be the case, it will have a separate subsistence, and will not be in a +subject. It is therefore rational, if it looks to itself: for in being +converted to, it surveys itself. For when extended to things external, it +looks to externals, or rather it looks to colored body, but does not see +itself, because sight itself is neither body nor that which is colored. +Hence it does not revert to itself. Neither therefore is this the case +with any other irrational nature. For neither does the phantasy project a +type of itself, but of that which is sensible, as for instance of colored +body. Nor does irrational appetite desire itself, but aspires after a +certain object of desire, such as honor, or pleasure, or riches. It does +not therefore move itself. + +But if some one, on seeing that brutes exert rational energies, should +apprehend that these also participate of the first self-moved, and on +this account possess a soul converted to itself, it may perhaps be +granted to him that these also are rational natures, except that they +are not so essentially, but according to participation, and this most +obscure, just as the rational soul may be said to be intellectual +according to participation, as always projecting common conceptions +without distortion. It must however be observed, that the extreme are +that which is capable of being perfectly separated, such as the rational +form, and that which is perfectly inseparable, such as corporeal quality, +and that in the middle of these nature subsists, which verges to the +inseparable, having a small representation of the separable and the +irrational soul, which verges to the separable; or it appears in a +certain respect to subsist by itself, separate from a subject; so that +it becomes doubtful whether it is self-motive, or alter-motive. For it +contains an abundant vestige of self-motion, but not that which is true +and converted to itself, and on this account perfectly separated from +a subject. And the vegetable soul has in a certain respect a middle +subsistence. On this account to some of the ancients it appeared to be +a certain soul, but to others, nature. + +Again, therefore, that we may return to the proposed object of +investigation, how can a self-motive nature of this kind, which is +mingled with the alter-motive, be the first principle of things? For +it neither subsists from itself, nor does it in reality perfect itself; +but it requires a certain other nature, both for its subsistence and +perfection: and prior to it is that which is truly self-moved. Is +therefore that which is properly self-moved the principle, and is it +indigent of no form more excellent than itself? Or is not that which +moves always naturally prior to that which is moved; and in short does +not every form which is pure from its contrary subsist by itself prior +to that which is mingled with it? And is not the pure the cause of the +commingled? For that which is coessentialized with another has also an +energy mingled with that other. So that a self-moved nature will indeed, +make itself; but thus subsisting it will be at the same time moving and +moved, but will not be made a moving nature only. For neither is it this +alone. Every form however is always alone according to its first +subsistence; so that there will be that which moves only without being +moved. And indeed it would be absurd that there should be that which is +moved only such as body, but that prior both to that which is self-moved +and that which is moved only, there should not be that which moves only. +For it is evident that there must be, since this will be a more excellent +nature, and that which is self-moved, so far as it moves itself, is more +excellent than so far as it is moved. It is necessary therefore that the +essence which moves unmoved, should be first, as that which is moved, not +being motive, is the third, in the middle of which is the self-moved, +which we say requires that which moves in order to its becoming motive. +In short, if it is moved, it will not abide, so far as it is moved; and +if it moves, it is necessary it should remain moving so far as it moves. +Whence then does it derive the power of abiding? For from itself it +derives the power either of being moved only, or of at the same time +abiding and being moved wholly according to the same. Whence then does +it simply obtain the power of abiding? Certainly from that which simply +abides. But, this is an immovable cause. We must therefore admit that +the immovable is prior to the self moved. Let us consider then if the +immovable is the most proper principle? But how is this possible? For the +immovable contains as numerous a multitude immovably; as the self-moved +self-moveably. Besides an immovable separation must necessarily subsist +prior to a self-moveable separation. The unmoved therefore is at the same +time one and many, and is at the same time united and separated, and a +nature of this kind is denominated intellect. But it is evident that +the united in this is naturally prior to and more honorable than the +separated. For separation is always indigent of union; but not, on the +contrary, union of separation. Intellect, however, has not the united +pure from its opposite. For intellectual form is coessentialized with the +separated, through the whole of itself. Hence that which is in a certain +respect united requires that which is simply united; and that which +subsists with another is indigent of that which subsists by itself; and +that which subsists according to participation, of that which subsists +according to essence. For intellect being self-subsistent produces itself +as united, and at the same time separated. Hence it subsists according to +both these. It is produced therefore from that which is simply united and +alone united. Prior therefore to that which is formal is the +uncircumscribed, and undistributed into forms. And this is that which we +call the united, and which the wise men of antiquity denominated being, +possessing in one contraction multitude, subsisting prior to the many. + +Having therefore arrived thus far, let us here rest for a while, and +consider with ourselves, whether being is the investigated principle of +all things. For what will there be which does not participate of being? +May we not say, that this, if it is the united, will be secondary to the +one, and that by participating of the one it becomes the united? But in +short; if we conceive the one to be something different from being, if +being is prior to the one, it will not participate of the one. It will +therefore be many only, and these will be infinitely infinite. But if the +one is with being, and being with the one, and they are either coordinate +or divided from each other, there will be two principles, and the +above-mentioned absurdity will happen. Or they will mutually participate +of each other, and there will be two elements. Or they are parts of +something else, consisting from both. And, if this be the case, what will +that be which leads them to union with each other? For if the one unites +being to itself (for this may be said), the one also will energize prior +to being, that it may call forth and convert being to itself. The one, +therefore, will subsist from itself self-perfect prior to being. Further +still, the more simple is always prior to the more composite. If +therefore they are similarly simple, there will either be two principles, +or one from the two, and this will be a composite. Hence the simple and +perfectly incomposite is prior to this, which must be either one, or not +one; and if not one, it must either be many, or nothing. But with respect +to nothing, if it signifies that which is perfectly void, it will signify +something vain. But if it signifies the arcane, this will not even be +that which is simple. In short, we cannot conceive any principle more +simple than the one. The one therefore is in every respect prior to +being. Hence this is the principle of all things, and Plato recurring to +this, did not require any other principle in his reasonings. For the +arcane in which this our ascent terminates is not the principle of +reasoning, nor of knowledge, nor of animals, nor of beings, nor of +unities, but simply of all things, being arranged above every conception +and suspicion that we can frame. Hence Plato indicates nothing concerning +it, but makes his negations of all other things except the one, from the +one. For that the one is he denies in the last place, but he does not +make a negation of the one. He also, besides this, even denies this +negation, but not the one. He denies, too, name and conception, and all +knowledge, and what can be said more, whole itself and every being. But +let there be the united and the unical, and, if you will, the two +principles bound and the infinite. Plato, however, never in any respect +makes a negation of the one which is beyond all these. Hence in the +Sophista he considers it as the one prior to being, and in the Republic +as the good beyond every essence; but at the same time the one alone is +left. Whether however is it known and effable, or unknown and ineffable? +Or is it in a certain respect these, and in a certain respect not? For by +a negation of this it may be said the ineffable is affirmed. And again, +by the simplicity of knowledge it will be known or suspected, but by +composition perfectly unknown. Hence neither will it be apprehended by +negation. And in short, so far as it is admitted to be one, so far it +will be coarranged with other things, which are the subject of position. +For it is the summit of things, which subsist according to position. At +the same time there is much in it of the ineffable and unknown, the +uncoordinated, and that which is deprived of position, but these are +accompanied with a representation of the Contraries: and the former are +more excellent, than the latter. But every where things pure subsist +prior to their contraries, and such as are unmingled to the commingled. +For either things more excellent subsist in the one essentially, and in a +certain respect the contraries of these also will be there at the same +time; or they subsist according to participation, and are derived from +that which is first a thing of this kind. Prior to the one, therefore, is +that which is simply and perfectly ineffable, without position, +uncoordinated, and incapable of being apprehended, to which also the +ascent of the present discourse hastens through the clearest indications, +omitting none of those natures between the first and the last of things. + +Such then is the ascent to the highest God, according to the theology of +Plato, venerably preserving his ineffable exemption from all things, and +his transcendency, which cannot be circumscribed by any gnostic energy, +and at the same time, unfolding the paths which lead upwards to him, and +enkindling that luminous summit of the soul, by which she is conjoined +with the incomprehensible one. + +From this truly ineffable principle, exempt from all essence, power, and +energy, a multitude of divine natures, according to Plato, immediately +proceeds. That this must necessarily be the case, will be admitted by the +reader who understands what has been already discussed, and is fully +demonstrated by Plato in the Parmenides, as will be evident to the +intelligent from the notes on that Dialogue. In addition therefore to +what I have staid on this subject, I shall further observe at present +that this doctrine, which is founded in the sublimest and most scientific +conceptions of the human mind, may be clearly shown to be a legitimate +dogma of Plato from what is asserted by him in the sixth book of his +Republic. For he there affirms, in the most clear and unequivocal terms, +that the good, or the ineffable principle of things is superessential, +and shows by the analogy of the sun to the good, that what light and +sight are in the visible, that truth and intelligence are in the +intelligible world. As light therefore, immediately proceeds from the +sun, and wholly subsists according to a solar idiom or property, so truth +or the immediate progeny of the good, must subsist according to a +superessential idiom. And as the good, according to Plato, is the same +with the one, as is evident from the Parmenides, the immediate progeny of +the one will be the same as that of the good. But, the immediate +offspring of the one cannot be any thing else than unities. And, hence we +necessarily infer that according to Plato, the immediate offspring of the +ineffable principle of things are superessential unities. They differ +however from their immense principle in this, that he is superessential +and ineffable, without any addition; but this divine multitude is +participated by the several orders of being, which are suspended from and +produced by it. Hence, in consequence of being connected with multitude +through this participation, they are necessarily subordinate to the one. + +No less admirably, therefore, than Platonically does Simplicius, in his +Commentary of Epictetus, observe on this subject as follows: "The +fountain and principle of all things is the good: for that which all +things desire, and to which all things are extended, is the principle and +the end of all things. The good also produces from itself all things, +first, middle, and last. But it produces such as are first and proximate +to itself, similar to itself; one goodness, many goodnesses, one +simplicity and unity which transcends all others, many, unities, and one +principle many principles. For the one, the principle, the good, and +deity, are the same: for deity is the first and the cause of all things. +But it is necessary that the first should also be most simple; since +whatever is a composite and has multitude is posterior to the one. And +multitude and things, which are not good desire the good as being above +them: and in short, that which is not itself the principle is from the +principle. + +But it is also necessary that the principle of all things should possess +the highest, and all, power. For the amplitude of power consists in +producing all things from itself, and in giving subsistence to similars, +prior to things which are dissimilar. Hence the one principle produces +many principles, many simplicities, and many goodnesses, proximately from +itself. For since all things differ from each other, and are multiplied +with their proper differences, each of these multitudes is suspended from +its one proper principle. Thus, for instance, all beautiful things, +whatever and wherever they may be, whether in souls or in bodies, are +suspended from one fountain of beauty. Thus too, whatever possesses +symmetry, and whatever is true, and all principles, are in a certain +respect, connate with the first principle, so far as they are principles +and fountains and goodnesses, with an appropriate subjection and analogy. +For what the one principle is to all beings, that each of the other +principles is to the multitude comprehended under the idiom of its +principle. For it is impossible, since each multitude is characterized +by a certain difference, that it should not be extended to its proper +principle, which illuminates one and the same form to all the individuals +of that multitude. For the one is the leader of every multitude; and +every peculiarity or idiom in the many is derived to the many from the +one. All partial principles therefore are established in that principle +which ranks as a whole, and are comprehended in it, not with interval and +multitude, but as parts in the whole, as multitude in the one, and number +in the monad. For this first principle is all things prior to all: and +many principles are multiplied about the one principle, and in the one +goodness, many goodnesses are established. This too, is not a certain +principle like each of the rest: for of these, one is the principle of +beauty, another of symmetry, another of truth, and another of something +else, but it is simply principle. Nor is it simply the principles of +beings, but it is the principle of principles. For it is necessary that +the idiom of principle, after the same manner as other things, should not +begin from multitude, but should be collected into one monad as a summit, +and which is the principle of principles. + +Such things therefore as are first produced by the first good, in +consequence of being connascent with it, do not recede from essential +goodness, since they are immovable and unchanged, and are eternally +established in the same blessedness. They are likewise not indigent of +the good, because they are goodnesses themselves. All other natures +however, being produced by the one good, and many goodnesses, since they +fall off from essential goodness, and are not immovably established in +the hyparxis of divine goodness, on this account they possess the good +according to participation." + +From this sublime theory the meaning of that ancient Egyptian dogma, that +God is all things, is at once apparent. For the first principle,[6] as +Simplicius in the above passage justly observes, is all things prior +to all; i.e. he comprehends all things causally, this being the most +transcendent mode of comprehension. As all things therefore, considered +as subsisting causally in deity, are transcendently more excellent than +they are when considered as effects preceding from him, hence that mighty +and all-comprehending whole, the first principle, is said to be all +things prior to all; priority here denoting exempt transcendency. As the +monad and the centre of a circle are images from their simplicity of this +greatest of principles, so likewise do they perspicuously shadow forth +to us its causal comprehension of all things. For all number may be +considered as subsisting occultly in the monad, and the circle in the +centre; this occult being the same in each with causal subsistence. + +----------------- +[6] By the first principle here, the one is to be understood for that +arcane nature which is beyond the one, since all language is subverted +about it, can only, as we have already observed, be conceived and +venerated in the most profound silence. +----------------- + +That this conception of causal subsistence is not an hypothesis devised +by the latter Platonists, but a genuine dogma of Plato, is evident from +what he says in the Philebus: for in that Dialogue he expressly asserts +that in Jupiter a royal intellect, and a royal soul subsist according to +cause. Pherecydes Syrus, too, in his Hymn to Jupiter, as cited by Kercher +(in Oedip. Egyptiac.), has the following lines: +[Greek: + O theos esti kuklos, tetragonos ede trigonos, + Keinos de gramme, kentron, kai panta pro panton.] + +i.e. Jove is a circle, triangle and square, centre and line, and all things +before all. From which testimonies the antiquity of this sublime doctrine +is sufficiently apparent. + +And here it is necessary to observe that nearly all philosophers: prior +to Jamblichus (as we are informed by Damascius) asserted indeed, that +there is one superessential God, but that the other gods had an essential +subsistence, and were deified by illuminations from the one. They +likewise said that there is a multitude of super-essential unities, who +are not self-perfect subsistences, but illuminated unions with deity, +imparted to essences by the highest Gods. That this hypothesis, however, +is not conformable to the doctrine of Plato is evident from his +Parmenides, in which he shows that the one does not subsist in itself. +(See vol. iii, p. 133). For as we have observed from Proclus, in the +notes on that Dialogue, every thing which is the cause of itself and is +self-subsistent, is said to be in itself. Hence as producing power +always comprehends, according to cause that which it produces, it is +necessary that whatever produces itself should comprehend itself so far +as it is a cause, and should be comprehended by itself so far as it is +caused; and that it should be at once both cause and the thing caused, +that which comprehends, and that which is comprehended. If therefore a +subsistence in another signifies, according to Plato, the being produced +by another more excellent cause (as we have shown in the note to p. 133, +vol. iii), a subsistence in itself must signify that which is self- +begotten, and produced by itself. If the one therefore is not self-sub- +sistent as even transcending this mode of subsistence, and if it be +necessary that there should be something self-subsistent, it follows +that this must be the characteristic property of that which immediately +proceeds from the ineffable. But that there must be something self- +subsistent is evident, since unless this is admitted there will not +be a true sufficiency in any thing. + +Besides, as Damascius well observes, if that which is subordinate by +nature is self-perfect, such as the human soul, much more will this be the +case with a divine soul. But if with soul, this also will be true of +intellect. And if it be true of intellect, it will also be true of life: if +of life, of being likewise; and if of being, of the unities above being. +For the self-perfect, the self-sufficient, and that which is established in +itself, will much more subsist in superior than in subordinate natures. If +therefore, these are in the latter, they will also be in the former. I mean +the subsistence of a thing by itself, and essentialized in itself; and such +are essence and life, intellect, soul, and body. For body, though it does +not subsist from, yet subsists by itself; and through this belongs to the +genus of substance, and is contra-distinguished from accident, which cannot +exist independent of a subject. + +Self-subsistent superessential natures therefore are the immediate +progeny of the one, if it be lawful thus to denominate things, which +ought rather to be called ineffable unfoldings into light from the +ineffable; for progeny implies a producing cause, and the one must be +conceived as something even more excellent than this. From this divine +self-perfect and self-producing multitude, a series of self-perfect +natures, viz. of beings, lives, intellects, and souls proceeds, according +to Plato, in the last link of which luminous series he also classes the +human soul; proximately suspended from the daemoniacal order: for this +order, as he clearly asserts in the Banquet, "stands in the middle rank +between the divine and human, fills up the vacant space, and links +together all intelligent nature." And here to the reader, who has not +penetrated the depths of Plato's philosophy, it will doubtless appear +paradoxical in the extreme, that any being should be said to produce +itself, and yet at the same time proceed from a superior cause. The +solution of this difficulty is as follows:--Essential production, or that +energy through which any nature produces something else by its very +being, is the most perfect mode of production, because vestiges of it are +seen in the last of things; thus fire imparts heat, by its very essence, +and snow coldness. And in short, this is a producing of that kind, in +which the effect is that secondarily which the cause is primarily. As +this mode of production therefore, from its being the most perfect of all +others, originates from the highest natures, it will consequently first +belong to those self-subsistent powers, who immediately proceed from the +ineffable, and will from them be derived to all the following orders of +beings. But this energy, as being characterized by the essential, will +necessarily be different in different producing causes. Hence, from that +which subsists, at the summit of self subsistent natures, a series of +self subsisting beings will indeed proceed, but then this series will be +secondarily that which its cause is primarily, and the energy by which it +produces itself will be secondary to that by which it is produced by its +cause. Thus, for instance, the rational soul both produces itself (in +consequence of being a self-motive nature), and is produced by intellect; +but it is produced by intellect immutably, and by itself transitively; +for all its energies subsist in time, and are accompanied with motion. So +far therefore as soul contains intellect by participation, so far it is +produced by intellect, but so far as it is self-motive it is produced by +itself. In short, with respect to every thing self-subsistent, the summit +of its nature is produced by a superior cause, but the evolution of that +summit is its own spontaneous energy; and, through this it becomes +self-subsistent, and self-perfect. + +That the rational soul, indeed, so far as it is rational, produces +itself, may be clearly demonstrated as follows:--That which is able to +impart any thing superior and more excellent in any genus of things, can +easily impart that which is subordinate and less excellent in the same +genus; but well being confessedly ranks higher and is more excellent than +mere being. The rational soul imparts well being to itself, when it +cultivates and perfects itself, and recalls and withdraws itself from the +contagion of the body. It will therefore also impart being to itself. And +this with great propriety; for all divine natures, and such things as +possess the ability of imparting any thing primarily to others, +necessarily begin this energy from themselves. Of this mighty truth the +sun himself is an illustrious example; for he illuminates all things with +his light, and is himself light, and the fountain and origin of all +splendour. Hence, since the souls imparts life and motion to other +things, on which account Aristotle calls an animal antokincton, self- +moved, it will much more, and by a much greater priority, impart life and +motion to itself. + +From this magnificent, sublime, and most scientific doctrine of Plato, +respecting the arcane principle of things and his immediate progeny, it +follows that this ineffable cause is not the immediate maker of the +universe, and this, as I have observed in the Introduction to the Timaeus, +not through any defect, but on the contrary through transcendency of power. +All things indeed are ineffably unfolded from him at once, into light; but +divine media are necessary to the fabrication of the world. For if the +universe was immediately produced from the ineffable, it would, agreeably +to what we have above observed, be ineffable also in a secondary degree. +But as this is by no means the case, it principally derives its immediate +subsistence from a deity of a fabricative characteristic, whom Plato calls +Jupiter, conformably to the theology of Orpheus. The intelligent reader +will readily admit that this dogmas is so far from being derogatory to the +dignity of the Supreme, that on the contrary it exalts that dignity, and, +preserves in a becoming manner the exempt transcendency of the ineffable. +If therefore we presume to celebrate him, for as we have already observed, +it is more becoming to establish in silence those parturitions of the soul +which dare anxiously to explore him, we should celebrate him as the +principle of principles, and the fountain of deity, or in the reverential +language of the Egyptians, as a darkness thrice unknown.[7] Highly laudable +indeed, and worthy the imitation of all posterity, is the veneration which +the great ancients paid to this immense principle. This I have already +noticed in the Introduction to the Parmenides, and I shall only observe at +present in addition, that in consequence of this profound and most pious +reverence of the first God, they did not even venture to give a name to +the summit of that highest order of divinities which is denominated +intelligible. Hence, says Proclus, in his Mss. Scholia on the Cratylus, +"Not every genus of the gods has an appellation; for with respect to the +first Deity, who is beyond all things, Parmenides teaches us that he is +ineffable; and the first genera of the intelligible gods, who are united to +the one, and are called occult, have much of the unknown and ineffable. For +that which is perfectly effable cannot be conjoined with the perfectly +ineffable; but it is necessary that the progression of intelligibles should +terminate in this order, in which the first effable subsists, and that +which is called by proper names. For there the first intelligible forms, +and the intellectual nature of intelligibles, are unfolded into light. +But, the natures prior to this being silent and occult, are only known +by intelligence. Hence the whole of the telestic science energizing +theurgically ascends as far as to this order. Orpheus also says that this +is first called by a name by the other gods; for the light proceeding from +it is known to and denominated by the intellectual gods." + +----------------- +[7] Psalm xviii:11; xcvii:2. +----------------- + +With no less magnificence therefore than piety, does Proclus thus speak +concerning the ineffable principle of things. "Let us now if ever remove +from ourselves multiform knowledge, exterminate all the variety of life, +and in perfect quiet approach near to the cause of all things. For this +purpose, let not only opinion and phantasy be at rest, nor the passions +alone which impede our anagogic impulse to the first be at peace; but let +the air, and the universe itself, be still. And let all things extend us +with a tranquil power to communion with the ineffable. Let us also +standing there, having transcended the intelligible (if we contain any +thing of this kind), and with nearly closed eyes adoring as it were the +rising sun, since it is not lawful for any being whatever intently to +behold him,--let us survey the sun whence the light of the intelligible +gods proceeds, emerging, as the poets say, from the bosom of the ocean; +and again from this divine tranquillity descending into intellect, and +from intellect employing the reasonings of the soul, let us relate to +ourselves what the natures are from which in this progression we shall +consider the first God as exempt. And let us as it were celebrate him, +not as establishing the earth and the heavens, nor as giving subsistence +to souls, and the generations of all animals; for he produced these +indeed, but among the last of things. But prior to these, let us +celebrate him as unfolding into light the whole intelligible and +intellectual genus of gods, together with all the supermundane and +mundane divinities as, the God of all gods, the Unity of all unities, +and beyond the first adyta--as more ineffable than all silence, and more +unknown than all essence,--as holy among the holies, and concealed in +the intelligible gods." Such is the piety, such the sublimity, and +magnificence of conception, with which the Platonic philosophers speak of +that which is in reality in every respect ineffable, when they presume to +speak about it, extending the ineffable parturitions of the soul to the +ineffable cosensation of the incomprehensible one. + +From this sublime veneration of this most awful nature, which, as is +noticed in the extracts from Damascius, induced the most ancient +theologists, philosophers, and poets, to be entirely silent concerning +it, arose the great reverence which the ancients paid to the divinities +even of a mundane characteristic, or from whom bodies are suspended, +considering them also as partaking of the nature of the ineffable, and as +so many links of the truly golden chain of deity. Hence we find in the +Odyssey, when Ulysses and Telemachus are removing the arms from the walls +of the palace of Ithaca, and Minerva going before them with her golden +lamp fills all the place with a divine light, +[Greek: + . . . . . paroithe de pallas Athene +Chryseon lychnon echrusa phars perikalles epoiei.] + +Before thee Pallas Athene bore a golden cresset and cast a most lovely +light. Telemachus having observed that certainly some one of the celestial +gods was present, +[Greek: + Emala tis deos endon, of ouranon euryn echousi.] + +Verily some God is within, of those that hold the wide heaven. Ulysses +says in reply, "Be silent, restrain your intellect (i.e. even cease to +energize intellectually), and speak not." +[Greek: + Siga, kai kata son noon ischana, med' ereeine.] + +Hold thy peace and keep all this in thine heart and ask not hereof. +--Book 19, Odyssey. + +Lastly, from all that has been said, it must, I think, be immediately +obvious to every one whose mental eye is not entirely blinded, that there +can be no such thing as a trinity in the theology of Plato, in any respect +analogous to the Christian Trinity. For the highest God, according to +Plato, as we have largely shown from irresistible evidence, is so far from +being a part of a consubsistent triad, that he is not to be connumerated +with any thing; but is so perfectly exempt from all multitude, that he is +even beyond being; and he so ineffably transcends all relation and +habitude, that language is in reality subverted about him, and knowledge +refunded into ignorance. What that trinity however is in the theology of +Plato, which doubtless gave birth to the Christian, will be evident to the +intelligent from the notes on the Parmenides, and the extracts, from +Damascius. And thus much for the doctrine of Plato concerning the principle +of things, and his immediate offspring, the great importance of which will, +I doubt not, be a sufficient apology for the length of this discussion. + +In the next place, following Proclus and Olympiodorus as our guides, let us +consider the mode according to which Plato teaches us mystic conceptions of +divine natures: for he appears not to have pursued every where the same +mode of doctrine about these; but sometimes according to a divinely +inspired energy, and at other times dialectically, he evolves the truth +concerning them. And sometimes he symbolically announces their ineffable +idioms, but at other times he recurs to them from images, and discovers in +them the primary causes of wholes. For in the Phaedrus being evidently +inspired, and having exchanged human intelligence for a better possession, +divine mania, he unfolds many arcane dogmas concerning the intellectual, +liberated, and mundane gods. But in the Sophista dialectically contending +about being, and the subsistence of the one above beings, and doubting +against philosophers more ancient than himself, he shows how all beings are +suspended from their cause and the first being, but that being itself +participates of that unity which is exempt from all things, that it is a +passive,[8] one, but not the one itself, being subject to and united to the +one, but not being that which is primarily one. In a similar manner too, in +the Parmenides, he unfolds dialectically the progressions of being from the +one, through the first hypothesis of that dialogue, and this, as he there +asserts, according to the most perfect division of this method. And again +in the Gorgias, he relates the fable concerning the three fabricators, and +their demiurgic allotment. But in the Banquet he speaks concerning the +union of love; and in the Protagoras, about the distribution of mortal +animals from the gods; in a symbolical manner concealing the truth +concerning divine natures, and as far as to mere indication unfolding his +mind to the most genuine of his readers. + +----------------- +[8] It is necessary to observe, that, according to Plato, whatever +participates of any thing is said to be passive to that which it +participates, and the participations themselves are called by him passions. +----------------- + +Again, if it be necessary to mention the doctrine delivered through the +mathematical disciplines, and the discussion of divine concerns from +ethical or physical discourses, of which many may be contemplated in the +Timaeus, many in the dialogue called Politicus, and many may be seen +scattered in other dialogues; here likewise, to those who are desirous of +knowing divine concerns through images, the method will be apparent. Thus, +for instance, the Politicus shadows forth the fabrication in the heavens. +But the figures of the five elements, delivered in geometrical proportions +in the Timaeus, represent in images the idioms of the gods who preside over +the parts of the universe. And the divisions of the essence of the soul in +that dialogue shadow forth the total orders of the gods. To this we may +also add that Plato composes politics, assimilating them to divine natures, +and adorning them from the whole world and the powers which it contains. +All these, therefore, through the similitude of mortal to divine concerns, +exhibit to us in images the progressions, orders, and fabrications of the +latter. And such are the modes of theologic doctrine employed by Plato. + +"But those," says Proclus, "who treat of divine concerns in an indicative +manner, either speak symbolically and fabulously, or through images. And of +those who openly announce their conceptions, some frame their discourses +according to science, but others according to inspiration from the gods. +And he who desires to signify divine concerns through symbols is Orphic, +and, in short, accords with those who write fables respecting the gods. +But he who does this through images is Pythagoric. For the mathematical +disciplines were invented by the Pythagorean in order to a reminiscence of +divine concerns, to which through these as images, they endeavour to +ascend. For they refer both numbers and figures to the gods, according to +the testimony of their historians. But the enthusiastic character, or he +who is divinely inspired, unfolding the truth itself concerning the gods +essentially, perspicuously ranks among the highest initiators. For these do +not think proper to unfold the divine orders, or their idioms, to their +familiars through veils, but announce their powers and their numbers in +consequence of being moved by the gods themselves. But the tradition of +divine concerns according to science is the illustrious, prerogative of the +Platonic philosophy. For Plato alone, as it appears to me of all those who +are known to us, has attempted methodically to divide and reduce into order +the regular progression of the divine genera, their mutual difference, the +common idioms of the total orders, and the distributed idioms in each." + +Again, since Plato employs fables, let us in the first place consider +whence the ancients were induced to devise fables, and in the second place, +what the difference is between the fables of philosophers and those of +poets. In answer to the first question then, it is necessary to know that +the ancients employed fables looking to two things, viz. nature, and our +soul. They employed them by looking to nature, and the fabrication of +things, as follows. Things unapparent are believed from things apparent, +and incorporeal natures from bodies. For seeing the orderly arrangement of +bodies, we understand that a certain incorporeal power presides over them; +as with respect to the celestial bodies, they have a certain presiding +motive power. As we therefore see that our body is moved, but is no longer +so after death, we conceive that it was a certain incorporeal power which +moved it. Hence, perceiving that we believe things incorporeal and +unapparent from things apparent and corporeal, fables came to be adopted, +that we might come from things apparent to certain unapparent natures; as, +for instance, that on hearing the adulteries, bonds, and lacerations of the +gods, castrations of heaven, and the like, we may not rest satisfied with +the apparent meaning of such like particulars, but may proceed to the +unapparent, and investigate the true signification. After this manner, +therefore, looking to the nature of things, were fables employed. + +But from looking to our souls, they originated as follows: While we are +children we live according to the phantasy, but the phantastic part is +conversant with figures, and types, and things of this kind. That the +phantastic part in us therefore may be preserved, we employ fables in +consequence of this part rejoicing in fables. It may also be said that +a fable is nothing else than a false discourse shadowing forth the truth: +for a fable is the image of truth. But the soul is the image of the +natures prior to herself; and hence the soul very properly rejoices in +fables, as an image in an image. As we are therefore from our childhood +nourished in fables, it is necessary that they should be introduced. And +thus much for the first problem, concerning the origin of fables. + +In the next place let us consider what the difference is between the +fables of philosophers and poets. Each therefore has something in which +it abounds more than, and something in which it is deficient from the +other. Thus, for instance, the poetic fable abounds in this, that we must +not rest satisfied with the apparent meaning, but pass on to the occult +truth. For who, endued with intellect, would believe that Jupiter was +desirous of having connection with Juno, and on the ground, without +waiting to go into the bed-chamber. So that the poetic fable abounds, in +consequence of asserting such things as do not suffer us to stop at the +apparent, but lead us to explore the occult truth. But it is defective in +this, that it deceives those of a juvenile age. Plato therefore neglects +fable of this kind, and banishes Homer from his Republic; because youth +on hearing such fables, will not be able to distinguish what is +allegorical from what is not. + +Philosophical fables, on the contrary, do not injure those that go no +further than the apparent meaning. Thus, for instance, they assert that +there are punishments and rivers under the earth: and if we adhere to the +literal meaning of these we shall not be injured. But they are deficient +in this, that as their apparent signification does not injure, we often +content ourselves with this, and do not explore the latent truth. We may +also say that philosophic fables look to the enemies of the soul. For if +we were entirely intellect alone, and had no connection with phantasy, we +should not require fables, in consequence of always associating with +intellectual natures. If again, we were entirely irrational, and lived +according to the phantasy, and had no other energy than this, it would be +requisite that the whole of our life should be fabulous. Since, however, +we possess intellect, opinion, and phantasy, demonstrations are given +with a view to intellect; and hence Plato says that if you are willing to +energize according to intellect, you will have demonstrations bound with +adamantine chains; if according to opinion, you will have the testimony +of renowned persons; and if according to the phantasy, you have fables by +which it is excited; so that from all these you will derive advantage. + +Plato therefore rejects the more tragical mode of mythologizing of the +ancient poets, who thought proper to establish an arcane theology +respecting the gods, and on this account devised wanderings, castrations, +battles and lacerations of the gods, and many other such symbols of the +truth about divine natures which this theology conceals;--this mode he +rejects, and asserts that it is in every respect most foreign from +erudition. But he considers those mythological discourses about the gods +as more persuasive and more adapted to truth, which assert that a divine +nature is the cause of all good, but of no evil, and that it is void of +all mutation, comprehending in itself the fountain of truth, but never +becoming the cause of any deception to others. For such types of theology +Socrates delivers in the Republic. + +All the fables therefore of Plato guarding the truth in concealment, +have not even their externally apparent apparatus discordant with our +undisciplined and unperverted anticipations of divinity. But they bring +with them an image of the mundane composition in which both the apparent +beauty is worthy of divinity, and a beauty more divine than this is +established in the unapparent lives and powers of its causes. + +In the next place, that the reader may see whence and from what dialogues +principally the theological dogmas of Plato may be collected, I shall +present him with the following translation of what Proclus has admirably +written on this subject. + +"The truth (says he) concerning the gods pervades, as I may say, through +all the Platonic dialogues, and in all of them conceptions of the first +philosophy, venerable, clear, and supernatural, are disseminated, in some +more obscurely, but in others more conspicuously;--conceptions which +excite those that are in any respect able to partake of them, to the +immaterial and separate essence of the gods. And as in each part of the +universe and in nature itself, the demiurgus of all which the world +contains established resemblances of the unknown essence of the gods, +that all things might be converted to divinity through their alliance +with it, in like manner I am of opinion, that the divine intellect of +Plato weaves conceptions about the gods with all its progeny, and leaves +nothing deprived of the mention of divinity, that from the whole of its +offspring a reminiscence of total natures may be obtained, and imparted +to the genuine lovers of divine concerns. + +"But if it be requisite to lay before the reader those dialogues out of +many which principally unfold to us the mystic discipline about the gods, +I shall not err in ranking among this number the Phaedo and Phaedrus, the +Banquet and the Philebus, and together with these the Sophista and +Politicus, the Cratylus and the Timaeus. For all these are full through +the whole of themselves, as I may say, of the divine science of Plato. +But I should place in the second rank after these, the fable in the +Gorgias, and that in the Protagoras, likewise the assertions about the +providence of the gods in the Laws, and such things as are delivered +about the Fates, or the mother of the Fates, or the circulations of the +universe, in the tenth book of the Republic. Again you may, if you +please, place in the third rank those Epistles through which we may be +able to arrive at the science about divine natures. For in these, mention +is made of the three kings; and many other divine dogmas worthy the +Platonic theory are delivered. It is necessary therefore, regarding +these, to explore in them each order of the gods. + +Thus from the Philebus, we may receive the science respecting the one +good, and the two first principles of things (bound and infinity) together +with the triad subsisting from these. For you will find all these +distinctly delivered to us by Plato in that dialogue. But from the Timaeus +you may obtain the theory about intelligibles, a divine narration about the +demiurgic monad, and the most full truth about the mundane gods. From the +Phaedrus you may learn all the intelligible and intellectual genera, and +the liberated orders of the gods, which are proximately established above +the celestial circulations. From the Politicus you may obtain the theory of +the fabrication in the heavens, of the periods of the universe, and of the +intellectual causes of those periods. But from the Sophista you may learn +the whole sublunary generation, and the idiom of the gods who are allotted +the sublunary region, and preside over its generations and corruptions. And +with respect to each of the gods, we may obtain many sacred conceptions +from the Banquet, many from the Cratylus, and many from the Phaedo. For in +each of these dialogues more or less mention is made of divine names, from +which it is easy for those who are exorcised in divine concerns to discover +by a reasoning process the idioms of each. + +"It is necessary, however, to evince that each of the dogmas accords with +Platonic principles and the mystic traditions of theologists. For all the +Grecian theology is the progeny of the mystic doctrine of Orpheus; +Pythagoras first of all learning from Aglaophemus the origins of the +gods, but Plato in the second place receiving an all-perfect science of +the divinities from the Pythagoric and Orphic writings. For in the +Philebus, referring the theory about the two forms of principles (bound +and infinity) to the Pythagoreans, he calls them men dwelling with the +gods, and truly blessed. Philolaus, therefore, the Pythagorean, has left +for us in writing admirable conceptions about these principles, +celebrating their common progression into beings, and their separate +fabrication. Again, in the Timaeus, endeavouring to teach us about the +sublunary gods and their order, Plato flies to theologists, calls them +the sons of the gods, and makes them the fathers of the truth about these +divinities. And lastly, he delivers the orders of the sublunary gods +proceeding from wholes, according to the progression delivered by +theologists of the intellectual kings. Further still, in the Cratylus he +follows the traditions of theologists respecting the order of the divine +processions. But in the Gorgias he adopts the Homeric dogma, respecting +the triadic hypostases of the demiurgi. And, in short, he every where +discourses concerning the gods agreeably to the principles of theologists; +rejecting indeed the tragical part of mythological fiction, but establishing +first hypotheses in common with the authors of fables. + +"Perhaps, however, some one may here object to us, that we do not in a +proper manner exhibit the every where dispersed theology of Plato, and that +we endeavour to heap together different particulars from different +dialogues, as if we were studious of collecting many things into one +mixture, instead of deriving them all from one and the same fountain. For +if this were our intention, we might indeed refer different dogmas to +different treatises of Plato, but we shall by no means have a precedaneous +doctrine concerning the gods, nor will there be any dialogue which presents +us with an all-perfect and entire procession of the divine genera, and +their coordination with each other. But we shall be similar to those who +endeavor to obtain a whole from parts, through the want of a whole prior[9] +to parts, and to weave together the perfect, from things imperfect, when, +on the contrary, the imperfect ought to have the first cause of its +generation in the perfect. For the Timaeus, for instance, will teach us the +theory of the intelligible genera, and the Phaedrus appears to present us +with a regular account of the first intellectual orders. But where will be +the coordination of intellectuals to intelligibles? And what will be the +generation of second from first natures? In short, after what manner the +progression of the divine orders takes place from the one principle of all +things, and how in the generations of the gods, the orders between the one, +and all-perfect number, are filled up, we shall be unable to evince. + +----------------- +[9] A whole prior to parts is that which causally contains parts in +itself. Such parts too, when they proceed from their occult causal +subsistence, and have a distinct being of their own, are nevertheless +comprehended, though in a different manner, in their producing whole. +----------------- + +"Further still, it may be said, where will be the venerableness of your +boasted science about divine natures? For it is absurd to call these +dogmas, which are collected from many places, Platonic, and which, as you +acknowledge, are reduced from foreign names to the philosophy of Plato; +nor are you able to evince the whole entire truth about divine natures. +Perhaps, indeed, they will say that certain persons, junior to Plato, +have delivered in their writings, and left to their disciples, one +perfect form of philosophy. You, therefore, are able to produce one +entire theory about nature from the Timaeus; but from the Republic, or +Laws, the most beautiful dogmas about morals, and which tend to one form +of philosophy. Alone, therefore, neglecting the treatise of Plato, which +contains all the good of the first philosophy, and which may be called +the summit of the whole theory, you will be deprived of the most perfect +knowledge of beings, unless you are so much infatuated as to boast on +account of fabulous fictions, though an analysis of things of this kind +abounds with much of the probable, but not of the demonstrative. Besides, +things of this kind are only delivered adventitiously in the Platonic +dialogues; as the fable in the Protagoras, which is inserted for the sake +of the political science, and the demonstrations respecting it. In like +manner the fable in the Republic is inserted for the sake of justice; and +in the Gorgias for the sake of temperance. For Plato combines fabulous +narrations with investigations of ethical dogmas, not for the sake of the +fables, but for the sake of the leading design, that we may not only +exercise the intellectual part of the soul, through contending reasons, +but that the divine part of the soul may more perfectly receive the +knowledge of beings, through its sympathy with more mystic concerns. +For from other discourses we resemble those who are compelled to the +reception of truth; but from fables we are affected in an ineffable +manner, and call forth our unperverted conceptions, venerating the mystic +information which they contain. + +"Hence, as it appears to me, Timaeus with great propriety thinks it fit +that we should produce the divine genera, following the inventors of +fables as sons of the gods, and subscribe to their always generating +secondary natures from such as are first, though they should speak +without demonstration. For this kind of discourse is not demonstrative, +but entheastic, or the progeny of divine inspiration; and was invented by +the ancients, not through necessity, but for the sake of persuasion, not +regarding naked discipline, but sympathy with things themselves. But if +you are willing to speculate not only the causes of fables, but of other +theological dogmas, you will find that some of them are scattered in the +Platonic dialogues for the sake of ethical, and others for the sake of +physical considerations. For in the Philebus, Plato discourses concerning +bound and infinity, for the sake of pleasure, and a life according to +intellect. For I think the latter are species of the former. In the +Timaeus the discourse about the intelligible gods is assumed for the sake +of the proposed physiology. On which account, it is every where necessary +that images should be known from paradigms, but that the paradigms of +material things should be immaterial, of sensibles, intelligible, and of +physical forms, separate from nature. But in the Phaedrus, Plato +celebrates the supercelestial place, the subcelestial profundity, and +every genus under this for the sake of amatory mania; the manner in which +the reminiscence of souls takes place; and the passage to these from +hence. Every where, however, the leading end, as I may say, is either +physical or political, while the conceptions about divine natures are +introduced either for the sake of invention or perfection. How, therefore, +can such a theory as yours be any longer venerable and supernatural, and +worthy to be studied beyond every thing, when it is neither able to +evince the whole in itself, nor the perfect, nor that which is +precedaneous in the writings of Plato, but is destitute of all these, is +violent and not spontaneous, and does not possess a genuine, but an +adventitious order, as in a drama? And such are the particulars which may +be urged against our design. + +"To this objection I shall make a just and perspicuous reply. I say then +that Plato every where discourses about the gods agreeably to ancient +opinions and the nature of things. And sometimes indeed, for the sake of +the cause of the things proposed, he reduces them to the principles of +the dogmas, and thence, as from an exalted place of survey, contemplates +the nature of the thing proposed. But some times he establishes the +theological science as the leading end. For in the Phaedrus, his subject +respects intelligible beauty, and the participation of beauty pervading +thence through all things; and in the Banquet it respects the amatory +order. + +"But if it be necessary to consider, in one Platonic dialogue, the +all-perfect, whole and connected, extending as far as to the complete +number of theology, I shall perhaps assert a paradox, and which will +alone be apparent to our familiars. We ought however to dare, since we +have begun the assertion, and affirm against our opponents, that the +Parmenides, and the mystic conceptions of this dialogue, will accomplish +all you desire. For in this dialogue, all the divine genera proceed in +order from the first cause, and evince their mutual suspension from each +other. And those indeed which are highest, connate with the one, and of +a primary nature, are allotted a form of subsistence, characterized by +unity, occult and simple; but such as are last are multiplied, are +distributed into many parts, and excel in number, but are inferior in +power to such as are of a higher order; and such as are middle, according +to a convenient proportion, are more composite than their causes, but +more simple than their proper progeny. And, in short, all the axioms of +the theological science appear in perfection in this dialogue; and all +the divine orders are exhibited subsisting in connection. So that this +is nothing else than the celebrated generation of the gods, and the +procession of every kind of being from the ineffable and unknown cause of +wholes.[10] The Parmenides therefore, enkindles in the lovers of Plato +the whole and perfect light of the theological science. But after this, +the aforementioned dialogues distribute parts of the mystic discipline +about the gods, and all of them, as I may say, participate of divine +wisdom, and excite our spontaneous conceptions respecting a divine nature. + +------------------ +[10] The principle of all things is celebrated by Platonic philosophy as +the cause of wholes, because through transcendency of power he first +produces those powers in the universe which rank as wholes, and afterward +those which rank as parts through these. Agreeably to this Jupiter, the +artificer of the universe, is almost always called [Greek: demiourgos ton +olon], the demiurgus of wholes. See the Timaeus, and the Introduction to it. +------------------ + +And it is necessary to refer all the parts of this mystic discipline to +these dialogues, and these again to the one and all perfect theory of the +Parmenides. For thus, as it appears to me, we shall suspend the more +imperfect from the perfect, and parts from wholes, and shall exhibit +reasons assimilated to things of which, according to the Platonic Timaeus, +they are interpreters. Such then is our answer to the objection which may +be urged against us; and thus we refer the Platonic theory to the +Parmenides; just as the Timaeus is acknowledged by all who have the least +degree of intelligence to contain the whole science about nature." + +All that is here asserted by Proclus will be immediately admitted by the +reader who understands the outlines which we have here given of the +theology of Plato, and who is besides this a complete master of the +mystic meaning of the Parmenides; which I trust he will find sufficiently +unfolded, through the assistance of Proclus, in the introduction and +notes to that dialogue. + +The next important Platonic dogma in order, is that doctrine concerning +ideas, about which the reader will find so much said in the notes on the +Parmenides, that but little remains to be added here. That little however +is as follows: The divine Pythagoras, and all those who have legitimately +received his doctrines, among whom Plato holds the most distinguished +rank, asserted that there are many orders of beings, viz. intelligible, +intellectual, dianoetic, physical, or in short, vital and corporeal +essences. For the progression of things, the subjection which naturally +subsists together with such progression, and the power of diversity in +coordinate genera give subsistence to all the multitude of corporeal and +incorporeal natures. They said, therefore, that there are three orders in +the whole extent of beings; viz. the intelligible, the dianoetic, and the +sensible; and that in each of these ideas subsist, characterized by the +respective essential properties of the natures by which they are +contained. And with respect to intelligible ideas, these they placed +among divine natures, together with the producing, paradigmatic, and +final causes of things in a consequent order. For if these three causes +sometimes concur, and are united among themselves, (which Aristotle says +is the case), without doubt this will not happen in the lowest works of +nature, but in the first and most excellent causes of all things, which +on account of their exuberant fecundity have a power generative of all +things, and from their converting and rendering similar to themselves the +natures which they have generated, are the paradigms, or exemplars of all +things. But as these divine causes act for their own sake, and on account +of their own goodness, do they not exhibit the final cause? Since +therefore intelligible forms are of this kind, and are the leaders of so +much good to wholes, they give completion to the divine orders, though +they largely subsist about the intelligible order contained in the +artificer of the universe. But dianoetic forms or ideas imitate the +intellectual, which have a prior subsistence, render the order of soul +similar to the intellectual order, and comprehend all things in a +secondary degree. + +These forms beheld in divine natures possess a fabricative power, but +with us they are only gnostic, and no longer demiurgic, through the +defluxion of our wings, or degradation of our intellectual powers. For, +as Plato says in the Phaedrus, when the winged powers of the soul are +perfect and plumed for flight, she dwells on high, and in conjunction +with divine natures governs the world. In the Timaeus, he manifestly +asserts that the demiurgus implanted these dianoetic forms in souls, in +geometric, arithmetic, and harmonic proportions: but in his Republic (in +the section of a line in the 6th book) he calls them images of +intelligibles; and on this account does not for the most part disdain to +denominate them intellectual, as being the exemplars of sensible natures. +In the Phaedo he says that these are the causes to us of reminiscence; +because disciplines are nothing else than reminiscences of middle +dianoetic forms, from which the productive powers of nature being derived +and inspired, give birth to all the mundane phenomena. + +Plato however did not consider things definable, or in modern language +abstract ideas, as the only universals, but prior to these he established +those principles productive of science which essentially reside in the +soul, as is evident from his Phaedrus and Phaedo. In the 10th book of the +Republic too, he venerates those separate forms which subsist in a divine +intellect. In the Phaedrus, he asserts that souls elevated to the +supercelestial place, behold Justice herself, temperance herself, and +science herself; and lastly in the Phaedo he evinces the immortality of +the soul from the hypothesis of separate forms. + +Syrianus[11], in his commentary on the 13th book of Aristotle's +Metaphysics, shows in defense of Socrates, Plato, the Parmenideans, +and Pythagoreans, that ideas were not introduced by these divine men +according to the usual meaning of names, as was the opinion of Chrysippus, +Archedemus, and many of the junior Stoics; for ideas are distinguished by +many differences from things which are denominated from custom. Nor do +they subsist, says he, together with intellect, in the same manner as +those slender conceptions which are denominated universals abstracted +from sensibles, according to the hypothesis of Longinus:[12] for if that +which subsists is unsubstantial, it cannot be consubsistent with intellect. + +----------------- +[11] See my translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics, p. 347. If the reader +conjoins what is said concerning ideas in the notes on that work, with +the introduction and notes to the Parmenides in this, he will be in +possession of nearly all that is to be found in the writings of the +ancients on this subject. + +[12] It appears from this passage of Syrianus that Longinus was the +original inventor of the theory of abstract ideas; and that Mr. Locke was +merely the restorer of it. +----------------- + +Nor are ideas according to these men notions, as Cleanthes afterwards +asserted them to be. Nor is idea definite reason, nor material form; for +these subsist in composition and division, and verge to matter. But ideas +are perfect, simple, immaterial, and impartible natures. And what wonder +is there, says Syrianus, if we should separate things which are so much +distant from each other? Since neither do we imitate in this particular +Plutarch, Atticus, and Democritus, who, because universal reasons +perpetually subsist in the essence of the soul, were of opinion that these +reasons are ideas: for though they separate them from the universal in +sensible natures, yet it is not proper to conjoin in one and the same the +reason of soul, and an intellect such as ours, with paradigmatic and +immaterial forms, and demiurgic intellections. But as the divine Plato +says, it is the province of our soul to collect things into one by a +reasoning process, and to possess a reminiscence of those transcendent +spectacles, which we once beheld when governing the universe in conjunction +with divinity. Boethus,[13] the peripatetic too, with whom it is proper to +join Cornutus; thought that ideas are the same with universals in sensible +natures. However, whether these universals are prior to particulars, they +are not prior in such a manner as to be denudated from the habitude which +they possess with respect to them, nor do they subsist as the causes of +particulars; both which are the prerogatives of ideas; or whether they are +posterior to particulars, as many are accustomed to call them, how can +things of posterior origin, which have no essential subsistence, but are +nothing more than slender conceptions, sustain the dignity of fabricative +ideas? + +------------------- +[13] This was a Greek philosopher, who is often cited by Simplicius in +his Commentary on the Predicaments, and must not therefore be confounded +with Boetius, the roman senator and philosopher. +------------------- + +In what manner then, says Syrianus, do ideas subsist according to the +contemplative lovers of truth? We reply, intelligibly and tetradically +([Greek: noeros kai tetradikos]), in animal itself ([Greek: en to +antozoo]), or the extremity of the intelligible order; but intellectually +and decadically ([Greek: noeros kai dekadikos]), in the intellect of the +artificer of the universe; for, according to the Pythagoric Hymn, "Divine +number proceeds from the retreats of the undecaying monad, till it arrives +at the divine tetrad which produced the mother of all things, the universal +recipient, venerable, circularly investing all things with bound, immovable +and unwearied, and which is denominated the sacred decad, both by the +immortal gods and earth-born men." + +[Greek: +Proeisi gar o Theios arithmos, os phesin o Pythagoreios eis auton +umnos, + Monados ek keuthmonos akeralou esti'an iketai + Tetrada epi zatheen, he de teke metera panton, + Pandechea, presbeiran, oron peri pasi titheiran, + Atropon, akamatou, dekada kleiousi min agnen, + Athanatoi to theoi kai gegeneeis anthropoi.] + +And such is the mode of their subsistence according to Orpheus, +Pythagoras and Plato. Or if it be requisite to speak in more familiar +language, an intellect sufficient to itself, and which is a most perfect +cause, presides over the wholes of the universe, and through these +governs all its parts; but at the same time that it fabricates all +mundane natures, and benefits them by its providential energies, it +preserves its own most divine and immaculate purity; and while it +illuminates all things, is not mingled with the natures which it +illuminates. This intellect, therefore, comprehending in the depths of +its essence an ideal world, replete with all various forms, excludes +privation of cause and casual subsistence, from its energy. But as it +imparts every good and all possible beauty to its fabrications, it +converts the universe to itself, and renders it similar to its own +omniform nature. Its energy, too, is such as its intellection; but it +understands all things, since it is most perfect. Hence there is not any +thing which ranks among true beings, that is not comprehended in the +essence of intellect; but it always establishes in itself ideas, which +are not different from itself and its essence, but give completion to it, +and introduce to the whole of things, a cause which is at the same time +productive, paradigmatic, and final. For it energizes as intellect, and +the ideas which it contains are paradigmatic, as being forms; and they +energize from themselves, and according to their own exuberant goodness. +And such are the Platonic dogmas concerning ideas, which sophistry and +ignorance may indeed oppose, but will never be able to confute. + +From this intelligible world, replete with omniform ideas, this sensible +world, according to Plato, perpetually flows, depending on its artificer +intellect, in the same manner as shadow on its forming substance. For as +a deity of an intellectual characteristic is its fabricator, and both the +essence and energy of intellect are established in eternity the sensible +universe, which is the effect or production of such an energy, must be +consubsistent with its cause, or in other words, must be a perpetual +emanation from it. This will be evident from considering that every thing +which is generated, is either generated by art or by nature, or according +to power. It is necessary, therefore, that every thing operating +according to nature or art should be prior to the things produced; but +that things operating according to power should have their productions +coexistent with themselves; just as the sun produces light coexistent +with itself; fire, heat; and snow, coldness. If therefore the artificer +of the universe produced it by art, he would not cause it simply to be, +but to be in some particular manner; for all art produces form. Whence +therefore does the world derive its being? If he produced it from nature, +since that which makes by nature imparts something of itself to its +productions, and the maker of the world is incorporeal, it would be +necessary that the world, the offspring of such an energy, should be +incorporeal. It remains therefore, that the demiurgus produced the +universe by power alone; but every thing generated by power subsists +together with the cause containing this power: and hence production of +this kind cannot be destroyed unless the producing cause is deprived of +power. The divine intellect therefore that produced the sensible universe +caused it to be coexistent with himself. + +This world thus depending on its divine artificer, who is himself an +intelligible world replete with the archetypal ideas of all things, +considered according to its corporeal nature, is perpetually flowing, and +perpetually advancing to being (en to gignesthai), and compared with its +paradigm, has no stability or reality of being. However, considered as +animated by a divine soul, and as receiving the illuminations of all the +supermundane gods, and being itself the receptacle of divinities from +whom bodies are suspended, it is said by Plato in the Timaeus to be a +blessed god. The great body of this world too, which subsists in a +perpetual dispersion of temporal extension, may be properly called a +whole with a total subsistence, on account of the perpetuity of its +duration, though this is nothing more than a flowing eternity. And hence +Plato calls it a whole of wholes; by the other wholes which are +comprehended in its meaning, the celestial spheres, the sphere of fire, +the whole of air considered as one great orb; the whole earth, and the +whole sea. These spheres, which are called by Platonic writers parts with +a total subsistence, are considered by Plato as aggoregately perpetual. +For if the body of this world is perpetual, this also must be the case +with its larger parts, on account of their exquisite alliance to it, and +in order that wholes with a partial subsistence, such as all individuals, +may rank in the last gradation of things. + +As the world too, considered as one great comprehending whole, is called +by Plato a divine animal, so likewise every whole which it contains is a +world, possessing in the first place, a self-perfect unity; proceeding +from the ineffable, by which it becomes a god; in the second place, a +divine intellect; in the third place, a divine soul; and in the last +place, a deified body. Hence each of these wholes is the producing cause +of all the multitude which it contains, and on this account is said to be +a whole prior to parts; because, considered as possessing an eternal form +which holds all its parts together, and gives to the whole perpetuity of +subsistence, it is not indigent of such parts to the perfection of its +being. That these wholes which rank thus high in the universe are +animated, must follow by a geometrical necessity. For, as Theophrastus +well observes, wholes would possess less authority than parts, and things +eternal than such as are corruptible, if deprived of the possession +of soul. + +And now having with venturous, yet unpresuming wing, ascended to the +ineffable principle of things, and standing with every eye closed in the +vestibules of the adytum, found that we could announce nothing concerning +him, but only indicate our doubts and disappointment, and having thence +descended to his occult and most venerable progeny, and passing through +the luminous world of ideas, holding fast by the golden chain of deity, +terminated our downward flight in the material universe, and its +undecaying wholes, let us stop awhile and contemplate the sublimity and +magnificence of the scene which this journey presents to our view. Here +then we see the vast empire of deity, an empire terminated upwards by a +principle so ineffable that all language is subverted about it, and +downwards, by the vast body of the world. Immediately subsisting after +this immense unknown we in the next place behold a mighty all- +comprehending one, which as being next to that which is in every +respect incomprehensible, possesses much of the ineffable and unknown. +From this principle of principles, in which all things casually subsist +absorbed in superessential light and involved in unfathomable depths, we +view a beauteous progeny of principles, all largely partaking of the +ineffable, all stamped with the occult characters of deity, all +possessing an over-flowing fullness of good. From these dazzling summits, +these ineffable blossoms, these divine propagations, we next see being, +life, intellect, soul, nature and body depending; monads suspended from +unities, deified natures proceeding from deities. Each of these monads +too, is the leader of a series which extends from itself to the last of +things, and which while it proceeds from, at the same time abides in, and +returns to its leader. And all these principles and all their progeny are +finally centred, and rooted by their summits in the first great all- +comprehending one. Thus all beings proceed from, and are comprehended +in the first being; all intellects emanate from one first intellect; all +souls from one first soul; all natures blossom from one first nature; and +all bodies proceed from the vital and luminous body of the world. And +lastly, all these great monads are comprehended in the first one, from +which both they and all their depending series are unfolded into light. +Hence this first one is truly the unity of unities, the monad of monads, +the principle of principles, the God of gods, one and all things, and yet +one prior to all. + +Such, according to Plato, are the flights of the true philosopher, such +the August and magnificent scene which presents itself to his view. By +ascending these luminous heights, the spontaneous tendencies of the soul +to deity alone find the adequate object of their desire; investigation +here alone finally reposes, doubt expires in certainty, and knowledge +loses itself in the ineffable. + +And here perhaps some grave objector, whose little soul is indeed acute, +but sees nothing with a vision healthy and sound, will say that all this +is very magnificent, but that it is soaring too high for man; that it is +merely the effect of spiritual pride; that no truths, either in morality +or theology, are of any importance which are not adapted to the level of +the meanest capacity; and that all that it is necessary for man to know +concerning either God or himself is so plain, that he that runs may read. +In answer to such like cant, for it is nothing more,--a cant produced by +the most profound ignorance, and frequently attended with the most +deplorable envy, I ask, is then the Delphic precept, KNOW THYSELF, a +trivial mandate? Can this be accomplished by every man? Or can any one +properly know himself without knowing the rank he holds in the scale of +being? And can this be effected without knowing what are the natures +which he surpasses, and what those are by which he is surpassed? And can +he know this without knowing as much of those natures as it is possible +for him to know? And will the objector be hardy enough to say that every +man is equal to this arduous task? That he who rushes from the forge, or +the mines, with a soul distorted, crushed and bruised by base mechanical +arts, and madly presumes to teach theology to a deluded audience, is +master of this sublime, this most important science? For my own part I +know of no truths which are thus obvious, thus accessible to every man, +but axioms, those self-evident principles of science which are +conspicuous by their own light, which are the spontaneous unperverted +conceptions of the soul, and to which he who does not assent deserves, as +Aristotle justly remarks, either pity or correction. In short, if this is +to be the criterion of all moral and theological knowledge, that it must +be immediately obvious to every man, that it is to be apprehended by the +most careless inspection, what occasion is there for seminaries of +learning? Education is ridiculous, the toil of investigation is idle. Let +us at once confine Wisdom in the dungeons of Folly, recall Ignorance from +her barbarous wilds, and close the gates of Science with +everlasting bars. + +Having thus taken a general survey of the great world, and descended from +the intelligible to the sensible universe, let us still, adhering to that +golden chain which is bound round the summit of Olympus, and from which +all things are suspended, descend to the microcosm man. For man +comprehends in himself partially everything which the world contains +divinely and totally. Hence, according to Pluto, he is endued with an +intellect subsisting in energy, and a rational soul proceeding from the +same father and vivific goddess as were the causes of the intellect and +soul of the universe. He has likewise an ethereal vehicle analogous to +the heavens, and a terrestrial body, composed from the four elements, and +with which also it is coordinate. + +With respect to his rational part, for in this the essence of man +consists, we have already shown that it is of a self-motive nature, and +that it subsists between intellect, which is immovable both in essence +and energy, and nature, which both moves and is moved. In consequence of +this middle subsistence, the mundane soul, from which all partial souls +are derived, is said by Plato in the Timaeus, to be a medium between that +which is indivisible and that which is divisible about bodies, i.e. the +mundane soul is a medium between the mundane intellect, and the whole of +that corporeal life which the world participates. In like manner, the +human soul is a medium between a daemoniacal intellect proximately, +established above our essence, which it also elevates and perfects, and +that corporeal life which is distributed about our body, and which is +the cause of its generation, nutrition and increase. This daemoniacal +intellect is called by Plato, in the Phaedrus, theoretic and, the +governor of the soul. The highest part therefore of the human soul is the +summit of the dianoetic power ([Greek: to akrotaton tes dianoias]), or +that power which reasons scientifically; and this summit is our intellect. +As, however, our very essence is characterized by reason, this our summit +is rational, and though it subsists in energy, yet it has a remitted union +with things themselves. Though too it energizes from itself, and contains +intelligibles in its essence, yet from its alliance to the discursive +nature of soul, and its inclination to that which is divisible, it falls +short of the perfection of an intellectual essence and energy profoundly +indivisible and united, and the intelligibles which it contains degenerate +from the transcendently fulged and self-luminous nature of first +intelligibles. Hence, in obtaining a perfectly indivisible knowledge, it +requires to be perfected by an intellect whose energy is ever vigilant +and unremitted; and it's intelligibles, that they may become perfect, +are indigent of the light which proceeds from separate intelligibles. +Aristotle, therefore, very properly compares the intelligibles of our +intellect to colors, because these require the splendour of the sun, and +denominates an intellect of this kind, intellect in capacity, both on +account of its subordination to an essential intellect, and because it is +from a separate intellect that it receives the full perfection of its +nature. The middle part of the rational soul is called by Plato, dianoia, +and is that power which, as we have already said, reasons scientifically, +deriving the principles of its reasoning, which are axioms from intellect. +And the extremity of the rational soul is opinion, which in his Sophista +he defines to be that power which knows the conclusion of dianoia. This +power also knows the universal in sensible particulars, as that every man +is a biped, but it knows only the oti, or that a thing is, but is ignorant +of the dioti, or why it is: knowledge of the latter kind being the province +of the dianoetic power. + +And such is Plato's division of the rational part of our nature, which he +very justly considers as the true man; the essence of every thing +consisting in its most excellent part. + +After this follows the irrational nature, the summit of which is the +phantasy, or that power which perceives every thing accompanied with +figure and interval; and on this account it may be called a figured +intelligence ([Greek: morphotike noesis]). This power, as Jamblichus +beautifully observes, groups upon, as it were, and fashions all the +powers of the soul; exciting in opinion the illuminations from the +senses, and fixing in that life which is extended with body, the +impressions which descend from intellect. Hence, slays Proclus, it folds +itself about the indivisibility of true intellect, conforms itself to all +formless species, and becomes perfectly every thing, from which the +dianoetic power and our indivisible reason consists. Hence too, it is all +things passively which intellect is impassively, and on this account +Aristotle calls it passive intellect. Under this subsist anger and +desire, the former resembling a raging lion, and the latter a many-headed +beast; and the whole is bounded by sense, which is nothing more than a +passive perception of things, and on this account is justly said by +Plato, to be rather passion than knowledge; since the former of these is +characterized by alertness, and the latter by energy. + +Further still, in order that the union of the soul with this gross +terrestrial body may be effected in a becoming manner, two vehicles, +according to Plato, are necessary as media, one of which is ethereal, and +the other aerial, and of these, the ethereal vehicle is simple and +immaterial, but the aerial, simple and material; and this dense earthly +body is composite and material. + +The soul thus subsisting as a medium between natures impartible +and such as are divided about bodies, it produces and constitutes the +latter of these; but establishes in itself the prior causes from which it +proceeds. Hence it previously receives, after the manner of an exemplar, +the natures to which it is prior as their cause; but it possesses through +participation, and as the blossoms of first natures, the causes of its +subsistence. Hence it contains in its essence immaterial forms of things +material, incorporeal of such as are corporeal, and extended of such as +are distinguished by interval. But it contains intelligibles after the +manner of an image, and receives partibly their impartible forms, such +as are uniform variously, and such as are immovable, according to a +self-motive condition. Soul therefore is all things, and is elegantly +said by Olympiodorus to be an omniform statue ([Greek: pammorphon +agalma]): for it contains such things as are first through participation, +but such as are posterior to its nature, after the manner of an exemplar. + +As, too, it is always moved; and this always is not eternal, but +temporal, for that which is properly eternal, and such is intellect, is +perfectly stable, and has no transitive energies, hence it is necessary +that its motions should be periodic. For motion is a certain mutation +from some things into others. And beings are terminated by multitudes and +magnitudes. These therefore being terminated, there can neither be an +infinite mutation, according to a right line, nor can that which is +always moved proceed according to a finished progression. Hence that +which is always moved will proceed from the same to the same; and will +thus form a periodic motion. Hence, too, the human, and this also is true +of every mundane soul, uses periods and restitutions of its proper life. +For, in consequence of being measured by time, it energizes transitively, +and possesses a proper motion. But every thing which is moved perpetually +and participates of time, revolves periodically and proceeds from the +same to the same. And hence the soul, from possessing motion, and +energizing according to time, will both possess periods of motion and +restitutions to its pristine state. + +Again, as the human soul, according to Plato, ranks among the number of +those souls that sometimes follow the mundane divinities, in consequence +of subsisting immediately after daemons and heroes, the perpetual +attendants of the gods, hence it possesses a power of descending +infinitely into generation, or the sublunary region, and of ascending +from generation to real being. For since it does not reside with divinity +through an infinite time, neither will it be conversant with bodies +through the whole succeeding time. For that which has no temporal +beginning, both according to Plato and Aristotle, cannot have an end; and +that which has no end, is necessarily without a beginning. It remains, +therefore, that every soul must perform periods, both of ascensions from +generation, and of descensions into generation; and that this will never +fail, through an infinite time. + +From all this it follows that the soul, while an inhabitant of earth, is +in a fallen condition, an apostate from deity, an exile from the orb of +light. Hence Plato, in the 7th book of his Republic, considering our life +with reference to erudition and the want of it, assimilates us to men in +a subterranean cavern, who have been there confined from their childhood, +and so fettered by chains as to be only able to look before them to the +entrance of the cave which expands to the light, but incapable through +the chain of turning themselves round. He supposes too, that they have +the light of a fire burning far above and behind them; and that between +the fire and the fettered men, there is a road above, along which a low +wall is built. On this wall are seen men bearing utensils of every kind, +and statues in wood and stone of men and other animals. And of these men +some are speaking and others silent. With respect to the fettered men in +this cave, they see nothing of themselves or another, or of what is +carrying along, but the shadows formed by the fire falling on the +opposite part of tho cave. He supposes too, that the opposite part of +this prison has an echo; and that in consequence of this the fettered +men, when they hear any one speak, will imagine that it is nothing else +than the passing shadow. + +Here, in the first place, as we have observed in the notes on that book, +the road above between the fire and the fettered men, indicates that +there is a certain ascent in the cave itself from a more abject to a more +elevated life. By this ascent, therefore Plato signifies the contemplation +of dianoetic objects in the mathematical disciplines. For as the shadows +in the cave correspond to the shadows of visible objects, and visible +objects are the immediate images of dianoetic forms, or those ideas which +the soul essentially participates, it is evident that the objects from +which these shadows are formed must correspond to such as are dianoetic. +It is requisite, therefore, that the dianoetic power exercising itself in +these, should draw forth the principles of these from their latent +retreats, and should contemplate them not in images, but as subsisting in +herself in impartible involution. + +In the next place he says, "that the man who is to be led from the cave +will more easily see what the heavens contain, and the heavens +themselves, by looking in the night to the light of the stars, and the +moon, than by day looking on the sun, and the light of the sun." By this +he signifies the contemplation of intelligibles: for the stars and their +light are imitations of intelligibles, so far as all of them partake of +the form of the sun, in the same manner as intelligibles are +characterized by the nature of the good. + +After the contemplation of these, and after the eye is accustomed through +these to the light, as it is requisite in the visible region to see the +sun himself in the last place, in like manner, according to Plato, the +idea of the good must be seen the last in the intelligible region. He, +likewise divinely adds, that it is scarcely to be seen; for we can only +be conjoined with it through the intelligible, in the vestibule of which +it is beheld by the ascending soul. + +In short, the cold, according to Plato, can only be restored while on +earth to the divine likeness, which she abandoned by her descent, and be +able after death to reascend to the intelligible world, by the exercise +of the cathartic and theoretic virtues; the former purifying her from the +defilements of a mortal nature, and the latter elevating her to the +vision of true being: for thus, as Plato says in the Timaeus, "the soul +becoming sane and entire, will arrive at the form of her pristine habit." +The cathartic, however, must necessarily precede the theoretic virtues; +since it is impossible to survey truth while subject to the perturbation +and tumult of the passions. For the rational soul subsisting as a medium +between intellect and the irrational nature, can then only without +revulsion associate with the intellect prior to herself, when she becomes +pure from copassivity with inferior natures. By the cathartic virtues, +therefore, we become sane, in consequence of being liberated from the +passions as diseases; but we become entire by the reassumption of +intellect and science as of our proper parts; and this is effected by +contemplative truth. Plato also clearly teaches us that our apostacy from +better natures is only to be healed by a flight from hence, when he +defines in his Theaetetus philosophy to be a flight from terrestrial +evils: for he evinces by this that passions are connascent with mortals +alone. He likewise says in the same dialogue, "that neither can evil +be abolished, nor yet do they subsist with the gods, but that they +necessarily revolve about this terrene abode, and a mortal nature." For +those who are obnoxious to generation and corruption can also be affected +in a manner contrary to nature, which is the beginning of evils. But in +the same dialogue he subjoins the mode by which our flight from evil +is to be accomplished. "It is necessary," says he "to fly from hence +thither: but the flight is a similitude to divinity, as far as is +possible to man; and this similitude consists in becoming just and holy +in conjunction with intellectual prudence." For it is necessary that he +who wishes to run from evils, should in the first place turn away from a +mortal nature; since it is not possible for those who are mingled with it +to avoid being filled with its attendant evils. As therefore, through our +flight from divinity, and the defluction of those wings which elevate us +on high, we fell into this mortal abode, and thus became connected with +evils, so by abandoning passivity with a mortal nature, and by the +germination of the virtues, as of certain wings, we return to the abode +of pure and true good, and to the possession of divine felicity. For the +essence of many subsisting as a medium between daemoniacal natures, who +always have an intellectual knowledge of divinity, and those beings who +are never adapted by nature to understand him, it ascends to the former +and descends to the latter, through the possession and desertion of +intellect. For it becomes familiar both with the divine and brutal +likeness, through the amphibious condition of its nature. + +When the soul therefore has recovered her pristine perfection in as great +a degree as is possible, while she is an inhabitant of earth by the +exercise of the cathartic and theoretic virtues, she returns after death, +as he says in the Timaeus, to her kindred star, from which she fell, and +enjoys a blessed life. Then, too, as he says in the Phaedrus, being +winged, she governs the world in conjunction with the gods. And this +indeed is the most beautiful end of her labors. This is what he calls in +the Phaedo, a great contest and a mighty hope. This is the most perfect +fruit of philosophy to familiarize and lead her back to things truly +beautiful, to liberate her from this terrene abode as from a certain +subterranean cavern of material life, elevate her to ethereal splendors, +and place her in the islands of the blessed. + +From this account of the human soul, that most important Platonic dogma +necessarily follows, that our soul essentially contains all knowledge, +and that whatever knowledge she acquires in the present life, is in +reality nothing more than a recovery of what a he once possessed. This +recovery is very properly called by Plato reminiscence, not as being +attended with actual recollection in the present life, but as being an +actual repossession of what the soul had lost through her oblivious union +with the body. Alluding to this essential knowledge of the soul, which +discipline evocates from its dormant retreats, Plato says in the +Sophista, "that we know all things as in a dream, and are again ignorant +of them, according to vigilant perception." Hence too, as Proclus well +observes, it is evident that the soul does not collect her knowledge from +sensibles, nor from things partial and divisible discover the whole and +the one. For it is not proper to think that things which have in no +respect a real subsistence, should be the leading causes of knowledge to +the soul; and that things which oppose each other and are ambiguous, +should precede science which has a sameness of subsistence; nor that +things which are variously mutable, should be generative of reasons which +are established in unity; nor that things indefinite should be the causes +of definite intelligence. It is not fit, therefore, that the truth of +things eternal should be received from the many, nor the discrimination +of universals from sensibles, nor a judgment respecting what is good from +irrational natures; but it is requisite that the soul entering within +herself, should investigate herself the true and the good, and the +eternal reasons of things. + +We have said that discipline awakens the dormant knowledge of +the soul; and Plato considered this as particularly effected by the +mathematical discipline. Hence, he asserts of theoretic arithmetic that +it imparts no small aid to our ascent to real being, and that it +liberates us from the wandering and ignorance about a sensible nature. +Geometry too is considered by him as most instrumental to the knowledge +of the good, when it is not pursued for the sake of practical purposes, +but as the means of ascent to an intelligible essence. Astronomy also is +useful for the purpose of investigating the fabricator of all things, +and contemplating as in most splendid images the ideal world, and its +ineffable cause. And lastly music, when properly studied, is subservient +to our ascent, viz. when from sensible we betake ourselves to the +contemplation of ideal and divine harmony. Unless, however, we thus +employ the mathematical discipline, the study of them is justly +considered by Plato as imperfect and useless, and of no worth. For as +the true end of man according to his philosophy is an assimilation to +divinity, in the greatest perfection of which human nature is capable, +whatever contributes to this is to be ardently pursued; but whatever has +a different tendency, however necessary it may be to the wants and +conveniences of the mere animal life, is comparatively little and vile. +Hence it necessary to pass rapidly from things visible and audible, to +those which are alone seen by the eye of intellect. For the mathematical +sciences, when properly studied, move the inherent knowledge of the soul; +awaken its intelligence; purify its dianoetic power; call forth its +essential forms from their dormant retreats; remove that oblivion and +ignorance which are congenial with our birth; and dissolve the bonds +arising from our union with an irrational nature. It is therefore +beautifully said by Plato in the 7th book of his Republic, "that the soul +through these disciplines has an organ purified and enlightened, which is +blinded and buried by studies of a different kind, an organ better worth +saving than ten thousand eyes, since truth becomes visible through this +alone." + +Dialectic, however, or the vertex of the mathematical sciences, +as it is called by Plato in his Republic, is that master discipline which +particularly leads us up to an intelligible essence. Of this first of +sciences, which is essentially different from vulgar logic, and is the +same with what Aristotle calls the first philosophy and wisdom, I have +largely spoken in the introduction and notes to the Parmenides. Suffice +it therefore to observe in this place, that dialectic differs from +mathematical science in this, that the latter flows from, and the former +is void of hypothesis. That dialectic has a power of knowing universals; +that it ascends to good and the supreme cause of all; and, that it +considers good as the end of its elevation; but that the mathematical +science, which previously fabricates for itself definite principles, from +which it evinces things consequent to such principles, does not tend to +the principle, but to the conclusion. Hence Plato does not expel +mathematical knowledge from the number of the sciences, but asserts it to +be the next in rank to that one science which is the summit of all; nor +does he accuse it as ignorant of its own principles, but considers it as +receiving these from the master science dialectic, and that possessing +them without any demonstration, it demonstrates from these its consequent +propositions. + +Hence Socrates, in the Republic, speaking of the power of dialectic, +says that it surrounds all disciplines like a defensive enclosure, and +elevates those that use it to the good itself, and the first unities; +that it purifies the eye of the soul; establishes itself in true beings, +and, the one principle of all things, and ends at last in that which is +no longer hypothetical. The power of dialectic, therefore, being thus +great, and the ends of this path so mighty, it must by no means be +confounded with arguments which are alone conversant with opinion: for +the former is the guardian of sciences, and the passage to it is through +these, but the latter is perfectly destitute of disciplinative science. +To which we may add, that the method of reasoning which is founded in +opinion, regards only that which is apparent; but the dialectic method +endeavors to arrive at the one itself, always employing for this purpose +steps of ascent, and at last beautifully ends in the nature of the good. +Very different therefore is it from the merely logical method, which +presides over the demonstrative phantasy, is of a secondary nature, and +is alone pleased with contentious discussions. For the dialectic of Plato +for the most part employs divisions and analyses as primary sciences, and +as imitating the progression of beings from the one, and their conversion +to it again. It likewise sometimes uses definitions and demonstrations, +and prior to these the definitive method, and the divisive prior to this. +On the contrary, the merely logical method, which is solely conversant +with opinion, is deprived of the incontrovertible reasonings of +demonstration. + +The following is a specimen of the analytical method of Plato's dialectic. +Of analysis there are three species. For one is an ascent from sensibles +to the first intelligibles; a second is an ascent through things +demonstrated and subdemonstrated, to undemonstrated and immediate +propositions; and a third proceeds from hypothesis to unhypothetical +principles. Of the first of these species, Plato has given a most +admirable specimen in the speech of Diotima in the Banquet. For there he +ascends from the beauty about bodies to the beauty in souls; from this to +the beauty in right disciplines; from this again to the beauty in laws; +from the beauty in laws to the ample sea of beauty (Greek: to polu pelagos +tou kalou); and thus proceeding he at length arrives at the beautiful +itself. + +The second species of analysis is as follows: It is necessary to make the +thing investigated the subject of hypothesis; to survey such things as +are prior to it; and to demonstrate these from things posterior, +ascending to such as are prior, till we arrive at the first thing and to +which we give our assent. But beginning from this, we descend +synthetically to the thing investigated. Of this species, the following +is an example from the Phaedrus of Plato. It is inquired if the soul is +immortal; and this being hypothetically admitted, it is inquired in the +next place if it is always moved. This being demonstrated, the next +inquiry is if that which is always moved, is self-moved; and this again +being demonstrated, it is considered whether that which is self-moved is +the principle of motion, and afterwards if the principle is unbegotten. +This then being admitted as a thing acknowledged, and likewise that what +is begotten is incorruptible, the demonstration of the thing proposed is +thus collected. If there is a principle, it is unbegotten and +incorruptible. That which is self-moved is the principle of motion. Soul +is self-moved. Soul therefore (i.e. the rational soul) is incorruptible, +unbegotten, and immortal. + +Of the third species of analysis, which proceeds from the hypothetical to +that which is unhypothetical, Plato has given a most beautiful specimen +in the first hypothesis of his Parmenides. For here, taking for his +hypothesis that the one is, he proceeds through an orderly series of +negations, which are not privative of their subjects, but generative of +things which are as it were, their opposites, till he at length takes +away the hypothesis that the one is. For he denies of it all discourse +and every appellation. And thus evidently denies of it not only that it +is, but even negation. For all things are posterior to the one; viz. +things known, knowledge, and the instruments of knowledge. And thus, +beginning from the hypothetical, he ends in that which is unhypothetical, +and truly ineffable. + +Having taken a general survey, both of the great world and the microcosm +man, I shall close this account of the principal dogmas of Plato, with +the outlines of his doctrine concerning Providence and Fate, as it is a +subject of the greatest importance, and the difficulties in which it is +involved are happily removed by that prince of philosophers. + +In the first place, therefore, Providence, according to common +conceptions, is the cause of good to the subjects of its care; and Fate +is the cause of a certain connection to generated natures. This being +admitted, let us consider what the things are which are connected. Of +beings, therefore, some have their essence in eternity, and others in +time. But by beings whose essence is in eternity, I mean those whose +energy as well as their essence is eternal; and by beings essentially +temporal, those whose essence is always in generation, or becoming to be, +though this should take place in an infinite time. The media between +these two extremes are natures which, in a certain respect, have an +essence permanent and better than generation, or a flowing subsistence, +but whose energy is measured by time. For it is necessary that every +procession from things first to last should be effected through media. +The medium, therefore, between these two extremes, must either be that +which has an eternal essence, but any energy indigent of time, or, on the +contrary, that which has a temporal essence, but an eternal energy. It is +impossible, however, for the latter of these to have any subsistence; for +if this were admitted, energy would be prior to essence. The medium, +therefore, must be that whose essence is eternal, but energy temporal. +And the three orders which compose this first middle and last are, the +intellectual, psychical (or that pertaining to soul), and corporeal. For +from what has been already said by us concerning the gradation of beings, +it is evident that the intellectual order is established in eternity, +both in essence and energy; that the corporeal order is always in +generation, or advancing to being, and this either in an infinite time, +or in a part of time; and that the psychical is indeed eternal in +essence, but temporal in energy. Where then shall we rank things which +being distributed either in places or times, have a certain coordination +and sympathy with each other through connection? It is evident that they +must be ranked among altermotive and corporeal natures. For of things +which subsist beyond the order of bodies, some are better both than place +and time; and others, though they energize according to time, appear to +be entirely pure from any connection with place. + +Hence things which are governed and connected by Fate are entirely +altermotive and corporeal. If this then is demonstrated, it is manifest +that admitting Fate to be a cause of connection, we must assert that it +presides over altermotive and corporeal natures. If, therefore, we look +to that which is the proximate cause of bodies, and thorough which also +altermotive beings are moved, breathe, and are held together, we shall +find that this is nature, the energies of which are to generate, nourish, +and increase. If, therefore, this power not only subsists in us, and all +other animals and plants, but prior to partial bodies there is, by a much +greater necessity, one nature of the world which comprehends and is +motive of all bodies; it follows that nature must be the cause of things +connected, and that in this we must investigate Fate. Hence, Fate is +nature, or that incorporeal power which is the one life of the world, +presiding over bodies, moving all things according to time, and +connecting the motions of things that, by places and times, are distant +from each other. It is likewise the cause of the mutual sympathy of +mortal natures, and of their conjunction with such as are eternal. For +the nature which is in us, binds and connects all the parts of our body, +of which also it is a certain Fate. And as in our body some parts have a +principal subsistence, and others are less principal, and the latter are +consequent to the former, so in the universe, the generations of the less +principal parts are consequent to the motions of the more principal, viz. +the sublunary generations to the periods of the celestial bodies; and the +circle of the former is the image of the latter. + +Hence it is not difficult to see that Providence is deity itself, the +fountain of all good. For whence can good be imparted, to all things, but +from divinity? So that no other cause of good but deity is, as Plato +says, to be assigned. And, in the next place, as this cause is superior +to all intelligible and sensible natures, it is consequently superior to +Fate. Whatever too is subject to Fate, is also under the dominion of +Providence; having its connection indeed from Fate, but deriving the good +which it possesses from Providence. But again, not all things that are +under the dominion of Providence are indigent of Fate; for intelligibles +are exempt from its sway. Fate therefore is profoundly conversant with +corporeal natures; since connection introduces time and corporeal motion. +Hence Plato, looking to this, says in the Timaeus, that the world is +mingled from intellect and necessity, the former ruling over the latter. +For by necessity here he means the motive cause of bodies, which in other +places he calls Fate. And this with great propriety; since every body is +compelled to do whatever it does, and to suffer whatever it suffers; to +heat or to be heated, to impart or to receive cold. But the elective +power is unknown to a corporeal nature; so that the necessary and the +nonelective may be said to be the peculiarities of bodies. + +As there are two genera of things, therefore, the intelligible and the +sensible, so likewise there are two kingdoms of these; that of +Providence, upwards, which reigns over intelligibles and sensibles, and +that of Fate downwards, which reigns over sensibles only. Providence +likewise differs from Fate in the same manner as deity from that which is +divine indeed, but participation, and not primarily. For in other things +we see that which has a primary subsistence, and that which subsists +according to participation. Thus the light which subsists in the orb of +the sun is primary light, and that which is in the air, according to +participation; the latter being derived from the former. And life is +primarily in the soul, but secondarily in the body. Thus also, according +to Plato, Providence is deity, but Fate is something divine, and not a +god: for it depends upon Providence, of which it is as it were the image. +As Providence too is to intelligibles, so is Fate to sensibles. And, +alternately, as Providence is to Fate, so are intelligibles to sensibles. +But intelligibles are the first of beings, and from these others derive +their subsistence. And hence the order of Fate depends on the dominion of +Providence. + +In the second place, let us look to the rational nature itself, when +correcting the inaccuracy of sensible information, as when it accuses the +sight of deception, in seeing the orb of the sun as not larger than a +foot in diameter; when it represses the ebullitions of anger, and +exclaims with Ulysses, + + "Endure my heart;" + +or when it restrains the wanton tendencies of desire to corporeal delight. +For in all such operations it manifestly subdues the irrational motions, +both gnostic and appetitive, and absolves itself from them, as from +things foreign to its nature. But it is necessary to investigate the +essence of every thing, not from its perversion, but from its energies +according to nature. If therefore reason, when it energizes in us as +reason, restrains the shadowy impressions of the delights of licentious +desire, punishes the precipitate motion of fury, and reproves the senses +as full of deception, asserting that + + "We nothing accurate, or see, or hear:" + +and if it says this, looking to its internal reasons, none of which it +knows through the body, or through corporeal cognitions, it is evident +that, according to this energy, it removes itself far from the senses, +contrary to the decision of which it becomes separated from those sorrows +and delights. + +After this, let us direct our attention to another and a better motion of +our rational soul, when, during the tranquillity of the inferior parts, +by a self-convertive energy, it sees its own essence, the powers which it +contains, the harmonic reasons from which it consists, and the many lives +of which it is the middle boundary, and thus finds itself to be a +rational world, the image of the prior natures, from which it proceeds, +but the paradigm of such as are posterior to itself. To this energy of +the soul, theoretic arithmetic and geometry greatly contribute, for these +remove it from the senses, purify the intellect from the irrational forms +of life with which it is surrounded, and lead it to the incorporeal +perception of ideas. For if these sciences receive the soul replete with +images, and knowing nothing subtile and unattended with material +garrulity; and if they elucidate reasons possessing an irrefragable +necessity of demonstration, and forms full of all certainty and +immateriality, and which by no means call to their aid the inaccuracy of +sensibles, do they not evidently purify our intellectual life from things +which fill us with a privation of intellect, and which impede our +perception of true being? + +After both these operations of the rational soul, let us now survey her +highest intelligence, through which she sees her sister souls in the +universe, who are allotted a residence in the heavens, and in the whole +of a visible nature, according to the will of the fabricator of the +world. But above all souls, she sees intellectual essences and orders. +For a deiform intellect resides above every soul, and which also imparts +to the soul an intellectual habit. Prior to these, however, she sees +those divine monads, from which all intellectual multitudes receive their +unions. For above all things united, there must necessarily be unific +causes; above things vivified, vivifying causes; above intellectual +natures, those that impart intellect; and above all participants, +imparticipable natures. From all these elevating modes of intelligence, +it must be obvious to such as are not perfectly blind, how the soul, +leaving sense and body behind, surveys through the projecting energies of +intellect those beings that are entirely exempt from all connection with +a corporeal nature. + +The rational and intellectual soul therefore, in whatever manner it may +be moved according to nature, is beyond body and sense. And hence it must +necessarily have an essence separate from both. But from this again, it +becomes manifest, that when it energizes according to its nature, it is +superior to Fate, and beyond the reach of its attractive power; but that, +when falling into sense and things irrational and corporalized, it +follows downward natures and lives, with them as with inebriated +neighbors, then together with them it becomes subject to the dominion of +Fate. For again, it is necessary that there should be an order of beings +of such a kind, as to subsist according to essence above Fate, but to be +sometimes ranked under it according to habitude. For if there are beings, +and such are all intellectual natures which are eternally established +above the laws of Fate, and also which, according to the whole of their +life, are distributed under the periods of Fate, it is necessary that the +medium between these should be that nature which is sometimes above, and +sometimes under the dominion of Fate. For the procession of incorporeal +natures is much more without a vacuum than that of bodies. + +The free will therefore of man, according to Plato, is a rational +elective, power, desiderative of true and apparent good, and leading the +soul to both, through which it ascends and descends, errs and acts with +rectitude. And hence the elective will be the same with that which +characterizes our essence. According to this power, we differ from divine +and mortal natures: for each of these is void of that two-fold inclination; +the one on account of its excellence being alone established in true +good; but the other in apparent good, on account of its defect. Intellect +too characterizes the one, but sense the other; and the former, as +Plotinus says, is our king, but the latter our messenger. We therefore +are established in the elective power as a medium; and having the ability +of tending both to true and apparent good, when we tend to the former we +follow the guidance of intellect, when to the latter, that of sense. The +power therefore which is in us is not capable of all things. For the +power which is omnipotent is characterized by unity; and on this account +is all-powerful, because it is one, and possesses the form of good. But +the elective power is two-fold, and on this account is not able to effect +all things; because, by it's inclinations to true and apparent good, it +falls short of that nature which is prior to all things. It would however +be all-powerful, if it had not an elective impulse, and was will alone. +For a life subsisting according to will alone subsists according to good, +because the will naturally tends to good, and such a life makes that +which is characteristic in us most powerful and deiform. And hence +through this the soul, according to Plato, becomes divine, and in another +life, in conjunction with deity, governs the world. And thus much of the +outlines of the leading dogmas of the philosophy of Plato. + +In the beginning of this Introduction, I observed that, in drawing these +outlines I should conduct the reader through novel and solitary paths, +solitary indeed they must be, since they have been unfrequented from the +reign of the emperor Justinian to the present time; and novel they will +doubtless appear to readers of every description, and particularly to +those who have been nursed as it were in the bosom of matter, the pupils +of experiment, the darlings of sense, and the legitimate descendants of +the earth-born race that warred on the Olympian gods. To such as these, +who have gazed on the dark and deformed face of their nurse, till they +are incapable of beholding the light of truth, and who are become so +drowsy from drinking immoderately of the cup of oblivion, that their +whole life is nothing more than a transmigration from sleep to sleep, and +from dream to dream, like men passing from one bed to another,--to such +as these, the road through which we have been traveling will appear to be +a delusive passage, and the objects which we have surveyed to be nothing +more than fantastic visions, seen only by the eye of imagination, and +when seen, idle and vain as the dreams of a shadow. + +The following arguments, however, may perhaps awaken some few of these +who are less lethargic than the rest, from the sleep of sense, and enable +them to elevate their mental eye from the dark mire in which they are +plunged, and gain a glimpse of this most weighty truth, that there is +another world, of which this is nothing more than a most obscure +resemblance, and another life, of which this is but the flying mockery. +My present discourse therefore is addressed to those who consider +experiment as the only solid criterion of truth. In the first place then, +these men appear to be ignorant of the invariable laws of demonstration +properly so called, and that the necessary requisites of all +demonstrative propositions are these: that they exist as causes, are +primary, more excellent, peculiar, true, and known than the conclusions. +For every demonstration not only consists of principles prior to others, +but of such as are eminently first; since if the assumed propositions may +be demonstrated by other assumptions, such propositions may indeed +appear prior to the conclusions, but are by no means entitled to the +appellation of first. Others, on the contrary, which require no +demonstration, but are of themselves manifest, are deservedly esteemed +the first, the truest, and the best. Such indemonstrable truths were +called by the ancients axioms from their majesty and authority, as the +assumptions which constitute demonstrative syllogisms derive all their +force and efficacy from these. + +In the next place, they seem not to be sufficiently aware, that universal +is better than partial demonstration. For that demonstration is the more +excellent which is derived from the better cause; but a universal is more +extended and excellent than a partial cause; since the arduous +investigation of the why in any subject is only stopped by the arrival at +universals. Thus if we desire to know why the outward angles of a +triangle are equal to four right angles, and it is answered, Because the +triangle is isosceles; we again ask, but why Because isosceles? And if it +be replied, Because it is a triangle; we may again inquire, But why +because a triangle? To which we finally answer, because a triangle is a +right-lined figure. And here our inquiry rests at that universal idea, +which embraces every preceding particular one, and is contained in no +other more general and comprehensive than itself. Add too, that the +demonstration of particulars is almost the demonstration of infinites; of +universals the demonstration of finites; and of infinites there can be no +science. That demonstration likewise is the best which furnishes the mind +with the most ample knowledge; and this is, alone, the province of +universals. We may also add, that he who knows universals knows +particulars likewise in capacity; but we can not infer that he who has +the best knowledge of particulars, knows any thing of universals. And +lastly, that which is universal is the object of intellect and reason; +but particulars are coordinated to the perceptions of sense. + +But here perhaps the experimentalist will say, admitting all this to be +true, yet we no otherwise obtain a perception of these universals than by +an induction of particulars, and abstraction from sensibles. To this, I +answer that the universal which is the proper object of science, is not +by any means the offspring of abstraction; and induction is no otherwise +subservient to its existence than an exciting cause. For if scientific +conclusions are indubitable, if the truth of demonstration is necessary +and eternal, this universal is truly all, and not like that gained by +abstraction, limited to a certain number of particulars. Thus, the +proposition that the angles of every triangle are equal to two right, if +it is indubitably true, that is, if the term every in it really includes +all triangles, cannot be the result of any abstraction; for this, however +extended it may be, is limited, and falls far short of universal +comprehension. Whence is it then that the dianoetic power concludes thus +confidently that the Proposition is true of all triangles? For if it be +said that the mind, after having abstracted triangle from a certain +number of particulars, adds from itself what is wanting to complete the +all; in the first place, no man, I believe, will say that any such +operation as this took place in his mind when he first learnt this +proposition; and in the next place, if this should be granted, it would +follow that such proposition is a mere fiction, since it is uncertain +whether that which is added to complete the all is truly added; and thus +the conclusion will no longer be indubitably necessary. + +In short, if the words all and every, with which every page of theoretic +mathematics is full, mean what they are conceived by all men to mean, and +if the universals which they signify are the proper objects of science, +such universals must subsist in the soul prior to the energies of sense. +Hence it will follow that induction is no otherwise subservient to +science, than as it produces credibility in axioms and petitions; and +this by exciting the universal conception of these latent in the soul. +The particulars, therefore, of which an induction is made in order to +produce science, must be so simple, that they may be immediately +apprehended, and that the universal may be predicated of them without +hesitation. The particulars of the experimentalists are not of this kind, +and therefore never can be sources of science truly so called. + +Of this, however, the man of experiment appears to be totally ignorant, +and in consequence of this, he is likewise ignorant that parts can only +be truly known through wholes, and that this is particularly the case +with parts when they belong to a whole, which, as we have already +observed, from comprehending in itself the parts which it produces, is +called a whole prior to parts. As he, therefore, would by no means merit +the appellation of a physician who should attempt to cure any part of the +human body, without a previous knowledge of the whole; so neither can he +know any thing truly of the vegetable life of plants, who has not a +previous knowledge of that vegetable life which subsists in the earth as +a whole prior to, because the principle and cause of all partial +vegetable life, and who still prior to this has not a knowledge of that +greater whole of this kind which subsists in nature herself; nor, as +Hippocrates justly observes, can he know any thing truly of the nature of +the human body who is ignorant what nature is considered as a great +comprehending whole. And if this be true, and it is so most indubitably, +with all physiological inquiries, how much more must it be the case with +respect to a knowledge of those incorporeal forms to which we ascended in +the first part of this Introduction, and which in consequence of +proceeding from wholes entirely exempt from body are participated by it, +with much greater obscurity and imperfection? Here then is the great +difference, and a mighty one it is, between the knowledge gained by the +most elaborate experiments, and that acquired by scientific reasoning, +founded on the spontaneous, unperverted, and self-luminous conceptions of +the soul. The former does not even lead its votary up to that one nature +of the earth from which the natures of all the animals and plants on its +surface, and of all the minerals and metals in its interior parts, +blossom as from a perennial root. The latter conducts its votary through +all the several mundane wholes up to that great whole the world itself, +and thence leads him through the luminous order of incorporeal wholes to +that vast whole of wholes, in which all other wholes are centred and +rooted, and which is no other than the principle of all principles, and +the fountain of deity itself. No less remarkable likewise, is the +difference between the tendencies of the two pursuits, for the one +elevates the soul to the most luminous heights, and to that great +ineffable which is beyond all altitude; but the other is the cause of a +mighty calamity to the soul, since, according to the elegant expression +of Plutarch, it extinguishes her principal and brightest eye, the +knowledge of divinity. In short, the one leads to all that is grand, +sublime and splendid in the universe; the other to all that is little, +groveling[14] and dark. The one is the parent of the most pure and ardent +piety; the genuine progeny of the other are impiety and atheism. And, in +fine, the one confers on its votary the most sincere, permanent, and +exalted delight; the other continual disappointment, and unceasing +molestation. + +----------------- +[14] That this must be the tendency of experiment, when prosecuted as the +criterion of truth, is evident from what Bacon, the prince of modern +philosophy, says in the 104th Aphorism of his Novum Organum, that +"baseless fabric of a vision." For he there sagely observes that wings +are not to be added to the human intellect, but rather lead and weights; +that all its leaps and flights may be restrained. That this is not yet +done, but that when it is we may entertain better hopes respecting the +sciences. "Itaque hominum intellectui non plumae addendae, sed plumbum +potius, et pondera; ut cohibeant omnem saltum et volatum. Atque hoc adhuc +factum non est; quum vero factum fuerit, melius de scientiis sperare +licebit." A considerable portion of lead must certainly have been added +to the intellect of Bacon when he wrote this Aphorism. +----------------- + +If such then are the consequences, such the tendencies of experimental +inquiries, when prosecuted as the criterion of truth, and daily +experience[15] unhappily shows that they are, there can be no other remedy +for this enormous evil than the intellectual philosophy of Plato. So +obviously excellent indeed is the tendency of this philosophy, that its +author, for a period of more than two thousand years, has been universally +celebrated by the epithet of divine. Such too is its preeminence, that it +may be shown, without much difficulty, that the greatest men of antiquity, +from the time in which its salutary light first blessed the human race, +have been more or less imbued with its sacred principles, have been more or +less the votaries of its divine truths. Thus, to mention a few from among a +countless multitude. In the catalogue of those endued with sovereign power, +it had for its votaries Dion of Siracusian, Julian the Roman, and Chosroes +the Persian, emperor; among the leaders of armies, it had Chabrias and +Phocion, those brave generals of the Athenians; among mathematicians, those +leading stars of science, Eudoxus, Archimedes[16] and Euclid; among +biographers, the inimitable Plutarch; among physicians, the admirable +Galen; among rhetoricians, those unrivaled orators Demosthenes and Cicero; +among critics, that prince of philologists, Longinus; and among poets, the +most learned and majestic Virgil. Instances, though not equally illustrious, +yet approximating to these in splendour, may doubtless be adduced after +the fall of the Roman empire; but then they have been formed on these +great ancients as models, and are, consequently, only rivulets from +Platonic streams. And instances of excellence in philosophic attainments, +similar to those among the Greeks, might have been enumerated among the +moderns, if the hand of barbaric despotism had not compelled philosophy +to retire into the deepest solitude, by demolishing her schools, and +involving the human intellect in Cimmerian darkness. In our own country, +however, though no one appears to have wholly devoted himself to the +study of this philosophy, and he who does not will never penetrate its +depths, yet we have a few bright examples of no common proficiency in its +more accessible parts. + +----------------- +[15] I never yet knew a man who made experiment the test of truth, and I +have known many such, that was not atheistically inclined. + +[16] I have ranked Archimedes among the Platonists, because he cultivated +the mathematical sciences Platonically, as is evident from the testimony of +Plutarch in his Life of Marcellus, p. 307. For he there informs us that +Archimedes considered the being busied about mechanics, and in short, every +art which is connected with the common purposes of life, as ignoble and +illiberal; and that those things alone were objects of his ambition with +which the beautiful and the excellent were present, unmingled with the +necessary. The great accuracy and elegance in the demonstrations of Euclid +and Archimedes, which have not been equaled by any of our greatest modern +mathematicians, were derived from a deep conviction of this important +truth. On the other hand modern mathematicians, through a profound +ignorance of this divine truth, and looking to nothing but the wants and +conveniences of the animal life of man, as if the gratification of his +senses was his only end, have corrupted pure geometry, by mingling with it +algebraical calculations, and through eagerness to reduce it as much as +possible to practical purposes, have more anxiously sought after +conciseness than accuracy, facility than elegance of geometrical +demonstration. +----------------- + +The instances I allude to are Shaftesbury, Akenside, Harris, Petwin, and +Sydenham. So splendid is the specimen of philosophic abilities displayed by +these writers, like the fair dawning of same unclouded morning, that we +have only deeply to regret that the sun of their genius sat before we were +gladdened with its effulgence. Had it shone with its full strength, the +writer of this Introduction would not have attempted either to translate +the works, or elucidate the doctrines of Plato; but though it rose with +vigor, it dispersed not the clouds in which its light was gradually +involved, and the eye in vain anxiously waited for it's meridian beam. +In short, the principles of the philosophy of Plato are of all others the +most friendly to true piety, pure morality, solid learning, and sound +government. For as it is scientific in all its parts, and in these parts +comprehends all that can be known by man in theology and ethics, and all +that is necessary for him to know in physics, it must consequently contain +in itself the source of all that is great and good both to individuals and +communities, must necessarily exalt while it benefits, and deify while it +exalts. + +We have said that this philosophy at first shone forth through Plato with +an occult and venerable splendor; and it is owing to the hidden manner in +which it is delivered by him, that its depth was not fathomed till many +ages after it's promulgation, and when fathomed, was treated by +superficial readers with ridicule and contempt. Plato indeed, is not +singular in delivering his philosophy occultly: for this was the custom +of all the great ancients; a custom not originating from a wish to become +tyrants in knowledge, and keep the multitude in ignorance, but from a +profound conviction that the sublimest truths are profaned when clearly +unfolded to the vulgar. This indeed must necessarily follow; since, as +Socrates in Plato justly observes, "it is not lawful for the pure to be +touched by the impure;" and the multitude are neither purified from the +defilements of vice, nor the darkness of twofold ignorance. Hence, while +they are thus doubly impure, it is as impossible for them to perceive the +splendors of truth, as for an eye buried in mire to survey the light +of day. + +The depth of this philosophy then does not appear to have been perfectly +penetrated except by the immediate disciples of Plato, for more than five +hundred years after its first propagation. For though Crantor, Atticus, +Albinus, Galen and Plutarch, were men of great genius, and made no common +proficiency in Philosophic attainments, yet they appear not to have +developed the profundity of Plato's conceptions; they withdrew not the +veil which covers his secret meaning, like the curtains which guarded the +adytum of temples from the profane eye; and they saw not that all behind +the veil is luminous, and that there divine spectacles[17] every where +present themselves to the view. This task was reserved for men who were +born indeed in a baser age, but, who being allotted a nature similar to +their leader, were the true interpreters of his mystic speculations. The +most conspicuous of these are the great Plotinus, the most learned +Porphyry, the divine Jamblichus, the most acute Syrianus, Proclus the +consummation of philosophic excellence, the magnificent Hierocles, the +concisely elegant Sallust, and the most inquisitive Damascius. By these +men, who were truly links of the golden chain of deity, all that is +sublime, all that is mystic in the doctrines of Plato (and they are +replete with both these in a transcendent degree), was freed from its +obscurity and unfolded into the most pleasing and admirable light. Their +labors, however, have been ungratefully received. The beautiful light +which they benevolently disclosed has hitherto unnoticed illumined +philosophy in her desolate retreats, like a lamp shining on some +venerable statue amidst dark and solitary ruins. The prediction of the +master has been unhappily fulfilled in these his most excellent +disciples. "For an attempt of this kind," says he,[18] "will only be +beneficial to a few, who from small vestiges, previously demonstrated, +are themselves able to discover these abstruse particulars. But with +respect to the rest of mankind, some it will fill with a contempt by no +means elegant, and others with a lofty and arrogant hope, that they shall +now learn certain excellent things." Thus with respect to these admirable +men, the last and the most legitimate of the followers of Plato, some +from being entirely ignorant of the abstruse dogmas of Plato, and finding +these interpreters full of conceptions which are by no means obvious to +every one in the writings of that philosopher, have immediately concluded +that such conceptions are mere jargon and revery, that they are not truly +Platonic, and that they are nothing more than streams, which, though, +originally derived from a pure fountain, have become polluted by distance +from their source. Others, who pay attention to nothing but the most +exquisite purity of language, look down with contempt upon every writer +who lived after the fall of the Macedonian empire; as if dignity and +weight of sentiment were inseparable from splendid and accurate diction; +or as if it were impossible for elegant writers to exist in a degenerate +age. So far is this from being the case, that though the style of +Plotinus[19] and Jamblichus[20] is by no means to be compared with that +of Plato, yet this inferiority is lost in the depth and sublimity of +their conceptions, and is as little regarded by the intelligent reader, +as motes in a sunbeam by the eye that gladly turns itself to the +solar light. + +-------------- +[17] See my Dissertation on the Mysteries. + +[18]See the 7th Epistle of Plato. + +[19] It would seem that those intemperate critics who have thought proper +to revile Plotinus, the leader of the latter Platonists, have paid no +attention to the testimony of Longinus concerning this most wonderful +man, as preserved by Porphyry in his life of him. For Longinus there +says, "that though he does not entirely accede to many of his hypotheses, +yet he exceedingly admires and loves the form of his writing, the density +of his conceptions, and the philosophic manner in which his questions are +disposed." And in another place he says, "Plotinus, as it seems, has +explained the Pythagoric and Platonic principles more clearly than those +that were prior to him; for neither are the writings of Numenius, +Cronius, Moderatus, and Thrasyllus, to be compared with those of Plotinus +on this subject." After such a testimony as this from such a consummate +critic as Longinus, the writings of Plotinus have nothing to fear from +the imbecile censure of modern critics. I shall only further observe, +that Longinus, in the above testimony, does not give the least hint of +his having found any polluted streams, or corruption of the doctrines of +Plato, in the works of Plotinus. There is not indeed the least vestige of +his entertaining any such opinion in any part of what he has said about +this most extraordinary man. This discovery was reserved for the more +acute critic of modern times, who, by a happiness of conjecture unknown +to the ancients, and the assistance of a good index, can in a few days +penetrate the meaning of the profoundest writer of antiquity, and bid +defiance even to the decision of Longinus. + +[20] Of this most divine man, who is justly said by the emperor Julian to +have been posterior indeed in time, but not in genius even to Plato himself, +see the life which I have given in the History of the Restoration of the +Platonic Theology, in the second vol. of my Proclus on Euclid. +---------------------- + +As to the style of Porphyry, when we consider that he was the disciple of +Longinus, whom Eunapius elegantly calls "a certain living library, and +walking museum," it is but reasonable to suppose that he imbibed some +portion of his master's excellence in writing. That he did so is +abundantly evident from the testimony of Eunapius, who particularly +commends his style for its clearness, purity, and grace. "Hence," he +says, "Porphyry being let down to men like a mercurial chain, through his +various erudition, unfolded every thing into perspicuity, and purity." +And in another place he speaks of him as abounding with all the graces of +diction, and as the only one that exhibited and proclaimed the praise of +his master. With respect to the style of Proclus, it is pure, clear and +elegant, like that of Dionysius Halicarnassus; but is much more copious +and magnificent; that of Hierocles is venerable and majestic, and nearly +equals the style of the greatest ancients; that of Sallust possesses an +accuracy and a pregnant brevity, which cannot easily be distinguished +from the composition of the Stagirite; and lastly, that of Damascius is +clear and accurate, and highly worthy a most investigating mind. + +Others again have filled themselves with a vain confidence, from reading +of commentaries of these admirable interpreters, and have in a short time +considered themselves superior to their masters. This was the case with +Ficinus, Picus, Dr. Henry Moore, and other pseudo Platonists, their +contemporaries, who, in order to combine Christianity with the doctrines +of Plato, rejected some of his most important tenets, and perverted +others, and thus corrupted one of these systems, and afforded no real +benefit to the other. + +But who are the men by whom these latter interpreters of Plato are +reviled? When and whence did this defamation originate? Was it when the +fierce champions for the trinity fled from Galilee to the groves of +Academus, and invoked, but in vain, the assistance of Philosophy? When + + The trembling grove confessed its fright, + The wood-nymphs started at the sight; + Ilissus backward urg'd his course, + And rush'd indignant to his source. + +Was it because that mitred sophist, Warburton, thought fit to talk of the +polluted streams of the Alexandrian school, without knowing any thing of +the source whence those streams are derived? Or was it because some heavy +German critic, who knew nothing beyond a verb in mi, presumed to grunt at +these venerable heroes? Whatever was its source, and whenever it +originated, for I have not been able to discover either, this however is +certain, that it owes its being to the most profound Ignorance, or the +most artful Sophistry, and that its origin is no less contemptible than +obscure. For let us but for a moment consider the advantages which these +latter Platonists possessed beyond any of their modern revilers. In the +first place, they had the felicity of having the Greek for their native +language, and must therefore, as they were confessedly, learned men, have +understood that language incomparably better than any man since the time +in which the ancient Greek was a living tongue. In the next place, they +had books to consult, written by the immediate disciples of Plato, which +have been lost for upwards of a thousand years, besides many Pythagoric +writings from which Plato himself derived most of his more sublime +dogmas. Hence we find the works of Parmenides, Empedocles, the Electic +Zeno, Speusippus, Xenocrates, and many other illustrious philosophers of +the highest antiquity, who were either genuine Platonists or the sources +of Platonism, are continually cited by these most excellent interpreters, +and in the third place they united the greatest purity of life to the +most piercing vigor of intellect. Now when it is considered that the +philosophy to the study of which these great men devoted their lives, was +professedly delivered by its author in obscurity; that Aristotle himself +studied it for twenty years; and that it was no uncommon thing, as Plato +informs us in one of his Epistles, to find students unable to comprehend +its sublimest tenets even in a longer period than this,--when all these +circumstances are considered, what must we think of the arrogance, not to +say impudence, of men in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth +centuries, who have dared to calumniate these great masters of wisdom? Of +men, with whom the Greek is no native language; who have no such books to +consult as those had whom they revile; who have never thought, even in a +dream, of making the acquisition of wisdom the great object of their +life; and who in short have committed that most baneful error of +mistaking philology for philosophy, and words for things? When such as +these dare to defame men who may be justly ranked among the greatest and +wisest of the ancients, what else can be said than that they are the +legitimate descendants of the suitors of Penelope, whom, in the animated +language of Ulysses, + + Laws or divine or human fail'd to move, + Or shame of men, or dread of gods above: + Heedless alike of infamy or praise, + Or Fame's eternal voice in future days,[21] + +----------------- +[21] Pope's Odyssey, book xxii, v. 47, &c. +----------------- + +But it is now time to present the reader with a general view of the works +of Plato, and, also to speak of the preambles, digressions, and style of +their author, and of the following translation. In accomplishing the +first of these, I shall avail myself of the synopsis of Mr. Sydenham, +taking the liberty at the same time of correcting it where it appears to +be erroneous, and of making additions to it where it appears to be +deficient. + +The dialogues of Plato are of various kinds; not only with regard to +those different matters, which are the subjects of them; but in respect +of the manner also in which they are composed or framed, and of the form +under which they make their appearance to the reader. It will therefore, +as I imagine, be not improper, in pursuance of the admonition given us by +Plato himself in his dialogue named Phaedrus[22] and in imitation of the +example set us by the ancient Platonists to distinguish the several +kinds; by dividing them, first, into the most general; and then, +subdividing into the subordinate; till we come to those lower species, +that particularly and precisely denote the nature of the several +dialogues, and from which they ought to take their respective +denominations. + +---------------- +[22] Whoever is unable to divide and distinguish things into their +several sorts or species; and, on the other hand, referring every +particular to its proper species, to comprehend them all in one general +idea; will never understand any writings of which those things are the +subject, like a true critic, upon those high principles of art to which +the human understanding reaches. We have thought proper, here, to +paraphrase this passage, for the sake of giving to every part of so +important a sentence its full force, agreeably to the tenor of Plato's +doctrine; and in order to initiate our readers into a way of thinking, +that probably many of them are as yet unacquainted with. +---------------- + +The most general division of the writings of Plato, is into those of the +Sceptical kind, and those of they Dogmatical. In the former sort, nothing +is expressly either proved or asserted, some philosophical question only is +considered and examined; and the reader is left to himself to draw such +conclusions, and discover such truths as the philosopher means to +insinuate. This is done, either in the way of inquiry, or in the way of +controversy and dispute. In the way of controversy are carried on all such +dialogues, as tend to eradicate false opinions; and that, either indirectly, +by involving them in difficulties, and embarrassing the maintainers of them; +or directly, by confuting them. In the way of inquiry proceed those whose +tendency is to raise in the mind right opinions; and that either by exciting +to the pursuit of some part of wisdom, and showing in what manner to +investigate it; or by leading the way, and helping the mind forward in the +search. And this is effected by a process through opposing arguments.[23] + +------------------ +[23] It is necessary to observe that Plato in the Parmenides calls all +that part of his Dialectic, which proceeds through opposite arguments, an +exercise and wandering. +------------------ + +The dialogues of the other kind, the Dogmatical or Didactic, teach +explicitly some point of doctrine; and this they do either by laying it +down in the authoritative way, or by proving it in the ways of reason and +argument. In the authoritative way the doctrine is delivered, sometimes by +the speaker himself magisterially, at other times as derived to him by +tradition from wise men. The argumentative or demonstrative method of +teaching, used by Plato, proceeds in all the dialectic ways, dividing, +defining, demonstrating, and analysing; and the object of it consists in +exploring truth alone. According to this division is framed the following +scheme, or table: + +DIALOGUES[24] + +Sceptical Disputative Embarrassing Confuting Inquisitive Exciting Assisting +Dogmatical Demonstrative Analytical Inductional Authoritative Magisterial +Traditional + +----------------- +[24]We have, given us by Diogenes Laertius, another division of the +characters, as he calls them, of Plato's writings, different from that +exhibited in the scheme above. This we have thought proper to subjoin, on +account of its antiquity and general reception. + +Dialogues + +Diadectic Speculative Physical Logical Practical Ethical Political +Inquisitive Gymnastic Maieutic Peirastic Agonistic Endeietic Anatreptic + +The learned reader will observe the latter half of the dialogues, according +to this scheme, to be described by metaphors taken from the gymnastic art: +the dialogues, here termed gymnastic, being imagined to bear a similitude +to that exercise; the agonistic, to the combat. In the lowest subdivision, +indeed, the word maieutic is a metaphor of another kind, fully explained in +Plato's Theaetetus: the maieutic dialogues, however, were supposed to +resemble giving the rudiments of the art; as the peirastic were, to +represent a skirmish, or trial of proficiency; the endeietic were, it +seems, likened to the exhibiting a specimen of skill; and the anatreptic, +to presenting the spectacle of a thorough defeat, or sound drubbing. The +principal reason why we contented not ourselves with this account of the +difference between the dialogues of Plato, was the capital error there +committed in the first subdivision, of course extending itself through the +latter. This error consists in dividing the Didactic dialogues with regard +to their subject-matter; while those of the Inquisitive sort are divided +with respect to the manner of their composition. So that the subdivisions +fall not, with any propriety, under one and the same general head. Besides, +a novice in the works of Plato might hence be led naturally to suppose, +that the dogmatical or didactic dialogues are, all of them, written in the +same manner; and that the others, those of the inquisitive kind, by us +termed sceptical, have no particular subjects at all; or, if they have, +that their subjects are different from those of the didactic dialogues, +and are consequently unphilosophical. Now every one of the suppositions +here mentioned is far from being true. +---------------- + +The philosopher, in thus varying his manner, and diversifying his +writings into these several kinds, means not merely to entertain with +their variety; not to teach, on different occasions, with more or less +plainness and perspicuity; not yet to insinuate different degrees of +certainty in the doctrines themselves: but he takes this method, as a +consummate master of the art of composition in the dialogue-way of +writing, from the different characters of the speakers, as from different +elements in the frame of these dramatic dialogues, or different +ingredients in their mixture, producing some peculiar genius and turn of +temper, as it were, in each. + +Socrates indeed is in almost all of them the principal speaker: but when +he falls into the company of some arrogant sophist; when the modest +wisdom, and clear science of the one, are contrasted with the confident +ignorance and blind opinionativeness of the other; dispute and +controversy must of course arise: where the false pretender cannot fail +of being either puzzled or confuted. To puzzle him only is sufficient, +if there be no other persons present; because such a man can never be +confuted in his own opinion: but when there is an audience round them, +in danger of being misled by sophistry into error, then is the true +philosopher to exert his utmost, and the vain sophist to be convicted +and exposed. + +In some dialogues Plato represents his great master mixing in +conversation with young men of the best families in the commonwealth. +When these happen to have docile dispositions and fair minds, then is +occasion given to the philosopher to call forth[25] the latent seeds of +wisdom, and to cultivate the noble plants with true doctrine, in the +affable and familiar way of joint inquiry. To this is owing the +inquisitive genius of such dialogues: where, by a seeming equality in the +conversation, the curiosity or zeal of the mere stranger is excited; that +of the disciple is encouraged; and, by proper questions, the mind is +aided and forwarded in the search of truth. + +----------------- +[25] We require exhortation, that we may be led to true good; dissuasion, +that we may be turned from things truly evil; obstetrication, that we may +draw forth our unperverted conceptions; and confutation, that we may be +purified from two-fold ignorance. +----------------- + +At other times, the philosophic hero of these dialogues is introduced +in a higher character, engaged in discourse with men of more improved +understandings and enlightened minds. At such seasons he has an +opportunity of teaching in a more explicit manner, and of discovering +the reasons of things: for to such an audience truth is due, and all +demonstrations[26] possible in the teaching it. Hence, in the dialogues +composed of these persons, naturally arises the justly argumentative or +demonstrative genius; and this, as we have before observed, according to +all the dialectic methods. + +----------------- +[26] The Platonists rightly observe, that Socrates, in these cases, makes +use of demonstrative and just reasoning, ([Greek: apodeiktikou]); whereas +to the novice he is contented with arguments only probable, ([Greek: +pithanois]); and against the litigious sophist often employs such as are +[Greek: eristikoi]; puzzling and contentious. +----------------- + +But when the doctrine to be taught admits not of demonstration; of which +kind is the doctrine of antiquities, being only traditional, and a matter +of belief; and the doctrine of laws, being injunctional, and the matter of +obedience; the air of authority is then assumed: in the former cases, the +doctrine is traditionally handed down to others from the authority of +ancient sages; in the latter, is magisterially pronounced with the +authority of a legislator.[27] + +----------------- +[27] It is necessary to observe, that in those dialogues in which Socrates +is indeed introduced, but sustains an inferior part, he is presented to +our view as a learner, and not as a teacher; and this is the case in the +Parmenides and Timaeus. For by the former of these philosophers he is +instructed in the most abtruse theological dogmas, and by the latter in +the whole of physiology. +----------------- + +Thus much for the manner in which the dialogues of Plato are severally +composed, and the cast of genius given them in their composition. The +form under which they appear, or the external character that marks them, +is of three sorts: either purely dramatic, like the dialogue of tragedy +or comedy; or purely narrative, where a former conversation is supposed +to be committed to writing, and communicated to some absent friend; or of +the mixed kind, like a narration in dramatic poems, where is recited, to +some person present, the story of things past. + +Having thus divided the dialogues of Plato, in respect of that inward +form or composition, which creates their genius; and again, with +reference to that outward form, which marks them, like flowers and other +vegetables, with a certain character; we are further to make a division +of them, with regard to their subject and their design; beginning with +their design, or end, because for the sake of this are all the subjects +chosen. The end of all the writings of Plato is that, which is the end of +all true philosophy or wisdom, the perfection and the happiness of man. +Man therefore is the general subject; and the first business of philosophy +must be to inquire what is that being called man, who is to be made happy; +and what is his nature, in the perfection of which is placed his happiness. +As however, in the preceding part of this Introduction, we have endeavored +to give the outlines of Plato's doctrine concerning man, it is unnecessary +in this place to say any thing further on that subject. + +The dialogues of Plato, therefore, with respect to their subjects, may be +divided into the speculative, the practical, and such as are of a mixed +nature. The subjects of these last are either general, comprehending both +the others; or differential, distinguishing them. The general subject are +either fundamental, or final: those of the fundamental kind are philosophy, +human nature, the soul of man; of the final kind are love, beauty, good. +The differential regard knowledge, as it stands related to practice; in +which are considered two questions: one of which is, whether virtue is to +he taught; the other is, whether error in the will depends on error in +the judgment. The subjects of the speculative dialogues relate either to +words, or to things. Of the former sort are etymology, sophistry, rhetoric, +poetry; of the latter sort are science, true being, the principles of +mind, outward nature. The practical subjects relate either to private +conduct, and the government of the mind over the whole man; or to his +duty towards others in his several relations; or to the government of a +civil state, and the public conduct of a whole people. Under these three +heads rank in order the particular subjects practical; virtue in general, +sanctity, temperance, fortitude, justice, friendship, patriotism, piety; +the ruling mind in a civil government, the frame and order of a state, +law in general, and lastly, those rules of government and of public +conduct, the civil laws. + +Thus, for the sake of giving the reader a scientific, that is a +comprehensive, and at the same time a distinct view of Plato's writings, +we have attempted to exhibit to him, their just and natural distinctions; +whether he chooses to consider them with regard to their inward form or +essence, their outward form or appearance, their matter; or their end: +that is, in those more familiar terms, we have used in this Synopsis, +their genius, their character, their subject, and their design. + +And here it is requisite to observe, that as it is the characteristic of +the highest good to be universally beneficial, though some things are +benefitted by it more and others less, in consequence of their greater or +less aptitude to receive it; in like manner the dialogues of Plato are +so largely stamped with the characters of sovereign good, that they are +calculated to benefit in a certain degree even those who are incapable +of penetrating their profundity. They can tame a savage sophist, like +Thrasymachus in the Republic; humble the arrogance even of those who +are ignorant of their ignorance; make those to become proficients in +political, who will never arrive at theoretic virtue; and, in short, like +the illuminations of deity, wherever there is any portion of aptitude in +their recipients, they purify, irradiate, and exalt. + +After this general view of the dialogues of Plato, let us in the next +place consider their preambles, the digressions with which they abound, +and the character of the style in which they are written. With respect to +the first of these, the preambles, however superfluous they may at first +sight appear, they will be found on a closer inspection necessary to the +design of the dialogues which they accompany. Thus the prefatory part of +the Timaeus unfolds, in images agreeably to the Pythagoric custom, the +theory of the world; and the first part of the Parmenides, or the +discussion of ideas, is in fact merely a preamble to the second part, +or the speculation of the one; to which however it is essentially +preparatory. Hence, as Plutarch says, when he speaks of Plato's dialogue +on the Atlantic island: These preambles are superb gates and magnificent +courts with which he purposely embellishes his great edifices, that +nothing may be wanting to their beauty, and that all may be equally +splendid. He acts, as Dacier well observes, like a great prince, who, +when he builds a sumptuous palace, adorns (in the language of Pindar) the +vestibule with golden pillars. For it is fit that what is first seen +should be splendid and magnificent, and should as it were perspicuously +announce all that grandeur which afterwards presents itself to the view. + +With respect to the frequent digressions in his dialogues, these also, +when accurately examined, will be found to be no less subservient to the +leading design of the dialogues in which they are introduced; at the same +time that they afford a pleasing relaxation to the mind from the labor of +severe investigation. Hence Plato, by the most happy and enchanting art, +contrives to lead the reader to the temple of Truth through the delightful +groves and valleys of the Graces. In short, this circuitous course, when +attentively considered, will be found to be the shortest road by which he +could conduct the reader to the desired end: for in accomplishing this it +is necessary to regard not that road, which is most straight in the +nature of things, or abstractedly considered, but that which is most +direct in the progressions of human understanding. + +With respect to the style of Plato, though it forms in reality the +most inconsiderable part of the merit of his writings, style in all +philosophical works being the last thing that should be attended to, yet +even in this Plato may contend for the palm of excellence with the most +renowned masters of diction. Hence we find that his style was the +admiration of the finest writers of antiquity. According to Ammianus, +Jupiter himself would not speak otherwise, if he were to converse in the +Attic tongue. Aristotle considered his style as a medium between poetry +and prose. Cicero no less praises him for the excellence of his diction +than the profundity of his conceptions; and Longinus calls him with +respect to his language, the rival of Homer. Hence he is considered by +this prince of critics, as deriving into himself abundant streams from +the Homeric fountain, and is compared by him, in his rivalship of Homer, +to a new antagonist who enters the lists against one that is already the +object of universal admiration. + +Notwithstanding this praise, however, Plato has been accused, as Longinus +informs us, of being frequently hurried away as by a certain Bacchic fury +of words to immoderate and unpleasant metaphors, and an allegoric +magnificence of diction. Longinus excuses this by saying that whatever +naturally excels in magnitude possesses very little of purity. For that, +says he, which is in every respect accurate is in danger of littleness. +He adds, "and may not this also be necessary, that those of an abject and +moderate genius, because they never encounter danger, nor aspire after +the summit of excellence, are for the most part without error and remain +in security; but that great things become insecure through their magnitude?" +Indeed it appears to me, that whenever this exuberance, this Bacchic +fury, occurs in the diction of Plato, it is owing to the magnitude of the +inspiring influence of deity with which he is then replete. For that he +sometimes wrote from divine inspiration is evident from his own confession +in the Phaedrus, a great part of which is not so much like an orderly +discourse as a dithyrambic poem. Such a style therefore, as it is the +progeny of divine mania, which, as Plato justly observes, is better than +all human prudence, spontaneously adapts itself to its producing cause, +imitates a supernatural power as far as this can be effected by words, +and thus necessarily becomes magnificent, vehement, and exuberant; for +such are the characteristics of its source. All judges of composition +however, both ancient and modern, are agreed that his style is in general +graceful and pure; and that it is sublime without being impetuous and +rapid. It is indeed no less harmonious than elevated, no less accurate[27] +than magnificent. It combines the force of the greatest orators with the +graces of the first of poets; and in short; is a river to which those +justly celebrated lines of Denham may be most pertinently applied: + + Tho' deep, yet clear; tho' gentle, yet not dull; + Strong without rage, without o'erfowing full. + +----------------- +[27] The reader will see, from the notes on Plato's dialogues, and +particularly from the notes on the Parmenides and Timaeus, that the style +of that philosopher possesses an accuracy which is not to be found in any +modern writer; an accuracy of such a wonderful nature, that the words are +exactly commensurate with the sense. Hence the reader who has happily +penetrated his profundity finds, with astonishment, that another word +could not have been added without being superfluous, nor one word taken +away without injuring the sense. The same observation may also be applied +to the style of Aristotle. +----------------- + +Having thus considered the philosophy of Plato, given a general view of +his writings, and made some observations on his style, it only now +remains to speak of the following arrangement of his dialogues and +translation of his works, and then, with a few appropriate observations, +to close this Introduction. + +As no accurate and scientific arrangement then of these dialogues has +been transmitted to us from the ancients, I was under the necessity of +adopting an arrangement of my own, which I trust is not unscientific, +however inferior it may be to that which was doubtless made, though +unfortunately lost, by the latter interpreters of Plato. In my +arrangement, therefore, I have imitated the order of the universe in +which, as I have already observed, wholes precede parts, and universals +particulars. Hence I have placed those dialogues first which rank as +wholes, or have the relation of a system, and afterwards those in which +these systems are branch out into particulars. Thus, after the First +Alcibiades, which may be called, and appears to have been generally +considered by the ancients an introduction to the whole of Plato's +philosophy, I have placed the Republic and the Laws, which may be said to +comprehend systematically the morals and politics of Plato. After these I +have ranked the Timaeus, which contains the whole of his physiology, and +together with it the Critias, because of its connection with the Timaeus. +The next in order is the Parmenides, which contains a system of his +theology. Thus far this arrangement is conformable to the natural progress +of the human mind in the acquisition of the sublimest knowledge; the +subsequent arrangement principally regards the order of things. After the +Parmenides then, the Sophista, Phaedrus, Greater Hippias, and Banquet, +follow, which may be considered as so many lesser wholes subordinate to +and comprehended in the Parmenides, which, like the universe itself, is a +whole of wholes. For in the Sophista being itself is investigated, in the +Banquet love itself, and in the Phaedrus beauty itself; all which are +intelligible forms, and are consequently contained in the Parmenides, in +which the whole extent of the intelligible is unfolded. The Greater +Hippias is classed with the Phaedrus, because in the latter the whole +series of the beautiful is discussed, and in the former that which +subsists in soul. After these follows the Theaetetus, in which science +considered as subsisting in soul is investigated; science itself, +according to its first subsistence, having been previously celebrated by +Socrates in one part of the Phaedrus. The Politicus and Minos, which +follow next, may be considered as ramifications from the Laws; and, in +short, all the following dialogues either consider more particularly the +dogmas which are systematically comprehended in those already enumerated, +or naturally flow from them as their original source. As it did not +however appear possible to arrange these dialogues which rank as parts in +the same accurate order as those which we considered as whole, it was +thought better to class them either according to their agreement in one +particular circumstance, as the Phaedo, Apology, and Crito, all which +relate to the death of Socrates, and as the Meno and Protagoras, which +relate to the question whether virtue can be taught; or according to +their agreement in character, as the Lesser Hippias and Euthydemus, which +are anatreptic, and the Theages, Laches, and Lysis, which are maieutic +dialogues. The Cratylus is ranked in the last place, not so much because +the subject of it is etymology, as because a great part of it is deeply +theological; for by this arrangement, after having ascended to all the +divine orders and their ineffable principle in the Parmenides, and thence +descended in a regular series to the human soul in the subsequent +dialogues, the reader is again led back to deity in this dialogue, and +thus imitates the order which all beings observe, that of incessantly +returning to the principles whence they flew. + +After the dialogues[28] follow the Epistles of Plato, which are in every +respect worthy that prince of all true philosophers. They are not only +written with great elegance, and occasionally with magnificence of +diction, but with all the becoming dignity of a mind conscious of its +superior endowments, and all the authority of a master in philosophy. +They are likewise replete with many admirable political observations, +and contain some of his most abstruse dogmas, which though delivered +enigmatically, yet the manner in which they are delivered, elucidates at +the same time that it is elucidated by what is said of these dogmas in +his more theological dialogues. + +----------------- +[28] As I profess to give the reader a translation of the genuine works +of Plato only, I have not translated the Axiochus, Demodoeus, Sisyphus, +&c. as these are evidently spurious dialogues. +----------------- + +With respect, to the following translation, it is necessary to observe, in +the first place, than the numbers of legitimate dialogues of Plato is +fifty-five; for though the Republic forms but one treatise, and the Laws +another, yet the former consists of ten, and the latter of twelve books, +and each of these books is a dialogue. Hence, as there are thirty-three +dialogues, besides the Laws and the Republic, fifty-five will, as we have +said, be the amount of the whole. Of these fifty-five, the nine following +have been translated by Mr. Sydenham; viz. the First and Second Alcibiades, +the Greater and Lesser Hippias, the Banquet (except the speech of +Alcibiades), the Philebus, the Meno, the Io, and the Rivals.[29] I have +already observed, and with deep regret, that this excellent though +unfortunate scholar died before he had made that proficiency in the +philosophy of Plato which might have been reasonably expected from so fair +a beginning. I personally knew him only in the decline of life, when his +mental powers were not only considerably impaired by age, but greatly +injured by calamity. His life had been very stormy; his circumstances, for +many years preceding his death, were indigent; his patrons were by no means +liberal; and his real friends were neither numerous nor affluent. He began +the study of Plato, as he himself informed me, when he had considerably +passed the meridian of life, and with most unfortunate prejudices against +his best disciples, which I attempted to remove during my acquaintance with +him, and partly succeeded in the attempt; but infirmity and death prevented +its completion. Under such circumstances it was not to be expected that he +would fathom the profundity of Plato's conceptions, and arrive at the +summit of philosophic attainments. I saw, however, that his talents and his +natural disposition were such as might have ranked him among the best of +Plato's interpreters, if he had not yielded to the pressure of calamity, if +he had not nourished such baneful prejudices, and if he had not neglected +philosophy in the early part of life. Had this happened, my labors would +have been considerably lessened, or perhaps rendered entirely unnecessary, +and his name would have been transmitted to posterity with undecaying +renown. As this unfortunately did not happen, I have been under the +necessity of diligently examining and comparing with the original all +those parts of the dialogues which he translated, that are more deeply +philosophical, or that contain any thing of the theology of Plato. In +these, as might be expected, I found him greatly deficient; I found him +sometimes mistaking the meaning through ignorance of Plato's more sublime +tenets, and at other times perverting it, in order to favor some opinions +of his own. His translation however of other parts which are not so +abstruse is excellent. In these he not only presents the reader faithfully +with the matter, but likewise with the genuine manner of Plato. The notes +too which accompany the translation of these parts generally exhibit just +criticism and extensive learning, an elegant taste, and a genius naturally +philosophic. Of these notes I have preserved as much as was consistent with +the limits and design of the following work. + +----------------- +[29] In the notes on the above-mentioned nine dialogues, those written +by Mr. Sydenham are signed S., and those by myself T. +----------------- + +Of the translation of the Republic by Dr. Spens, it is necessary to observe +that a considerable part of it is very faithfully executed; but that in the +more abstruse parts it is inaccurate; and that it every where abounds with +Scotticisms which offend an English ear, and vulgarisms which are no less +disgraceful to the translator than disgusting to the reader. Suffice it +therefore to say of this version, that I have adopted it wherever I found +it could with propriety be adopted, and given my own translation where it +was otherwise. + +Of the ten dialogues translated by Dacier, I can say nothing with +accuracy, because I have no knowledge whatever of the French language; +but if any judgment may be formed of this work, from a translation of it +into English, I will be bold to say that it is by no means literal, and +that he very frequently mistakes the sense of the original. From this +translation therefore I could derive but little assistance; some however +I have derived, and that little I willingly acknowledge. In translating +the rest of Plato's works, and this, as the reader may easily see, form +by far the greatest part of them, I have had no assistance from any +translation except that of Ficinus, the general excellency of which is +well known to every student of Plato, arising not only from his +possessing a knowledge of Platonism superior to that of any translators +that have followed him, but likewise from his having made this +translation from a very valuable manuscript in the Medicean library, +which is now no longer to be found. I have, however, availed myself of +the learned labors of the editors of various dialogues of Plato; such as +the edition of the Rivals, Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, and Phaedo, by +Forster; of the First and Second Alcibiades and Hipparchus, by Etwall; of +the Meno, First Alcibiades, Phaedo and Phaedrus, printed at Vienna, 1784; +of the Cratylus and Theaetetus, by Fischer; of the Republic, by Massey; +and of the Euthydemus and Gorgias, by Dr. Routh, president of Magdalen +College, Oxford. This last editor has enriched his edition of these two +dialogues with very valuable and copious philological and critical notes, +in which he has displayed no less learning than judgment, no less +acuteness than taste. He appears indeed to me to be one of the best and +most modest of philologists; and it is to be hoped that he will be +imitated in what he has done by succeeding editors of Plato's text. + +If my translation had been made with an eye to the judgment of the many, +it would have been necessary to apologize for its literal exactness. +Had I been anxious to gratify false taste with respect to composition, I +should doubtless have attended less to the precise meaning of the original, +have omitted almost all connective Particles, have divided long periods +into a number of short ones, and branched out the strong and deep river of +Plato's language into smooth-gliding, shallow, and feeble streams; but as +the present work was composed with the hope indeed of benefitting all, but +with an eye to the criticism solely of men of elevated souls, I have +endeavored not to lose a word of the original; and yet at the same time +have attempted to give the translation as much elegance as such verbal +accuracy can be supposed capable of admitting. I have also endeavored to +preserve the manner as well as the matter of my author, being fully +persuaded that no translation deserves applause, in which both these are +not as much as possible preserved. + +My principal object in this arduous undertaking has been to unfold all +the abstruse and sublime dogmas of Plato, as they are found dispersed in +his works. Minutely to unravel the art which he employs in the +composition of all his dialogues, and to do full justice to his meaning +in every particular, must be the task of some one who has more leisure, +and who is able to give the works of Plato to the public on a more +extensive plan. In accomplishing this great object, I have presented the +reader in my notes with nearly the substance in English of all the +following manuscript Greek Commentaries and Scholia on Plato; viz. of the +Commentaries of Proclus on the Parmenides and First Alcibiades; and of +his Scholia on the Cratylus; of the Scholia of Olympiodorus on the +Phaedo, Gorgias, and Philebus; and of Hermeas on the Phoedrus. To these +are added very copious extracts from the manuscript of Damascius,[30] +Peri Archon, and from the published works of Proclus on the Timeus, +Republic, and Theology of Plato. Of the four first of these manuscripts, +three of which are folio volumes, I have complete copies taken with my +own hand; and of the copious extracts from the others, those from +Olympiodorus on the Gorgias were taken by me from the copy preserved in +the British Museum; those from the same philosopher on the Philebus, and +those from Hermeas on the Phaedrus, and Damascius Peri Archon, from the +copies in the Bodleian library. + +----------------- +[30] Patricius was one of the very few in modern times who have been +sensible of the great merit of these writings, as is evident from the +extract from the preface to his translation of Proclus's Theological +Elements. (Ferrar. 4to. 1583.) Patricius, prior to this, enumerates the +writings of Proclus, and they are included in his wish that all the +manuscript Greek commentaries on Plato were made public. +----------------- + +And here gratitude demands that I should publicly acknowledge the very +handsome and liberal manner in which I was received by the University of +Oxford, and by the principal librarian and sub-librarians of the Bodleian +library, during the time that I made the above mentioned extracts. In the +first place I have to acknowledge the very polite attention which was paid +to me by Dr. Jackson,[31] dean of Christ-church. In the second place, the +liberty of attendance at the Bodleian library, and the accommodation which +was there afforded me, by the librarians of that excellent collection, +demand from me no small tribute of praise. And, above all, the very liberal +manner in which I was received by the fellows of New College, with whom I +resided for three weeks, and from whom I experienced even Grecian +hospitality, will, I trust, be as difficult a task for time to obliterate +from my memory, as it would be for me to express it as it deserves. + +----------------- +[31] I was much pleased to find that this very respectable prelate is a +great admirer of Aristotle, and that extracts from the Commentaries of +Simplicius and Ammonius on the Categories of that philosopher, are read +by his orders in the college of which he is the head. +----------------- + +With respect to the faults which I may have committed in this translation +(for I am not vain enough to suppose it is without fault), I might plead +as an excuse, that the whole of it has been executed amidst severe +endurance from bodily infirmity and indigent circumstances; and that a +very considerable part of it was accomplished amidst other ills of no +common magnitude, and other labors inimical to such an undertaking. But +whatever may be my errors, I will not fly to calamity for an apology. Let +it be my excuse that the mistakes I may have committed in lesser +particulars, have arisen from my eagerness to seize and promulgate those +great truths in the philosophy and theology of Plato, which though they +have been concealed for ages in oblivion, have a subsistence coeval with +the universe, and will again be restored, and flourish for very extended +periods, through all the infinite revolutions of time. + +In the next place, it is necessary to speak concerning the qualifications +requisite in a legitimate student of the philosophy of Plato, previous to +which I shall just notice the absurdity of supposing that a mere knowledge +of the Greek tongue, however great that knowledge may be, is alone +sufficient to the understanding the sublime doctrines of Plato; for a man +might as well think that he can understand Archimedes without a knowledge +of the elements of geometry, merely because he can read him in the +original. Those who entertain such an idle opinion, would do well to +meditate on the profound observation of Heraclitus, "that polymathy does +not teach intellect," ([Greek: Polymathic noon ou didaskei]). + +By a legitimate student, then, of the Platonic philosophy, I mean one +who, both from nature and education, is properly qualified for such +an arduous undertaking; that is one who possesses a naturally good +disposition; is sagacious and acute, and is inflamed with an ardent +desire for the acquisition of wisdom and truth; who from his childhood +has been well instructed in the mathematical disciplines; who, besides +this, has spent whole days, and frequently the greater part of the night, +in profound meditation; and, like one triumphantly sailing over a raging +sea, or skillfully piercing through an army of foes, has successfully +encountered an hostile multitude of doubts;--in short, who has never +considered wisdom as a thing of trifling estimation and easy access, but +as that which cannot be obtained without the most generous and severe +endurance, and the intrinsic worth of which surpasses all corporeal good, +far more than the ocean the fleeting bubble which floats on its surface. +To such as are destitute of these requisites, who make the study of words +their sole employment, and the pursuit of wisdom but at best a secondary +thing, who expect to be wise by desultory application for an hour or two +in a day, after the fatigues of business, after mixing with the base +multitude of mankind, laughing with the gay affecting airs of gravity +with the serious, tacitly assenting to every man's opinion, however +absurd, and winking at folly however shameful and base--to such as +these--and, alas! the world is full of such--the sublimest truths must +appear to be nothing more than jargon and reverie, the dreams of a +distempered imagination, or the ebullitions of fanatical faith. + +But all this is by no means wonderful, if we consider that two-fold +ignorance is the disease of the many. For they are not only ignorant with +respect to the sublimest knowledge, but they are even ignorant of their +ignorance. Hence they never suspect their want of understanding, but +immediately reject a doctrine which appears at first sight absurd, +because it is too splendid for their bat-like eyes to behold. Or if they +even yield their assent to its truth, their very assent is the result of +the same most dreadful disease of the soul. For they will fancy, says +Plato, that they understand the highest truths, when the very contrary is +really the case. I earnestly therefore entreat men of this description, +not to meddle with any of the profound speculations of the Platonic +philosophy, for it is more dangerous to urge them to such an employment, +than to advise them to follow their sordid avocations with unwearied +assiduity, and toil for wealth with increasing alacrity and vigor; as +they will by this means give free scope to the base habits of their soul, +and sooner suffer that punishment which in such as these must always +precede mental illumination, and be the inevitable consequence of guilt. +It is well said indeed by Lysis, the Pythagorean, that to inculcate +liberal speculations and discourses to those whose morals are turbid and +confused, is just as absurd as to pour pure and transparent water into a +deep well full of mire and clay; for he who does this will only disturb +the mud, and cause the pure water to become defiled. The woods of such, +as the same author beautifully observes, (that is the irrational or +corporeal life), in which these dire passions are nourished, must first +be purified with fire and sword, and every kind of instrument (that is, +through preparatory disciplines, and the political virtues), and reason +must be freed from its slavery to the affections, before any thing useful +can be planted in these savage haunts. + +Let not such then presume to explore the regions of Platonic philosophy. +The land is too pure to admit the sordid and the base. The road which +conducts to it is too intricate to be discovered by the unskillful and +stupid, and the journey is too long and laborious to be accomplished by +the effeminate and the timid, by the slave of passion and the dupe of +opinion, by the lover of sense and the despiser of truth. The dangers and +difficulties in the undertaking are such as can be sustained by none but +the most hardy and accomplished adventurers; and he who begins the journey +without the strength of Hercules, or the wisdom and patience of Ulysses, +must be destroyed by the wild beasts of the forest, or perish in the storms +of the ocean; must suffer transmutation into a beast through the magic +power of Circe, or be exiled for life by the detaining charm of Calypso; +and in short must descend into Hades, and wander in its darkness, without +emerging from thence to the bright regions of the morning, or be ruined +by the deadly melody of the Syren's song. To the most skillful traveler, +who pursues the right road with an ardor which no toils can abate, with +a vigilance which no weariness can surprise into negligence, and with +virtue which no temptations can seduce, it exhibits for many years the +appearance of the Ithaca of Ulysses, or the flying Italy of AEneas; for +we no sooner gain a glimpse of the pleasing land which is to be the end +of our journey, than it is suddenly ravished from our view, and we still +find ourselves at a distance from the beloved coast, exposed to the fury +of a stormy sea of doubts. + +Abandon then, ye groveling souls, the fruitless design! Pursue with +avidity the beaten road which leads to popular honors and sordid gain, +but relinquish all thoughts of a voyage for which you are totally +unprepared. Do you not perceive what a length of sea separates you from +the royal coast? A sea, + + Huge, horrid, vast, where scarce in safety sails + The best built ship, though Jove inspire the gales. + +And may we not very justly ask you, similar to the interrogation of +Calypso, + + What ships have you, what sailors to convey, + What oars to cut the long laborious way? + +I shall only observe further, that the life of Plato, by Olympiodorus, was +prefixed to this translation, in preference to that by Diogenes Laertius, +because the former is the production of a most eminent Platonist, and the +latter of a mere historian, who indiscriminately gave to the public whatever +anecdotes he found in other authors. If the reader combines this short +sketch of the life of Plato with what that philosopher says of himself in +his 7th Epistle, he will be in possession of the most important particulars +about him that can be obtained at present. + + + +EXPLANATIONS OF CERTAIN PLATONIC TERMS + +As some apology may be thought necessary for having introduced certain +unusual words of Greek origin, I shall only observe, that, as all arts and +sciences have certain appropriate terms peculiar to themselves, philosophy, +which is the art of arts, and science of sciences, as being the mistress of +both, has certainly a prior and a far superior claim to this privilege. I +have not, however, introduced, I believe, any of these terms without at the +same time sufficiently explaining them; but, lest the contrary should have +taken place, the following explanation of all such terms as I have been +able to recollect, and also of common words used by Platonists in a +peculiar sense, is subjoined for the information of the reader. + +Anagogic, [Greek: anagogikos]. Leading on high. + +Demiurgus, [Greek: demiourgos]. Jupiter, the artificer of the universe. + +Dianoetia. This word is derived from [Greek: dianoia], or that power of +the soul which reasons scientifically, deriving the principles of its +reasoning from intellect. Plato is so uncommonly accurate in his diction, +that this word is very seldom used by him in any other than its primary +sense. + +The Divine, [Greek: to Theion], is being subsisting in conjunction with +the one. For all things, except the one, viz. essence, life, and +intellect, are considered by Plato as suspended from and secondary to the +gods. For the gods do not subsist in, but prior to, these, which they +also produce and connect, but are not characterized by these. In many +places, however, Plato calls the participants of the gods by the names of +the gods. For not only the Athenian Guest in the Laws, but also Socrates +in the Phaedrus, calls a divine soul a god. "For," says he, "all the +horses and charioteers of the gods are good," &c. And afterwards, still +more clearly, he adds, "And this is the life of the gods." And not only +this, but he also denominates those nature gods that are always united to +the gods, and which, in conjunction with them, give completion to one +series. He also frequently calls daemons gods, though, according to +essence, they are secondary to and subsist about the gods. For in the +Phaedrus, Timaeus, and other dialogues, he extends the appellation of +gods as far as the daemons. And what is still more paradoxical than all +this, he does not refuse to call some men gods; as, for instance, the +Elean Guest in the Sophista. From all this, therefore, we must infer that +with respect to the word god, one thing which is thus denominated is +simply deity; another is so according to union; a third, according to +participation; a fourth, according to contact; and a fifth, according to +similitude. Thus every superessential nature is primarily a god; but +every intellectual nature is so according to union. And again, every +divine soul is a god according to participation; but divine daemons are +gods according to contact with the gods; and the souls of men obtain this +appellation through similitude. Each of these, however, except the first, +is as we have said, rather divine than a god; for the Athenian Guest in +the Laws, calls intellect itself divine. But that which is divine is +secondary to the first deity, in the same manner as the united is to the +one; that which is intellectual to intellect; and that which is animated +to soul. Indeed, things more uniform and simple always precede, and the +series of beings ends in the one itself. + +Doxastic. This word is derived from doxa, opinion, and signifies that +which is apprehended by opinion, or that power which is the extremity of +the rational soul. This power knows the universal in particulars, as that +every man is a rational animal; but it knows not the dioti, or why a +thing is, but only the oti, or that it is. + +The Eternal, [Greek: To aionion], that which has a never-ending subsistence, +without any connection with time; or, as Plotinus profoundly defines it, +infinite life at once total and full. + +That which is generated, [Greek: to geneton]. That which has not the +whole of its essence or energy subsisting at once without temporal +dispersion. + +Generation, [Greek: genesis]. An essence composite and multiform, and +conjoined with time. This is the proper signification of the word; but it +is used symbolically by Plato, and also by theologists more ancient than +Plato, for the sake of indication. For as Proclus beautifully observes +(in MS. Comment in Parmenidem), "Fables call the ineffable unfolding into +light through causes, generation." "Hence," he adds in the Orphic +writings, the first cause is denominated time; for where there is +generation, according to its proper signification, there also there +is time." + +A Guest, [Greek: Xenos]. This word, in its more ample signification in +the Greek, denotes a stranger, but properly implies one who receives +another, or is himself received at an entertainment. In the following +dialogues, therefore, wherever one of the speakers is introduced as a +Xenos, I have translated this word guest, as being more conformable to +the genius of Plato's dialogues, which may be justly called rich mental +banquets, and consequently the speakers in them may be considered as so +many guests. Hence in the Timaeus, the persons of that dialogue are +expressly spoken of as guests. + +Hyparxis, [Greek: uparxis]. The first principle or foundation, as it +were, of the essence of a thing. Hence also, it is the summit of essence. + +Idiom, [Greek: Idioma]. The characteristic peculiarity of a thing. + +The Immortal, [Greek: To athanaton]. According to Plato, there are many +orders of immortality, pervading from on high to the last of things; and +the ultimate echo, as it were, of immorality is seen in the perpetuity of +the mundane wholes, which according to the doctrine of the Elean Guest in +the Politicus, they participate from the Father of the universe. For both +the being and the life of every body depend on another cause; since body +is not itself naturally adapted to connect, or adorn, or preserve itself. +But the immortality of partial souls, such as ours, is more manifest and +more perfect than this of the perpetual bodies in the universe; as is +evident from the many demonstrations which are given of it in the Phaedo, +and in the 10th book of the Republic. For the immortality of partial +souls has a more principal subsistence, as possessing in itself the cause +of eternal permanency. But prior to both these is the immortality of +daemons; for these neither verge to mortality, nor are they filled with +the nature of things which are generated and corrupted. More venerable, +however, than these, and essentially transcending them, is the +immortality of divine souls, which are primarily self-motive, and contain +the fountains and principles of the life which is attributed about +bodies, and through which bodies participate of renewed immortality. And +prior to all these is the immortality of the gods: for Diotima in the +Banquet does not ascribe an immortality of this kind to demons. Hence +such an immortality as this is separate and exempt from wholes. For, +together with the immortality of the gods, eternity subsists, which is +the fountain of all immortality and life, as well that life which is +perpetual, as that which is dissipated into nonentity. In short, +therefore, the divine immortal is that which is generative and connective +of perpetual life. For it is not immortal, as participating of life, but +as supplying divine life, and deifying life itself. + +Imparticipable, [Greek: To amethekton]. That which is not consubsistent +with an inferior nature. Thus imparticipable intellect is an intellect +which is not consubsistent with soul. + +Intellectual Projection, [Greek: noera epibole]. As the perception of +intellect is immediate, being a darting forth, as it were, directly to +its proper objects, this direct intuition is expressed by the term +projection. + +The Intelligible, [Greek: To noeton]. This word in Plato and Platonic +writers has a various signification: for, in the first place, whatever is +exempt from sensibles, and has its essence separate from them, is said to +be intelligible, and in this sense soul is intelligible. In the second +place, intellect, which is prior to soul, is intelligible. In the third +place, that which is more ancient than intellect, which replenishes +intelligence and is essentially perfective of it, is called intelligible; +and this is the intelligible which Timaeus in Plato places in the order +of a paradigm, prior to the demiurgic intellect and intellectual energy. +But beyond these is the divine intelligible, which is defined according +to divine union and hyparxis. For this is intelligible as the object of +desire to intellect, as giving perfection to and containing it, and as +the completion of being. The highest intelligible, therefore, is that +which is the hyparxis of the gods; the second, that which is true being, +and the first essence; the third, intellect, and all intellectual life; +and the fourth, the order belonging to soul. + +Logismos, reasoning. When applied to divinity as by Plato in the Timaeus, +signifies a distributive cause of things. + +On account of which; with reference to which; through which; according to +which, from which; or in which; viz. [Greek: di o, uph' ou, di ou, kath' +o, ex ou]. By the first of these terms, Plato is accustomed to denominate +the final cause; by the second the paradigmatic; by the third, the +demiurgic; by the fourth, the instrumental; by the fifth, form; and by +the sixth, matter. + +Orectic. This word is derived from [Greek: orexis], appetite. + +Paradigm, [Greek: paradeigma]. A pattern, or that with reference to which +a thing is made. + +The perpetual, [Greek: to aidion]. That which subsists forever, but through +a connection with time. + +A Politician, [Greek: politikos]. This word, as Mr. Sydenham justly +observes in his notes in the Rivals, is of a very large and extensive +import as used by Plato, and the other ancient writers on politics: for +it includes all those statesmen or politicians in aristocracies and +democracies, who were, either for life, or for a certain time, invested +with the whole or a part of kingly authority, and the power thereto +belonging. See the Politicus. + +Prudence, [Greek: Phronesis]. This word frequently means in Plato and +Platonic writers, the habit of discerning what is good in all moral +actions, and frequently signifies intelligence, or intellectual +Perception. The following admirable explanation of this word is given by +Jamblichus Prudence having a precedaneous subsistence, receives its +generation from a pure and perfect intellect. Hence it looks to intellect +itself, is perfected by it, and has this as the measure and most +beautiful paradigm of all its energies. If also we have any communion +with the gods, it is especially effected by this virtue; and through this +we are in the highest degree assimilated to them. The knowledge too of +such things as are good, profitable, and beautiful, and of the contraries +to these, is obtained by this virtue; and the judgment and correction of +works proper to be done are by this directed. And in short it is a +certain governing leader of men, and of the whole arrangement of their +nature; and referring cities and houses, and the particular life, of +every one to a divine paradigm, it forms them according to the best +similitude; obliterating some things and purifying others. So that +prudence renders its possessors similar to divinity. Jamblic. apud. +Stob. p. 141. + +Psychical, [Greek: psychikos]. Pertaining to soul. + +Science. This word is sometimes defined by Plato to be that which assigns +the causes of things; sometimes to be that the subjects of which have a +perfectly stable essence; and together with this, he conjoins the +assignation of cause from reasoning. Sometimes again he defines it to be +that the principles of which are not hypotheses; and, according to this +definition, he asserts that there is one science which ascends as far as +to the principle of things. For this science considers that which is +truly the principle as unhypothetic, has for its subject true being, and +produces its reasonings from cause. According to the second definition, +he calls dianoetic knowledge science; but according to the first alone, +he assigns to physiology the appellation of science. + +The telestic art. The art pertaining to mystic ceremonies. + +Theurgic. This word is derived from [Greek: Theourgia], or that religious +operation which deifies him by whom it is performed as much as is possible +to man. + +Truth, [Greek: aletheia]. Plato, following ancient theologists, considers +truth multifariously. Hence, according to his doctrine, the highest truth +is characterized by unity, and is the light proceeding from the good, +which imparts purity, as he says in the Philebus, and union, as he says +in the Republic, to intelligibles. The truth which is next to this in +dignity is that which proceeds from intelligibles, and illuminates the +intellectual orders, and which an essence unfigured, uncolored, and +without contact, first receives, where also the plain of truth is +situated, as it is written in the Phaedrus. The third kind of truth is, +that which is connascent with souls, and which through intelligence comes +into contact with true being. For the psychical light is the third, from +the intelligible; intellectual deriving its plenitude from intelligible +light, and the psychical from the intellectual. And the last kind of +truth is that which is full of error and inaccuracy through sense, and +the instability of its object. For a material nature is perpetually +flowing, and is not naturally adapted to abide even for a moment. + +The following beautiful description of the third kind of truth, or that +which subsists in souls, is given by Jamblichus: "Truth, as the name +implies, makest a conversion about the gods and their incorporeal energy; +but, doxastic imitation, which, as Plato says, is fabricative of images, +wanders about that which is deprived of divinity and is dark. And the +former indeed receives its perfection in intelligible and divine forms, +and real beings which have a perpetual sameness of subsistence; but the +latter looks to that which is formless, and non-being, and which has a +various subsistence; and, about this it's visive power is blunted. The +former contemplates that which is, but the latter assumes such a form as +appears to the many. Hence the former associates with intellect, and +increases the intellectual nature which we contain; but the latter, from +looking to that which always seems to be, hunts after folly and +deceives." Jamblic. apud Stob. p. 136. + +The unical, [Greek: to niaion]. That which is characterized by unity. + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Introduction to the Philosophy and +Writings of Plato, by Thomas Taylor + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK INTRODUCTION TO THE *** + +***** This file should be named 10214-8.txt or 10214-8.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/1/0/2/1/10214/ + +Produced by Jake Jaqua + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, +set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to +copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to +protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. 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For +example an eBook of filename 10234 would be found at: + + https://www.gutenberg.org/1/0/2/3/10234 + +or filename 24689 would be found at: + https://www.gutenberg.org/2/4/6/8/24689 + +An alternative method of locating eBooks: + https://www.gutenberg.org/GUTINDEX.ALL + + diff --git a/old/10214-8.zip b/old/10214-8.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..9f06801 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/10214-8.zip diff --git a/old/10214.txt b/old/10214.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9297b3b --- /dev/null +++ b/old/10214.txt @@ -0,0 +1,4083 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Introduction to the Philosophy and Writings +of Plato, by Thomas Taylor + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Introduction to the Philosophy and Writings of Plato + +Author: Thomas Taylor + +Release Date: November 22, 2003 [EBook #10214] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO Latin-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK INTRODUCTION TO THE *** + + + + +Produced by Jake Jaqua + + + + +INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY AND WRITINGS OF PLATO + +By + +THOMAS TAYLOR + + + + +"Philosophy," says Hierocles, "is the purification and perfection of human +life. It is the purification, indeed, from material irrationality, and the +mortal body; but the perfection, in consequence of being the resumption of +our proper felicity, and a reascent to the divine likeness. To effect these +two is the province of Virtue and Truth; the former exterminating the +immoderation of the passions; and the latter introducing the divine form to +those who are naturally adapted to its reception." + +Of philosophy thus defined, which may be compared to a luminous pyramid, +terminating in Deity, and having for its basis the rational soul of man +and its spontaneous unperverted conceptions,--of this philosophy, August, +magnificent, and divine, Plato may be justly called the primary leader +and hierophant, through whom, like the mystic light in the inmost +recesses of some sacred temple, it first shone forth with occult and +venerable splendour.[1] It may indeed be truly said of the whole of this +philosophy, that it is the greatest good which man can participate: for +if it purifies us from the defilements of the passions and assimilates us +to Divinity, it confers on us the proper felicity of our nature. Hence it +is easy to collect its pre-eminence to all other philosophies; to show +that where they oppose it, they are erroneous; that so far as they +contain any thing scientific they are allied to it; and that at best they +are but rivulets derived from this vast ocean of truth. + +------------------ +[1] In the mysteries a light of this kind shone forth from the adytum of +the temple in which they were exhibited. +------------------ + +To evince that the philosophy of Plato possesses this preeminence; that +its dignity and sublimity are unrivaled; that it is the parent of all +that ennobles man; and, that it is founded on principles, which neither +time can obliterate, nor sophistry subvert, is the principal design of +this Introduction. + +To effect this design, I shall in the first place present the reader with +the outlines of the principal dogmas of Plato's philosophy. The undertaking +is indeed no less novel than arduous, since the author of it has to tread +in paths which have been untrodden for upwards of a thousand years, and +to bring to light truths which for that extended period have been +concealed in Greek. Let not the reader, therefore, be surprised at the +solitariness of the paths through which I shall attempt to conduct him, +or at the novelty of the objects which will present themselves in the +journey: for perhaps he may fortunately recollect that he has traveled +the same road before, that the scenes were once familiar to him, and that +the country through which he is passing is his native land. At, least, if +his sight should be dim, and his memory oblivious, (for the objects which +he will meet with can only be seen by the most piercing eyes,) and his +absence from them has been lamentably long, let him implore the power +of wisdom, + + From mortal mists to purify his eyes, + That God and man he may distinctly see. + +Let us also, imploring the assistance of the same illuminating power, begin +the solitary journey. + +Of all the dogmas of Plato, that concerning the first principle of things +as far transcends in sublimity the doctrine of other philosophers of a +different sect, on this subject, as this supreme cause of all transcends +other causes. For, according to Plato, the highest God, whom in the +Republic he calls the good, and in the Parmenides the one, is not only +above soul and intellect, but is even superior to being itself. Hence, +since every thing which can in any respect be known, or of which any +thing can be asserted, must be connected with the universality of things, +but the first cause is above all things, it is very properly said by +Plato to be perfectly ineffable. The first hypothesis therefore of his, +Parmenides, in which all things are denied of this immense principle, +concludes as follows: "The one therefore is in no respect. So it seems. +Hence it is not in such a manner as to be one, for thus it would be +being, and participate of essence; but as it appears, the one neither is +one, nor is, if it be proper to believe in reasoning of this kind. It +appears so. But can any thing either belong to, or be affirmed of that, +which is not? How can it? Neither therefore does any name belong to it, +nor discourse, nor any science, nor sense, nor opinion. It does not +appear that there can. Hence it can neither be named, nor spoken of, nor +conceived by opinion, nor be known, nor perceived by any being. So it +seems." And here it must be observed that this conclusion respecting the +highest principle of things, that he is perfectly ineffable and +inconceivable, is the result of a most scientific series of negations, in +which not only all sensible and intellectual beings are denied of him, +but even natures the most transcendently allied to him, his first and +most divine progeny. For that which so eminently distinguishes the +philosophy of Plato from others is this, that every part of it is stamped +with the character of science. The vulgar indeed proclaim the Deity to be +ineffable; but as they have no scientific knowledge that he is so, this +is nothing more than a confused and indistinct perception of the most +sublime of all truths, like that of a thing seen between sleeping and +waking, like Phaeacia to Ulysses when sailing to his native land, + + That lay before him indistinct and vast, + Like a broad shield amid the watr'y waste. + +In short, an unscientific perception of the ineffable nature of the +Divinity resembles that of a man, who on surveying the heavens, should +assert of the altitude of its highest part, that it surpasses that of +the loftiest tree, and is therefore immeasurable. But to see this +scientifically, is like a survey of this highest part of the heavens by +the astronomer; for he by knowing the height of the media between us and +it, knows also scientifically that it transcends in altitude not only the +loftiest tree; but the summits of air and aether, the moon, and even the +sun itself. + +Let us therefore investigate what is the ascent to the ineffably, and +after what manner it is accomplished, according to Plato, from the last +of things, following the profound and most inquisitive Damascius as our +leader in this arduous investigation. Let our discourse also be common +to other principles, and to things proceeding from them to that which is +last, and let us, beginning from that which is perfectly effable and +known to sense, ascend too the ineffable, and establish in silence, as in +a port, the parturitions of truth concerning it. Let us then assume the +following axiom, in which as in a secure vehicle we may safely pass from +hence thither. I say, therefore, that the unindigent is naturally prior +to the indigent. For that which is in want of another is naturally +adapted from necessity to be subservient to that of which it is indigent. +But if they are mutually in want of each other, each being indigent of +the other in a different respect, neither of them will be the principle. +For the unindigent is most adapted to that which is truly the principle. +And if it is in want of any thing, according to this it will not be the +principle. It is however necessary that the principles should be this +very thing, the principle alone. The unindigent therefore pertains to +this, nor must it by any means be acknowledged that there is any thing +prior to it. This however, would be acknowledged if it had any connection +with the indigent. + +Let us then consider body, (that is, a triply extended substance,) endued +with quality; for this is the first thing effable by us, and is, sensible. +Is this then the principle of things? But it is two things, body, and +quality which is in body as a subject. Which of these therefore is by +nature prior? For both are indigent of their proper parts; and that also +which is in a subject is indigent of the subject. Shall we say then that +body itself is the principle of the first essence? But this is impossible. +For, in the first place, the principle will not receive any thing from that +which is posterior to itself. But body, we say is the recipient of quality. +Hence quality, and a subsistence in conjunction with it, are not derived +from body, since quality is present with body as something different. And, +in the second place, body is every way, divisible; its several parts are +indigent of each other, and the whole is indigent of all the parts. As it +is indigent, therefore, and receives its completion from things which are +indigent, it will not be entirely unindigent. + +Further still, if it is not one but united, it will require, as Plato +says, the connecting one. It is likewise something common and formless, +being as it were a certain matter. It requires, therefore, ornament and +the possession of form, that it may not be merely body, but a body with a +certain particular quality; as for instance, a fiery, or earthly, body, +and, in short, body adorned and invested with a particular quality. Hence +the things which accede to it, finish and adorn it. Is then that which +accedes the principle? But this is impossible. For it does not abide in +itself, nor does it subsist alone, but is in a subject of which also it +is indigent. If, however, some one should assert that body is not a +subject, but one of the elements in each, as for instance, animal in +horses and man, thus also each will be indigent of the other, viz. this +subject, and that which is in the subject; or rather the common element, +animal, and the peculiarities, as the rational and irrational, will be +indigent. For elements are always, indigent of each other, and that which +is composed from elements is indigent of the elements. In short, this +sensible nature, and which is so manifest to us, is neither body, for +this does not of itself move the senses, nor quality; for this does not +possess an interval commensurate with sense. Hence, that which is the +object of sight, is neither body nor color; but colored body, or color +corporalized, is that which is motive of the sight. And universally, that +which its sensible, which is body with a particular quality, is motive of +sense. From hence it is evident that the thing which excites the sense is +something incorporeal. For if it was body, it would not yet be the object +of sense. Body therefore requires that which is incorporeal, and that +which is incorporeal, body. For an incorporeal nature, is not of itself +sensible. It is, however, different from body, because these two possess +prerogatives different from each other, and neither of these subsists +prior to the other; but being elements of one sensible thing, they are +present with each other; the one imparting interval to that which is void +of interval, but the other introducing to that which is formless, +sensible variety invested with form. In the third place, neither are both +these together the principles; since they are not unindigent. For they +stand in need of their proper elements, and of that which conducts them +to the generation of one form. For body cannot effect this, since it is +of itself impotent; nor quality, since it is not able to subsist separate +from the body in which it is, or together with which it has its being. +The composite therefore either produces itself, which is impossible, for +it does not converge to itself, but the whole of it is multifariously +dispersed, or it is not produced by itself, and there is some other +principle prior to it. + +Let it then be supposed to be that which is called nature, being a +principle of motion and rest, in that which is moved and at rest, +essentially and not according to accident. For this is something more +simple, and is fabricative of composite forms. If, however, it is in the +things fabricated, and does not subsist separate from nor prior to them, +but stands in need of them for its being, it will not be unindigent; +though its possesses something transcendent with respect to them, viz. +the power of fashioning and fabricating them. For it has its being +together with them, and has in them an inseparable subsistence; so +that, when they are it is, and is not when they are not, and this in +consequence of perfectly verging to them, and not being able to sustain +that which is appropriate. For the power of increasing, nourishing, and +generating similars, and the one prior to these three, viz. nature, is +not wholly incorporeal, but is nearly a certain quality of body, from +which it alone differs, in that it imparts to the composite to be +inwardly moved and at rest. For the quality of that which is sensible +imparts that which is apparent in matter, and that which falls on sense. +But body imparts interval every way extended; and nature, an inwardly +proceeding natural energy, whether according to place only, or according +to nourishing, increasing, and generating things similar. Nature, +however, is inseparable from a subject, and is indigent, so that it will +not be in short the principle, since it is indigent of that which is +subordinate. For it will not be wonderful, if being a certain principle, +it is indigent of the principle above it; but it would be wonderful if it +were indigent of things posterior to itself, and of which it is supposed +to be the principle. + +By the like arguments we may show that the principle cannot be irrational +soul, whether sensitive, or orectic. For if it appears that it has +something separate, together with impulsive and Gnostic enemies, yet at +the same time it is bound in body, and has something inseparable from it; +since it is notable to convert itself to itself, but its enemy is mingled +with its subject. For it is evident that its essence is something of this +kind; since if it were liberated and in itself free, it would also evince +a certain independent enemy, and would not always be converted to body; +but sometimes it would be converted to itself; or though it were always +converted to body, yet it would judge and explore itself. The energies, +therefore, of the multitude of mankind, (though they are conversant with +externals,) yet, at the same time they exhibit that which is separate +about them. For they consult how they should engage in them, and observe +that deliberation is necessary, in order to effect or be passive to +apparent good, or to decline something of the contrary. But the impulses +of other animals are uniform and spontaneous, are moved together with the +sensible organs, and require the senses alone that they may obtain from +sensibles the pleasurable, and avoid the painful. If, therefore, the body +communicates in pleasure and pain, and is affected in a certain respect +by them, it is evident that the psychical energies, (i.e. energies +belonging to the soul) are exerted, mingled with bodies, and are not +purely psychical, but are also corporeal; for perception is of the +animated body, or of the soul corporalized, though in such perception the +psychical idiom predominates over the corporeal; just as in bodies, the +corporeal idiom has dominion according to interval and subsistence. As +the irrational soul, therefore, has its being in something different from +itself, so far it is indigent of the subordinate: but a thing of this +kind will not be the principle. + +Prior them to this essence, we see a certain form separate from a +subject, and converted to itself, such as is the rational nature. Our +soul, therefore, presides over its proper energies and corrects itself. +This, however, would not be the case, unless it was converted to itself; +and it would not be converted, to itself unless it had a separate +essence. It is not therefore indigent of the subordinate. Shall we then +say that it is the most perfect principle? But, it does not at once exert +all its energies, but is always indigent of the greater part. The +principle, however, wishes to have nothing indigent: but the rational +nature is an essence in want of its own energies. Some one, however, may +say that it is an eternal essence, and has never-failing essential +energies, always concurring with its essence, according to the self-moved +and ever vital, and that it is therefore unindigent; but the principle is +perfectly unindigent. Soul therefore, and which exerts mutable energies, +will not be the most proper principle. Hence it is necessary that there +should be something prior to this, which is in every respect immutable, +according to nature, life, and knowledge, and according to all powers and +enemies, such as we assert an eternal and immutable essence to be, and +such as is much honoured intellect, to which Aristotle having ascended, +thought he had discovered the first principle. For what can be wanting to +that which perfectly comprehends in itself its own plenitudes (oleromata), +and of which neither addition nor ablation changes any thing belonging to +it? Or is not this also, one and many, whole and parts, containing in +itself, things first, middle, and last? The subordinate plenitudes also +stand in need of the more excellent, and the more excellent of the +subordinate, and the whole of the parts. For the things related are +indigent of each other, and what are first of what are last, through the +same cause; for it is not of itself that which is first. Besides, the one +here is indigent of the many, because it has its subsistence in the many. +Or it may be said, that this one is collective of the many, and this not +by itself, but in conjunction with them. Hence there is much of the +indigent in this principle. For since intellect generates in itself its +proper plenitudes from which the whole at once receives its completion, +it will be itself indigent of itself, not only that which is generated of +that which generates, but also that which generates, of that which is +generated, in order to the whole completion of that which wholly generates +itself. Further still, intellect understands and is understood, is +intellective of and intelligible to itself, and both these. Hence the +intellectual is indigent of the intelligible, as of its proper object of +desire; and the intelligible is in want of the intellectual, because it +wishes to be the intelligible of it. Both also are indigent of either, +since the possession is always accompanied with indigence, in the same +manner as the world is always present with matter. Hence a certain +indigence is naturally coessentiallized with intellect, so that it cannot +be the most proper principle. Shall we, therefore, in the next place, +direct our attention to the most simple of beings, which Plato calls the +one being, [Greek: en on]? For as there is no separation there throughout +the Whole, nor any multitude, or order, or duplicity, or conversion to +itself, what indigence will there appear to me, in the perfectly united? +And especially what indigence will there be of that which is subordinate? +Hence the great Parmenides ascended to this most safe principle, as that +which is most unindigent. Is it not, however, here necessary to attend to +the conception of Plato, that the united is not the one itself, but that +which is passive[2] to it? And this being the case, it is evident that it +ranks after the one; for it is supposed to be the united and not the one +itself. If also being is composed from the elements bound and infinity, +as appears from the Philebus of Plato, where he calls it that which is +mixt, it will be indigent of its elements. Besides, if the conception of +being is different from that of being united, and that which is a whole +is both united and being, these will be indigent of each other, and the +whole which is called one being is indigent of the two. And though the +one in this is better than being, yet this is indigent of being, in order +to the subsistence of one being. But if being here supervenes the one, as +it were, form in that which is mixt and united, just as the idiom of man +in that which is collectively rational-mortal-animal, thus also the one +will be indigent of being. If, however, to speak more properly, the one +is two-fold; this being the cause of the mixture, and subsisting prior to +being, but that conferring rectitude, on being,--if this be the case, +neither will the indigent perfectly desert this nature. After all these, +it may be said that the one will be perfectly unindigent. For neither is +it indigent of that which is posterior to itself for its subsistence, +since the truly one is by itself separated from all things; nor is it +indigent of that which is inferior or more excellent in itself; for there +is nothing in it besides itself; nor is it in want of itself. But it is +one, because neither has it any duplicity with respect to itself. For not +even the relation of itself to itself must be asserted of the truly one; +since it is perfectly simple. This, therefore, is the most unindigent of +all things. Hence this is the principle and the cause of all; and this is +at once the first of all things. If these qualities, however, are present +with it, it will not be the one. Or may we not say that all things +subsist in the one according to the one? And that both these subsist in +it, and such other things as we predicate of it, as, for instance, the +most simple, the most excellent, the most powerful, the preserver of all +things, and the good itself? If these things, however, are thus true of +the one, it will thus also be indigent of things posterior to itself, +according to those very things which we add to it. For the principle is, +and is said to be the principle of things proceeding from it, and the +cause is the cause of things caused, and the first is the first of things +arranged, posterior to it.[3] + +------------------ +[2] See the Sophista of Plato, where this is asserted. + +[3] For a thing cannot be said to be a principle or cause without the +subsistence of the things of which it is the principle or cause. Hence, +so far as it is a principle or cause, it will be indigent of the +subsistence of these. +------------------ + +Further still, the simple subsists according to a transcendency of other +things, the most powerful according to power with relation to the subjects +of it; and the good, the desirable, and the preserving, are so called with +reference to things benefitted, preserved, and desiring. And if it should +be said to be all things according to the preassumption of all things in +itself, it will indeed be said to be so according to the one alone, and +will at the same time be the one cause of all things prior to all, and will +be thus, and no other according to the one. So far, therefore, as it is the +one alone, it will be unindigent; but so far as unindigent, it will be the +first principle, and stable root of all principles. So far, however, as it +is the principle and the first cause of all things, and is pre-established +as the object of desire to all things, so far it appears to be in a certain +respect indigent of the things to which it is related. It has therefore, if +it be lawful so to speak, an ultimate vestige of indigence, just as on the +contrary matter has an ultimate echo of the unindigent, or a most obscure +and debile impression of the one. And language indeed appears to be here +subverted. For so far as it is the one, it is also unindigent, since the +principle has appeared to subsist according to the most unindigent and the +one. At the same time, however, so far as it is the one, it is also the +principle; and so far as it is the one it is unindigent, but so far as the +principle, indigent. Hence so far as it is unindigent, it is also indigent, +though not according to the same; but with respect to being that which it +is, it is undigent; but as producing and comprehending other things in +itself, it is indigent. This, however, is the peculiarity of the one; so +that it is both unindigent and indigent according to the one. Not indeed +than it is each of these, in such a manner as we divide it in speaking of +it, but it is one alone; and according to this is both other things, and +that which is indigent. For how is it possible, it should not be indigent +also so far as it is the one? Just as it is all other things which proceed +from it. For the indigent also is, something belonging to all things. +Something else, therefore, must be investigated which in no respect has any +kind of indigence. But of a thing of this kind it cannot with truth be +asserted that it is the principle, nor can it even be said of it that it is +most unindigent, though this appears to be the most venerable of all +assertions.[4] + +--------------- +[4] See the extracts from Damascius in the additional notes to the third +volume, which contain an inestimable treasury of the most profound +conceptions concerning the ineffable. +------------------ + +For this signifies transcendency, and an exemption from the indigent. We do +not, however, think it proper to call this even the perfectly exempt; but +that which is in every respect incapable of being apprehended, and about +which we must be perfectly silent, will be the most, just axiom of our +conception in the present investigation; nor yet this as uttering any +thing, but as rejoicing in not uttering, and by this venerating that +immense unknown. This then is the mode of ascent to that which is called +the first, or rather to that which is beyond every thing which can be +conceived, or become the subject of hypothesis. + +There is also another mode, which does not place the unindigent before +the indigent, but considers that which is indigent of a more excellent +nature, as subsisting secondary to that which is more excellent. Every +where then, that which is in capacity is secondary to that which is in +energy. For that it may proceed into energy, and that it may not remain +in capacity in vain, it requires that which is in energy. For the more +excellent never blossoms from the subordinate nature. Let this then be +defined by us according to common unperverted conceptions. Matter +therefore has prior to itself material form; because all matter is form +in capacity, whether it be the first matter which is perfectly formless, +or the second which subsists according to body void of quality, or in +other words mere triple extension, to which it is likely those directed +their attention who first investigated sensibles, and which at first +appeared to be the only thing that had a subsistence. For the existence +of that which is common in the different elements, persuaded them that +there is a certain body void of quality. But since, among bodies of this +kind, some possess the governing principle inwardly, and others +externally, such as things artificial, it is necessary besides quality to +direct our attention to nature, as being something better than qualities, +and which is prearranged in the order of cause, as art is, of things +artificial. Of things, however, which are inwardly governed, some appear +to possess being alone, but others to be nourished and increased, and to +generate things similar to themselves. There is therefore another certain +cause prior to the above-mentioned nature, viz. a vegetable power itself. +But it is evident that all such things as are ingenerated in body as in a +subject, are of themselves incorporeal, though they become corporeal by +the participation of that in which they subsist, so that they are said +to be and are material in consequence of what they suffer from matter. +Qualities therefore, and still more natures, and in a still greater +degree the vegetable life, preserve the incorporeal in themselves. Since +however, sense exhibits another more conspicuous life, pertaining to +beings which are moved according to impulse and place, this must be +established prior to that, as being a more proper principle, and as the +supplier of a certain better form, that of a self-moved animal, and which +naturally precedes plants rooted in the earth. The animal however, is not +accurately self-moved. For the whole is not such throughout they whole; +but a part moves and a part is moved. This therefore is the apparent +self-moved. Hence, prior to this it is necessary there should be that +which is truly self-moved, and which according to the whole of itself +moves ands is moved, that the apparently self-moved may be the image of +this. And indeed the soul which moves the body must be considered as a +more proper self-moved essence. This, however, is twofold, the one +rational, the other irrational. For that there is a rational soul is +evident: or has not every one a cosensation of himself, more clear or +more obscure, when converted to himself in the attentions to and +investigations of himself, and in the vital and Gnostic animadversions of +himself? For the essence which is capable of this, and which can collect +universals by reasoning, will very justly be rational. The irrational +soul also, though it does not appear to investigate these things, and to +reason with itself, yet at the same time it moves bodies from place to +place, being itself previously moved from itself; for at different times +it exerts a different impulse. Does it therefore move itself from one +impulse to another? or it is moved by something else, as, for instance, +by the whole rational soul in the universe? But it would be absurd to say +that the energies of every irrational soul are not the energies of that +soul, but of one more divine; since they are infinite, and mingled with +much of the base and imperfect. For this would be just the same as to say +that the irrational enemies are the energies of the rational soul. I omit +to mention the absurdity of supposing that the whole essence is not +generative of its proper energies. For if the irrational soul is a +certain essence, it will have peculiar energies of its own, not imparted +from something else, but proceeding from itself. This irrational soul, +therefore, will also move itself at different times to different impulses. +But if it moves itself, it will be converted to itself. If, however, this +be the case, it will have a separate subsistence, and will not be in a +subject. It is therefore rational, if it looks to itself: for in being +converted to, it surveys itself. For when extended to things external, it +looks to externals, or rather it looks to colored body, but does not see +itself, because sight itself is neither body nor that which is colored. +Hence it does not revert to itself. Neither therefore is this the case +with any other irrational nature. For neither does the phantasy project a +type of itself, but of that which is sensible, as for instance of colored +body. Nor does irrational appetite desire itself, but aspires after a +certain object of desire, such as honor, or pleasure, or riches. It does +not therefore move itself. + +But if some one, on seeing that brutes exert rational energies, should +apprehend that these also participate of the first self-moved, and on +this account possess a soul converted to itself, it may perhaps be +granted to him that these also are rational natures, except that they +are not so essentially, but according to participation, and this most +obscure, just as the rational soul may be said to be intellectual +according to participation, as always projecting common conceptions +without distortion. It must however be observed, that the extreme are +that which is capable of being perfectly separated, such as the rational +form, and that which is perfectly inseparable, such as corporeal quality, +and that in the middle of these nature subsists, which verges to the +inseparable, having a small representation of the separable and the +irrational soul, which verges to the separable; or it appears in a +certain respect to subsist by itself, separate from a subject; so that +it becomes doubtful whether it is self-motive, or alter-motive. For it +contains an abundant vestige of self-motion, but not that which is true +and converted to itself, and on this account perfectly separated from +a subject. And the vegetable soul has in a certain respect a middle +subsistence. On this account to some of the ancients it appeared to be +a certain soul, but to others, nature. + +Again, therefore, that we may return to the proposed object of +investigation, how can a self-motive nature of this kind, which is +mingled with the alter-motive, be the first principle of things? For +it neither subsists from itself, nor does it in reality perfect itself; +but it requires a certain other nature, both for its subsistence and +perfection: and prior to it is that which is truly self-moved. Is +therefore that which is properly self-moved the principle, and is it +indigent of no form more excellent than itself? Or is not that which +moves always naturally prior to that which is moved; and in short does +not every form which is pure from its contrary subsist by itself prior +to that which is mingled with it? And is not the pure the cause of the +commingled? For that which is coessentialized with another has also an +energy mingled with that other. So that a self-moved nature will indeed, +make itself; but thus subsisting it will be at the same time moving and +moved, but will not be made a moving nature only. For neither is it this +alone. Every form however is always alone according to its first +subsistence; so that there will be that which moves only without being +moved. And indeed it would be absurd that there should be that which is +moved only such as body, but that prior both to that which is self-moved +and that which is moved only, there should not be that which moves only. +For it is evident that there must be, since this will be a more excellent +nature, and that which is self-moved, so far as it moves itself, is more +excellent than so far as it is moved. It is necessary therefore that the +essence which moves unmoved, should be first, as that which is moved, not +being motive, is the third, in the middle of which is the self-moved, +which we say requires that which moves in order to its becoming motive. +In short, if it is moved, it will not abide, so far as it is moved; and +if it moves, it is necessary it should remain moving so far as it moves. +Whence then does it derive the power of abiding? For from itself it +derives the power either of being moved only, or of at the same time +abiding and being moved wholly according to the same. Whence then does +it simply obtain the power of abiding? Certainly from that which simply +abides. But, this is an immovable cause. We must therefore admit that +the immovable is prior to the self moved. Let us consider then if the +immovable is the most proper principle? But how is this possible? For the +immovable contains as numerous a multitude immovably; as the self-moved +self-moveably. Besides an immovable separation must necessarily subsist +prior to a self-moveable separation. The unmoved therefore is at the same +time one and many, and is at the same time united and separated, and a +nature of this kind is denominated intellect. But it is evident that +the united in this is naturally prior to and more honorable than the +separated. For separation is always indigent of union; but not, on the +contrary, union of separation. Intellect, however, has not the united +pure from its opposite. For intellectual form is coessentialized with the +separated, through the whole of itself. Hence that which is in a certain +respect united requires that which is simply united; and that which +subsists with another is indigent of that which subsists by itself; and +that which subsists according to participation, of that which subsists +according to essence. For intellect being self-subsistent produces itself +as united, and at the same time separated. Hence it subsists according to +both these. It is produced therefore from that which is simply united and +alone united. Prior therefore to that which is formal is the +uncircumscribed, and undistributed into forms. And this is that which we +call the united, and which the wise men of antiquity denominated being, +possessing in one contraction multitude, subsisting prior to the many. + +Having therefore arrived thus far, let us here rest for a while, and +consider with ourselves, whether being is the investigated principle of +all things. For what will there be which does not participate of being? +May we not say, that this, if it is the united, will be secondary to the +one, and that by participating of the one it becomes the united? But in +short; if we conceive the one to be something different from being, if +being is prior to the one, it will not participate of the one. It will +therefore be many only, and these will be infinitely infinite. But if the +one is with being, and being with the one, and they are either coordinate +or divided from each other, there will be two principles, and the +above-mentioned absurdity will happen. Or they will mutually participate +of each other, and there will be two elements. Or they are parts of +something else, consisting from both. And, if this be the case, what will +that be which leads them to union with each other? For if the one unites +being to itself (for this may be said), the one also will energize prior +to being, that it may call forth and convert being to itself. The one, +therefore, will subsist from itself self-perfect prior to being. Further +still, the more simple is always prior to the more composite. If +therefore they are similarly simple, there will either be two principles, +or one from the two, and this will be a composite. Hence the simple and +perfectly incomposite is prior to this, which must be either one, or not +one; and if not one, it must either be many, or nothing. But with respect +to nothing, if it signifies that which is perfectly void, it will signify +something vain. But if it signifies the arcane, this will not even be +that which is simple. In short, we cannot conceive any principle more +simple than the one. The one therefore is in every respect prior to +being. Hence this is the principle of all things, and Plato recurring to +this, did not require any other principle in his reasonings. For the +arcane in which this our ascent terminates is not the principle of +reasoning, nor of knowledge, nor of animals, nor of beings, nor of +unities, but simply of all things, being arranged above every conception +and suspicion that we can frame. Hence Plato indicates nothing concerning +it, but makes his negations of all other things except the one, from the +one. For that the one is he denies in the last place, but he does not +make a negation of the one. He also, besides this, even denies this +negation, but not the one. He denies, too, name and conception, and all +knowledge, and what can be said more, whole itself and every being. But +let there be the united and the unical, and, if you will, the two +principles bound and the infinite. Plato, however, never in any respect +makes a negation of the one which is beyond all these. Hence in the +Sophista he considers it as the one prior to being, and in the Republic +as the good beyond every essence; but at the same time the one alone is +left. Whether however is it known and effable, or unknown and ineffable? +Or is it in a certain respect these, and in a certain respect not? For by +a negation of this it may be said the ineffable is affirmed. And again, +by the simplicity of knowledge it will be known or suspected, but by +composition perfectly unknown. Hence neither will it be apprehended by +negation. And in short, so far as it is admitted to be one, so far it +will be coarranged with other things, which are the subject of position. +For it is the summit of things, which subsist according to position. At +the same time there is much in it of the ineffable and unknown, the +uncoordinated, and that which is deprived of position, but these are +accompanied with a representation of the Contraries: and the former are +more excellent, than the latter. But every where things pure subsist +prior to their contraries, and such as are unmingled to the commingled. +For either things more excellent subsist in the one essentially, and in a +certain respect the contraries of these also will be there at the same +time; or they subsist according to participation, and are derived from +that which is first a thing of this kind. Prior to the one, therefore, is +that which is simply and perfectly ineffable, without position, +uncoordinated, and incapable of being apprehended, to which also the +ascent of the present discourse hastens through the clearest indications, +omitting none of those natures between the first and the last of things. + +Such then is the ascent to the highest God, according to the theology of +Plato, venerably preserving his ineffable exemption from all things, and +his transcendency, which cannot be circumscribed by any gnostic energy, +and at the same time, unfolding the paths which lead upwards to him, and +enkindling that luminous summit of the soul, by which she is conjoined +with the incomprehensible one. + +From this truly ineffable principle, exempt from all essence, power, and +energy, a multitude of divine natures, according to Plato, immediately +proceeds. That this must necessarily be the case, will be admitted by the +reader who understands what has been already discussed, and is fully +demonstrated by Plato in the Parmenides, as will be evident to the +intelligent from the notes on that Dialogue. In addition therefore to +what I have staid on this subject, I shall further observe at present +that this doctrine, which is founded in the sublimest and most scientific +conceptions of the human mind, may be clearly shown to be a legitimate +dogma of Plato from what is asserted by him in the sixth book of his +Republic. For he there affirms, in the most clear and unequivocal terms, +that the good, or the ineffable principle of things is superessential, +and shows by the analogy of the sun to the good, that what light and +sight are in the visible, that truth and intelligence are in the +intelligible world. As light therefore, immediately proceeds from the +sun, and wholly subsists according to a solar idiom or property, so truth +or the immediate progeny of the good, must subsist according to a +superessential idiom. And as the good, according to Plato, is the same +with the one, as is evident from the Parmenides, the immediate progeny of +the one will be the same as that of the good. But, the immediate +offspring of the one cannot be any thing else than unities. And, hence we +necessarily infer that according to Plato, the immediate offspring of the +ineffable principle of things are superessential unities. They differ +however from their immense principle in this, that he is superessential +and ineffable, without any addition; but this divine multitude is +participated by the several orders of being, which are suspended from and +produced by it. Hence, in consequence of being connected with multitude +through this participation, they are necessarily subordinate to the one. + +No less admirably, therefore, than Platonically does Simplicius, in his +Commentary of Epictetus, observe on this subject as follows: "The +fountain and principle of all things is the good: for that which all +things desire, and to which all things are extended, is the principle and +the end of all things. The good also produces from itself all things, +first, middle, and last. But it produces such as are first and proximate +to itself, similar to itself; one goodness, many goodnesses, one +simplicity and unity which transcends all others, many, unities, and one +principle many principles. For the one, the principle, the good, and +deity, are the same: for deity is the first and the cause of all things. +But it is necessary that the first should also be most simple; since +whatever is a composite and has multitude is posterior to the one. And +multitude and things, which are not good desire the good as being above +them: and in short, that which is not itself the principle is from the +principle. + +But it is also necessary that the principle of all things should possess +the highest, and all, power. For the amplitude of power consists in +producing all things from itself, and in giving subsistence to similars, +prior to things which are dissimilar. Hence the one principle produces +many principles, many simplicities, and many goodnesses, proximately from +itself. For since all things differ from each other, and are multiplied +with their proper differences, each of these multitudes is suspended from +its one proper principle. Thus, for instance, all beautiful things, +whatever and wherever they may be, whether in souls or in bodies, are +suspended from one fountain of beauty. Thus too, whatever possesses +symmetry, and whatever is true, and all principles, are in a certain +respect, connate with the first principle, so far as they are principles +and fountains and goodnesses, with an appropriate subjection and analogy. +For what the one principle is to all beings, that each of the other +principles is to the multitude comprehended under the idiom of its +principle. For it is impossible, since each multitude is characterized +by a certain difference, that it should not be extended to its proper +principle, which illuminates one and the same form to all the individuals +of that multitude. For the one is the leader of every multitude; and +every peculiarity or idiom in the many is derived to the many from the +one. All partial principles therefore are established in that principle +which ranks as a whole, and are comprehended in it, not with interval and +multitude, but as parts in the whole, as multitude in the one, and number +in the monad. For this first principle is all things prior to all: and +many principles are multiplied about the one principle, and in the one +goodness, many goodnesses are established. This too, is not a certain +principle like each of the rest: for of these, one is the principle of +beauty, another of symmetry, another of truth, and another of something +else, but it is simply principle. Nor is it simply the principles of +beings, but it is the principle of principles. For it is necessary that +the idiom of principle, after the same manner as other things, should not +begin from multitude, but should be collected into one monad as a summit, +and which is the principle of principles. + +Such things therefore as are first produced by the first good, in +consequence of being connascent with it, do not recede from essential +goodness, since they are immovable and unchanged, and are eternally +established in the same blessedness. They are likewise not indigent of +the good, because they are goodnesses themselves. All other natures +however, being produced by the one good, and many goodnesses, since they +fall off from essential goodness, and are not immovably established in +the hyparxis of divine goodness, on this account they possess the good +according to participation." + +From this sublime theory the meaning of that ancient Egyptian dogma, that +God is all things, is at once apparent. For the first principle,[6] as +Simplicius in the above passage justly observes, is all things prior +to all; i.e. he comprehends all things causally, this being the most +transcendent mode of comprehension. As all things therefore, considered +as subsisting causally in deity, are transcendently more excellent than +they are when considered as effects preceding from him, hence that mighty +and all-comprehending whole, the first principle, is said to be all +things prior to all; priority here denoting exempt transcendency. As the +monad and the centre of a circle are images from their simplicity of this +greatest of principles, so likewise do they perspicuously shadow forth +to us its causal comprehension of all things. For all number may be +considered as subsisting occultly in the monad, and the circle in the +centre; this occult being the same in each with causal subsistence. + +----------------- +[6] By the first principle here, the one is to be understood for that +arcane nature which is beyond the one, since all language is subverted +about it, can only, as we have already observed, be conceived and +venerated in the most profound silence. +----------------- + +That this conception of causal subsistence is not an hypothesis devised +by the latter Platonists, but a genuine dogma of Plato, is evident from +what he says in the Philebus: for in that Dialogue he expressly asserts +that in Jupiter a royal intellect, and a royal soul subsist according to +cause. Pherecydes Syrus, too, in his Hymn to Jupiter, as cited by Kercher +(in Oedip. Egyptiac.), has the following lines: +[Greek: + O theos esti kuklos, tetragonos ede trigonos, + Keinos de gramme, kentron, kai panta pro panton.] + +i.e. Jove is a circle, triangle and square, centre and line, and all things +before all. From which testimonies the antiquity of this sublime doctrine +is sufficiently apparent. + +And here it is necessary to observe that nearly all philosophers: prior +to Jamblichus (as we are informed by Damascius) asserted indeed, that +there is one superessential God, but that the other gods had an essential +subsistence, and were deified by illuminations from the one. They +likewise said that there is a multitude of super-essential unities, who +are not self-perfect subsistences, but illuminated unions with deity, +imparted to essences by the highest Gods. That this hypothesis, however, +is not conformable to the doctrine of Plato is evident from his +Parmenides, in which he shows that the one does not subsist in itself. +(See vol. iii, p. 133). For as we have observed from Proclus, in the +notes on that Dialogue, every thing which is the cause of itself and is +self-subsistent, is said to be in itself. Hence as producing power +always comprehends, according to cause that which it produces, it is +necessary that whatever produces itself should comprehend itself so far +as it is a cause, and should be comprehended by itself so far as it is +caused; and that it should be at once both cause and the thing caused, +that which comprehends, and that which is comprehended. If therefore a +subsistence in another signifies, according to Plato, the being produced +by another more excellent cause (as we have shown in the note to p. 133, +vol. iii), a subsistence in itself must signify that which is self- +begotten, and produced by itself. If the one therefore is not self-sub- +sistent as even transcending this mode of subsistence, and if it be +necessary that there should be something self-subsistent, it follows +that this must be the characteristic property of that which immediately +proceeds from the ineffable. But that there must be something self- +subsistent is evident, since unless this is admitted there will not +be a true sufficiency in any thing. + +Besides, as Damascius well observes, if that which is subordinate by +nature is self-perfect, such as the human soul, much more will this be the +case with a divine soul. But if with soul, this also will be true of +intellect. And if it be true of intellect, it will also be true of life: if +of life, of being likewise; and if of being, of the unities above being. +For the self-perfect, the self-sufficient, and that which is established in +itself, will much more subsist in superior than in subordinate natures. If +therefore, these are in the latter, they will also be in the former. I mean +the subsistence of a thing by itself, and essentialized in itself; and such +are essence and life, intellect, soul, and body. For body, though it does +not subsist from, yet subsists by itself; and through this belongs to the +genus of substance, and is contra-distinguished from accident, which cannot +exist independent of a subject. + +Self-subsistent superessential natures therefore are the immediate +progeny of the one, if it be lawful thus to denominate things, which +ought rather to be called ineffable unfoldings into light from the +ineffable; for progeny implies a producing cause, and the one must be +conceived as something even more excellent than this. From this divine +self-perfect and self-producing multitude, a series of self-perfect +natures, viz. of beings, lives, intellects, and souls proceeds, according +to Plato, in the last link of which luminous series he also classes the +human soul; proximately suspended from the daemoniacal order: for this +order, as he clearly asserts in the Banquet, "stands in the middle rank +between the divine and human, fills up the vacant space, and links +together all intelligent nature." And here to the reader, who has not +penetrated the depths of Plato's philosophy, it will doubtless appear +paradoxical in the extreme, that any being should be said to produce +itself, and yet at the same time proceed from a superior cause. The +solution of this difficulty is as follows:--Essential production, or that +energy through which any nature produces something else by its very +being, is the most perfect mode of production, because vestiges of it are +seen in the last of things; thus fire imparts heat, by its very essence, +and snow coldness. And in short, this is a producing of that kind, in +which the effect is that secondarily which the cause is primarily. As +this mode of production therefore, from its being the most perfect of all +others, originates from the highest natures, it will consequently first +belong to those self-subsistent powers, who immediately proceed from the +ineffable, and will from them be derived to all the following orders of +beings. But this energy, as being characterized by the essential, will +necessarily be different in different producing causes. Hence, from that +which subsists, at the summit of self subsistent natures, a series of +self subsisting beings will indeed proceed, but then this series will be +secondarily that which its cause is primarily, and the energy by which it +produces itself will be secondary to that by which it is produced by its +cause. Thus, for instance, the rational soul both produces itself (in +consequence of being a self-motive nature), and is produced by intellect; +but it is produced by intellect immutably, and by itself transitively; +for all its energies subsist in time, and are accompanied with motion. So +far therefore as soul contains intellect by participation, so far it is +produced by intellect, but so far as it is self-motive it is produced by +itself. In short, with respect to every thing self-subsistent, the summit +of its nature is produced by a superior cause, but the evolution of that +summit is its own spontaneous energy; and, through this it becomes +self-subsistent, and self-perfect. + +That the rational soul, indeed, so far as it is rational, produces +itself, may be clearly demonstrated as follows:--That which is able to +impart any thing superior and more excellent in any genus of things, can +easily impart that which is subordinate and less excellent in the same +genus; but well being confessedly ranks higher and is more excellent than +mere being. The rational soul imparts well being to itself, when it +cultivates and perfects itself, and recalls and withdraws itself from the +contagion of the body. It will therefore also impart being to itself. And +this with great propriety; for all divine natures, and such things as +possess the ability of imparting any thing primarily to others, +necessarily begin this energy from themselves. Of this mighty truth the +sun himself is an illustrious example; for he illuminates all things with +his light, and is himself light, and the fountain and origin of all +splendour. Hence, since the souls imparts life and motion to other +things, on which account Aristotle calls an animal antokincton, self- +moved, it will much more, and by a much greater priority, impart life and +motion to itself. + +From this magnificent, sublime, and most scientific doctrine of Plato, +respecting the arcane principle of things and his immediate progeny, it +follows that this ineffable cause is not the immediate maker of the +universe, and this, as I have observed in the Introduction to the Timaeus, +not through any defect, but on the contrary through transcendency of power. +All things indeed are ineffably unfolded from him at once, into light; but +divine media are necessary to the fabrication of the world. For if the +universe was immediately produced from the ineffable, it would, agreeably +to what we have above observed, be ineffable also in a secondary degree. +But as this is by no means the case, it principally derives its immediate +subsistence from a deity of a fabricative characteristic, whom Plato calls +Jupiter, conformably to the theology of Orpheus. The intelligent reader +will readily admit that this dogmas is so far from being derogatory to the +dignity of the Supreme, that on the contrary it exalts that dignity, and, +preserves in a becoming manner the exempt transcendency of the ineffable. +If therefore we presume to celebrate him, for as we have already observed, +it is more becoming to establish in silence those parturitions of the soul +which dare anxiously to explore him, we should celebrate him as the +principle of principles, and the fountain of deity, or in the reverential +language of the Egyptians, as a darkness thrice unknown.[7] Highly laudable +indeed, and worthy the imitation of all posterity, is the veneration which +the great ancients paid to this immense principle. This I have already +noticed in the Introduction to the Parmenides, and I shall only observe at +present in addition, that in consequence of this profound and most pious +reverence of the first God, they did not even venture to give a name to +the summit of that highest order of divinities which is denominated +intelligible. Hence, says Proclus, in his Mss. Scholia on the Cratylus, +"Not every genus of the gods has an appellation; for with respect to the +first Deity, who is beyond all things, Parmenides teaches us that he is +ineffable; and the first genera of the intelligible gods, who are united to +the one, and are called occult, have much of the unknown and ineffable. For +that which is perfectly effable cannot be conjoined with the perfectly +ineffable; but it is necessary that the progression of intelligibles should +terminate in this order, in which the first effable subsists, and that +which is called by proper names. For there the first intelligible forms, +and the intellectual nature of intelligibles, are unfolded into light. +But, the natures prior to this being silent and occult, are only known +by intelligence. Hence the whole of the telestic science energizing +theurgically ascends as far as to this order. Orpheus also says that this +is first called by a name by the other gods; for the light proceeding from +it is known to and denominated by the intellectual gods." + +----------------- +[7] Psalm xviii:11; xcvii:2. +----------------- + +With no less magnificence therefore than piety, does Proclus thus speak +concerning the ineffable principle of things. "Let us now if ever remove +from ourselves multiform knowledge, exterminate all the variety of life, +and in perfect quiet approach near to the cause of all things. For this +purpose, let not only opinion and phantasy be at rest, nor the passions +alone which impede our anagogic impulse to the first be at peace; but let +the air, and the universe itself, be still. And let all things extend us +with a tranquil power to communion with the ineffable. Let us also +standing there, having transcended the intelligible (if we contain any +thing of this kind), and with nearly closed eyes adoring as it were the +rising sun, since it is not lawful for any being whatever intently to +behold him,--let us survey the sun whence the light of the intelligible +gods proceeds, emerging, as the poets say, from the bosom of the ocean; +and again from this divine tranquillity descending into intellect, and +from intellect employing the reasonings of the soul, let us relate to +ourselves what the natures are from which in this progression we shall +consider the first God as exempt. And let us as it were celebrate him, +not as establishing the earth and the heavens, nor as giving subsistence +to souls, and the generations of all animals; for he produced these +indeed, but among the last of things. But prior to these, let us +celebrate him as unfolding into light the whole intelligible and +intellectual genus of gods, together with all the supermundane and +mundane divinities as, the God of all gods, the Unity of all unities, +and beyond the first adyta--as more ineffable than all silence, and more +unknown than all essence,--as holy among the holies, and concealed in +the intelligible gods." Such is the piety, such the sublimity, and +magnificence of conception, with which the Platonic philosophers speak of +that which is in reality in every respect ineffable, when they presume to +speak about it, extending the ineffable parturitions of the soul to the +ineffable cosensation of the incomprehensible one. + +From this sublime veneration of this most awful nature, which, as is +noticed in the extracts from Damascius, induced the most ancient +theologists, philosophers, and poets, to be entirely silent concerning +it, arose the great reverence which the ancients paid to the divinities +even of a mundane characteristic, or from whom bodies are suspended, +considering them also as partaking of the nature of the ineffable, and as +so many links of the truly golden chain of deity. Hence we find in the +Odyssey, when Ulysses and Telemachus are removing the arms from the walls +of the palace of Ithaca, and Minerva going before them with her golden +lamp fills all the place with a divine light, +[Greek: + . . . . . paroithe de pallas Athene +Chryseon lychnon echrusa phars perikalles epoiei.] + +Before thee Pallas Athene bore a golden cresset and cast a most lovely +light. Telemachus having observed that certainly some one of the celestial +gods was present, +[Greek: + Emala tis deos endon, of ouranon euryn echousi.] + +Verily some God is within, of those that hold the wide heaven. Ulysses +says in reply, "Be silent, restrain your intellect (i.e. even cease to +energize intellectually), and speak not." +[Greek: + Siga, kai kata son noon ischana, med' ereeine.] + +Hold thy peace and keep all this in thine heart and ask not hereof. +--Book 19, Odyssey. + +Lastly, from all that has been said, it must, I think, be immediately +obvious to every one whose mental eye is not entirely blinded, that there +can be no such thing as a trinity in the theology of Plato, in any respect +analogous to the Christian Trinity. For the highest God, according to +Plato, as we have largely shown from irresistible evidence, is so far from +being a part of a consubsistent triad, that he is not to be connumerated +with any thing; but is so perfectly exempt from all multitude, that he is +even beyond being; and he so ineffably transcends all relation and +habitude, that language is in reality subverted about him, and knowledge +refunded into ignorance. What that trinity however is in the theology of +Plato, which doubtless gave birth to the Christian, will be evident to the +intelligent from the notes on the Parmenides, and the extracts, from +Damascius. And thus much for the doctrine of Plato concerning the principle +of things, and his immediate offspring, the great importance of which will, +I doubt not, be a sufficient apology for the length of this discussion. + +In the next place, following Proclus and Olympiodorus as our guides, let us +consider the mode according to which Plato teaches us mystic conceptions of +divine natures: for he appears not to have pursued every where the same +mode of doctrine about these; but sometimes according to a divinely +inspired energy, and at other times dialectically, he evolves the truth +concerning them. And sometimes he symbolically announces their ineffable +idioms, but at other times he recurs to them from images, and discovers in +them the primary causes of wholes. For in the Phaedrus being evidently +inspired, and having exchanged human intelligence for a better possession, +divine mania, he unfolds many arcane dogmas concerning the intellectual, +liberated, and mundane gods. But in the Sophista dialectically contending +about being, and the subsistence of the one above beings, and doubting +against philosophers more ancient than himself, he shows how all beings are +suspended from their cause and the first being, but that being itself +participates of that unity which is exempt from all things, that it is a +passive,[8] one, but not the one itself, being subject to and united to the +one, but not being that which is primarily one. In a similar manner too, in +the Parmenides, he unfolds dialectically the progressions of being from the +one, through the first hypothesis of that dialogue, and this, as he there +asserts, according to the most perfect division of this method. And again +in the Gorgias, he relates the fable concerning the three fabricators, and +their demiurgic allotment. But in the Banquet he speaks concerning the +union of love; and in the Protagoras, about the distribution of mortal +animals from the gods; in a symbolical manner concealing the truth +concerning divine natures, and as far as to mere indication unfolding his +mind to the most genuine of his readers. + +----------------- +[8] It is necessary to observe, that, according to Plato, whatever +participates of any thing is said to be passive to that which it +participates, and the participations themselves are called by him passions. +----------------- + +Again, if it be necessary to mention the doctrine delivered through the +mathematical disciplines, and the discussion of divine concerns from +ethical or physical discourses, of which many may be contemplated in the +Timaeus, many in the dialogue called Politicus, and many may be seen +scattered in other dialogues; here likewise, to those who are desirous of +knowing divine concerns through images, the method will be apparent. Thus, +for instance, the Politicus shadows forth the fabrication in the heavens. +But the figures of the five elements, delivered in geometrical proportions +in the Timaeus, represent in images the idioms of the gods who preside over +the parts of the universe. And the divisions of the essence of the soul in +that dialogue shadow forth the total orders of the gods. To this we may +also add that Plato composes politics, assimilating them to divine natures, +and adorning them from the whole world and the powers which it contains. +All these, therefore, through the similitude of mortal to divine concerns, +exhibit to us in images the progressions, orders, and fabrications of the +latter. And such are the modes of theologic doctrine employed by Plato. + +"But those," says Proclus, "who treat of divine concerns in an indicative +manner, either speak symbolically and fabulously, or through images. And of +those who openly announce their conceptions, some frame their discourses +according to science, but others according to inspiration from the gods. +And he who desires to signify divine concerns through symbols is Orphic, +and, in short, accords with those who write fables respecting the gods. +But he who does this through images is Pythagoric. For the mathematical +disciplines were invented by the Pythagorean in order to a reminiscence of +divine concerns, to which through these as images, they endeavour to +ascend. For they refer both numbers and figures to the gods, according to +the testimony of their historians. But the enthusiastic character, or he +who is divinely inspired, unfolding the truth itself concerning the gods +essentially, perspicuously ranks among the highest initiators. For these do +not think proper to unfold the divine orders, or their idioms, to their +familiars through veils, but announce their powers and their numbers in +consequence of being moved by the gods themselves. But the tradition of +divine concerns according to science is the illustrious, prerogative of the +Platonic philosophy. For Plato alone, as it appears to me of all those who +are known to us, has attempted methodically to divide and reduce into order +the regular progression of the divine genera, their mutual difference, the +common idioms of the total orders, and the distributed idioms in each." + +Again, since Plato employs fables, let us in the first place consider +whence the ancients were induced to devise fables, and in the second place, +what the difference is between the fables of philosophers and those of +poets. In answer to the first question then, it is necessary to know that +the ancients employed fables looking to two things, viz. nature, and our +soul. They employed them by looking to nature, and the fabrication of +things, as follows. Things unapparent are believed from things apparent, +and incorporeal natures from bodies. For seeing the orderly arrangement of +bodies, we understand that a certain incorporeal power presides over them; +as with respect to the celestial bodies, they have a certain presiding +motive power. As we therefore see that our body is moved, but is no longer +so after death, we conceive that it was a certain incorporeal power which +moved it. Hence, perceiving that we believe things incorporeal and +unapparent from things apparent and corporeal, fables came to be adopted, +that we might come from things apparent to certain unapparent natures; as, +for instance, that on hearing the adulteries, bonds, and lacerations of the +gods, castrations of heaven, and the like, we may not rest satisfied with +the apparent meaning of such like particulars, but may proceed to the +unapparent, and investigate the true signification. After this manner, +therefore, looking to the nature of things, were fables employed. + +But from looking to our souls, they originated as follows: While we are +children we live according to the phantasy, but the phantastic part is +conversant with figures, and types, and things of this kind. That the +phantastic part in us therefore may be preserved, we employ fables in +consequence of this part rejoicing in fables. It may also be said that +a fable is nothing else than a false discourse shadowing forth the truth: +for a fable is the image of truth. But the soul is the image of the +natures prior to herself; and hence the soul very properly rejoices in +fables, as an image in an image. As we are therefore from our childhood +nourished in fables, it is necessary that they should be introduced. And +thus much for the first problem, concerning the origin of fables. + +In the next place let us consider what the difference is between the +fables of philosophers and poets. Each therefore has something in which +it abounds more than, and something in which it is deficient from the +other. Thus, for instance, the poetic fable abounds in this, that we must +not rest satisfied with the apparent meaning, but pass on to the occult +truth. For who, endued with intellect, would believe that Jupiter was +desirous of having connection with Juno, and on the ground, without +waiting to go into the bed-chamber. So that the poetic fable abounds, in +consequence of asserting such things as do not suffer us to stop at the +apparent, but lead us to explore the occult truth. But it is defective in +this, that it deceives those of a juvenile age. Plato therefore neglects +fable of this kind, and banishes Homer from his Republic; because youth +on hearing such fables, will not be able to distinguish what is +allegorical from what is not. + +Philosophical fables, on the contrary, do not injure those that go no +further than the apparent meaning. Thus, for instance, they assert that +there are punishments and rivers under the earth: and if we adhere to the +literal meaning of these we shall not be injured. But they are deficient +in this, that as their apparent signification does not injure, we often +content ourselves with this, and do not explore the latent truth. We may +also say that philosophic fables look to the enemies of the soul. For if +we were entirely intellect alone, and had no connection with phantasy, we +should not require fables, in consequence of always associating with +intellectual natures. If again, we were entirely irrational, and lived +according to the phantasy, and had no other energy than this, it would be +requisite that the whole of our life should be fabulous. Since, however, +we possess intellect, opinion, and phantasy, demonstrations are given +with a view to intellect; and hence Plato says that if you are willing to +energize according to intellect, you will have demonstrations bound with +adamantine chains; if according to opinion, you will have the testimony +of renowned persons; and if according to the phantasy, you have fables by +which it is excited; so that from all these you will derive advantage. + +Plato therefore rejects the more tragical mode of mythologizing of the +ancient poets, who thought proper to establish an arcane theology +respecting the gods, and on this account devised wanderings, castrations, +battles and lacerations of the gods, and many other such symbols of the +truth about divine natures which this theology conceals;--this mode he +rejects, and asserts that it is in every respect most foreign from +erudition. But he considers those mythological discourses about the gods +as more persuasive and more adapted to truth, which assert that a divine +nature is the cause of all good, but of no evil, and that it is void of +all mutation, comprehending in itself the fountain of truth, but never +becoming the cause of any deception to others. For such types of theology +Socrates delivers in the Republic. + +All the fables therefore of Plato guarding the truth in concealment, +have not even their externally apparent apparatus discordant with our +undisciplined and unperverted anticipations of divinity. But they bring +with them an image of the mundane composition in which both the apparent +beauty is worthy of divinity, and a beauty more divine than this is +established in the unapparent lives and powers of its causes. + +In the next place, that the reader may see whence and from what dialogues +principally the theological dogmas of Plato may be collected, I shall +present him with the following translation of what Proclus has admirably +written on this subject. + +"The truth (says he) concerning the gods pervades, as I may say, through +all the Platonic dialogues, and in all of them conceptions of the first +philosophy, venerable, clear, and supernatural, are disseminated, in some +more obscurely, but in others more conspicuously;--conceptions which +excite those that are in any respect able to partake of them, to the +immaterial and separate essence of the gods. And as in each part of the +universe and in nature itself, the demiurgus of all which the world +contains established resemblances of the unknown essence of the gods, +that all things might be converted to divinity through their alliance +with it, in like manner I am of opinion, that the divine intellect of +Plato weaves conceptions about the gods with all its progeny, and leaves +nothing deprived of the mention of divinity, that from the whole of its +offspring a reminiscence of total natures may be obtained, and imparted +to the genuine lovers of divine concerns. + +"But if it be requisite to lay before the reader those dialogues out of +many which principally unfold to us the mystic discipline about the gods, +I shall not err in ranking among this number the Phaedo and Phaedrus, the +Banquet and the Philebus, and together with these the Sophista and +Politicus, the Cratylus and the Timaeus. For all these are full through +the whole of themselves, as I may say, of the divine science of Plato. +But I should place in the second rank after these, the fable in the +Gorgias, and that in the Protagoras, likewise the assertions about the +providence of the gods in the Laws, and such things as are delivered +about the Fates, or the mother of the Fates, or the circulations of the +universe, in the tenth book of the Republic. Again you may, if you +please, place in the third rank those Epistles through which we may be +able to arrive at the science about divine natures. For in these, mention +is made of the three kings; and many other divine dogmas worthy the +Platonic theory are delivered. It is necessary therefore, regarding +these, to explore in them each order of the gods. + +Thus from the Philebus, we may receive the science respecting the one +good, and the two first principles of things (bound and infinity) together +with the triad subsisting from these. For you will find all these +distinctly delivered to us by Plato in that dialogue. But from the Timaeus +you may obtain the theory about intelligibles, a divine narration about the +demiurgic monad, and the most full truth about the mundane gods. From the +Phaedrus you may learn all the intelligible and intellectual genera, and +the liberated orders of the gods, which are proximately established above +the celestial circulations. From the Politicus you may obtain the theory of +the fabrication in the heavens, of the periods of the universe, and of the +intellectual causes of those periods. But from the Sophista you may learn +the whole sublunary generation, and the idiom of the gods who are allotted +the sublunary region, and preside over its generations and corruptions. And +with respect to each of the gods, we may obtain many sacred conceptions +from the Banquet, many from the Cratylus, and many from the Phaedo. For in +each of these dialogues more or less mention is made of divine names, from +which it is easy for those who are exorcised in divine concerns to discover +by a reasoning process the idioms of each. + +"It is necessary, however, to evince that each of the dogmas accords with +Platonic principles and the mystic traditions of theologists. For all the +Grecian theology is the progeny of the mystic doctrine of Orpheus; +Pythagoras first of all learning from Aglaophemus the origins of the +gods, but Plato in the second place receiving an all-perfect science of +the divinities from the Pythagoric and Orphic writings. For in the +Philebus, referring the theory about the two forms of principles (bound +and infinity) to the Pythagoreans, he calls them men dwelling with the +gods, and truly blessed. Philolaus, therefore, the Pythagorean, has left +for us in writing admirable conceptions about these principles, +celebrating their common progression into beings, and their separate +fabrication. Again, in the Timaeus, endeavouring to teach us about the +sublunary gods and their order, Plato flies to theologists, calls them +the sons of the gods, and makes them the fathers of the truth about these +divinities. And lastly, he delivers the orders of the sublunary gods +proceeding from wholes, according to the progression delivered by +theologists of the intellectual kings. Further still, in the Cratylus he +follows the traditions of theologists respecting the order of the divine +processions. But in the Gorgias he adopts the Homeric dogma, respecting +the triadic hypostases of the demiurgi. And, in short, he every where +discourses concerning the gods agreeably to the principles of theologists; +rejecting indeed the tragical part of mythological fiction, but establishing +first hypotheses in common with the authors of fables. + +"Perhaps, however, some one may here object to us, that we do not in a +proper manner exhibit the every where dispersed theology of Plato, and that +we endeavour to heap together different particulars from different +dialogues, as if we were studious of collecting many things into one +mixture, instead of deriving them all from one and the same fountain. For +if this were our intention, we might indeed refer different dogmas to +different treatises of Plato, but we shall by no means have a precedaneous +doctrine concerning the gods, nor will there be any dialogue which presents +us with an all-perfect and entire procession of the divine genera, and +their coordination with each other. But we shall be similar to those who +endeavor to obtain a whole from parts, through the want of a whole prior[9] +to parts, and to weave together the perfect, from things imperfect, when, +on the contrary, the imperfect ought to have the first cause of its +generation in the perfect. For the Timaeus, for instance, will teach us the +theory of the intelligible genera, and the Phaedrus appears to present us +with a regular account of the first intellectual orders. But where will be +the coordination of intellectuals to intelligibles? And what will be the +generation of second from first natures? In short, after what manner the +progression of the divine orders takes place from the one principle of all +things, and how in the generations of the gods, the orders between the one, +and all-perfect number, are filled up, we shall be unable to evince. + +----------------- +[9] A whole prior to parts is that which causally contains parts in +itself. Such parts too, when they proceed from their occult causal +subsistence, and have a distinct being of their own, are nevertheless +comprehended, though in a different manner, in their producing whole. +----------------- + +"Further still, it may be said, where will be the venerableness of your +boasted science about divine natures? For it is absurd to call these +dogmas, which are collected from many places, Platonic, and which, as you +acknowledge, are reduced from foreign names to the philosophy of Plato; +nor are you able to evince the whole entire truth about divine natures. +Perhaps, indeed, they will say that certain persons, junior to Plato, +have delivered in their writings, and left to their disciples, one +perfect form of philosophy. You, therefore, are able to produce one +entire theory about nature from the Timaeus; but from the Republic, or +Laws, the most beautiful dogmas about morals, and which tend to one form +of philosophy. Alone, therefore, neglecting the treatise of Plato, which +contains all the good of the first philosophy, and which may be called +the summit of the whole theory, you will be deprived of the most perfect +knowledge of beings, unless you are so much infatuated as to boast on +account of fabulous fictions, though an analysis of things of this kind +abounds with much of the probable, but not of the demonstrative. Besides, +things of this kind are only delivered adventitiously in the Platonic +dialogues; as the fable in the Protagoras, which is inserted for the sake +of the political science, and the demonstrations respecting it. In like +manner the fable in the Republic is inserted for the sake of justice; and +in the Gorgias for the sake of temperance. For Plato combines fabulous +narrations with investigations of ethical dogmas, not for the sake of the +fables, but for the sake of the leading design, that we may not only +exercise the intellectual part of the soul, through contending reasons, +but that the divine part of the soul may more perfectly receive the +knowledge of beings, through its sympathy with more mystic concerns. +For from other discourses we resemble those who are compelled to the +reception of truth; but from fables we are affected in an ineffable +manner, and call forth our unperverted conceptions, venerating the mystic +information which they contain. + +"Hence, as it appears to me, Timaeus with great propriety thinks it fit +that we should produce the divine genera, following the inventors of +fables as sons of the gods, and subscribe to their always generating +secondary natures from such as are first, though they should speak +without demonstration. For this kind of discourse is not demonstrative, +but entheastic, or the progeny of divine inspiration; and was invented by +the ancients, not through necessity, but for the sake of persuasion, not +regarding naked discipline, but sympathy with things themselves. But if +you are willing to speculate not only the causes of fables, but of other +theological dogmas, you will find that some of them are scattered in the +Platonic dialogues for the sake of ethical, and others for the sake of +physical considerations. For in the Philebus, Plato discourses concerning +bound and infinity, for the sake of pleasure, and a life according to +intellect. For I think the latter are species of the former. In the +Timaeus the discourse about the intelligible gods is assumed for the sake +of the proposed physiology. On which account, it is every where necessary +that images should be known from paradigms, but that the paradigms of +material things should be immaterial, of sensibles, intelligible, and of +physical forms, separate from nature. But in the Phaedrus, Plato +celebrates the supercelestial place, the subcelestial profundity, and +every genus under this for the sake of amatory mania; the manner in which +the reminiscence of souls takes place; and the passage to these from +hence. Every where, however, the leading end, as I may say, is either +physical or political, while the conceptions about divine natures are +introduced either for the sake of invention or perfection. How, therefore, +can such a theory as yours be any longer venerable and supernatural, and +worthy to be studied beyond every thing, when it is neither able to +evince the whole in itself, nor the perfect, nor that which is +precedaneous in the writings of Plato, but is destitute of all these, is +violent and not spontaneous, and does not possess a genuine, but an +adventitious order, as in a drama? And such are the particulars which may +be urged against our design. + +"To this objection I shall make a just and perspicuous reply. I say then +that Plato every where discourses about the gods agreeably to ancient +opinions and the nature of things. And sometimes indeed, for the sake of +the cause of the things proposed, he reduces them to the principles of +the dogmas, and thence, as from an exalted place of survey, contemplates +the nature of the thing proposed. But some times he establishes the +theological science as the leading end. For in the Phaedrus, his subject +respects intelligible beauty, and the participation of beauty pervading +thence through all things; and in the Banquet it respects the amatory +order. + +"But if it be necessary to consider, in one Platonic dialogue, the +all-perfect, whole and connected, extending as far as to the complete +number of theology, I shall perhaps assert a paradox, and which will +alone be apparent to our familiars. We ought however to dare, since we +have begun the assertion, and affirm against our opponents, that the +Parmenides, and the mystic conceptions of this dialogue, will accomplish +all you desire. For in this dialogue, all the divine genera proceed in +order from the first cause, and evince their mutual suspension from each +other. And those indeed which are highest, connate with the one, and of +a primary nature, are allotted a form of subsistence, characterized by +unity, occult and simple; but such as are last are multiplied, are +distributed into many parts, and excel in number, but are inferior in +power to such as are of a higher order; and such as are middle, according +to a convenient proportion, are more composite than their causes, but +more simple than their proper progeny. And, in short, all the axioms of +the theological science appear in perfection in this dialogue; and all +the divine orders are exhibited subsisting in connection. So that this +is nothing else than the celebrated generation of the gods, and the +procession of every kind of being from the ineffable and unknown cause of +wholes.[10] The Parmenides therefore, enkindles in the lovers of Plato +the whole and perfect light of the theological science. But after this, +the aforementioned dialogues distribute parts of the mystic discipline +about the gods, and all of them, as I may say, participate of divine +wisdom, and excite our spontaneous conceptions respecting a divine nature. + +------------------ +[10] The principle of all things is celebrated by Platonic philosophy as +the cause of wholes, because through transcendency of power he first +produces those powers in the universe which rank as wholes, and afterward +those which rank as parts through these. Agreeably to this Jupiter, the +artificer of the universe, is almost always called [Greek: demiourgos ton +olon], the demiurgus of wholes. See the Timaeus, and the Introduction to it. +------------------ + +And it is necessary to refer all the parts of this mystic discipline to +these dialogues, and these again to the one and all perfect theory of the +Parmenides. For thus, as it appears to me, we shall suspend the more +imperfect from the perfect, and parts from wholes, and shall exhibit +reasons assimilated to things of which, according to the Platonic Timaeus, +they are interpreters. Such then is our answer to the objection which may +be urged against us; and thus we refer the Platonic theory to the +Parmenides; just as the Timaeus is acknowledged by all who have the least +degree of intelligence to contain the whole science about nature." + +All that is here asserted by Proclus will be immediately admitted by the +reader who understands the outlines which we have here given of the +theology of Plato, and who is besides this a complete master of the +mystic meaning of the Parmenides; which I trust he will find sufficiently +unfolded, through the assistance of Proclus, in the introduction and +notes to that dialogue. + +The next important Platonic dogma in order, is that doctrine concerning +ideas, about which the reader will find so much said in the notes on the +Parmenides, that but little remains to be added here. That little however +is as follows: The divine Pythagoras, and all those who have legitimately +received his doctrines, among whom Plato holds the most distinguished +rank, asserted that there are many orders of beings, viz. intelligible, +intellectual, dianoetic, physical, or in short, vital and corporeal +essences. For the progression of things, the subjection which naturally +subsists together with such progression, and the power of diversity in +coordinate genera give subsistence to all the multitude of corporeal and +incorporeal natures. They said, therefore, that there are three orders in +the whole extent of beings; viz. the intelligible, the dianoetic, and the +sensible; and that in each of these ideas subsist, characterized by the +respective essential properties of the natures by which they are +contained. And with respect to intelligible ideas, these they placed +among divine natures, together with the producing, paradigmatic, and +final causes of things in a consequent order. For if these three causes +sometimes concur, and are united among themselves, (which Aristotle says +is the case), without doubt this will not happen in the lowest works of +nature, but in the first and most excellent causes of all things, which +on account of their exuberant fecundity have a power generative of all +things, and from their converting and rendering similar to themselves the +natures which they have generated, are the paradigms, or exemplars of all +things. But as these divine causes act for their own sake, and on account +of their own goodness, do they not exhibit the final cause? Since +therefore intelligible forms are of this kind, and are the leaders of so +much good to wholes, they give completion to the divine orders, though +they largely subsist about the intelligible order contained in the +artificer of the universe. But dianoetic forms or ideas imitate the +intellectual, which have a prior subsistence, render the order of soul +similar to the intellectual order, and comprehend all things in a +secondary degree. + +These forms beheld in divine natures possess a fabricative power, but +with us they are only gnostic, and no longer demiurgic, through the +defluxion of our wings, or degradation of our intellectual powers. For, +as Plato says in the Phaedrus, when the winged powers of the soul are +perfect and plumed for flight, she dwells on high, and in conjunction +with divine natures governs the world. In the Timaeus, he manifestly +asserts that the demiurgus implanted these dianoetic forms in souls, in +geometric, arithmetic, and harmonic proportions: but in his Republic (in +the section of a line in the 6th book) he calls them images of +intelligibles; and on this account does not for the most part disdain to +denominate them intellectual, as being the exemplars of sensible natures. +In the Phaedo he says that these are the causes to us of reminiscence; +because disciplines are nothing else than reminiscences of middle +dianoetic forms, from which the productive powers of nature being derived +and inspired, give birth to all the mundane phenomena. + +Plato however did not consider things definable, or in modern language +abstract ideas, as the only universals, but prior to these he established +those principles productive of science which essentially reside in the +soul, as is evident from his Phaedrus and Phaedo. In the 10th book of the +Republic too, he venerates those separate forms which subsist in a divine +intellect. In the Phaedrus, he asserts that souls elevated to the +supercelestial place, behold Justice herself, temperance herself, and +science herself; and lastly in the Phaedo he evinces the immortality of +the soul from the hypothesis of separate forms. + +Syrianus[11], in his commentary on the 13th book of Aristotle's +Metaphysics, shows in defense of Socrates, Plato, the Parmenideans, +and Pythagoreans, that ideas were not introduced by these divine men +according to the usual meaning of names, as was the opinion of Chrysippus, +Archedemus, and many of the junior Stoics; for ideas are distinguished by +many differences from things which are denominated from custom. Nor do +they subsist, says he, together with intellect, in the same manner as +those slender conceptions which are denominated universals abstracted +from sensibles, according to the hypothesis of Longinus:[12] for if that +which subsists is unsubstantial, it cannot be consubsistent with intellect. + +----------------- +[11] See my translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics, p. 347. If the reader +conjoins what is said concerning ideas in the notes on that work, with +the introduction and notes to the Parmenides in this, he will be in +possession of nearly all that is to be found in the writings of the +ancients on this subject. + +[12] It appears from this passage of Syrianus that Longinus was the +original inventor of the theory of abstract ideas; and that Mr. Locke was +merely the restorer of it. +----------------- + +Nor are ideas according to these men notions, as Cleanthes afterwards +asserted them to be. Nor is idea definite reason, nor material form; for +these subsist in composition and division, and verge to matter. But ideas +are perfect, simple, immaterial, and impartible natures. And what wonder +is there, says Syrianus, if we should separate things which are so much +distant from each other? Since neither do we imitate in this particular +Plutarch, Atticus, and Democritus, who, because universal reasons +perpetually subsist in the essence of the soul, were of opinion that these +reasons are ideas: for though they separate them from the universal in +sensible natures, yet it is not proper to conjoin in one and the same the +reason of soul, and an intellect such as ours, with paradigmatic and +immaterial forms, and demiurgic intellections. But as the divine Plato +says, it is the province of our soul to collect things into one by a +reasoning process, and to possess a reminiscence of those transcendent +spectacles, which we once beheld when governing the universe in conjunction +with divinity. Boethus,[13] the peripatetic too, with whom it is proper to +join Cornutus; thought that ideas are the same with universals in sensible +natures. However, whether these universals are prior to particulars, they +are not prior in such a manner as to be denudated from the habitude which +they possess with respect to them, nor do they subsist as the causes of +particulars; both which are the prerogatives of ideas; or whether they are +posterior to particulars, as many are accustomed to call them, how can +things of posterior origin, which have no essential subsistence, but are +nothing more than slender conceptions, sustain the dignity of fabricative +ideas? + +------------------- +[13] This was a Greek philosopher, who is often cited by Simplicius in +his Commentary on the Predicaments, and must not therefore be confounded +with Boetius, the roman senator and philosopher. +------------------- + +In what manner then, says Syrianus, do ideas subsist according to the +contemplative lovers of truth? We reply, intelligibly and tetradically +([Greek: noeros kai tetradikos]), in animal itself ([Greek: en to +antozoo]), or the extremity of the intelligible order; but intellectually +and decadically ([Greek: noeros kai dekadikos]), in the intellect of the +artificer of the universe; for, according to the Pythagoric Hymn, "Divine +number proceeds from the retreats of the undecaying monad, till it arrives +at the divine tetrad which produced the mother of all things, the universal +recipient, venerable, circularly investing all things with bound, immovable +and unwearied, and which is denominated the sacred decad, both by the +immortal gods and earth-born men." + +[Greek: +Proeisi gar o Theios arithmos, os phesin o Pythagoreios eis auton +umnos, + Monados ek keuthmonos akeralou esti'an iketai + Tetrada epi zatheen, he de teke metera panton, + Pandechea, presbeiran, oron peri pasi titheiran, + Atropon, akamatou, dekada kleiousi min agnen, + Athanatoi to theoi kai gegeneeis anthropoi.] + +And such is the mode of their subsistence according to Orpheus, +Pythagoras and Plato. Or if it be requisite to speak in more familiar +language, an intellect sufficient to itself, and which is a most perfect +cause, presides over the wholes of the universe, and through these +governs all its parts; but at the same time that it fabricates all +mundane natures, and benefits them by its providential energies, it +preserves its own most divine and immaculate purity; and while it +illuminates all things, is not mingled with the natures which it +illuminates. This intellect, therefore, comprehending in the depths of +its essence an ideal world, replete with all various forms, excludes +privation of cause and casual subsistence, from its energy. But as it +imparts every good and all possible beauty to its fabrications, it +converts the universe to itself, and renders it similar to its own +omniform nature. Its energy, too, is such as its intellection; but it +understands all things, since it is most perfect. Hence there is not any +thing which ranks among true beings, that is not comprehended in the +essence of intellect; but it always establishes in itself ideas, which +are not different from itself and its essence, but give completion to it, +and introduce to the whole of things, a cause which is at the same time +productive, paradigmatic, and final. For it energizes as intellect, and +the ideas which it contains are paradigmatic, as being forms; and they +energize from themselves, and according to their own exuberant goodness. +And such are the Platonic dogmas concerning ideas, which sophistry and +ignorance may indeed oppose, but will never be able to confute. + +From this intelligible world, replete with omniform ideas, this sensible +world, according to Plato, perpetually flows, depending on its artificer +intellect, in the same manner as shadow on its forming substance. For as +a deity of an intellectual characteristic is its fabricator, and both the +essence and energy of intellect are established in eternity the sensible +universe, which is the effect or production of such an energy, must be +consubsistent with its cause, or in other words, must be a perpetual +emanation from it. This will be evident from considering that every thing +which is generated, is either generated by art or by nature, or according +to power. It is necessary, therefore, that every thing operating +according to nature or art should be prior to the things produced; but +that things operating according to power should have their productions +coexistent with themselves; just as the sun produces light coexistent +with itself; fire, heat; and snow, coldness. If therefore the artificer +of the universe produced it by art, he would not cause it simply to be, +but to be in some particular manner; for all art produces form. Whence +therefore does the world derive its being? If he produced it from nature, +since that which makes by nature imparts something of itself to its +productions, and the maker of the world is incorporeal, it would be +necessary that the world, the offspring of such an energy, should be +incorporeal. It remains therefore, that the demiurgus produced the +universe by power alone; but every thing generated by power subsists +together with the cause containing this power: and hence production of +this kind cannot be destroyed unless the producing cause is deprived of +power. The divine intellect therefore that produced the sensible universe +caused it to be coexistent with himself. + +This world thus depending on its divine artificer, who is himself an +intelligible world replete with the archetypal ideas of all things, +considered according to its corporeal nature, is perpetually flowing, and +perpetually advancing to being (en to gignesthai), and compared with its +paradigm, has no stability or reality of being. However, considered as +animated by a divine soul, and as receiving the illuminations of all the +supermundane gods, and being itself the receptacle of divinities from +whom bodies are suspended, it is said by Plato in the Timaeus to be a +blessed god. The great body of this world too, which subsists in a +perpetual dispersion of temporal extension, may be properly called a +whole with a total subsistence, on account of the perpetuity of its +duration, though this is nothing more than a flowing eternity. And hence +Plato calls it a whole of wholes; by the other wholes which are +comprehended in its meaning, the celestial spheres, the sphere of fire, +the whole of air considered as one great orb; the whole earth, and the +whole sea. These spheres, which are called by Platonic writers parts with +a total subsistence, are considered by Plato as aggoregately perpetual. +For if the body of this world is perpetual, this also must be the case +with its larger parts, on account of their exquisite alliance to it, and +in order that wholes with a partial subsistence, such as all individuals, +may rank in the last gradation of things. + +As the world too, considered as one great comprehending whole, is called +by Plato a divine animal, so likewise every whole which it contains is a +world, possessing in the first place, a self-perfect unity; proceeding +from the ineffable, by which it becomes a god; in the second place, a +divine intellect; in the third place, a divine soul; and in the last +place, a deified body. Hence each of these wholes is the producing cause +of all the multitude which it contains, and on this account is said to be +a whole prior to parts; because, considered as possessing an eternal form +which holds all its parts together, and gives to the whole perpetuity of +subsistence, it is not indigent of such parts to the perfection of its +being. That these wholes which rank thus high in the universe are +animated, must follow by a geometrical necessity. For, as Theophrastus +well observes, wholes would possess less authority than parts, and things +eternal than such as are corruptible, if deprived of the possession +of soul. + +And now having with venturous, yet unpresuming wing, ascended to the +ineffable principle of things, and standing with every eye closed in the +vestibules of the adytum, found that we could announce nothing concerning +him, but only indicate our doubts and disappointment, and having thence +descended to his occult and most venerable progeny, and passing through +the luminous world of ideas, holding fast by the golden chain of deity, +terminated our downward flight in the material universe, and its +undecaying wholes, let us stop awhile and contemplate the sublimity and +magnificence of the scene which this journey presents to our view. Here +then we see the vast empire of deity, an empire terminated upwards by a +principle so ineffable that all language is subverted about it, and +downwards, by the vast body of the world. Immediately subsisting after +this immense unknown we in the next place behold a mighty all- +comprehending one, which as being next to that which is in every +respect incomprehensible, possesses much of the ineffable and unknown. +From this principle of principles, in which all things casually subsist +absorbed in superessential light and involved in unfathomable depths, we +view a beauteous progeny of principles, all largely partaking of the +ineffable, all stamped with the occult characters of deity, all +possessing an over-flowing fullness of good. From these dazzling summits, +these ineffable blossoms, these divine propagations, we next see being, +life, intellect, soul, nature and body depending; monads suspended from +unities, deified natures proceeding from deities. Each of these monads +too, is the leader of a series which extends from itself to the last of +things, and which while it proceeds from, at the same time abides in, and +returns to its leader. And all these principles and all their progeny are +finally centred, and rooted by their summits in the first great all- +comprehending one. Thus all beings proceed from, and are comprehended +in the first being; all intellects emanate from one first intellect; all +souls from one first soul; all natures blossom from one first nature; and +all bodies proceed from the vital and luminous body of the world. And +lastly, all these great monads are comprehended in the first one, from +which both they and all their depending series are unfolded into light. +Hence this first one is truly the unity of unities, the monad of monads, +the principle of principles, the God of gods, one and all things, and yet +one prior to all. + +Such, according to Plato, are the flights of the true philosopher, such +the August and magnificent scene which presents itself to his view. By +ascending these luminous heights, the spontaneous tendencies of the soul +to deity alone find the adequate object of their desire; investigation +here alone finally reposes, doubt expires in certainty, and knowledge +loses itself in the ineffable. + +And here perhaps some grave objector, whose little soul is indeed acute, +but sees nothing with a vision healthy and sound, will say that all this +is very magnificent, but that it is soaring too high for man; that it is +merely the effect of spiritual pride; that no truths, either in morality +or theology, are of any importance which are not adapted to the level of +the meanest capacity; and that all that it is necessary for man to know +concerning either God or himself is so plain, that he that runs may read. +In answer to such like cant, for it is nothing more,--a cant produced by +the most profound ignorance, and frequently attended with the most +deplorable envy, I ask, is then the Delphic precept, KNOW THYSELF, a +trivial mandate? Can this be accomplished by every man? Or can any one +properly know himself without knowing the rank he holds in the scale of +being? And can this be effected without knowing what are the natures +which he surpasses, and what those are by which he is surpassed? And can +he know this without knowing as much of those natures as it is possible +for him to know? And will the objector be hardy enough to say that every +man is equal to this arduous task? That he who rushes from the forge, or +the mines, with a soul distorted, crushed and bruised by base mechanical +arts, and madly presumes to teach theology to a deluded audience, is +master of this sublime, this most important science? For my own part I +know of no truths which are thus obvious, thus accessible to every man, +but axioms, those self-evident principles of science which are +conspicuous by their own light, which are the spontaneous unperverted +conceptions of the soul, and to which he who does not assent deserves, as +Aristotle justly remarks, either pity or correction. In short, if this is +to be the criterion of all moral and theological knowledge, that it must +be immediately obvious to every man, that it is to be apprehended by the +most careless inspection, what occasion is there for seminaries of +learning? Education is ridiculous, the toil of investigation is idle. Let +us at once confine Wisdom in the dungeons of Folly, recall Ignorance from +her barbarous wilds, and close the gates of Science with +everlasting bars. + +Having thus taken a general survey of the great world, and descended from +the intelligible to the sensible universe, let us still, adhering to that +golden chain which is bound round the summit of Olympus, and from which +all things are suspended, descend to the microcosm man. For man +comprehends in himself partially everything which the world contains +divinely and totally. Hence, according to Pluto, he is endued with an +intellect subsisting in energy, and a rational soul proceeding from the +same father and vivific goddess as were the causes of the intellect and +soul of the universe. He has likewise an ethereal vehicle analogous to +the heavens, and a terrestrial body, composed from the four elements, and +with which also it is coordinate. + +With respect to his rational part, for in this the essence of man +consists, we have already shown that it is of a self-motive nature, and +that it subsists between intellect, which is immovable both in essence +and energy, and nature, which both moves and is moved. In consequence of +this middle subsistence, the mundane soul, from which all partial souls +are derived, is said by Plato in the Timaeus, to be a medium between that +which is indivisible and that which is divisible about bodies, i.e. the +mundane soul is a medium between the mundane intellect, and the whole of +that corporeal life which the world participates. In like manner, the +human soul is a medium between a daemoniacal intellect proximately, +established above our essence, which it also elevates and perfects, and +that corporeal life which is distributed about our body, and which is +the cause of its generation, nutrition and increase. This daemoniacal +intellect is called by Plato, in the Phaedrus, theoretic and, the +governor of the soul. The highest part therefore of the human soul is the +summit of the dianoetic power ([Greek: to akrotaton tes dianoias]), or +that power which reasons scientifically; and this summit is our intellect. +As, however, our very essence is characterized by reason, this our summit +is rational, and though it subsists in energy, yet it has a remitted union +with things themselves. Though too it energizes from itself, and contains +intelligibles in its essence, yet from its alliance to the discursive +nature of soul, and its inclination to that which is divisible, it falls +short of the perfection of an intellectual essence and energy profoundly +indivisible and united, and the intelligibles which it contains degenerate +from the transcendently fulged and self-luminous nature of first +intelligibles. Hence, in obtaining a perfectly indivisible knowledge, it +requires to be perfected by an intellect whose energy is ever vigilant +and unremitted; and it's intelligibles, that they may become perfect, +are indigent of the light which proceeds from separate intelligibles. +Aristotle, therefore, very properly compares the intelligibles of our +intellect to colors, because these require the splendour of the sun, and +denominates an intellect of this kind, intellect in capacity, both on +account of its subordination to an essential intellect, and because it is +from a separate intellect that it receives the full perfection of its +nature. The middle part of the rational soul is called by Plato, dianoia, +and is that power which, as we have already said, reasons scientifically, +deriving the principles of its reasoning, which are axioms from intellect. +And the extremity of the rational soul is opinion, which in his Sophista +he defines to be that power which knows the conclusion of dianoia. This +power also knows the universal in sensible particulars, as that every man +is a biped, but it knows only the oti, or that a thing is, but is ignorant +of the dioti, or why it is: knowledge of the latter kind being the province +of the dianoetic power. + +And such is Plato's division of the rational part of our nature, which he +very justly considers as the true man; the essence of every thing +consisting in its most excellent part. + +After this follows the irrational nature, the summit of which is the +phantasy, or that power which perceives every thing accompanied with +figure and interval; and on this account it may be called a figured +intelligence ([Greek: morphotike noesis]). This power, as Jamblichus +beautifully observes, groups upon, as it were, and fashions all the +powers of the soul; exciting in opinion the illuminations from the +senses, and fixing in that life which is extended with body, the +impressions which descend from intellect. Hence, slays Proclus, it folds +itself about the indivisibility of true intellect, conforms itself to all +formless species, and becomes perfectly every thing, from which the +dianoetic power and our indivisible reason consists. Hence too, it is all +things passively which intellect is impassively, and on this account +Aristotle calls it passive intellect. Under this subsist anger and +desire, the former resembling a raging lion, and the latter a many-headed +beast; and the whole is bounded by sense, which is nothing more than a +passive perception of things, and on this account is justly said by +Plato, to be rather passion than knowledge; since the former of these is +characterized by alertness, and the latter by energy. + +Further still, in order that the union of the soul with this gross +terrestrial body may be effected in a becoming manner, two vehicles, +according to Plato, are necessary as media, one of which is ethereal, and +the other aerial, and of these, the ethereal vehicle is simple and +immaterial, but the aerial, simple and material; and this dense earthly +body is composite and material. + +The soul thus subsisting as a medium between natures impartible +and such as are divided about bodies, it produces and constitutes the +latter of these; but establishes in itself the prior causes from which it +proceeds. Hence it previously receives, after the manner of an exemplar, +the natures to which it is prior as their cause; but it possesses through +participation, and as the blossoms of first natures, the causes of its +subsistence. Hence it contains in its essence immaterial forms of things +material, incorporeal of such as are corporeal, and extended of such as +are distinguished by interval. But it contains intelligibles after the +manner of an image, and receives partibly their impartible forms, such +as are uniform variously, and such as are immovable, according to a +self-motive condition. Soul therefore is all things, and is elegantly +said by Olympiodorus to be an omniform statue ([Greek: pammorphon +agalma]): for it contains such things as are first through participation, +but such as are posterior to its nature, after the manner of an exemplar. + +As, too, it is always moved; and this always is not eternal, but +temporal, for that which is properly eternal, and such is intellect, is +perfectly stable, and has no transitive energies, hence it is necessary +that its motions should be periodic. For motion is a certain mutation +from some things into others. And beings are terminated by multitudes and +magnitudes. These therefore being terminated, there can neither be an +infinite mutation, according to a right line, nor can that which is +always moved proceed according to a finished progression. Hence that +which is always moved will proceed from the same to the same; and will +thus form a periodic motion. Hence, too, the human, and this also is true +of every mundane soul, uses periods and restitutions of its proper life. +For, in consequence of being measured by time, it energizes transitively, +and possesses a proper motion. But every thing which is moved perpetually +and participates of time, revolves periodically and proceeds from the +same to the same. And hence the soul, from possessing motion, and +energizing according to time, will both possess periods of motion and +restitutions to its pristine state. + +Again, as the human soul, according to Plato, ranks among the number of +those souls that sometimes follow the mundane divinities, in consequence +of subsisting immediately after daemons and heroes, the perpetual +attendants of the gods, hence it possesses a power of descending +infinitely into generation, or the sublunary region, and of ascending +from generation to real being. For since it does not reside with divinity +through an infinite time, neither will it be conversant with bodies +through the whole succeeding time. For that which has no temporal +beginning, both according to Plato and Aristotle, cannot have an end; and +that which has no end, is necessarily without a beginning. It remains, +therefore, that every soul must perform periods, both of ascensions from +generation, and of descensions into generation; and that this will never +fail, through an infinite time. + +From all this it follows that the soul, while an inhabitant of earth, is +in a fallen condition, an apostate from deity, an exile from the orb of +light. Hence Plato, in the 7th book of his Republic, considering our life +with reference to erudition and the want of it, assimilates us to men in +a subterranean cavern, who have been there confined from their childhood, +and so fettered by chains as to be only able to look before them to the +entrance of the cave which expands to the light, but incapable through +the chain of turning themselves round. He supposes too, that they have +the light of a fire burning far above and behind them; and that between +the fire and the fettered men, there is a road above, along which a low +wall is built. On this wall are seen men bearing utensils of every kind, +and statues in wood and stone of men and other animals. And of these men +some are speaking and others silent. With respect to the fettered men in +this cave, they see nothing of themselves or another, or of what is +carrying along, but the shadows formed by the fire falling on the +opposite part of tho cave. He supposes too, that the opposite part of +this prison has an echo; and that in consequence of this the fettered +men, when they hear any one speak, will imagine that it is nothing else +than the passing shadow. + +Here, in the first place, as we have observed in the notes on that book, +the road above between the fire and the fettered men, indicates that +there is a certain ascent in the cave itself from a more abject to a more +elevated life. By this ascent, therefore Plato signifies the contemplation +of dianoetic objects in the mathematical disciplines. For as the shadows +in the cave correspond to the shadows of visible objects, and visible +objects are the immediate images of dianoetic forms, or those ideas which +the soul essentially participates, it is evident that the objects from +which these shadows are formed must correspond to such as are dianoetic. +It is requisite, therefore, that the dianoetic power exercising itself in +these, should draw forth the principles of these from their latent +retreats, and should contemplate them not in images, but as subsisting in +herself in impartible involution. + +In the next place he says, "that the man who is to be led from the cave +will more easily see what the heavens contain, and the heavens +themselves, by looking in the night to the light of the stars, and the +moon, than by day looking on the sun, and the light of the sun." By this +he signifies the contemplation of intelligibles: for the stars and their +light are imitations of intelligibles, so far as all of them partake of +the form of the sun, in the same manner as intelligibles are +characterized by the nature of the good. + +After the contemplation of these, and after the eye is accustomed through +these to the light, as it is requisite in the visible region to see the +sun himself in the last place, in like manner, according to Plato, the +idea of the good must be seen the last in the intelligible region. He, +likewise divinely adds, that it is scarcely to be seen; for we can only +be conjoined with it through the intelligible, in the vestibule of which +it is beheld by the ascending soul. + +In short, the cold, according to Plato, can only be restored while on +earth to the divine likeness, which she abandoned by her descent, and be +able after death to reascend to the intelligible world, by the exercise +of the cathartic and theoretic virtues; the former purifying her from the +defilements of a mortal nature, and the latter elevating her to the +vision of true being: for thus, as Plato says in the Timaeus, "the soul +becoming sane and entire, will arrive at the form of her pristine habit." +The cathartic, however, must necessarily precede the theoretic virtues; +since it is impossible to survey truth while subject to the perturbation +and tumult of the passions. For the rational soul subsisting as a medium +between intellect and the irrational nature, can then only without +revulsion associate with the intellect prior to herself, when she becomes +pure from copassivity with inferior natures. By the cathartic virtues, +therefore, we become sane, in consequence of being liberated from the +passions as diseases; but we become entire by the reassumption of +intellect and science as of our proper parts; and this is effected by +contemplative truth. Plato also clearly teaches us that our apostacy from +better natures is only to be healed by a flight from hence, when he +defines in his Theaetetus philosophy to be a flight from terrestrial +evils: for he evinces by this that passions are connascent with mortals +alone. He likewise says in the same dialogue, "that neither can evil +be abolished, nor yet do they subsist with the gods, but that they +necessarily revolve about this terrene abode, and a mortal nature." For +those who are obnoxious to generation and corruption can also be affected +in a manner contrary to nature, which is the beginning of evils. But in +the same dialogue he subjoins the mode by which our flight from evil +is to be accomplished. "It is necessary," says he "to fly from hence +thither: but the flight is a similitude to divinity, as far as is +possible to man; and this similitude consists in becoming just and holy +in conjunction with intellectual prudence." For it is necessary that he +who wishes to run from evils, should in the first place turn away from a +mortal nature; since it is not possible for those who are mingled with it +to avoid being filled with its attendant evils. As therefore, through our +flight from divinity, and the defluction of those wings which elevate us +on high, we fell into this mortal abode, and thus became connected with +evils, so by abandoning passivity with a mortal nature, and by the +germination of the virtues, as of certain wings, we return to the abode +of pure and true good, and to the possession of divine felicity. For the +essence of many subsisting as a medium between daemoniacal natures, who +always have an intellectual knowledge of divinity, and those beings who +are never adapted by nature to understand him, it ascends to the former +and descends to the latter, through the possession and desertion of +intellect. For it becomes familiar both with the divine and brutal +likeness, through the amphibious condition of its nature. + +When the soul therefore has recovered her pristine perfection in as great +a degree as is possible, while she is an inhabitant of earth by the +exercise of the cathartic and theoretic virtues, she returns after death, +as he says in the Timaeus, to her kindred star, from which she fell, and +enjoys a blessed life. Then, too, as he says in the Phaedrus, being +winged, she governs the world in conjunction with the gods. And this +indeed is the most beautiful end of her labors. This is what he calls in +the Phaedo, a great contest and a mighty hope. This is the most perfect +fruit of philosophy to familiarize and lead her back to things truly +beautiful, to liberate her from this terrene abode as from a certain +subterranean cavern of material life, elevate her to ethereal splendors, +and place her in the islands of the blessed. + +From this account of the human soul, that most important Platonic dogma +necessarily follows, that our soul essentially contains all knowledge, +and that whatever knowledge she acquires in the present life, is in +reality nothing more than a recovery of what a he once possessed. This +recovery is very properly called by Plato reminiscence, not as being +attended with actual recollection in the present life, but as being an +actual repossession of what the soul had lost through her oblivious union +with the body. Alluding to this essential knowledge of the soul, which +discipline evocates from its dormant retreats, Plato says in the +Sophista, "that we know all things as in a dream, and are again ignorant +of them, according to vigilant perception." Hence too, as Proclus well +observes, it is evident that the soul does not collect her knowledge from +sensibles, nor from things partial and divisible discover the whole and +the one. For it is not proper to think that things which have in no +respect a real subsistence, should be the leading causes of knowledge to +the soul; and that things which oppose each other and are ambiguous, +should precede science which has a sameness of subsistence; nor that +things which are variously mutable, should be generative of reasons which +are established in unity; nor that things indefinite should be the causes +of definite intelligence. It is not fit, therefore, that the truth of +things eternal should be received from the many, nor the discrimination +of universals from sensibles, nor a judgment respecting what is good from +irrational natures; but it is requisite that the soul entering within +herself, should investigate herself the true and the good, and the +eternal reasons of things. + +We have said that discipline awakens the dormant knowledge of +the soul; and Plato considered this as particularly effected by the +mathematical discipline. Hence, he asserts of theoretic arithmetic that +it imparts no small aid to our ascent to real being, and that it +liberates us from the wandering and ignorance about a sensible nature. +Geometry too is considered by him as most instrumental to the knowledge +of the good, when it is not pursued for the sake of practical purposes, +but as the means of ascent to an intelligible essence. Astronomy also is +useful for the purpose of investigating the fabricator of all things, +and contemplating as in most splendid images the ideal world, and its +ineffable cause. And lastly music, when properly studied, is subservient +to our ascent, viz. when from sensible we betake ourselves to the +contemplation of ideal and divine harmony. Unless, however, we thus +employ the mathematical discipline, the study of them is justly +considered by Plato as imperfect and useless, and of no worth. For as +the true end of man according to his philosophy is an assimilation to +divinity, in the greatest perfection of which human nature is capable, +whatever contributes to this is to be ardently pursued; but whatever has +a different tendency, however necessary it may be to the wants and +conveniences of the mere animal life, is comparatively little and vile. +Hence it necessary to pass rapidly from things visible and audible, to +those which are alone seen by the eye of intellect. For the mathematical +sciences, when properly studied, move the inherent knowledge of the soul; +awaken its intelligence; purify its dianoetic power; call forth its +essential forms from their dormant retreats; remove that oblivion and +ignorance which are congenial with our birth; and dissolve the bonds +arising from our union with an irrational nature. It is therefore +beautifully said by Plato in the 7th book of his Republic, "that the soul +through these disciplines has an organ purified and enlightened, which is +blinded and buried by studies of a different kind, an organ better worth +saving than ten thousand eyes, since truth becomes visible through this +alone." + +Dialectic, however, or the vertex of the mathematical sciences, +as it is called by Plato in his Republic, is that master discipline which +particularly leads us up to an intelligible essence. Of this first of +sciences, which is essentially different from vulgar logic, and is the +same with what Aristotle calls the first philosophy and wisdom, I have +largely spoken in the introduction and notes to the Parmenides. Suffice +it therefore to observe in this place, that dialectic differs from +mathematical science in this, that the latter flows from, and the former +is void of hypothesis. That dialectic has a power of knowing universals; +that it ascends to good and the supreme cause of all; and, that it +considers good as the end of its elevation; but that the mathematical +science, which previously fabricates for itself definite principles, from +which it evinces things consequent to such principles, does not tend to +the principle, but to the conclusion. Hence Plato does not expel +mathematical knowledge from the number of the sciences, but asserts it to +be the next in rank to that one science which is the summit of all; nor +does he accuse it as ignorant of its own principles, but considers it as +receiving these from the master science dialectic, and that possessing +them without any demonstration, it demonstrates from these its consequent +propositions. + +Hence Socrates, in the Republic, speaking of the power of dialectic, +says that it surrounds all disciplines like a defensive enclosure, and +elevates those that use it to the good itself, and the first unities; +that it purifies the eye of the soul; establishes itself in true beings, +and, the one principle of all things, and ends at last in that which is +no longer hypothetical. The power of dialectic, therefore, being thus +great, and the ends of this path so mighty, it must by no means be +confounded with arguments which are alone conversant with opinion: for +the former is the guardian of sciences, and the passage to it is through +these, but the latter is perfectly destitute of disciplinative science. +To which we may add, that the method of reasoning which is founded in +opinion, regards only that which is apparent; but the dialectic method +endeavors to arrive at the one itself, always employing for this purpose +steps of ascent, and at last beautifully ends in the nature of the good. +Very different therefore is it from the merely logical method, which +presides over the demonstrative phantasy, is of a secondary nature, and +is alone pleased with contentious discussions. For the dialectic of Plato +for the most part employs divisions and analyses as primary sciences, and +as imitating the progression of beings from the one, and their conversion +to it again. It likewise sometimes uses definitions and demonstrations, +and prior to these the definitive method, and the divisive prior to this. +On the contrary, the merely logical method, which is solely conversant +with opinion, is deprived of the incontrovertible reasonings of +demonstration. + +The following is a specimen of the analytical method of Plato's dialectic. +Of analysis there are three species. For one is an ascent from sensibles +to the first intelligibles; a second is an ascent through things +demonstrated and subdemonstrated, to undemonstrated and immediate +propositions; and a third proceeds from hypothesis to unhypothetical +principles. Of the first of these species, Plato has given a most +admirable specimen in the speech of Diotima in the Banquet. For there he +ascends from the beauty about bodies to the beauty in souls; from this to +the beauty in right disciplines; from this again to the beauty in laws; +from the beauty in laws to the ample sea of beauty (Greek: to polu pelagos +tou kalou); and thus proceeding he at length arrives at the beautiful +itself. + +The second species of analysis is as follows: It is necessary to make the +thing investigated the subject of hypothesis; to survey such things as +are prior to it; and to demonstrate these from things posterior, +ascending to such as are prior, till we arrive at the first thing and to +which we give our assent. But beginning from this, we descend +synthetically to the thing investigated. Of this species, the following +is an example from the Phaedrus of Plato. It is inquired if the soul is +immortal; and this being hypothetically admitted, it is inquired in the +next place if it is always moved. This being demonstrated, the next +inquiry is if that which is always moved, is self-moved; and this again +being demonstrated, it is considered whether that which is self-moved is +the principle of motion, and afterwards if the principle is unbegotten. +This then being admitted as a thing acknowledged, and likewise that what +is begotten is incorruptible, the demonstration of the thing proposed is +thus collected. If there is a principle, it is unbegotten and +incorruptible. That which is self-moved is the principle of motion. Soul +is self-moved. Soul therefore (i.e. the rational soul) is incorruptible, +unbegotten, and immortal. + +Of the third species of analysis, which proceeds from the hypothetical to +that which is unhypothetical, Plato has given a most beautiful specimen +in the first hypothesis of his Parmenides. For here, taking for his +hypothesis that the one is, he proceeds through an orderly series of +negations, which are not privative of their subjects, but generative of +things which are as it were, their opposites, till he at length takes +away the hypothesis that the one is. For he denies of it all discourse +and every appellation. And thus evidently denies of it not only that it +is, but even negation. For all things are posterior to the one; viz. +things known, knowledge, and the instruments of knowledge. And thus, +beginning from the hypothetical, he ends in that which is unhypothetical, +and truly ineffable. + +Having taken a general survey, both of the great world and the microcosm +man, I shall close this account of the principal dogmas of Plato, with +the outlines of his doctrine concerning Providence and Fate, as it is a +subject of the greatest importance, and the difficulties in which it is +involved are happily removed by that prince of philosophers. + +In the first place, therefore, Providence, according to common +conceptions, is the cause of good to the subjects of its care; and Fate +is the cause of a certain connection to generated natures. This being +admitted, let us consider what the things are which are connected. Of +beings, therefore, some have their essence in eternity, and others in +time. But by beings whose essence is in eternity, I mean those whose +energy as well as their essence is eternal; and by beings essentially +temporal, those whose essence is always in generation, or becoming to be, +though this should take place in an infinite time. The media between +these two extremes are natures which, in a certain respect, have an +essence permanent and better than generation, or a flowing subsistence, +but whose energy is measured by time. For it is necessary that every +procession from things first to last should be effected through media. +The medium, therefore, between these two extremes, must either be that +which has an eternal essence, but any energy indigent of time, or, on the +contrary, that which has a temporal essence, but an eternal energy. It is +impossible, however, for the latter of these to have any subsistence; for +if this were admitted, energy would be prior to essence. The medium, +therefore, must be that whose essence is eternal, but energy temporal. +And the three orders which compose this first middle and last are, the +intellectual, psychical (or that pertaining to soul), and corporeal. For +from what has been already said by us concerning the gradation of beings, +it is evident that the intellectual order is established in eternity, +both in essence and energy; that the corporeal order is always in +generation, or advancing to being, and this either in an infinite time, +or in a part of time; and that the psychical is indeed eternal in +essence, but temporal in energy. Where then shall we rank things which +being distributed either in places or times, have a certain coordination +and sympathy with each other through connection? It is evident that they +must be ranked among altermotive and corporeal natures. For of things +which subsist beyond the order of bodies, some are better both than place +and time; and others, though they energize according to time, appear to +be entirely pure from any connection with place. + +Hence things which are governed and connected by Fate are entirely +altermotive and corporeal. If this then is demonstrated, it is manifest +that admitting Fate to be a cause of connection, we must assert that it +presides over altermotive and corporeal natures. If, therefore, we look +to that which is the proximate cause of bodies, and thorough which also +altermotive beings are moved, breathe, and are held together, we shall +find that this is nature, the energies of which are to generate, nourish, +and increase. If, therefore, this power not only subsists in us, and all +other animals and plants, but prior to partial bodies there is, by a much +greater necessity, one nature of the world which comprehends and is +motive of all bodies; it follows that nature must be the cause of things +connected, and that in this we must investigate Fate. Hence, Fate is +nature, or that incorporeal power which is the one life of the world, +presiding over bodies, moving all things according to time, and +connecting the motions of things that, by places and times, are distant +from each other. It is likewise the cause of the mutual sympathy of +mortal natures, and of their conjunction with such as are eternal. For +the nature which is in us, binds and connects all the parts of our body, +of which also it is a certain Fate. And as in our body some parts have a +principal subsistence, and others are less principal, and the latter are +consequent to the former, so in the universe, the generations of the less +principal parts are consequent to the motions of the more principal, viz. +the sublunary generations to the periods of the celestial bodies; and the +circle of the former is the image of the latter. + +Hence it is not difficult to see that Providence is deity itself, the +fountain of all good. For whence can good be imparted, to all things, but +from divinity? So that no other cause of good but deity is, as Plato +says, to be assigned. And, in the next place, as this cause is superior +to all intelligible and sensible natures, it is consequently superior to +Fate. Whatever too is subject to Fate, is also under the dominion of +Providence; having its connection indeed from Fate, but deriving the good +which it possesses from Providence. But again, not all things that are +under the dominion of Providence are indigent of Fate; for intelligibles +are exempt from its sway. Fate therefore is profoundly conversant with +corporeal natures; since connection introduces time and corporeal motion. +Hence Plato, looking to this, says in the Timaeus, that the world is +mingled from intellect and necessity, the former ruling over the latter. +For by necessity here he means the motive cause of bodies, which in other +places he calls Fate. And this with great propriety; since every body is +compelled to do whatever it does, and to suffer whatever it suffers; to +heat or to be heated, to impart or to receive cold. But the elective +power is unknown to a corporeal nature; so that the necessary and the +nonelective may be said to be the peculiarities of bodies. + +As there are two genera of things, therefore, the intelligible and the +sensible, so likewise there are two kingdoms of these; that of +Providence, upwards, which reigns over intelligibles and sensibles, and +that of Fate downwards, which reigns over sensibles only. Providence +likewise differs from Fate in the same manner as deity from that which is +divine indeed, but participation, and not primarily. For in other things +we see that which has a primary subsistence, and that which subsists +according to participation. Thus the light which subsists in the orb of +the sun is primary light, and that which is in the air, according to +participation; the latter being derived from the former. And life is +primarily in the soul, but secondarily in the body. Thus also, according +to Plato, Providence is deity, but Fate is something divine, and not a +god: for it depends upon Providence, of which it is as it were the image. +As Providence too is to intelligibles, so is Fate to sensibles. And, +alternately, as Providence is to Fate, so are intelligibles to sensibles. +But intelligibles are the first of beings, and from these others derive +their subsistence. And hence the order of Fate depends on the dominion of +Providence. + +In the second place, let us look to the rational nature itself, when +correcting the inaccuracy of sensible information, as when it accuses the +sight of deception, in seeing the orb of the sun as not larger than a +foot in diameter; when it represses the ebullitions of anger, and +exclaims with Ulysses, + + "Endure my heart;" + +or when it restrains the wanton tendencies of desire to corporeal delight. +For in all such operations it manifestly subdues the irrational motions, +both gnostic and appetitive, and absolves itself from them, as from +things foreign to its nature. But it is necessary to investigate the +essence of every thing, not from its perversion, but from its energies +according to nature. If therefore reason, when it energizes in us as +reason, restrains the shadowy impressions of the delights of licentious +desire, punishes the precipitate motion of fury, and reproves the senses +as full of deception, asserting that + + "We nothing accurate, or see, or hear:" + +and if it says this, looking to its internal reasons, none of which it +knows through the body, or through corporeal cognitions, it is evident +that, according to this energy, it removes itself far from the senses, +contrary to the decision of which it becomes separated from those sorrows +and delights. + +After this, let us direct our attention to another and a better motion of +our rational soul, when, during the tranquillity of the inferior parts, +by a self-convertive energy, it sees its own essence, the powers which it +contains, the harmonic reasons from which it consists, and the many lives +of which it is the middle boundary, and thus finds itself to be a +rational world, the image of the prior natures, from which it proceeds, +but the paradigm of such as are posterior to itself. To this energy of +the soul, theoretic arithmetic and geometry greatly contribute, for these +remove it from the senses, purify the intellect from the irrational forms +of life with which it is surrounded, and lead it to the incorporeal +perception of ideas. For if these sciences receive the soul replete with +images, and knowing nothing subtile and unattended with material +garrulity; and if they elucidate reasons possessing an irrefragable +necessity of demonstration, and forms full of all certainty and +immateriality, and which by no means call to their aid the inaccuracy of +sensibles, do they not evidently purify our intellectual life from things +which fill us with a privation of intellect, and which impede our +perception of true being? + +After both these operations of the rational soul, let us now survey her +highest intelligence, through which she sees her sister souls in the +universe, who are allotted a residence in the heavens, and in the whole +of a visible nature, according to the will of the fabricator of the +world. But above all souls, she sees intellectual essences and orders. +For a deiform intellect resides above every soul, and which also imparts +to the soul an intellectual habit. Prior to these, however, she sees +those divine monads, from which all intellectual multitudes receive their +unions. For above all things united, there must necessarily be unific +causes; above things vivified, vivifying causes; above intellectual +natures, those that impart intellect; and above all participants, +imparticipable natures. From all these elevating modes of intelligence, +it must be obvious to such as are not perfectly blind, how the soul, +leaving sense and body behind, surveys through the projecting energies of +intellect those beings that are entirely exempt from all connection with +a corporeal nature. + +The rational and intellectual soul therefore, in whatever manner it may +be moved according to nature, is beyond body and sense. And hence it must +necessarily have an essence separate from both. But from this again, it +becomes manifest, that when it energizes according to its nature, it is +superior to Fate, and beyond the reach of its attractive power; but that, +when falling into sense and things irrational and corporalized, it +follows downward natures and lives, with them as with inebriated +neighbors, then together with them it becomes subject to the dominion of +Fate. For again, it is necessary that there should be an order of beings +of such a kind, as to subsist according to essence above Fate, but to be +sometimes ranked under it according to habitude. For if there are beings, +and such are all intellectual natures which are eternally established +above the laws of Fate, and also which, according to the whole of their +life, are distributed under the periods of Fate, it is necessary that the +medium between these should be that nature which is sometimes above, and +sometimes under the dominion of Fate. For the procession of incorporeal +natures is much more without a vacuum than that of bodies. + +The free will therefore of man, according to Plato, is a rational +elective, power, desiderative of true and apparent good, and leading the +soul to both, through which it ascends and descends, errs and acts with +rectitude. And hence the elective will be the same with that which +characterizes our essence. According to this power, we differ from divine +and mortal natures: for each of these is void of that two-fold inclination; +the one on account of its excellence being alone established in true +good; but the other in apparent good, on account of its defect. Intellect +too characterizes the one, but sense the other; and the former, as +Plotinus says, is our king, but the latter our messenger. We therefore +are established in the elective power as a medium; and having the ability +of tending both to true and apparent good, when we tend to the former we +follow the guidance of intellect, when to the latter, that of sense. The +power therefore which is in us is not capable of all things. For the +power which is omnipotent is characterized by unity; and on this account +is all-powerful, because it is one, and possesses the form of good. But +the elective power is two-fold, and on this account is not able to effect +all things; because, by it's inclinations to true and apparent good, it +falls short of that nature which is prior to all things. It would however +be all-powerful, if it had not an elective impulse, and was will alone. +For a life subsisting according to will alone subsists according to good, +because the will naturally tends to good, and such a life makes that +which is characteristic in us most powerful and deiform. And hence +through this the soul, according to Plato, becomes divine, and in another +life, in conjunction with deity, governs the world. And thus much of the +outlines of the leading dogmas of the philosophy of Plato. + +In the beginning of this Introduction, I observed that, in drawing these +outlines I should conduct the reader through novel and solitary paths, +solitary indeed they must be, since they have been unfrequented from the +reign of the emperor Justinian to the present time; and novel they will +doubtless appear to readers of every description, and particularly to +those who have been nursed as it were in the bosom of matter, the pupils +of experiment, the darlings of sense, and the legitimate descendants of +the earth-born race that warred on the Olympian gods. To such as these, +who have gazed on the dark and deformed face of their nurse, till they +are incapable of beholding the light of truth, and who are become so +drowsy from drinking immoderately of the cup of oblivion, that their +whole life is nothing more than a transmigration from sleep to sleep, and +from dream to dream, like men passing from one bed to another,--to such +as these, the road through which we have been traveling will appear to be +a delusive passage, and the objects which we have surveyed to be nothing +more than fantastic visions, seen only by the eye of imagination, and +when seen, idle and vain as the dreams of a shadow. + +The following arguments, however, may perhaps awaken some few of these +who are less lethargic than the rest, from the sleep of sense, and enable +them to elevate their mental eye from the dark mire in which they are +plunged, and gain a glimpse of this most weighty truth, that there is +another world, of which this is nothing more than a most obscure +resemblance, and another life, of which this is but the flying mockery. +My present discourse therefore is addressed to those who consider +experiment as the only solid criterion of truth. In the first place then, +these men appear to be ignorant of the invariable laws of demonstration +properly so called, and that the necessary requisites of all +demonstrative propositions are these: that they exist as causes, are +primary, more excellent, peculiar, true, and known than the conclusions. +For every demonstration not only consists of principles prior to others, +but of such as are eminently first; since if the assumed propositions may +be demonstrated by other assumptions, such propositions may indeed +appear prior to the conclusions, but are by no means entitled to the +appellation of first. Others, on the contrary, which require no +demonstration, but are of themselves manifest, are deservedly esteemed +the first, the truest, and the best. Such indemonstrable truths were +called by the ancients axioms from their majesty and authority, as the +assumptions which constitute demonstrative syllogisms derive all their +force and efficacy from these. + +In the next place, they seem not to be sufficiently aware, that universal +is better than partial demonstration. For that demonstration is the more +excellent which is derived from the better cause; but a universal is more +extended and excellent than a partial cause; since the arduous +investigation of the why in any subject is only stopped by the arrival at +universals. Thus if we desire to know why the outward angles of a +triangle are equal to four right angles, and it is answered, Because the +triangle is isosceles; we again ask, but why Because isosceles? And if it +be replied, Because it is a triangle; we may again inquire, But why +because a triangle? To which we finally answer, because a triangle is a +right-lined figure. And here our inquiry rests at that universal idea, +which embraces every preceding particular one, and is contained in no +other more general and comprehensive than itself. Add too, that the +demonstration of particulars is almost the demonstration of infinites; of +universals the demonstration of finites; and of infinites there can be no +science. That demonstration likewise is the best which furnishes the mind +with the most ample knowledge; and this is, alone, the province of +universals. We may also add, that he who knows universals knows +particulars likewise in capacity; but we can not infer that he who has +the best knowledge of particulars, knows any thing of universals. And +lastly, that which is universal is the object of intellect and reason; +but particulars are coordinated to the perceptions of sense. + +But here perhaps the experimentalist will say, admitting all this to be +true, yet we no otherwise obtain a perception of these universals than by +an induction of particulars, and abstraction from sensibles. To this, I +answer that the universal which is the proper object of science, is not +by any means the offspring of abstraction; and induction is no otherwise +subservient to its existence than an exciting cause. For if scientific +conclusions are indubitable, if the truth of demonstration is necessary +and eternal, this universal is truly all, and not like that gained by +abstraction, limited to a certain number of particulars. Thus, the +proposition that the angles of every triangle are equal to two right, if +it is indubitably true, that is, if the term every in it really includes +all triangles, cannot be the result of any abstraction; for this, however +extended it may be, is limited, and falls far short of universal +comprehension. Whence is it then that the dianoetic power concludes thus +confidently that the Proposition is true of all triangles? For if it be +said that the mind, after having abstracted triangle from a certain +number of particulars, adds from itself what is wanting to complete the +all; in the first place, no man, I believe, will say that any such +operation as this took place in his mind when he first learnt this +proposition; and in the next place, if this should be granted, it would +follow that such proposition is a mere fiction, since it is uncertain +whether that which is added to complete the all is truly added; and thus +the conclusion will no longer be indubitably necessary. + +In short, if the words all and every, with which every page of theoretic +mathematics is full, mean what they are conceived by all men to mean, and +if the universals which they signify are the proper objects of science, +such universals must subsist in the soul prior to the energies of sense. +Hence it will follow that induction is no otherwise subservient to +science, than as it produces credibility in axioms and petitions; and +this by exciting the universal conception of these latent in the soul. +The particulars, therefore, of which an induction is made in order to +produce science, must be so simple, that they may be immediately +apprehended, and that the universal may be predicated of them without +hesitation. The particulars of the experimentalists are not of this kind, +and therefore never can be sources of science truly so called. + +Of this, however, the man of experiment appears to be totally ignorant, +and in consequence of this, he is likewise ignorant that parts can only +be truly known through wholes, and that this is particularly the case +with parts when they belong to a whole, which, as we have already +observed, from comprehending in itself the parts which it produces, is +called a whole prior to parts. As he, therefore, would by no means merit +the appellation of a physician who should attempt to cure any part of the +human body, without a previous knowledge of the whole; so neither can he +know any thing truly of the vegetable life of plants, who has not a +previous knowledge of that vegetable life which subsists in the earth as +a whole prior to, because the principle and cause of all partial +vegetable life, and who still prior to this has not a knowledge of that +greater whole of this kind which subsists in nature herself; nor, as +Hippocrates justly observes, can he know any thing truly of the nature of +the human body who is ignorant what nature is considered as a great +comprehending whole. And if this be true, and it is so most indubitably, +with all physiological inquiries, how much more must it be the case with +respect to a knowledge of those incorporeal forms to which we ascended in +the first part of this Introduction, and which in consequence of +proceeding from wholes entirely exempt from body are participated by it, +with much greater obscurity and imperfection? Here then is the great +difference, and a mighty one it is, between the knowledge gained by the +most elaborate experiments, and that acquired by scientific reasoning, +founded on the spontaneous, unperverted, and self-luminous conceptions of +the soul. The former does not even lead its votary up to that one nature +of the earth from which the natures of all the animals and plants on its +surface, and of all the minerals and metals in its interior parts, +blossom as from a perennial root. The latter conducts its votary through +all the several mundane wholes up to that great whole the world itself, +and thence leads him through the luminous order of incorporeal wholes to +that vast whole of wholes, in which all other wholes are centred and +rooted, and which is no other than the principle of all principles, and +the fountain of deity itself. No less remarkable likewise, is the +difference between the tendencies of the two pursuits, for the one +elevates the soul to the most luminous heights, and to that great +ineffable which is beyond all altitude; but the other is the cause of a +mighty calamity to the soul, since, according to the elegant expression +of Plutarch, it extinguishes her principal and brightest eye, the +knowledge of divinity. In short, the one leads to all that is grand, +sublime and splendid in the universe; the other to all that is little, +groveling[14] and dark. The one is the parent of the most pure and ardent +piety; the genuine progeny of the other are impiety and atheism. And, in +fine, the one confers on its votary the most sincere, permanent, and +exalted delight; the other continual disappointment, and unceasing +molestation. + +----------------- +[14] That this must be the tendency of experiment, when prosecuted as the +criterion of truth, is evident from what Bacon, the prince of modern +philosophy, says in the 104th Aphorism of his Novum Organum, that +"baseless fabric of a vision." For he there sagely observes that wings +are not to be added to the human intellect, but rather lead and weights; +that all its leaps and flights may be restrained. That this is not yet +done, but that when it is we may entertain better hopes respecting the +sciences. "Itaque hominum intellectui non plumae addendae, sed plumbum +potius, et pondera; ut cohibeant omnem saltum et volatum. Atque hoc adhuc +factum non est; quum vero factum fuerit, melius de scientiis sperare +licebit." A considerable portion of lead must certainly have been added +to the intellect of Bacon when he wrote this Aphorism. +----------------- + +If such then are the consequences, such the tendencies of experimental +inquiries, when prosecuted as the criterion of truth, and daily +experience[15] unhappily shows that they are, there can be no other remedy +for this enormous evil than the intellectual philosophy of Plato. So +obviously excellent indeed is the tendency of this philosophy, that its +author, for a period of more than two thousand years, has been universally +celebrated by the epithet of divine. Such too is its preeminence, that it +may be shown, without much difficulty, that the greatest men of antiquity, +from the time in which its salutary light first blessed the human race, +have been more or less imbued with its sacred principles, have been more or +less the votaries of its divine truths. Thus, to mention a few from among a +countless multitude. In the catalogue of those endued with sovereign power, +it had for its votaries Dion of Siracusian, Julian the Roman, and Chosroes +the Persian, emperor; among the leaders of armies, it had Chabrias and +Phocion, those brave generals of the Athenians; among mathematicians, those +leading stars of science, Eudoxus, Archimedes[16] and Euclid; among +biographers, the inimitable Plutarch; among physicians, the admirable +Galen; among rhetoricians, those unrivaled orators Demosthenes and Cicero; +among critics, that prince of philologists, Longinus; and among poets, the +most learned and majestic Virgil. Instances, though not equally illustrious, +yet approximating to these in splendour, may doubtless be adduced after +the fall of the Roman empire; but then they have been formed on these +great ancients as models, and are, consequently, only rivulets from +Platonic streams. And instances of excellence in philosophic attainments, +similar to those among the Greeks, might have been enumerated among the +moderns, if the hand of barbaric despotism had not compelled philosophy +to retire into the deepest solitude, by demolishing her schools, and +involving the human intellect in Cimmerian darkness. In our own country, +however, though no one appears to have wholly devoted himself to the +study of this philosophy, and he who does not will never penetrate its +depths, yet we have a few bright examples of no common proficiency in its +more accessible parts. + +----------------- +[15] I never yet knew a man who made experiment the test of truth, and I +have known many such, that was not atheistically inclined. + +[16] I have ranked Archimedes among the Platonists, because he cultivated +the mathematical sciences Platonically, as is evident from the testimony of +Plutarch in his Life of Marcellus, p. 307. For he there informs us that +Archimedes considered the being busied about mechanics, and in short, every +art which is connected with the common purposes of life, as ignoble and +illiberal; and that those things alone were objects of his ambition with +which the beautiful and the excellent were present, unmingled with the +necessary. The great accuracy and elegance in the demonstrations of Euclid +and Archimedes, which have not been equaled by any of our greatest modern +mathematicians, were derived from a deep conviction of this important +truth. On the other hand modern mathematicians, through a profound +ignorance of this divine truth, and looking to nothing but the wants and +conveniences of the animal life of man, as if the gratification of his +senses was his only end, have corrupted pure geometry, by mingling with it +algebraical calculations, and through eagerness to reduce it as much as +possible to practical purposes, have more anxiously sought after +conciseness than accuracy, facility than elegance of geometrical +demonstration. +----------------- + +The instances I allude to are Shaftesbury, Akenside, Harris, Petwin, and +Sydenham. So splendid is the specimen of philosophic abilities displayed by +these writers, like the fair dawning of same unclouded morning, that we +have only deeply to regret that the sun of their genius sat before we were +gladdened with its effulgence. Had it shone with its full strength, the +writer of this Introduction would not have attempted either to translate +the works, or elucidate the doctrines of Plato; but though it rose with +vigor, it dispersed not the clouds in which its light was gradually +involved, and the eye in vain anxiously waited for it's meridian beam. +In short, the principles of the philosophy of Plato are of all others the +most friendly to true piety, pure morality, solid learning, and sound +government. For as it is scientific in all its parts, and in these parts +comprehends all that can be known by man in theology and ethics, and all +that is necessary for him to know in physics, it must consequently contain +in itself the source of all that is great and good both to individuals and +communities, must necessarily exalt while it benefits, and deify while it +exalts. + +We have said that this philosophy at first shone forth through Plato with +an occult and venerable splendor; and it is owing to the hidden manner in +which it is delivered by him, that its depth was not fathomed till many +ages after it's promulgation, and when fathomed, was treated by +superficial readers with ridicule and contempt. Plato indeed, is not +singular in delivering his philosophy occultly: for this was the custom +of all the great ancients; a custom not originating from a wish to become +tyrants in knowledge, and keep the multitude in ignorance, but from a +profound conviction that the sublimest truths are profaned when clearly +unfolded to the vulgar. This indeed must necessarily follow; since, as +Socrates in Plato justly observes, "it is not lawful for the pure to be +touched by the impure;" and the multitude are neither purified from the +defilements of vice, nor the darkness of twofold ignorance. Hence, while +they are thus doubly impure, it is as impossible for them to perceive the +splendors of truth, as for an eye buried in mire to survey the light +of day. + +The depth of this philosophy then does not appear to have been perfectly +penetrated except by the immediate disciples of Plato, for more than five +hundred years after its first propagation. For though Crantor, Atticus, +Albinus, Galen and Plutarch, were men of great genius, and made no common +proficiency in Philosophic attainments, yet they appear not to have +developed the profundity of Plato's conceptions; they withdrew not the +veil which covers his secret meaning, like the curtains which guarded the +adytum of temples from the profane eye; and they saw not that all behind +the veil is luminous, and that there divine spectacles[17] every where +present themselves to the view. This task was reserved for men who were +born indeed in a baser age, but, who being allotted a nature similar to +their leader, were the true interpreters of his mystic speculations. The +most conspicuous of these are the great Plotinus, the most learned +Porphyry, the divine Jamblichus, the most acute Syrianus, Proclus the +consummation of philosophic excellence, the magnificent Hierocles, the +concisely elegant Sallust, and the most inquisitive Damascius. By these +men, who were truly links of the golden chain of deity, all that is +sublime, all that is mystic in the doctrines of Plato (and they are +replete with both these in a transcendent degree), was freed from its +obscurity and unfolded into the most pleasing and admirable light. Their +labors, however, have been ungratefully received. The beautiful light +which they benevolently disclosed has hitherto unnoticed illumined +philosophy in her desolate retreats, like a lamp shining on some +venerable statue amidst dark and solitary ruins. The prediction of the +master has been unhappily fulfilled in these his most excellent +disciples. "For an attempt of this kind," says he,[18] "will only be +beneficial to a few, who from small vestiges, previously demonstrated, +are themselves able to discover these abstruse particulars. But with +respect to the rest of mankind, some it will fill with a contempt by no +means elegant, and others with a lofty and arrogant hope, that they shall +now learn certain excellent things." Thus with respect to these admirable +men, the last and the most legitimate of the followers of Plato, some +from being entirely ignorant of the abstruse dogmas of Plato, and finding +these interpreters full of conceptions which are by no means obvious to +every one in the writings of that philosopher, have immediately concluded +that such conceptions are mere jargon and revery, that they are not truly +Platonic, and that they are nothing more than streams, which, though, +originally derived from a pure fountain, have become polluted by distance +from their source. Others, who pay attention to nothing but the most +exquisite purity of language, look down with contempt upon every writer +who lived after the fall of the Macedonian empire; as if dignity and +weight of sentiment were inseparable from splendid and accurate diction; +or as if it were impossible for elegant writers to exist in a degenerate +age. So far is this from being the case, that though the style of +Plotinus[19] and Jamblichus[20] is by no means to be compared with that +of Plato, yet this inferiority is lost in the depth and sublimity of +their conceptions, and is as little regarded by the intelligent reader, +as motes in a sunbeam by the eye that gladly turns itself to the +solar light. + +-------------- +[17] See my Dissertation on the Mysteries. + +[18]See the 7th Epistle of Plato. + +[19] It would seem that those intemperate critics who have thought proper +to revile Plotinus, the leader of the latter Platonists, have paid no +attention to the testimony of Longinus concerning this most wonderful +man, as preserved by Porphyry in his life of him. For Longinus there +says, "that though he does not entirely accede to many of his hypotheses, +yet he exceedingly admires and loves the form of his writing, the density +of his conceptions, and the philosophic manner in which his questions are +disposed." And in another place he says, "Plotinus, as it seems, has +explained the Pythagoric and Platonic principles more clearly than those +that were prior to him; for neither are the writings of Numenius, +Cronius, Moderatus, and Thrasyllus, to be compared with those of Plotinus +on this subject." After such a testimony as this from such a consummate +critic as Longinus, the writings of Plotinus have nothing to fear from +the imbecile censure of modern critics. I shall only further observe, +that Longinus, in the above testimony, does not give the least hint of +his having found any polluted streams, or corruption of the doctrines of +Plato, in the works of Plotinus. There is not indeed the least vestige of +his entertaining any such opinion in any part of what he has said about +this most extraordinary man. This discovery was reserved for the more +acute critic of modern times, who, by a happiness of conjecture unknown +to the ancients, and the assistance of a good index, can in a few days +penetrate the meaning of the profoundest writer of antiquity, and bid +defiance even to the decision of Longinus. + +[20] Of this most divine man, who is justly said by the emperor Julian to +have been posterior indeed in time, but not in genius even to Plato himself, +see the life which I have given in the History of the Restoration of the +Platonic Theology, in the second vol. of my Proclus on Euclid. +---------------------- + +As to the style of Porphyry, when we consider that he was the disciple of +Longinus, whom Eunapius elegantly calls "a certain living library, and +walking museum," it is but reasonable to suppose that he imbibed some +portion of his master's excellence in writing. That he did so is +abundantly evident from the testimony of Eunapius, who particularly +commends his style for its clearness, purity, and grace. "Hence," he +says, "Porphyry being let down to men like a mercurial chain, through his +various erudition, unfolded every thing into perspicuity, and purity." +And in another place he speaks of him as abounding with all the graces of +diction, and as the only one that exhibited and proclaimed the praise of +his master. With respect to the style of Proclus, it is pure, clear and +elegant, like that of Dionysius Halicarnassus; but is much more copious +and magnificent; that of Hierocles is venerable and majestic, and nearly +equals the style of the greatest ancients; that of Sallust possesses an +accuracy and a pregnant brevity, which cannot easily be distinguished +from the composition of the Stagirite; and lastly, that of Damascius is +clear and accurate, and highly worthy a most investigating mind. + +Others again have filled themselves with a vain confidence, from reading +of commentaries of these admirable interpreters, and have in a short time +considered themselves superior to their masters. This was the case with +Ficinus, Picus, Dr. Henry Moore, and other pseudo Platonists, their +contemporaries, who, in order to combine Christianity with the doctrines +of Plato, rejected some of his most important tenets, and perverted +others, and thus corrupted one of these systems, and afforded no real +benefit to the other. + +But who are the men by whom these latter interpreters of Plato are +reviled? When and whence did this defamation originate? Was it when the +fierce champions for the trinity fled from Galilee to the groves of +Academus, and invoked, but in vain, the assistance of Philosophy? When + + The trembling grove confessed its fright, + The wood-nymphs started at the sight; + Ilissus backward urg'd his course, + And rush'd indignant to his source. + +Was it because that mitred sophist, Warburton, thought fit to talk of the +polluted streams of the Alexandrian school, without knowing any thing of +the source whence those streams are derived? Or was it because some heavy +German critic, who knew nothing beyond a verb in mi, presumed to grunt at +these venerable heroes? Whatever was its source, and whenever it +originated, for I have not been able to discover either, this however is +certain, that it owes its being to the most profound Ignorance, or the +most artful Sophistry, and that its origin is no less contemptible than +obscure. For let us but for a moment consider the advantages which these +latter Platonists possessed beyond any of their modern revilers. In the +first place, they had the felicity of having the Greek for their native +language, and must therefore, as they were confessedly, learned men, have +understood that language incomparably better than any man since the time +in which the ancient Greek was a living tongue. In the next place, they +had books to consult, written by the immediate disciples of Plato, which +have been lost for upwards of a thousand years, besides many Pythagoric +writings from which Plato himself derived most of his more sublime +dogmas. Hence we find the works of Parmenides, Empedocles, the Electic +Zeno, Speusippus, Xenocrates, and many other illustrious philosophers of +the highest antiquity, who were either genuine Platonists or the sources +of Platonism, are continually cited by these most excellent interpreters, +and in the third place they united the greatest purity of life to the +most piercing vigor of intellect. Now when it is considered that the +philosophy to the study of which these great men devoted their lives, was +professedly delivered by its author in obscurity; that Aristotle himself +studied it for twenty years; and that it was no uncommon thing, as Plato +informs us in one of his Epistles, to find students unable to comprehend +its sublimest tenets even in a longer period than this,--when all these +circumstances are considered, what must we think of the arrogance, not to +say impudence, of men in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth +centuries, who have dared to calumniate these great masters of wisdom? Of +men, with whom the Greek is no native language; who have no such books to +consult as those had whom they revile; who have never thought, even in a +dream, of making the acquisition of wisdom the great object of their +life; and who in short have committed that most baneful error of +mistaking philology for philosophy, and words for things? When such as +these dare to defame men who may be justly ranked among the greatest and +wisest of the ancients, what else can be said than that they are the +legitimate descendants of the suitors of Penelope, whom, in the animated +language of Ulysses, + + Laws or divine or human fail'd to move, + Or shame of men, or dread of gods above: + Heedless alike of infamy or praise, + Or Fame's eternal voice in future days,[21] + +----------------- +[21] Pope's Odyssey, book xxii, v. 47, &c. +----------------- + +But it is now time to present the reader with a general view of the works +of Plato, and, also to speak of the preambles, digressions, and style of +their author, and of the following translation. In accomplishing the +first of these, I shall avail myself of the synopsis of Mr. Sydenham, +taking the liberty at the same time of correcting it where it appears to +be erroneous, and of making additions to it where it appears to be +deficient. + +The dialogues of Plato are of various kinds; not only with regard to +those different matters, which are the subjects of them; but in respect +of the manner also in which they are composed or framed, and of the form +under which they make their appearance to the reader. It will therefore, +as I imagine, be not improper, in pursuance of the admonition given us by +Plato himself in his dialogue named Phaedrus[22] and in imitation of the +example set us by the ancient Platonists to distinguish the several +kinds; by dividing them, first, into the most general; and then, +subdividing into the subordinate; till we come to those lower species, +that particularly and precisely denote the nature of the several +dialogues, and from which they ought to take their respective +denominations. + +---------------- +[22] Whoever is unable to divide and distinguish things into their +several sorts or species; and, on the other hand, referring every +particular to its proper species, to comprehend them all in one general +idea; will never understand any writings of which those things are the +subject, like a true critic, upon those high principles of art to which +the human understanding reaches. We have thought proper, here, to +paraphrase this passage, for the sake of giving to every part of so +important a sentence its full force, agreeably to the tenor of Plato's +doctrine; and in order to initiate our readers into a way of thinking, +that probably many of them are as yet unacquainted with. +---------------- + +The most general division of the writings of Plato, is into those of the +Sceptical kind, and those of they Dogmatical. In the former sort, nothing +is expressly either proved or asserted, some philosophical question only is +considered and examined; and the reader is left to himself to draw such +conclusions, and discover such truths as the philosopher means to +insinuate. This is done, either in the way of inquiry, or in the way of +controversy and dispute. In the way of controversy are carried on all such +dialogues, as tend to eradicate false opinions; and that, either indirectly, +by involving them in difficulties, and embarrassing the maintainers of them; +or directly, by confuting them. In the way of inquiry proceed those whose +tendency is to raise in the mind right opinions; and that either by exciting +to the pursuit of some part of wisdom, and showing in what manner to +investigate it; or by leading the way, and helping the mind forward in the +search. And this is effected by a process through opposing arguments.[23] + +------------------ +[23] It is necessary to observe that Plato in the Parmenides calls all +that part of his Dialectic, which proceeds through opposite arguments, an +exercise and wandering. +------------------ + +The dialogues of the other kind, the Dogmatical or Didactic, teach +explicitly some point of doctrine; and this they do either by laying it +down in the authoritative way, or by proving it in the ways of reason and +argument. In the authoritative way the doctrine is delivered, sometimes by +the speaker himself magisterially, at other times as derived to him by +tradition from wise men. The argumentative or demonstrative method of +teaching, used by Plato, proceeds in all the dialectic ways, dividing, +defining, demonstrating, and analysing; and the object of it consists in +exploring truth alone. According to this division is framed the following +scheme, or table: + +DIALOGUES[24] + +Sceptical Disputative Embarrassing Confuting Inquisitive Exciting Assisting +Dogmatical Demonstrative Analytical Inductional Authoritative Magisterial +Traditional + +----------------- +[24]We have, given us by Diogenes Laertius, another division of the +characters, as he calls them, of Plato's writings, different from that +exhibited in the scheme above. This we have thought proper to subjoin, on +account of its antiquity and general reception. + +Dialogues + +Diadectic Speculative Physical Logical Practical Ethical Political +Inquisitive Gymnastic Maieutic Peirastic Agonistic Endeietic Anatreptic + +The learned reader will observe the latter half of the dialogues, according +to this scheme, to be described by metaphors taken from the gymnastic art: +the dialogues, here termed gymnastic, being imagined to bear a similitude +to that exercise; the agonistic, to the combat. In the lowest subdivision, +indeed, the word maieutic is a metaphor of another kind, fully explained in +Plato's Theaetetus: the maieutic dialogues, however, were supposed to +resemble giving the rudiments of the art; as the peirastic were, to +represent a skirmish, or trial of proficiency; the endeietic were, it +seems, likened to the exhibiting a specimen of skill; and the anatreptic, +to presenting the spectacle of a thorough defeat, or sound drubbing. The +principal reason why we contented not ourselves with this account of the +difference between the dialogues of Plato, was the capital error there +committed in the first subdivision, of course extending itself through the +latter. This error consists in dividing the Didactic dialogues with regard +to their subject-matter; while those of the Inquisitive sort are divided +with respect to the manner of their composition. So that the subdivisions +fall not, with any propriety, under one and the same general head. Besides, +a novice in the works of Plato might hence be led naturally to suppose, +that the dogmatical or didactic dialogues are, all of them, written in the +same manner; and that the others, those of the inquisitive kind, by us +termed sceptical, have no particular subjects at all; or, if they have, +that their subjects are different from those of the didactic dialogues, +and are consequently unphilosophical. Now every one of the suppositions +here mentioned is far from being true. +---------------- + +The philosopher, in thus varying his manner, and diversifying his +writings into these several kinds, means not merely to entertain with +their variety; not to teach, on different occasions, with more or less +plainness and perspicuity; not yet to insinuate different degrees of +certainty in the doctrines themselves: but he takes this method, as a +consummate master of the art of composition in the dialogue-way of +writing, from the different characters of the speakers, as from different +elements in the frame of these dramatic dialogues, or different +ingredients in their mixture, producing some peculiar genius and turn of +temper, as it were, in each. + +Socrates indeed is in almost all of them the principal speaker: but when +he falls into the company of some arrogant sophist; when the modest +wisdom, and clear science of the one, are contrasted with the confident +ignorance and blind opinionativeness of the other; dispute and +controversy must of course arise: where the false pretender cannot fail +of being either puzzled or confuted. To puzzle him only is sufficient, +if there be no other persons present; because such a man can never be +confuted in his own opinion: but when there is an audience round them, +in danger of being misled by sophistry into error, then is the true +philosopher to exert his utmost, and the vain sophist to be convicted +and exposed. + +In some dialogues Plato represents his great master mixing in +conversation with young men of the best families in the commonwealth. +When these happen to have docile dispositions and fair minds, then is +occasion given to the philosopher to call forth[25] the latent seeds of +wisdom, and to cultivate the noble plants with true doctrine, in the +affable and familiar way of joint inquiry. To this is owing the +inquisitive genius of such dialogues: where, by a seeming equality in the +conversation, the curiosity or zeal of the mere stranger is excited; that +of the disciple is encouraged; and, by proper questions, the mind is +aided and forwarded in the search of truth. + +----------------- +[25] We require exhortation, that we may be led to true good; dissuasion, +that we may be turned from things truly evil; obstetrication, that we may +draw forth our unperverted conceptions; and confutation, that we may be +purified from two-fold ignorance. +----------------- + +At other times, the philosophic hero of these dialogues is introduced +in a higher character, engaged in discourse with men of more improved +understandings and enlightened minds. At such seasons he has an +opportunity of teaching in a more explicit manner, and of discovering +the reasons of things: for to such an audience truth is due, and all +demonstrations[26] possible in the teaching it. Hence, in the dialogues +composed of these persons, naturally arises the justly argumentative or +demonstrative genius; and this, as we have before observed, according to +all the dialectic methods. + +----------------- +[26] The Platonists rightly observe, that Socrates, in these cases, makes +use of demonstrative and just reasoning, ([Greek: apodeiktikou]); whereas +to the novice he is contented with arguments only probable, ([Greek: +pithanois]); and against the litigious sophist often employs such as are +[Greek: eristikoi]; puzzling and contentious. +----------------- + +But when the doctrine to be taught admits not of demonstration; of which +kind is the doctrine of antiquities, being only traditional, and a matter +of belief; and the doctrine of laws, being injunctional, and the matter of +obedience; the air of authority is then assumed: in the former cases, the +doctrine is traditionally handed down to others from the authority of +ancient sages; in the latter, is magisterially pronounced with the +authority of a legislator.[27] + +----------------- +[27] It is necessary to observe, that in those dialogues in which Socrates +is indeed introduced, but sustains an inferior part, he is presented to +our view as a learner, and not as a teacher; and this is the case in the +Parmenides and Timaeus. For by the former of these philosophers he is +instructed in the most abtruse theological dogmas, and by the latter in +the whole of physiology. +----------------- + +Thus much for the manner in which the dialogues of Plato are severally +composed, and the cast of genius given them in their composition. The +form under which they appear, or the external character that marks them, +is of three sorts: either purely dramatic, like the dialogue of tragedy +or comedy; or purely narrative, where a former conversation is supposed +to be committed to writing, and communicated to some absent friend; or of +the mixed kind, like a narration in dramatic poems, where is recited, to +some person present, the story of things past. + +Having thus divided the dialogues of Plato, in respect of that inward +form or composition, which creates their genius; and again, with +reference to that outward form, which marks them, like flowers and other +vegetables, with a certain character; we are further to make a division +of them, with regard to their subject and their design; beginning with +their design, or end, because for the sake of this are all the subjects +chosen. The end of all the writings of Plato is that, which is the end of +all true philosophy or wisdom, the perfection and the happiness of man. +Man therefore is the general subject; and the first business of philosophy +must be to inquire what is that being called man, who is to be made happy; +and what is his nature, in the perfection of which is placed his happiness. +As however, in the preceding part of this Introduction, we have endeavored +to give the outlines of Plato's doctrine concerning man, it is unnecessary +in this place to say any thing further on that subject. + +The dialogues of Plato, therefore, with respect to their subjects, may be +divided into the speculative, the practical, and such as are of a mixed +nature. The subjects of these last are either general, comprehending both +the others; or differential, distinguishing them. The general subject are +either fundamental, or final: those of the fundamental kind are philosophy, +human nature, the soul of man; of the final kind are love, beauty, good. +The differential regard knowledge, as it stands related to practice; in +which are considered two questions: one of which is, whether virtue is to +he taught; the other is, whether error in the will depends on error in +the judgment. The subjects of the speculative dialogues relate either to +words, or to things. Of the former sort are etymology, sophistry, rhetoric, +poetry; of the latter sort are science, true being, the principles of +mind, outward nature. The practical subjects relate either to private +conduct, and the government of the mind over the whole man; or to his +duty towards others in his several relations; or to the government of a +civil state, and the public conduct of a whole people. Under these three +heads rank in order the particular subjects practical; virtue in general, +sanctity, temperance, fortitude, justice, friendship, patriotism, piety; +the ruling mind in a civil government, the frame and order of a state, +law in general, and lastly, those rules of government and of public +conduct, the civil laws. + +Thus, for the sake of giving the reader a scientific, that is a +comprehensive, and at the same time a distinct view of Plato's writings, +we have attempted to exhibit to him, their just and natural distinctions; +whether he chooses to consider them with regard to their inward form or +essence, their outward form or appearance, their matter; or their end: +that is, in those more familiar terms, we have used in this Synopsis, +their genius, their character, their subject, and their design. + +And here it is requisite to observe, that as it is the characteristic of +the highest good to be universally beneficial, though some things are +benefitted by it more and others less, in consequence of their greater or +less aptitude to receive it; in like manner the dialogues of Plato are +so largely stamped with the characters of sovereign good, that they are +calculated to benefit in a certain degree even those who are incapable +of penetrating their profundity. They can tame a savage sophist, like +Thrasymachus in the Republic; humble the arrogance even of those who +are ignorant of their ignorance; make those to become proficients in +political, who will never arrive at theoretic virtue; and, in short, like +the illuminations of deity, wherever there is any portion of aptitude in +their recipients, they purify, irradiate, and exalt. + +After this general view of the dialogues of Plato, let us in the next +place consider their preambles, the digressions with which they abound, +and the character of the style in which they are written. With respect to +the first of these, the preambles, however superfluous they may at first +sight appear, they will be found on a closer inspection necessary to the +design of the dialogues which they accompany. Thus the prefatory part of +the Timaeus unfolds, in images agreeably to the Pythagoric custom, the +theory of the world; and the first part of the Parmenides, or the +discussion of ideas, is in fact merely a preamble to the second part, +or the speculation of the one; to which however it is essentially +preparatory. Hence, as Plutarch says, when he speaks of Plato's dialogue +on the Atlantic island: These preambles are superb gates and magnificent +courts with which he purposely embellishes his great edifices, that +nothing may be wanting to their beauty, and that all may be equally +splendid. He acts, as Dacier well observes, like a great prince, who, +when he builds a sumptuous palace, adorns (in the language of Pindar) the +vestibule with golden pillars. For it is fit that what is first seen +should be splendid and magnificent, and should as it were perspicuously +announce all that grandeur which afterwards presents itself to the view. + +With respect to the frequent digressions in his dialogues, these also, +when accurately examined, will be found to be no less subservient to the +leading design of the dialogues in which they are introduced; at the same +time that they afford a pleasing relaxation to the mind from the labor of +severe investigation. Hence Plato, by the most happy and enchanting art, +contrives to lead the reader to the temple of Truth through the delightful +groves and valleys of the Graces. In short, this circuitous course, when +attentively considered, will be found to be the shortest road by which he +could conduct the reader to the desired end: for in accomplishing this it +is necessary to regard not that road, which is most straight in the +nature of things, or abstractedly considered, but that which is most +direct in the progressions of human understanding. + +With respect to the style of Plato, though it forms in reality the +most inconsiderable part of the merit of his writings, style in all +philosophical works being the last thing that should be attended to, yet +even in this Plato may contend for the palm of excellence with the most +renowned masters of diction. Hence we find that his style was the +admiration of the finest writers of antiquity. According to Ammianus, +Jupiter himself would not speak otherwise, if he were to converse in the +Attic tongue. Aristotle considered his style as a medium between poetry +and prose. Cicero no less praises him for the excellence of his diction +than the profundity of his conceptions; and Longinus calls him with +respect to his language, the rival of Homer. Hence he is considered by +this prince of critics, as deriving into himself abundant streams from +the Homeric fountain, and is compared by him, in his rivalship of Homer, +to a new antagonist who enters the lists against one that is already the +object of universal admiration. + +Notwithstanding this praise, however, Plato has been accused, as Longinus +informs us, of being frequently hurried away as by a certain Bacchic fury +of words to immoderate and unpleasant metaphors, and an allegoric +magnificence of diction. Longinus excuses this by saying that whatever +naturally excels in magnitude possesses very little of purity. For that, +says he, which is in every respect accurate is in danger of littleness. +He adds, "and may not this also be necessary, that those of an abject and +moderate genius, because they never encounter danger, nor aspire after +the summit of excellence, are for the most part without error and remain +in security; but that great things become insecure through their magnitude?" +Indeed it appears to me, that whenever this exuberance, this Bacchic +fury, occurs in the diction of Plato, it is owing to the magnitude of the +inspiring influence of deity with which he is then replete. For that he +sometimes wrote from divine inspiration is evident from his own confession +in the Phaedrus, a great part of which is not so much like an orderly +discourse as a dithyrambic poem. Such a style therefore, as it is the +progeny of divine mania, which, as Plato justly observes, is better than +all human prudence, spontaneously adapts itself to its producing cause, +imitates a supernatural power as far as this can be effected by words, +and thus necessarily becomes magnificent, vehement, and exuberant; for +such are the characteristics of its source. All judges of composition +however, both ancient and modern, are agreed that his style is in general +graceful and pure; and that it is sublime without being impetuous and +rapid. It is indeed no less harmonious than elevated, no less accurate[27] +than magnificent. It combines the force of the greatest orators with the +graces of the first of poets; and in short; is a river to which those +justly celebrated lines of Denham may be most pertinently applied: + + Tho' deep, yet clear; tho' gentle, yet not dull; + Strong without rage, without o'erfowing full. + +----------------- +[27] The reader will see, from the notes on Plato's dialogues, and +particularly from the notes on the Parmenides and Timaeus, that the style +of that philosopher possesses an accuracy which is not to be found in any +modern writer; an accuracy of such a wonderful nature, that the words are +exactly commensurate with the sense. Hence the reader who has happily +penetrated his profundity finds, with astonishment, that another word +could not have been added without being superfluous, nor one word taken +away without injuring the sense. The same observation may also be applied +to the style of Aristotle. +----------------- + +Having thus considered the philosophy of Plato, given a general view of +his writings, and made some observations on his style, it only now +remains to speak of the following arrangement of his dialogues and +translation of his works, and then, with a few appropriate observations, +to close this Introduction. + +As no accurate and scientific arrangement then of these dialogues has +been transmitted to us from the ancients, I was under the necessity of +adopting an arrangement of my own, which I trust is not unscientific, +however inferior it may be to that which was doubtless made, though +unfortunately lost, by the latter interpreters of Plato. In my +arrangement, therefore, I have imitated the order of the universe in +which, as I have already observed, wholes precede parts, and universals +particulars. Hence I have placed those dialogues first which rank as +wholes, or have the relation of a system, and afterwards those in which +these systems are branch out into particulars. Thus, after the First +Alcibiades, which may be called, and appears to have been generally +considered by the ancients an introduction to the whole of Plato's +philosophy, I have placed the Republic and the Laws, which may be said to +comprehend systematically the morals and politics of Plato. After these I +have ranked the Timaeus, which contains the whole of his physiology, and +together with it the Critias, because of its connection with the Timaeus. +The next in order is the Parmenides, which contains a system of his +theology. Thus far this arrangement is conformable to the natural progress +of the human mind in the acquisition of the sublimest knowledge; the +subsequent arrangement principally regards the order of things. After the +Parmenides then, the Sophista, Phaedrus, Greater Hippias, and Banquet, +follow, which may be considered as so many lesser wholes subordinate to +and comprehended in the Parmenides, which, like the universe itself, is a +whole of wholes. For in the Sophista being itself is investigated, in the +Banquet love itself, and in the Phaedrus beauty itself; all which are +intelligible forms, and are consequently contained in the Parmenides, in +which the whole extent of the intelligible is unfolded. The Greater +Hippias is classed with the Phaedrus, because in the latter the whole +series of the beautiful is discussed, and in the former that which +subsists in soul. After these follows the Theaetetus, in which science +considered as subsisting in soul is investigated; science itself, +according to its first subsistence, having been previously celebrated by +Socrates in one part of the Phaedrus. The Politicus and Minos, which +follow next, may be considered as ramifications from the Laws; and, in +short, all the following dialogues either consider more particularly the +dogmas which are systematically comprehended in those already enumerated, +or naturally flow from them as their original source. As it did not +however appear possible to arrange these dialogues which rank as parts in +the same accurate order as those which we considered as whole, it was +thought better to class them either according to their agreement in one +particular circumstance, as the Phaedo, Apology, and Crito, all which +relate to the death of Socrates, and as the Meno and Protagoras, which +relate to the question whether virtue can be taught; or according to +their agreement in character, as the Lesser Hippias and Euthydemus, which +are anatreptic, and the Theages, Laches, and Lysis, which are maieutic +dialogues. The Cratylus is ranked in the last place, not so much because +the subject of it is etymology, as because a great part of it is deeply +theological; for by this arrangement, after having ascended to all the +divine orders and their ineffable principle in the Parmenides, and thence +descended in a regular series to the human soul in the subsequent +dialogues, the reader is again led back to deity in this dialogue, and +thus imitates the order which all beings observe, that of incessantly +returning to the principles whence they flew. + +After the dialogues[28] follow the Epistles of Plato, which are in every +respect worthy that prince of all true philosophers. They are not only +written with great elegance, and occasionally with magnificence of +diction, but with all the becoming dignity of a mind conscious of its +superior endowments, and all the authority of a master in philosophy. +They are likewise replete with many admirable political observations, +and contain some of his most abstruse dogmas, which though delivered +enigmatically, yet the manner in which they are delivered, elucidates at +the same time that it is elucidated by what is said of these dogmas in +his more theological dialogues. + +----------------- +[28] As I profess to give the reader a translation of the genuine works +of Plato only, I have not translated the Axiochus, Demodoeus, Sisyphus, +&c. as these are evidently spurious dialogues. +----------------- + +With respect, to the following translation, it is necessary to observe, in +the first place, than the numbers of legitimate dialogues of Plato is +fifty-five; for though the Republic forms but one treatise, and the Laws +another, yet the former consists of ten, and the latter of twelve books, +and each of these books is a dialogue. Hence, as there are thirty-three +dialogues, besides the Laws and the Republic, fifty-five will, as we have +said, be the amount of the whole. Of these fifty-five, the nine following +have been translated by Mr. Sydenham; viz. the First and Second Alcibiades, +the Greater and Lesser Hippias, the Banquet (except the speech of +Alcibiades), the Philebus, the Meno, the Io, and the Rivals.[29] I have +already observed, and with deep regret, that this excellent though +unfortunate scholar died before he had made that proficiency in the +philosophy of Plato which might have been reasonably expected from so fair +a beginning. I personally knew him only in the decline of life, when his +mental powers were not only considerably impaired by age, but greatly +injured by calamity. His life had been very stormy; his circumstances, for +many years preceding his death, were indigent; his patrons were by no means +liberal; and his real friends were neither numerous nor affluent. He began +the study of Plato, as he himself informed me, when he had considerably +passed the meridian of life, and with most unfortunate prejudices against +his best disciples, which I attempted to remove during my acquaintance with +him, and partly succeeded in the attempt; but infirmity and death prevented +its completion. Under such circumstances it was not to be expected that he +would fathom the profundity of Plato's conceptions, and arrive at the +summit of philosophic attainments. I saw, however, that his talents and his +natural disposition were such as might have ranked him among the best of +Plato's interpreters, if he had not yielded to the pressure of calamity, if +he had not nourished such baneful prejudices, and if he had not neglected +philosophy in the early part of life. Had this happened, my labors would +have been considerably lessened, or perhaps rendered entirely unnecessary, +and his name would have been transmitted to posterity with undecaying +renown. As this unfortunately did not happen, I have been under the +necessity of diligently examining and comparing with the original all +those parts of the dialogues which he translated, that are more deeply +philosophical, or that contain any thing of the theology of Plato. In +these, as might be expected, I found him greatly deficient; I found him +sometimes mistaking the meaning through ignorance of Plato's more sublime +tenets, and at other times perverting it, in order to favor some opinions +of his own. His translation however of other parts which are not so +abstruse is excellent. In these he not only presents the reader faithfully +with the matter, but likewise with the genuine manner of Plato. The notes +too which accompany the translation of these parts generally exhibit just +criticism and extensive learning, an elegant taste, and a genius naturally +philosophic. Of these notes I have preserved as much as was consistent with +the limits and design of the following work. + +----------------- +[29] In the notes on the above-mentioned nine dialogues, those written +by Mr. Sydenham are signed S., and those by myself T. +----------------- + +Of the translation of the Republic by Dr. Spens, it is necessary to observe +that a considerable part of it is very faithfully executed; but that in the +more abstruse parts it is inaccurate; and that it every where abounds with +Scotticisms which offend an English ear, and vulgarisms which are no less +disgraceful to the translator than disgusting to the reader. Suffice it +therefore to say of this version, that I have adopted it wherever I found +it could with propriety be adopted, and given my own translation where it +was otherwise. + +Of the ten dialogues translated by Dacier, I can say nothing with +accuracy, because I have no knowledge whatever of the French language; +but if any judgment may be formed of this work, from a translation of it +into English, I will be bold to say that it is by no means literal, and +that he very frequently mistakes the sense of the original. From this +translation therefore I could derive but little assistance; some however +I have derived, and that little I willingly acknowledge. In translating +the rest of Plato's works, and this, as the reader may easily see, form +by far the greatest part of them, I have had no assistance from any +translation except that of Ficinus, the general excellency of which is +well known to every student of Plato, arising not only from his +possessing a knowledge of Platonism superior to that of any translators +that have followed him, but likewise from his having made this +translation from a very valuable manuscript in the Medicean library, +which is now no longer to be found. I have, however, availed myself of +the learned labors of the editors of various dialogues of Plato; such as +the edition of the Rivals, Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, and Phaedo, by +Forster; of the First and Second Alcibiades and Hipparchus, by Etwall; of +the Meno, First Alcibiades, Phaedo and Phaedrus, printed at Vienna, 1784; +of the Cratylus and Theaetetus, by Fischer; of the Republic, by Massey; +and of the Euthydemus and Gorgias, by Dr. Routh, president of Magdalen +College, Oxford. This last editor has enriched his edition of these two +dialogues with very valuable and copious philological and critical notes, +in which he has displayed no less learning than judgment, no less +acuteness than taste. He appears indeed to me to be one of the best and +most modest of philologists; and it is to be hoped that he will be +imitated in what he has done by succeeding editors of Plato's text. + +If my translation had been made with an eye to the judgment of the many, +it would have been necessary to apologize for its literal exactness. +Had I been anxious to gratify false taste with respect to composition, I +should doubtless have attended less to the precise meaning of the original, +have omitted almost all connective Particles, have divided long periods +into a number of short ones, and branched out the strong and deep river of +Plato's language into smooth-gliding, shallow, and feeble streams; but as +the present work was composed with the hope indeed of benefitting all, but +with an eye to the criticism solely of men of elevated souls, I have +endeavored not to lose a word of the original; and yet at the same time +have attempted to give the translation as much elegance as such verbal +accuracy can be supposed capable of admitting. I have also endeavored to +preserve the manner as well as the matter of my author, being fully +persuaded that no translation deserves applause, in which both these are +not as much as possible preserved. + +My principal object in this arduous undertaking has been to unfold all +the abstruse and sublime dogmas of Plato, as they are found dispersed in +his works. Minutely to unravel the art which he employs in the +composition of all his dialogues, and to do full justice to his meaning +in every particular, must be the task of some one who has more leisure, +and who is able to give the works of Plato to the public on a more +extensive plan. In accomplishing this great object, I have presented the +reader in my notes with nearly the substance in English of all the +following manuscript Greek Commentaries and Scholia on Plato; viz. of the +Commentaries of Proclus on the Parmenides and First Alcibiades; and of +his Scholia on the Cratylus; of the Scholia of Olympiodorus on the +Phaedo, Gorgias, and Philebus; and of Hermeas on the Phoedrus. To these +are added very copious extracts from the manuscript of Damascius,[30] +Peri Archon, and from the published works of Proclus on the Timeus, +Republic, and Theology of Plato. Of the four first of these manuscripts, +three of which are folio volumes, I have complete copies taken with my +own hand; and of the copious extracts from the others, those from +Olympiodorus on the Gorgias were taken by me from the copy preserved in +the British Museum; those from the same philosopher on the Philebus, and +those from Hermeas on the Phaedrus, and Damascius Peri Archon, from the +copies in the Bodleian library. + +----------------- +[30] Patricius was one of the very few in modern times who have been +sensible of the great merit of these writings, as is evident from the +extract from the preface to his translation of Proclus's Theological +Elements. (Ferrar. 4to. 1583.) Patricius, prior to this, enumerates the +writings of Proclus, and they are included in his wish that all the +manuscript Greek commentaries on Plato were made public. +----------------- + +And here gratitude demands that I should publicly acknowledge the very +handsome and liberal manner in which I was received by the University of +Oxford, and by the principal librarian and sub-librarians of the Bodleian +library, during the time that I made the above mentioned extracts. In the +first place I have to acknowledge the very polite attention which was paid +to me by Dr. Jackson,[31] dean of Christ-church. In the second place, the +liberty of attendance at the Bodleian library, and the accommodation which +was there afforded me, by the librarians of that excellent collection, +demand from me no small tribute of praise. And, above all, the very liberal +manner in which I was received by the fellows of New College, with whom I +resided for three weeks, and from whom I experienced even Grecian +hospitality, will, I trust, be as difficult a task for time to obliterate +from my memory, as it would be for me to express it as it deserves. + +----------------- +[31] I was much pleased to find that this very respectable prelate is a +great admirer of Aristotle, and that extracts from the Commentaries of +Simplicius and Ammonius on the Categories of that philosopher, are read +by his orders in the college of which he is the head. +----------------- + +With respect to the faults which I may have committed in this translation +(for I am not vain enough to suppose it is without fault), I might plead +as an excuse, that the whole of it has been executed amidst severe +endurance from bodily infirmity and indigent circumstances; and that a +very considerable part of it was accomplished amidst other ills of no +common magnitude, and other labors inimical to such an undertaking. But +whatever may be my errors, I will not fly to calamity for an apology. Let +it be my excuse that the mistakes I may have committed in lesser +particulars, have arisen from my eagerness to seize and promulgate those +great truths in the philosophy and theology of Plato, which though they +have been concealed for ages in oblivion, have a subsistence coeval with +the universe, and will again be restored, and flourish for very extended +periods, through all the infinite revolutions of time. + +In the next place, it is necessary to speak concerning the qualifications +requisite in a legitimate student of the philosophy of Plato, previous to +which I shall just notice the absurdity of supposing that a mere knowledge +of the Greek tongue, however great that knowledge may be, is alone +sufficient to the understanding the sublime doctrines of Plato; for a man +might as well think that he can understand Archimedes without a knowledge +of the elements of geometry, merely because he can read him in the +original. Those who entertain such an idle opinion, would do well to +meditate on the profound observation of Heraclitus, "that polymathy does +not teach intellect," ([Greek: Polymathic noon ou didaskei]). + +By a legitimate student, then, of the Platonic philosophy, I mean one +who, both from nature and education, is properly qualified for such +an arduous undertaking; that is one who possesses a naturally good +disposition; is sagacious and acute, and is inflamed with an ardent +desire for the acquisition of wisdom and truth; who from his childhood +has been well instructed in the mathematical disciplines; who, besides +this, has spent whole days, and frequently the greater part of the night, +in profound meditation; and, like one triumphantly sailing over a raging +sea, or skillfully piercing through an army of foes, has successfully +encountered an hostile multitude of doubts;--in short, who has never +considered wisdom as a thing of trifling estimation and easy access, but +as that which cannot be obtained without the most generous and severe +endurance, and the intrinsic worth of which surpasses all corporeal good, +far more than the ocean the fleeting bubble which floats on its surface. +To such as are destitute of these requisites, who make the study of words +their sole employment, and the pursuit of wisdom but at best a secondary +thing, who expect to be wise by desultory application for an hour or two +in a day, after the fatigues of business, after mixing with the base +multitude of mankind, laughing with the gay affecting airs of gravity +with the serious, tacitly assenting to every man's opinion, however +absurd, and winking at folly however shameful and base--to such as +these--and, alas! the world is full of such--the sublimest truths must +appear to be nothing more than jargon and reverie, the dreams of a +distempered imagination, or the ebullitions of fanatical faith. + +But all this is by no means wonderful, if we consider that two-fold +ignorance is the disease of the many. For they are not only ignorant with +respect to the sublimest knowledge, but they are even ignorant of their +ignorance. Hence they never suspect their want of understanding, but +immediately reject a doctrine which appears at first sight absurd, +because it is too splendid for their bat-like eyes to behold. Or if they +even yield their assent to its truth, their very assent is the result of +the same most dreadful disease of the soul. For they will fancy, says +Plato, that they understand the highest truths, when the very contrary is +really the case. I earnestly therefore entreat men of this description, +not to meddle with any of the profound speculations of the Platonic +philosophy, for it is more dangerous to urge them to such an employment, +than to advise them to follow their sordid avocations with unwearied +assiduity, and toil for wealth with increasing alacrity and vigor; as +they will by this means give free scope to the base habits of their soul, +and sooner suffer that punishment which in such as these must always +precede mental illumination, and be the inevitable consequence of guilt. +It is well said indeed by Lysis, the Pythagorean, that to inculcate +liberal speculations and discourses to those whose morals are turbid and +confused, is just as absurd as to pour pure and transparent water into a +deep well full of mire and clay; for he who does this will only disturb +the mud, and cause the pure water to become defiled. The woods of such, +as the same author beautifully observes, (that is the irrational or +corporeal life), in which these dire passions are nourished, must first +be purified with fire and sword, and every kind of instrument (that is, +through preparatory disciplines, and the political virtues), and reason +must be freed from its slavery to the affections, before any thing useful +can be planted in these savage haunts. + +Let not such then presume to explore the regions of Platonic philosophy. +The land is too pure to admit the sordid and the base. The road which +conducts to it is too intricate to be discovered by the unskillful and +stupid, and the journey is too long and laborious to be accomplished by +the effeminate and the timid, by the slave of passion and the dupe of +opinion, by the lover of sense and the despiser of truth. The dangers and +difficulties in the undertaking are such as can be sustained by none but +the most hardy and accomplished adventurers; and he who begins the journey +without the strength of Hercules, or the wisdom and patience of Ulysses, +must be destroyed by the wild beasts of the forest, or perish in the storms +of the ocean; must suffer transmutation into a beast through the magic +power of Circe, or be exiled for life by the detaining charm of Calypso; +and in short must descend into Hades, and wander in its darkness, without +emerging from thence to the bright regions of the morning, or be ruined +by the deadly melody of the Syren's song. To the most skillful traveler, +who pursues the right road with an ardor which no toils can abate, with +a vigilance which no weariness can surprise into negligence, and with +virtue which no temptations can seduce, it exhibits for many years the +appearance of the Ithaca of Ulysses, or the flying Italy of AEneas; for +we no sooner gain a glimpse of the pleasing land which is to be the end +of our journey, than it is suddenly ravished from our view, and we still +find ourselves at a distance from the beloved coast, exposed to the fury +of a stormy sea of doubts. + +Abandon then, ye groveling souls, the fruitless design! Pursue with +avidity the beaten road which leads to popular honors and sordid gain, +but relinquish all thoughts of a voyage for which you are totally +unprepared. Do you not perceive what a length of sea separates you from +the royal coast? A sea, + + Huge, horrid, vast, where scarce in safety sails + The best built ship, though Jove inspire the gales. + +And may we not very justly ask you, similar to the interrogation of +Calypso, + + What ships have you, what sailors to convey, + What oars to cut the long laborious way? + +I shall only observe further, that the life of Plato, by Olympiodorus, was +prefixed to this translation, in preference to that by Diogenes Laertius, +because the former is the production of a most eminent Platonist, and the +latter of a mere historian, who indiscriminately gave to the public whatever +anecdotes he found in other authors. If the reader combines this short +sketch of the life of Plato with what that philosopher says of himself in +his 7th Epistle, he will be in possession of the most important particulars +about him that can be obtained at present. + + + +EXPLANATIONS OF CERTAIN PLATONIC TERMS + +As some apology may be thought necessary for having introduced certain +unusual words of Greek origin, I shall only observe, that, as all arts and +sciences have certain appropriate terms peculiar to themselves, philosophy, +which is the art of arts, and science of sciences, as being the mistress of +both, has certainly a prior and a far superior claim to this privilege. I +have not, however, introduced, I believe, any of these terms without at the +same time sufficiently explaining them; but, lest the contrary should have +taken place, the following explanation of all such terms as I have been +able to recollect, and also of common words used by Platonists in a +peculiar sense, is subjoined for the information of the reader. + +Anagogic, [Greek: anagogikos]. Leading on high. + +Demiurgus, [Greek: demiourgos]. Jupiter, the artificer of the universe. + +Dianoetia. This word is derived from [Greek: dianoia], or that power of +the soul which reasons scientifically, deriving the principles of its +reasoning from intellect. Plato is so uncommonly accurate in his diction, +that this word is very seldom used by him in any other than its primary +sense. + +The Divine, [Greek: to Theion], is being subsisting in conjunction with +the one. For all things, except the one, viz. essence, life, and +intellect, are considered by Plato as suspended from and secondary to the +gods. For the gods do not subsist in, but prior to, these, which they +also produce and connect, but are not characterized by these. In many +places, however, Plato calls the participants of the gods by the names of +the gods. For not only the Athenian Guest in the Laws, but also Socrates +in the Phaedrus, calls a divine soul a god. "For," says he, "all the +horses and charioteers of the gods are good," &c. And afterwards, still +more clearly, he adds, "And this is the life of the gods." And not only +this, but he also denominates those nature gods that are always united to +the gods, and which, in conjunction with them, give completion to one +series. He also frequently calls daemons gods, though, according to +essence, they are secondary to and subsist about the gods. For in the +Phaedrus, Timaeus, and other dialogues, he extends the appellation of +gods as far as the daemons. And what is still more paradoxical than all +this, he does not refuse to call some men gods; as, for instance, the +Elean Guest in the Sophista. From all this, therefore, we must infer that +with respect to the word god, one thing which is thus denominated is +simply deity; another is so according to union; a third, according to +participation; a fourth, according to contact; and a fifth, according to +similitude. Thus every superessential nature is primarily a god; but +every intellectual nature is so according to union. And again, every +divine soul is a god according to participation; but divine daemons are +gods according to contact with the gods; and the souls of men obtain this +appellation through similitude. Each of these, however, except the first, +is as we have said, rather divine than a god; for the Athenian Guest in +the Laws, calls intellect itself divine. But that which is divine is +secondary to the first deity, in the same manner as the united is to the +one; that which is intellectual to intellect; and that which is animated +to soul. Indeed, things more uniform and simple always precede, and the +series of beings ends in the one itself. + +Doxastic. This word is derived from doxa, opinion, and signifies that +which is apprehended by opinion, or that power which is the extremity of +the rational soul. This power knows the universal in particulars, as that +every man is a rational animal; but it knows not the dioti, or why a +thing is, but only the oti, or that it is. + +The Eternal, [Greek: To aionion], that which has a never-ending subsistence, +without any connection with time; or, as Plotinus profoundly defines it, +infinite life at once total and full. + +That which is generated, [Greek: to geneton]. That which has not the +whole of its essence or energy subsisting at once without temporal +dispersion. + +Generation, [Greek: genesis]. An essence composite and multiform, and +conjoined with time. This is the proper signification of the word; but it +is used symbolically by Plato, and also by theologists more ancient than +Plato, for the sake of indication. For as Proclus beautifully observes +(in MS. Comment in Parmenidem), "Fables call the ineffable unfolding into +light through causes, generation." "Hence," he adds in the Orphic +writings, the first cause is denominated time; for where there is +generation, according to its proper signification, there also there +is time." + +A Guest, [Greek: Xenos]. This word, in its more ample signification in +the Greek, denotes a stranger, but properly implies one who receives +another, or is himself received at an entertainment. In the following +dialogues, therefore, wherever one of the speakers is introduced as a +Xenos, I have translated this word guest, as being more conformable to +the genius of Plato's dialogues, which may be justly called rich mental +banquets, and consequently the speakers in them may be considered as so +many guests. Hence in the Timaeus, the persons of that dialogue are +expressly spoken of as guests. + +Hyparxis, [Greek: uparxis]. The first principle or foundation, as it +were, of the essence of a thing. Hence also, it is the summit of essence. + +Idiom, [Greek: Idioma]. The characteristic peculiarity of a thing. + +The Immortal, [Greek: To athanaton]. According to Plato, there are many +orders of immortality, pervading from on high to the last of things; and +the ultimate echo, as it were, of immorality is seen in the perpetuity of +the mundane wholes, which according to the doctrine of the Elean Guest in +the Politicus, they participate from the Father of the universe. For both +the being and the life of every body depend on another cause; since body +is not itself naturally adapted to connect, or adorn, or preserve itself. +But the immortality of partial souls, such as ours, is more manifest and +more perfect than this of the perpetual bodies in the universe; as is +evident from the many demonstrations which are given of it in the Phaedo, +and in the 10th book of the Republic. For the immortality of partial +souls has a more principal subsistence, as possessing in itself the cause +of eternal permanency. But prior to both these is the immortality of +daemons; for these neither verge to mortality, nor are they filled with +the nature of things which are generated and corrupted. More venerable, +however, than these, and essentially transcending them, is the +immortality of divine souls, which are primarily self-motive, and contain +the fountains and principles of the life which is attributed about +bodies, and through which bodies participate of renewed immortality. And +prior to all these is the immortality of the gods: for Diotima in the +Banquet does not ascribe an immortality of this kind to demons. Hence +such an immortality as this is separate and exempt from wholes. For, +together with the immortality of the gods, eternity subsists, which is +the fountain of all immortality and life, as well that life which is +perpetual, as that which is dissipated into nonentity. In short, +therefore, the divine immortal is that which is generative and connective +of perpetual life. For it is not immortal, as participating of life, but +as supplying divine life, and deifying life itself. + +Imparticipable, [Greek: To amethekton]. That which is not consubsistent +with an inferior nature. Thus imparticipable intellect is an intellect +which is not consubsistent with soul. + +Intellectual Projection, [Greek: noera epibole]. As the perception of +intellect is immediate, being a darting forth, as it were, directly to +its proper objects, this direct intuition is expressed by the term +projection. + +The Intelligible, [Greek: To noeton]. This word in Plato and Platonic +writers has a various signification: for, in the first place, whatever is +exempt from sensibles, and has its essence separate from them, is said to +be intelligible, and in this sense soul is intelligible. In the second +place, intellect, which is prior to soul, is intelligible. In the third +place, that which is more ancient than intellect, which replenishes +intelligence and is essentially perfective of it, is called intelligible; +and this is the intelligible which Timaeus in Plato places in the order +of a paradigm, prior to the demiurgic intellect and intellectual energy. +But beyond these is the divine intelligible, which is defined according +to divine union and hyparxis. For this is intelligible as the object of +desire to intellect, as giving perfection to and containing it, and as +the completion of being. The highest intelligible, therefore, is that +which is the hyparxis of the gods; the second, that which is true being, +and the first essence; the third, intellect, and all intellectual life; +and the fourth, the order belonging to soul. + +Logismos, reasoning. When applied to divinity as by Plato in the Timaeus, +signifies a distributive cause of things. + +On account of which; with reference to which; through which; according to +which, from which; or in which; viz. [Greek: di o, uph' ou, di ou, kath' +o, ex ou]. By the first of these terms, Plato is accustomed to denominate +the final cause; by the second the paradigmatic; by the third, the +demiurgic; by the fourth, the instrumental; by the fifth, form; and by +the sixth, matter. + +Orectic. This word is derived from [Greek: orexis], appetite. + +Paradigm, [Greek: paradeigma]. A pattern, or that with reference to which +a thing is made. + +The perpetual, [Greek: to aidion]. That which subsists forever, but through +a connection with time. + +A Politician, [Greek: politikos]. This word, as Mr. Sydenham justly +observes in his notes in the Rivals, is of a very large and extensive +import as used by Plato, and the other ancient writers on politics: for +it includes all those statesmen or politicians in aristocracies and +democracies, who were, either for life, or for a certain time, invested +with the whole or a part of kingly authority, and the power thereto +belonging. See the Politicus. + +Prudence, [Greek: Phronesis]. This word frequently means in Plato and +Platonic writers, the habit of discerning what is good in all moral +actions, and frequently signifies intelligence, or intellectual +Perception. The following admirable explanation of this word is given by +Jamblichus Prudence having a precedaneous subsistence, receives its +generation from a pure and perfect intellect. Hence it looks to intellect +itself, is perfected by it, and has this as the measure and most +beautiful paradigm of all its energies. If also we have any communion +with the gods, it is especially effected by this virtue; and through this +we are in the highest degree assimilated to them. The knowledge too of +such things as are good, profitable, and beautiful, and of the contraries +to these, is obtained by this virtue; and the judgment and correction of +works proper to be done are by this directed. And in short it is a +certain governing leader of men, and of the whole arrangement of their +nature; and referring cities and houses, and the particular life, of +every one to a divine paradigm, it forms them according to the best +similitude; obliterating some things and purifying others. So that +prudence renders its possessors similar to divinity. Jamblic. apud. +Stob. p. 141. + +Psychical, [Greek: psychikos]. Pertaining to soul. + +Science. This word is sometimes defined by Plato to be that which assigns +the causes of things; sometimes to be that the subjects of which have a +perfectly stable essence; and together with this, he conjoins the +assignation of cause from reasoning. Sometimes again he defines it to be +that the principles of which are not hypotheses; and, according to this +definition, he asserts that there is one science which ascends as far as +to the principle of things. For this science considers that which is +truly the principle as unhypothetic, has for its subject true being, and +produces its reasonings from cause. According to the second definition, +he calls dianoetic knowledge science; but according to the first alone, +he assigns to physiology the appellation of science. + +The telestic art. The art pertaining to mystic ceremonies. + +Theurgic. This word is derived from [Greek: Theourgia], or that religious +operation which deifies him by whom it is performed as much as is possible +to man. + +Truth, [Greek: aletheia]. Plato, following ancient theologists, considers +truth multifariously. Hence, according to his doctrine, the highest truth +is characterized by unity, and is the light proceeding from the good, +which imparts purity, as he says in the Philebus, and union, as he says +in the Republic, to intelligibles. The truth which is next to this in +dignity is that which proceeds from intelligibles, and illuminates the +intellectual orders, and which an essence unfigured, uncolored, and +without contact, first receives, where also the plain of truth is +situated, as it is written in the Phaedrus. The third kind of truth is, +that which is connascent with souls, and which through intelligence comes +into contact with true being. For the psychical light is the third, from +the intelligible; intellectual deriving its plenitude from intelligible +light, and the psychical from the intellectual. And the last kind of +truth is that which is full of error and inaccuracy through sense, and +the instability of its object. For a material nature is perpetually +flowing, and is not naturally adapted to abide even for a moment. + +The following beautiful description of the third kind of truth, or that +which subsists in souls, is given by Jamblichus: "Truth, as the name +implies, makest a conversion about the gods and their incorporeal energy; +but, doxastic imitation, which, as Plato says, is fabricative of images, +wanders about that which is deprived of divinity and is dark. And the +former indeed receives its perfection in intelligible and divine forms, +and real beings which have a perpetual sameness of subsistence; but the +latter looks to that which is formless, and non-being, and which has a +various subsistence; and, about this it's visive power is blunted. The +former contemplates that which is, but the latter assumes such a form as +appears to the many. Hence the former associates with intellect, and +increases the intellectual nature which we contain; but the latter, from +looking to that which always seems to be, hunts after folly and +deceives." Jamblic. apud Stob. p. 136. + +The unical, [Greek: to niaion]. That which is characterized by unity. + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Introduction to the Philosophy and +Writings of Plato, by Thomas Taylor + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK INTRODUCTION TO THE *** + +***** This file should be named 10214.txt or 10214.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/1/0/2/1/10214/ + +Produced by Jake Jaqua + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, +set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to +copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to +protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. 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